I intend to reconstruct Husserl’s conception of meaning, expounded in the Logische Untersuchungen, and to defend his central thesis according to which the meaning of an expression should be explained as the intentional content in specie of the speaker’s intention and thus as an ideal attribute (i.e. an universal) instantiated in the intentional content of the meaning intention that the expression intimates. I discuss some theoretical advantages of this conception, especially concerning the account of our ordinary consciousness of meanings.

Unlike the absolutification of the mode of thinking that reduces man to a mind, which represents, and the world to a physical-mathematical structure available just through objectification, Heidegger requests philosophy to return to the question of the being making it a task of the thinking. During the course of this task he constructs the possibility of a thinking about man unbending to the objectifying discourse. Taking the treatise of 1927 and the Zollikon Seminars as a reference, we would like to ask if the Freudian psychoanalysis – as a science of psychic phenomenon – is able to think the human existence as outside of the enclosure of the modern subjectivity and objectivity. In other words: if the freudian meta-psychology breaks with or adjusts to the imperatives of the metaphysics of subjectivity.Contra a absolutização do modo de pensar que reduz o homem a uma mente que representa e o mundo a uma estrutura fisico-matemática disponível apenas pela via da objetificação, Heidegger convoca a filosofi a retomar a questão do ser, fazendo-a tarefa do pensamento. No caminho desta tarefa, constrói a possibilidade de um pensar sobre homem irredutível ao discurso objetifi cante. Tomando como referência o tratado de 1927 e os Seminarios de Zollikon, visamos perguntar se a psicanálise freudiana – enquanto ciência dos fenômenos psíquicos – dá conta de pensar o existir humano fora da clausura da subjetividade e objetividade modernas. Em outros termos: se a metapsicologia freudiana rompe ou afi na-se, com os imperativos da metafísica da subjetividade.

The paper seeks to revisit Levinas’s conception of à-Dieu as a plausible account of a new way of saying (dire) the name of God (Dieu) without reducing its radical alterity to a mere dictum (dit). The Portuguese word adeus is perhaps the most felicitous way of doing justice to Levinas’s radical subversion of onto-theology, as the hyphenated term (a-deus) also allows for an important ambiguity, beyond its own polysemy and plays on words, that not only one may think of the equivalent function of addressing the Other (à Dieu) and its negation by way of a privative alpha (a-Dieu) but also a tacit il y a.

The goal of this article is to describe and discuss the concepts of Mania according to a phenomenological-structural approach. The mainstream of psychiatry defines mania on the basis of signs and symptoms, most of them merely behaviors. The phenomenological-structural thinking attempts to illuminate the structure which defines the pathology and determines the phenomena. The manifestation of mania will be divided in fundamental phenomenological categories such as Time, Space, and Interpersonal Contact in a dialogue with postulations of classical authors. The possibility of a similar structure for mania and melancholia is suggested in the last part of the article.

This paper attempts to present an introduction to Phenomenology and Mathematics. Phenomenology was created and developed by Edmund Husserl. He left an amazing production concerning one of the questions that haunted him throughout his life: “what is the nature of the objectivity of Mathematics”. The following items are here dealt with: the meaning ground of Husserl’s phenomenological conceptions; the meaning of mathematical idealities; and formalization and categorization as constitutive aspects of the Science of Mathematics.

This paper proposes a reflection upon philosophy’s role in discussing contemporaneity. By questioning if it is the philosopher’s vocation to think our actuality, the author discusses the character and temporality of philosophical discourse itself. She argues, in a provocative manner, that it is only possible to philosophise about today. Recognizing philosophical discourse’s distinctive character as its possibility of understanding the today beyond today’s facts, she refers to an essential temporal dimension of the contemporary, the same that the temporality of philosophical discourse refers to. Concerning philosophical discourse, the author shows that its reference to the essential dimension of today not only is a signature of distinction from a mere historical-anthropological approach, but precisely that it is what determines its very mode of being. This interpretation is founded on the analysis of two distinct philosophical approaches to contemporaneity. First, it establishes a close dialogue with Martin Heidegger’s thinking of his own contemporaneity, making explicit how he thinks his actuality and how he had an insight into what it is [Einblick in das was ist] as a way of revealing the today in its phenomenological sense. !e second illustration, or the counterpoint, is made by an analysis of the lecture of Giorgio Agamben’s “What is the contemporary?” [Che cos’è il contemporaneo?], which portrays the predominant character of contemporary philosophical discourse about contemporaneity. Such a character is based on a conception of temporality that cannot grasp the essential dimension of the today and, as a result, thinking remains enclosed in the perspective of human agency. Heidegger’s approach to contemporaneity remains in the realm of philosophical discourse by grasping the essential temporality of the today. In general, philosophical discourses in our contemporaneity about contemporary issues remain attached to an interpretation of events in time that reinforces the agency of the human. In short, the author considers relevant the contrast between both discourses in order to claim that philosophical discourse should be always an insight into and beyond the today. The awareness of this essential temporality is what defines its philosophical status and most importantly gives philosophy the task of questioning contemporaneity—of truly thinking the world of today.

This article focuses on the cybernetic reality, asking about its ontological and epistemological aspects and about its possible educational horizons. We develop the ontological arguments about the cybernetic reality drawing from authors that deal with Virtual Reality (VR) such as Levy and Castells. They take VR as a concept and show us which of the concept’s characteristics are in opposition to those characteristics that do not belong to VR. These procedures present difficulties that are confronted when one tries to express the concept of cybernetic world reality. They concern space and time, and what is deemed real, virtual, probable, potential and actual. These difficulties are confronted, attempting to clarify the philosophical meanings of reality by drawing on presenting studies by Granger and Deleuze, and assuming the phenomenological conceptions of knowledge and world. The authors assume that cyberspace is a world reality, which reveals its own characteristics as being dynamic, fast, speeded, de-territorialized. !e cyberspace reality is supported by a strong scientific and technological apparatus and updates its potentialities through the possible intervention triggered by the actions of people living-in-the-world-with-others-and-with-the-media. The modalities of these interventions are actualized with the exchange among subjects during knowledge production and social communication. The apparatus of the cybernetic world makes possible the collaborative knowledge construction and distance education (e-learning). The authors present and discuss the educational horizons as well as the open region of possibilities that are posed at the world, which can be realized and can be worked in a cybernetic context.

Bridging the gap between phenomenology, namely, husserlian’s phenomenology, and concrete and everyday issues such as the mind/body problem comes now to light as the chief driving force in this paper. Showing that this called for connection was to be written within, and not beyond, the field of transcendental phenomenology, worked for us as the guideline that shaped all further steps and decisions. To accomplish this, we attended to some of the mains thesis developed by Edmund Husserl in the second book of his Ideen, in an attempt to trace the signs that bears witness to a plan where not only phenomenology has the required expertise for dealing the problem, but a plan which is also responsible for the production of this new and distinctive evaluation which, by it self, should put together a better version of a less puzzling problem.

La tâche d'unification du savoir ne s'arrête jamais. Aujourd'hui telle urgence est plus encore sensible. Pour le faire il faut prendre le savoir au sens large, sans l'identifier avec la science au sens strict. Le savoir est une action de construction du monde. Son niveau le plus radical se trouve peut-être dans l'activité artistique, vue plus du côté de la poétique que du sentiment esthétique. A ce niveau-là art et savoir, théorie et pratique, arts plastiques et Humanités se trouvent.

Le présent essai envisage une caractérisation de l'objectivité en tant que catégorie philosophique. Dans le cadre d’une approche herméneutique qui remonte de la thèse immédiatement disponible à ses horizons problématiques de constitution du sens, l'objectivité s’avère comme porteuse de signification dans de différents champs sémantiques, notamment ceux de la finalité, de l’éloignement du subjectif, de la gnoséologie et de l’épistémologie, de l’ontologie. La connaissance et la pratique présentent certainement leurs conditions; entendue ontologiquement en tant que matérialité, l'objectivité n’a pas de conditions transmatérielles de possibilité, mais devient elle-même condition.

Was bedeutet heute die Überlegung über das Problem der Gerechtigkeit? Die ser Vor trag versucht die Grundlage dieser Frage zur Klarheit bringen, nämlich durch die Feststell ung der inneren Beziehung zwischen der riesigen Umweltpolitischproblemen unseres Jahrhunderts und die Hauptbestimmungen der Philosophie der Natur und der Philosophie der Politik in der Neuzeit.

The author proposes an interpretation of the theory and practise of paradeigma, developed in conjunction with the method of diairesis in the Sophist, Politicus and Philebus. The conclusions reached are then balanced against the evidence of Plato's views on knowledge and language in the Cratylus, and compared to the logos of Heraclitus, in order to explain the conception designated as the "metaphorical structure of reality". It is then suggested that the degradation and reevaluation of this structure in Modern and Contemporary thought was due to the attention paid, or not paid, to Aristotle's consideration of metaphor as a purely linguistic fact.

La philosophie de Malebranche est située pa r rapport à sa tâche historique: mener à son terme la restauration catholique introduite en France par Descartes pour faire face à la nouvelle "intelligentia" scientifique. L'originalité de l'Oratorien, due à ses sources augustinnienes et dionisiennes, est néanmoins marquée dès les premières oeuvres, éclatant dans la pensée de la maturité par la conception de la métaphysique comme théologie rationelle, construite a partir de la foi et ses dogmes. La rationalité cartésienne est donc reprise, premièrement dans une métaphysique de l'Ordre, deuxièmement dans une philosophie de l'Action, a travers un cheminement de pensée qui se nourri de la conception chrétienne du Dieu-Trinité. Par le relief pris dans les dernières oeuvres par la question de l'action et de son interprétation, la philosophie de Malebranche ouvre la voie à la philosophie de l'Esprit française, annoncée par Ravaisson dans son célèbre "Rapport" et menée de nos jours à son terme par Blondel et Lavelle.

On essaie ici de comprendre la pensée de Merleau-Ponty comme un appro fond issement de sa notion première - la perception. Cet approfondissement, dans son exigence de penser la relation du sujet de la perception avec ce qu’il peut percevoir, s’anonçant comme la "réversibilité" du schéma-corporel et des choses, réversibilité qui est elle même l’horizon d’où se détaché l’acte perceptif, amène l’auteur a l’anéantissement de la subjectivité. Le sujet radical - le schéma-corporel - est sujet dans un monde, caractérisé lui aussi comme activité de réversibilité. Ainsi, sujet e monde devenus ambigus, la pensée de Merleau-Ponty, qui dit Chair comme le dernier mot, peut bien se dire une pensée niiliste.

L'auteur essaie de montrer comment le projet nietzschéen déployé dans La naissance de la tragédie (1872) doit être compris à l'intérieur d'un mouvement spéculatif de retour au mythe, en cours dans la philosophie européenne depuis Kant. Ce mouvement se caractérise par le rôle qu'on attribue alors à l'art, comprise soit comme l'expression suprême de la subjectivité, de l'esprit (Gemüt) et de la volonté, soit comme la révélation même de l'Absolu, de l'Etre et de la Nature. Dans l'oeuvre de Nietzsche c'est la musique - l'art romantique par excellence - qui, s'instituant d'abord comme "mythe et monde de symboles", mène la raison et la philosophie à la rencontre du sens du mythe tragique ancien et, par là, aussi à la rencontre de leur lieu d'origine, à la fois historique et essentiel, dans le mythe même.

Obwohl die Feuerbach-Bibliographie sehr umfangreich ist, wiederholen sich dennoch bei den meisten Titeln fast immer dieselben Deutungsmuster: Feuerbach wird hauptsächlich als Kritiker der Religion und der spekulativen Philosophie dargestellt und sein Denken als fragmentarisch und negativ beurteilt. Dementsprechend kann man behaupten, daß die wesentlichen Aspekte seiner Philosophie, bzw. seiner Anthropologie, nicht genug hervorgehoben worden sind. Nach einer knappen Darstellung der wichtigsten Momente der Rezeption seit dem 19. Jahrhundert, werden in diesem Artikeln sowohl die Monographien von Ursula Reitemeyer (Philosophie der Leiblichkeit. Ludwig Feuerbachs E ntw urf einer Philosophie der Zukunft) und Alexis Philonenko (La jeune sse de Feuerbach (1828-1841). Introduction à ses positions fondamentales), als auch die Vorträge des 1. Feuerbach-Kongresses (Bielefeld, 1989) rezensiert. Die neuen Richtungen der Forschung zeigen deutlich das Streben nach einer gründlicheren Hermeneutik der Texten, um die bisherigen Vorurteile zu überwinden und Feuerbach im Rahmen der aktuellen Fragen der Philosophie zu verstehen.