The problem of identities and cultural differences constitute one of the global problems of our time. Identity and the differences in human beings are expressed in each individual, in each society and in humanity itself as a species. The differences of individual identities are solved by the integration of the latter inside society. The differences of the social or cultural identities are solved by humanity's integration. Is humanity's integration possible? If it was possible, what are the ontologic foundations for such an integration?, why is humanity integration necessary? To understand the problem of the integration and confront mans imminent self-destruction as species becomes necessary not only to return to the study of nature and the essence human beings but, also of other entities of the universe.

Una gran parte de las arquitecturas de la posmodernidad, se presenta como expresiones indecisas y de nomenclatura ambigua. El ejercicio que realizan estos arquitectos, a través de sus edificaciones, refleja con nitidez el cambio provocado por el auge del sector informático y la expansión de la economía global, dos fenómenos entrelazados de manera inextricable, han contribuido a generar una nueva geografía de la centralidad y la marginalidad (Sassen), por eso, el proyecto que reflejan los dibujos de estas arquitecturas, puede ser alterado en su imagen mediante toda suerte de yuxtaposiciones, analogías, contrastes, adulteraciones formales y distorsiones espaciales, porque todo es intercambiable en la nueva realidad espacio-temporal de la telemática; materiales,texturas y formas aleatorias, la imagen pública tiende a excluir el espacio público.

Una gran parte de las arquitecturas de la posmodernidad, se presenta como expresiones indecisas y de nomenclatura ambigua. El ejercicio que realizan estos arquitectos, a través de sus edificaciones, refleja con nitidez el cambio provocado por el auge del sector informático y la expansión de la economía global, dos fenómenos entrelazados de manera inextricable, han contribuido a generar una nueva geografía de la centralidad y la marginalidad (Sassen), por eso, el proyecto que reflejan los dibujos de estas arquitecturas, puede ser alterado en su imagen mediante toda suerte de yuxtaposiciones, analogías, contrastes, adulteraciones formales y distorsiones espaciales, porque todo es intercambiable en la nueva realidad espacio‐temporal de la telemática; materiales,texturas y formas aleatorias, la imagen pública tiende a excluir el espacio público.

The present paper outlines the main points of Heidegger’s philosophical program starting from his early lectures of Freiburg. This program is founded in two fundamental questions. On the one hand, a thematic question: the phenomenon of life and its different forms of manifestation and apprehension. On the other hand, an eminently methodological question, namely the question of how it is possible to access in a correct manner to the primary sphere of life. This last issue conducts the young Heidegger to a first and deep questioning of Husserl’s reflexive phenomenology that ends up in his hermeneutic turn of phenomenology.

The metaphysical-epistemological paradigm has ceased to be of actuality in contemporary culture. This does not mean that its falsity has been shown. Such an affirmation would imply that there is something like the truth, from which now, finally, the inanity of this paradigm can be claimed. The Rortian hermeneutics,with his pragmatic-ironic character, cannot justify this consideration. Taking into account Rorty’s criticism to ‘Platon-Kant canon’, and after analysing the Rortian ironic canon, and focusing on Rorty’s pan-relationism theory, I will discuss in this contribution whether there are or not some ontological suppositions in Rortianhermeneutics. I will situate in the middle of this debate the contingency and freedom categories with the background of Gadamer’s hermeneutical ontology. The projection of this theoretical debate on the political space of contemporary advanced democracies will show the practical-political importance of hermenutics.

We highlight the deep ecology movement, inspired on ecological knowledge but mainly on the life-style of the ecological and biological field-worker. Its creator, the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess, stresses that human and no human beings have, at least, one kind of right in common: namely the ‘right’ to express its own nature, to live and blossom. This idea shows the inspiration from perseverare in suo esse, from Baruch Spinoza’s Ethics. But beyond this Spinozan influence, the striving for expression of one’s own nature is interpreted from the perspective of present evolutionism and endosymbiosis. Even though, scientific knowledge, if necessary, is considered limited. Thus, this movement should be regarded as ecophilosophical rather than ecological, as a kind of sophia orwisdom. In turn, many supporters of conservation biology (following Michael Soulé) associate their science with ecosophy, not encouraging the dichotomy fact/value. Conservation biology axioms such as: evolution in valuable, organism’s diversity is good, premature extinction of species populations is negative, etc., have been inspired on the deep ecology movement. The consideration of the terms biodiversity, evolution or biosphere as thick ethical concepts (following Hillary Putnam), shows this integration of the descriptive and the normative.

The discovery of the oriental poetry, specially Japanese and Chinese, had a deep impact in the poetic writing and personal evolution of the mexican poet Octavio Paz. The initial approach to the taoist aesthetic and philosophical universe was made trough the synthetic, sensorial and deeply suggestive strength of oriental poetry, and Paz found immediately an essential resemblance between the universe just discovered and the prehispanic cosmovision. As a result of that experience, in 1955 he published “Piedras sueltas”, a brief poem collection, in which he combines the evocative power of the poetic image typical of the japanese haiku with several indigenous topics. The influence and the attraction to Oriental thought, particularly Taoism, is also present in El arco y la lira(1956), book that represents the pinacle of Octavio Paz’s ultimate poetic thought.

The latest philosophy of P. Ricoeur offers us the opportunity to articulate an ethic applied responsive to the challenges of our time. This proposal is basically collected in his book The fair 2, a compilation of work and consolidating core issues of practical philosophy. Part of an original sense of justice where "the rightthing" does not arise as a name or abstract category, but as a sustantivated adjective. This is not an abstract value but a value whose scope, accuracy and meaning depends on its realization in the unity of human life. Retrieving the original sense already appeared in the Socratic dialogues of Plato, as just described, defines and conducts the practice of justice. This analysis is productive in applied ethics because it raises the "implementation" of an original and original is not a post or outside the foundation, but an exercise in interpretation and philosophical creativity morality. By understanding and applied ethics, through what we find just the issues central to the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: an anthropology of the human being capable, a hermeneutics of action and imagination, a reconstruction of the history of practical philosophy, and also an ethic of fair distance.

La philosophie de Bergson, plus concrètement sa dernière oeuvre Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion, porte une grande attention aux problèmes des sociétés contemporaines: la violence et la guerre. Le Français souligne les difficultés qui existent pour arriver à une vraie coexistence et, comme philosophe, il se demande quelles sont les sources de la sociabilité humaine. C’est seulement lorsque l’homme travaillera pour établir une relation adéquate entre son ego intérieur et son ego extérieur, qu’il sera prêt à coexister avec les autres personnes qui habitent dans le même monde. De plus, Bergson pense qu’il y a deux sources de sociabilité, l’obligation et l’ouverture, et il a l’intention de mettre en relief l’importance de la seconde afin d’établir la démocratie, vue comme la meilleure option pour la coexistence humaine.

Nietzsche’s experiences seem to be like mysticism. Several texts are examined: <Did something very insignificant in your life ever make you happy? That’s enough to make up for all the horrendous moments you had suffered> <My glance makes things beautiful>. <Inspiration: one could hardly reject the idea that one is a mouthpiece of superior forces. Something reveals itself and upends us; it’s heard but not sought after; it’s accepted and not asked for. A rapture whosetremendous tension occasionally discharges itself in a flood of tears, with the distinct consciousness of subtle shudders and of one’s skin creeping down to one’s toes; the fullness of happiness. Everything happens involuntarily, as if in a whirlwind of intense feeling of divinity>. <Why didn’t he speak more clearly? He has fled, my unknown God. Come back! With all your afflictions! You, My ultimate happiness!>

The purpose is to show the phenomenon of the “Decolonization” starting from the Heideggerian concept of “destruction” of the Metaphysical language which would have a similar sense to the notion of “De-construction” that comes up from the same conception of the Heideggerian destruction. The Heideggerian proposal has guidelines to begin to “to destroy”, “ to de-construct” the imperatives of thought imposed during the colonization of Latin America and likewise, opens other ways to think “post”, in this case, “post-colonial” or a “De-colonization” of thought, according to my thesis. Therefore, “estar” (to be) is proposed as a concept to destroy the Metaphysical postulates and imperatives imposed in the colony and also, to show the own language of the Latin American thought. It is necessary to emphasize that the theoretical‐philosophical basis is not evident in the development of the post-modern and post-colonial thesis and debates in Latin America, since these speeches are exclusively pronounced from the literary field. Thus, the philosophical basis is necessary, otherwise, it would not be possible to perceive completely the phenomenon neither the problem.

Con esta ponencia se analizan y discuten algunas formas de desarrollo de la inteligencia social considerada como expresión de un nuevo contexto simbólico de prácticas culturales que reúnen diversos ejercicios colectivos de comunicación. Se hace énfasis en los espacios y relaciones que se estructuran y proyectan en torno al aprendizaje que se produce a través de las redes virtuales. Se intenta comprender y analizar lo que supone aprender con los otros y desde el otro bajo nuevos modos libres, espontáneos e intencionales de creación de redes inteligentes en el marco de la información y comunicación que supone el ciberespacio. Se discuten diversas tendencias en la creación de nuevos entornos de aprendizaje e inteligencia social.

El objetivo de la educación es la formación universal del ser humano. ¿Qué significa la formación universal del ser humano? Significa su máxima realización. Esta máxima realización hace posible la reproducción de los valores universales por medio de la educación garantizando la continuidad de la especie humana. Esta tarea de la educación se ve truncado en el hombre moderno por el paradigma fragmentario de formación unilateral. Esta formación unilateral es la causa de la fragmentación espiritual del individuo que se refleja en la crisis existencial y de valores. El predominio de los antivalores en la sociedad conduce a la involución espiritual del individuo y, en consecuencia, a la destrucción de la sociedad. Ante este problema global, surge la necesidad de replantear el objetivode la educación sobre nuevas bases ontológicas que comprende la naturaleza y esencia del hombre, y los principios universales.

The document starts by skating that the concept of progress, which is key in the Enlightenment programme of philosophy of history, has disappeared in our society of risk, and wonders whether it is today possible rethinking the philosophy of history. The second part refers to the denial of philosophy of history by Badiou and Lyotard, as a consequence of the disappearance of the “modern subject”, which was the core of philosophy of history. There are many “histories”, but there is not one “History”. The third part of the paper looks for a way out from that denial, finding it in the sartrean concept of “alienation”, which involves a changein the human relationships (“reification”) as a consequences of the “subject matter worked by praxis”, which is a concept that allows us to speak today of a universal history, whose “no‐subject” would be that “worked subject matter”. The conclusion of the paper is that the aim of philosophy today is not to “contemplate the world” or “change the world” but rather to “take care of the world”.

The objective of our research is to examine the diverse methods of judicial interpretation, taking off from that established in Article 4 of the Venezuelan Civil Code. We attempt to explain what and how to interpret using the exegetic method of interpretation through an exhaustive analysis of the article, in agreement with Article 22 of the Penal Process Organic Code. Emphasis is placed on the classical methods of legal interpretation: grammatical, logical-systematic, and historical-comparative, among others.

First the rationalist tradition and then the cognitive revolution put limits on the philosophy and social sciences with regard to the analysis of emotion, of irrationality in mental events and actions, to the reduction of our representations to conceptual elements, and so on. This fact caused an increasing interest in these topics. In this paper, we intend to claim the significant relations among these three issues: emotion, selfdeception and non-conceptual content, with two aims: i) to analyse the relation between non-conceptual content of emotion and the phenomenon of self-deception; and ii) to explain how self-deception canbe overcome by the conceptualization of some non-conceptual elements of emotion.

Starting with an account of some of the main elements that are constitutive of the contemporary approach to the phenomena of religion, whereby special attention shall be given to the phenomenological approaches to the phenomenon of Religion as such, this paper shall, in the following moment, proceed with a reflexive analysis of some of the crucial analytic aspects of religion on the basis of a philosophical study of one of its most universal manifestations, i.e., the phenomenon of Prayer. We shall analyze different forms of prayer, which have a span that goes from its manifestation in the Prayer of Silence to its manifestation in the Cultic expression of Prayer. Following this analysis, attention will especially be given to the need for an identification of some of the dangers and menacesattached to an ideological or fundamentalist approach to Religion. Finally, what we intend to show is the creative power of the tension that is given between what Jean-Luc Marion calls the Idolatric and the Iconic, since in this very tension we can explore the true dimension of what Religion is both in its essence and in its manifestations.

En este escrito intento exponer la manera en que establezco una relación entre la filosofía de la ciencia social y la teoría social. Lo anterior se da “incidentalmente” a partir de mi propio trabajo en teoría social; el cual se origina en la Teoría de la Estructuración de Anthony Giddens y actualmente involucra al Naturalismo Crítico. Mi interés original en la teoría social, el cual giraba en torno al trato que Giddens le da a la dualidad agente-estructura a través de su Teoría de la Estructuración, me llevó a conocer la teorización social realista de Margaret Archer. De esa forma me comienzo a empapar del Realismo Crítico de Roy Bhaskar, que en su vertiente filosófica fundamenta la teoría social de Archer, y eventual y necesariamente, como parte de mi interés actual por analizar la teoríasocial realista, empiezo a involucrarme en la discusión contemporánea de la filosofía de la ciencia social. Una primera lección que me deja dicho ejercicio, la cual ejemplifico con ciertas puntualizaciones respecto al (que considero) deficiente trato que dicha filosofía recibe en y por parte de mi academia, es la necesidad de hacer explícito (de pensar un poco en) el trasfondo filosófico que subyace toda teorización social. Ya que creo que muchos de los problemas originalmente achacados a esta última pueden ser atajados, de forma satisfactoria, desde su contraparte filosófica.

The planetary civilization we are having affects positively world's religions. The former model, based on the isolation, suspicion and competency among religions, is being substituted for the search of common ties of those religions. The interreligious dialogue does not intend to eliminate the religious differences in order to create a common religion. On the contrary, starting from these differences, we are interested in those unity ties shared by all of them, beginning with the ethical-moral values. This contribution of religions to the creation of universal ethics is the first fruit of the interreligious dialogue. In the second part we analyse the relationship of the Christian religion with the others. Nowadays it is not understood to defend an absolutist conception of truth. Although Truth is unique, it is possessed in a multiple manner. That's why the interreligious dialogue is needed.

The subject of the action and the politician, introduces to us necessarily in the consideration of the problem of the power. Arendt talks about the term to be able, like the human capacity to act of arranged way. For our author, the power never belongs to an individual but to a group of individuals and continues existing while the group stays united. In other words, a man must be able when he acts in name of a group of people; without the consent of the group, the person lets have to be able. The man like individual, by itself, lacks only being able has power. We shared this notion of being able totally, considering to Arendt like one of the authors who better have analyzed it distinguishing it of the force (or violence), giving of him a definition us that ejemplariza resulting his “ontologic status” as makes specific of the voluntary organization of individualities, and founding it on basic the human condition of the plurality. Arendt understands clearly that to the power she only can oppose to it him the force or violence, but this one cannot really replace it: the violence is not for her to be able, but destructive of being able: “But the violence is able well to destroy to the power, never can become its substitute. From it is the frequent political combination of force and deficiency of being able there.”