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101. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Juan Antonio Valor La definición del electron en la mecánica cuántica (The electron’s quantum definition)
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En este trabajo presentamos una revision de la definición cuántica del elcetrón en relación con el principio de incertidumbre de Werner Heisenberg.In this paper we present a revision of the electron’s quantum definition in relation to the so called uncerrainty principle by Wenrer Heisenberg.
102. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
Javier Vilanova Un análisis dei concepto de cognoscibilidad desde la semántica de mundos posibles (An Analysis of the Notion of Knowability in the F ield of Possible Worlds Semantics)
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Las nociones epistémicas modales se definen como aquellos conceptos epistémicos que, como el de cognoscibilidad o el de indudabilidad, incluyen una nota modal. Segun se defiende en este trabajo, la semántica de mundos posibles y algunas de sus extensiones (especialmente las llevadas a cabo para logica temporal, logica epistemica y logica condicional) son instrumentos adecuados para deshacer el nudo de las intensionalidades superpuestas en estas nociones especialmente esquivas al análisis. Para mostrarlo, se proporcionan una serie de análisis sucesivos de la nocion de cognoscibilidad que a partir de una interpretación naif van salvando una serie de presuposiciones, problemas y paradojas hasta dar con una analisis que se presume satisfactorio.“Modal epistemic notions” are those epistemic concepts which in some way or another has a modal element. These modal epistemic notions, although they could appear intuitively clear, they turn out to be particularly obscure, slippery, when one subjects them to a formal analysis. In this paper we will try to show that possible world semantics (and its extensions for epistemic, temporal and conditional logic) is an appropriate instrument for the explanation ofthese notions. Four successive analysis of the notion of “knowability” are given, ranging from a naive account to an analysis that gets to the bottom ofthe problem.
103. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
Consrirución de Ia Cátedra Miguel Sánchez-Mazas de Ia Universidad deI País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitea
104. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
Manuel A. SeIlés Isaac Newton y el infinitesimal (Isaac Newton’s Infinitesimals)
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A través de una reconstrucción de la evolución de su pensamiento, en este artículo se estudia la utilización de infinitesimales por parte de Newton. Se distingue entre dos concepciones sucesivas de lo que denominó momento. A la primera de estas entidades la caracterizó como un infinitesimal, pero a la segunda (un indivisible generador de magnitudes finitas, que interviene en su método de las primeras y últimas razones) no la consideró como tal. Se entiende así su manifestación de rechazo a los infinitesimales, formulada en una segunda etapa, y se ve que las dudas arrojadas por algunos investigadores sobre la veracidad de tal manifestación se deben a una determinada interpretación de esta última concepción de momento.This paper discusses Newton’s recourse to infinitesimals through the reconstruction of the evolution of his thought. Two successive concepts of what he termed “moment” are told apart. The first of those entities was characterized by him as an infinitesimal, while the second -an indivisible generating finite magnitudes, present in his method of first and last reasons- was not considered such an entity. This move makes understandable his express rejection of infinitesimals in the second stage, and exposes the doubts of some scholars about the sincerity of Newton’s rejection as due to a peculiar interpretation of his last concept of “moment”.
105. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
María José Guerra Bioética y género: problemas y controversias (Bioethics and Gender: Problems and Controversies)
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Este artículo presenta las difíciles relaciones entre perspectivas atentas al género y la bioetica. Tanto la ética como la ciencia, y en concreto la medicina, han sido objetadas desde enfoques feministas con el fin de revelar su sesgo androcéntrico. La bioética, no obstante, hasta hace bien poco, se ha mostrado reticente a considerar como categoría analítica el factor genero. Aludimos aquí a las causas de este desencuentro así como, posteriormente, a las posibilidades abiertas por una bioética feminista.This paper focuses on the difficult relationship between bioethics and gender. Ethics and science, especially medicine, have been rejected from feminist perspectives revealing the androcentric bias. Bioethics, nevertheless, has resisted the option of consider gender as an analytic category. We point out the reasons of this resistance and also the open possibilities ofan feminist bioethics.
106. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
Olimpia Lombardi EI fin de la omnisciencia: la respuesta de Prigogine al problema de la irreversibilidad (The End of Omniscience: Prigogine’s Answer to the Problem of Irreversibility)
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Prigogine afirma que, en presencia de alta inestabilidad (caos), los estados puntuales y las trayectorias lineales en el espacio de las fases se convierten en una falsa idealización. En el presente trabajo se sostiene que: (i) los argumentos de Prigogine en favor de tal tesis no son concluyentes, y (ii) hay buenas razones para retener la postulacion de estados puntuales y trayectorias lineales, en tanto conceptos teóricos legítimos en mecánica estadística.Prigogine asserts that the existence of radical instability (chaos) makes the postulation of pointlike states and linelike trajectories in phase space a false idealization. In this paper we argue that (i) Prigogine’s arguments for this claim are not conclusive, and (ii) there are good reasons for retain the positing of pointlike states and linelike trajectories as a legitimate theoretical posit in statistical mechanics.
107. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 14 > Issue: 3
Agustín Vicente Sobredeterminación causal mente-cuerpo (Mind-Body Causal Overdetermination)
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Jaegwon Kim ha actualizado y resumido el problema cartesiano de la causación mental en tres ideas en conflicto: el principio deI cierre causal deI mundo fisico, la eficacia causal de la mente, y el principio de exclusión causal-explicativa (PEE). Este último principio nos dice que no puede haber dos causas/explicaciones causales que sean ambas completas e independientes para un evento determinado, salvo en casos de sobredeterminación. Aunque la forma habitual de afrontar este problema de exclusión es buscar una relación de dependencia entre las propiedades físicas y las mentales, algunosfilósofos mantienen que puede tratarse de un caso de sobredeterminación. En este artículo, analizo la posibilidad de que esto sea así.Jaegwon Kim has very nicely updated and summed up Descartes’ problem of mental causation in three conflicting ideas: the principle of the causal closure of the physical, the causal efficacy of the mental, and the principle of the causal-explanatory exclusion (PEE). This last principle tells us that there cannot be two causes/causal explanations that are both complete and independent for one event, excpt in eases of overdetermination. Though the usual way to this exclusion problem is look for a dependency relation between mental and physical properties, some philosophers hold it can be a case of overdetermination. In this paper, I analyze the chances that this could be so.
108. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Juan David García Bacca Tres ejercicios de Lógica: I. Potenciaciones de la negación
109. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Ernesto García Camarero Bases de datos y representación del conocimiento
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The computer has three fundamental analogies with the human being (senses, memory and intelligence), but the coming out of the data bases announced a new form of language: the computer language. The data bases not only set several new technical and social problems, but moreover are modifying the traditional form of social memory, supported by paper, by changing it in a memory based on electronic means. This situation creates new forms of representation of knowledge to which the author gave attention in previous contributions with his SENECA project, in which computer language tries to give a synthesis of oral and written languages, with their respective advantages.
110. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
El Centro de Analisis, Logica e Informatica Juridica
111. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Leibniz: Questions de Logique (Bruselas y Lovaina)
112. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Primer Congreso Latinoamericano de Historia de las Ciencias y la Tecnologia (La Habana)
113. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
José Hierro Pescador Mundos imposibles
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An impossible world is a world which necessarily does not exist. Besides the paradigm of necessity, wich is logical necesslty, we must consider physical necessity and ethical necessity, both of wich can beexpressed in terms of logical necessity, in the way suggested by Montague. Accordingly, an impossible world can be logically impossible, physically impossible or ethically impossible, but in every case the impossibility can be reduced to logical impossibility, and in consequence an impossible world is irrational and cannot be understood by us. An illustration is taken from the incongruities of Kafka’s story in Di Verwandlung.
114. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Lorenzo Peña Agregados, sistemas y euerpos: un enfoque difuso-conjuntual
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A Fuzzy-Set Theoretical Framework -resting on a paraconsistent infinite-valued logic- is sketched, wherein a thorough ontological-reduction program can be carried out. The framework includes formulae of the form “x comprises z in the time-interval e”. Reducing aggregates to sets thus handled is shown to escape usual objections. Likewise, systems generally can be regarded as aggregates, hence as (fuzzy) sets -the purported nonextensionality of systems objection being disposed of owing to our system’s recognizing infinitely many membership degrees. So do bodies, too, which enables us to find a solutionto Unger’s sorites concerning ordinary material bodies.
115. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
XVII Congreso Internacional de Historia de la Ciencia (Berkeley)
116. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Jesús-María Larrazábal Logic Colloquium ’84
117. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Logic Colloquium ’85 (París)
118. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Miguel Sánchez-Mazas eadem mutata resurgo
119. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Lorenzo Peña En memoria de Ayda J. Arruda
120. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Simposio Internacional sobre la filosofía de Karl Popper