101.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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J. Lenore Wright
Review of The Beautiful Shape of the Good: Platonic and Pythagorean Themes in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment, by Mihaela C. Fistioc
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102.
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Richard B. Miller
How the Belmont Report Fails
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103.
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William O. Stephens
Review of Forgiveness and Revenge, by Trudy Govier
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104.
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Steven Schroeder
Review of Autobiography, by Bertrand Russell
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105.
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Steven Schroeder
Review of Essays on Music, by Theodor Adorno. Selected, with Introduction, Commentary, and Notes by Richard Leppert
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106.
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Lowell Kleiman
Review of The Problem of Perception, A.D. Smith
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107.
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Charles E. M. Dunlop
Review of Knowledge, Possiblity and Consciousness, by John Perry
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108.
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Karim Dharamsi
Review of Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range, and Resolution, by Nicholas Rescher
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109.
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Dennis Cooley
Review of Responsible Conduct of Research, by Adil E. Shamoo and David B. Resnik
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110.
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Douglas Chismar
Review of The Heart of What Matters: The Role for Literature in Moral Philosophy, by Anthony Cunningham
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111.
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David K. Chan
Review of Forgiveness and Revenge, by Trudy Govier
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112.
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Randy Cagle
Review of Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings, 4th edition, ed. Alan Soble
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113.
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Anne-Marie Bowery
Review of Reading Plato, by Thomas Szlezák
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114.
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Robert Barnard, Allan Hillman
Review of A Philosophical Companion to First-Order Logic, ed. R.I.G. Hughes
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115.
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Ron Barnette
Review of Skeptical Philosophy for Everyone, by Richard H. Popkin and Avrum Stroll
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116.
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Julia J. Aaron
Review of Rethinking Evil: Contemporary Perspectives, ed. María Pía Lara
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117.
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William Fish
The Direct/Indirect Distinction in Contemporary Philosophy of Perception
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118.
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Paul Coates
Wilfrid Sellars, Perceptual Consciousness and Theories of Attention
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The problem of the richness of visual experience is that of finding principled grounds for claims about how much of the world a person actually sees at any given moment. It is argued that there are suggestive parallels between the two-component analysis of experience defended by Wilfrid Sellars, and certain recently advanced information processing accounts of visual perception. Sellars' later account of experience is examined in detail, and it is argued that there are good reasons in support of the claim that the sensory nonconceptual content of experience can vary independently of conceptual awareness. It is argued that the Sellarsian analysis is not undermined by recent work on change blindness and related phenomena; a model of visual experience developed by Ronald Rensink is shown to be in essential harmony with the framework provided by Sellars, and provides a satisfactory answer to the problem of the richness of visual experience.
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119.
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David DeMoss
Hunting Fat Gnu:
How to Identify a Proxytype
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120.
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Jeffrey S. Galko
Ontology and Perception
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rights & permissions
The ontological question of what there is, from the perspective of common sense, is intricately bound to what can be perceived. The above observation, when combined with the fact that nouns within language can be divided between nouns that admit counting, such as ‘pen’ or ‘human’, and those that do not, such as ‘water’ or ‘gold’, provides the starting point for the following investigation into the foundations of our linguistic and conceptual phenomena. The purpose of this paper is to claim that such phenomena are facilitated by, on the one hand, an intricate cognitive capacity, and on the other by the complex environment within which we live. We are, in a sense, cognitively equipped to perceive discrete instances of matter such as bodies of water. This equipment is related to, but also differs from, that devoted to the perception of objects such as this computer. Behind this difference in cognitive equipment underlies a rich ontology, the beginnings of which lies in the distinction between matter and objects. The following paper is an attempt to make explicit the relationship between matter and objects and also provide a window to our cognition of such entities.
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