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101. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 3
Błażej Gębura Błażej Gębura
On the Epistemology of Chance
O Epistemologii Przypadku

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Probabilistic theism according to Dariusz Łukaszewicz is a theism which ennobles the concept of chance and explains the role which chance plays in the context of Divine Providence. An epistemologist can, however, be interested in a much more basic issue and ask whether our beliefs concerning chance can be called knowledge. This article is divided into three parts. In the first one I discuss selected ways of justifying knowledge of chance, namely common sense justification, pragmatic justification, empirical justification, and a priori justification, as well as concluding that we possess tychical knowledge in reference to non-intentional chance (C2), epistemic chance (C3), probabilistic chance (C5), and causal chance (C6). In the second part I undertake the problem of skepticism in the problem of chance and I suggest that a significant role in the discussion with tychical skepticism is played by the standards of rationality. In the third section I refer to the concept of composite chance discussed by Łukasiewicz, and I claim that (i) we do not possess knowledge of composite chance as understood by Łukasiewicz, and that (ii) this fact should not be treated as a reason in favor of tychical skepticism.
102. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 3
Marian Grabowski Marian Grabowski
Is Probabilistic Theism a Tenable Idea?: Critical Remarks on Opatrzność Boża, wolność, przypadek by Dariusz Łukasiewicz
Czy Można Obronić Teizm Probabilistyczny?

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The article contains an evaluation of a fragment from the book Opatrzność Boża, wolność, przypadek, written by Dariusz Łukasiewicz.
103. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 3
Jacek Wojtysiak Jacek Wojtysiak
God and Chance
Bóg i Przypadek

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In the present paper, I analyse six concepts of a chance event (as defined by Dariusz Łukasiewicz) and also propose a definition of the term “random event.” Rejecting the existence of entirely causeless events, I discuss the relationship between random events and God. The view I formulate is based on three principles: the principle of simultaneous concurrence, the principle of complementarity, and the principle of middle knowledge (inspired by Luis de Molina). In adopting these three principles, I can reconcile the existence of God conceived in a classical manner, as Creator and Lord of all events, with the existence of random events. The model I propose provides an alternative to the conceptions offered by different currents of (more or less) revisionist (open) theism, including Łukasiewicz’s probabilistic theism.
104. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 3
Dariusz Łukasiewicz Dariusz Łukasiewicz
Divine Providence and Chance in the World: Replies
Opatrzność Boża a Przypadek w Świecie: Odpowiedzi

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In the paper, I reply to the objections contained in the other papers in this issue raised against my conception of providence and chance presented in the opening article and the book from 2014. I argue that the existence of variously understood random events (chance) does not imply the thesis that God, the Creator of the world is not interested in the fate of individual creatures, including human beings. The reason why God can permit random events to occur is God’s will to create a relatively autonomous world that has the ability to self-develop and self-create. In such a world, there may be pointless evil for which God is not directly responsible.
105. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 4
Marek Słomka, Kazimierz Wolsza Evolutionism–Creationism: An Introduction to a Still Open Debate
106. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 4
Dariusz Dąbek Dariusz Dąbek
Evolutionism–Creationism: In Search for a Platform of Dialogue
Ewolucjonizm– Kreacjonizm

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This article seeks to indicate a platform for discussion between evolutionists and creationists, which will enable dialogue and increase the chance of developing a coherent worldview that combines elements of scientific knowledge and religious faith. In the context of various types of knowledge, three levels are indicated: (1) the subject of research, (2) knowledge of this subject, and (3) interpretation of this knowledge. Dialogue can be undertaken and conducted already at the second level, but only accompanied by both respect for mutual autonomy and a focus on inspiration rather than integration. The appropriate level of dialogue is the third level: the interpretation of knowledge and building an overarching view of the world and man. The aim of dialogue at this level is to integrate all elements of a worldview and to strive to explain and understand the whole reality.
107. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 4
Andrzej Maryniarczyk Andrzej Maryniarczyk
Metaphysical Creationism and the Paradoxes of Evolutionary Theism: A Contribution to the Discussion within Contemporary Thomism
Metafizyczny Kreacjonizm a Paradoksy Teizmu Ewolucyjnego

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In this article I argue that metaphysical creationism that we encounter in the philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, as opposed to American creationism and theological and biblical creationism, is a theory that stems from a purely philosophical explanation of the beginnings of the world and man. It is not, therefore, a biblical idea transferred to philosophy. Like the theism of the Aristotelian metaphysics, the theism of Aquinas’s metaphysics is not a religious (theological) theism, but a purely philosophical (metaphysical) theism, because it stems from a metaphysical explanation of reality. Metaphysical creationism is the ultimate explanation of the source of the existence of beings that are given to us in experience as both unnecessary in their own existence and changeable. American creationism, on the other hand, is a biological-cosmological interpretation of the biblical truth concerning the creation of the world within a certain time frame (the 7-day paradigm) and—at its starting point—refers to the data of Revelation, which it wants to confirm scientifically. This article is divided into two parts. The first part presents the key elements of the metaphysical theory of ex nihilo creation and the understanding thereof. In the second part, the elements of evolutionary theism are recalled which, from the point of view of metaphysical creationism, are the source of various paradoxes and, at times, even absurdities, and thus demand reconsideration.
108. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 4
Piotr Kulicki Advances in Philosophical Logic: Editorial to the Thematic Section
109. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 4
Zhiqiang Sun, Fenrong Liu Zhiqiang Sun
The Inference Pattern Mou in Mohist Logic: A Monotonicity Reasoning View
Schemat Wnioskowania Mou w Logice Mohistycznej

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Taking the standpoint of monotonicity reasoning, this paper provides a systematic way of looking at the inference pattern mou in the Mohist text. We have taken a logical, as well as a linguistic perspective, emphasizing features of classical Chinese, the role of context, and making use of any possible clues that we can find from the old text. By applying monotonicity rules we provide a uniform account of why shi er ran examples are valid inferences, and shi er buran examples are counter-examples.
110. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 4
Bożena Czernecka-Rej Bożena Czernecka-Rej
On Four Types of Argumentation For Classical Logic
O Czterech Typach Argumentacji na Rzecz Logiki Klasycznej

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My goal of this article is to analyze the argumentation lines for the correctness of standard logic. I also formulate a few critical and comparative remarks. I focus on four the most coherent and complete argumentations which try to justify the distinguished position of classical logic. There are the following argumentations: Willard van O. Quine’s pragmatic-methodological argumentation, Jan Woleński’s philosophical-metalogical argumentation, Stanisław Kiczuk’s ontological-semantic argumentation, argumentation based on metalogic. In my opinion, the thesis concerning the correctness of classical logic is rationally justified by these argumentations. The problem remains whether the analyzed standard logic is the only proper logic.
111. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 4
Tomasz Jarmużek, Krzysztof Krawczyk, Rafał Palczewski Tomasz Jarmużek
Knowability as De Re Modality: A Certain Solution to Fitch Paradox
Poznawalność Jako Modalność De Re

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In the paper, we try to find a new, intuitive solution to the Fitch paradox. We claim that traditional expression of Knowability Principle (p → ◊Kp) is based on erroneous understanding of knowability as de dicto modality. Instead, we propose to understand knowability as de re modality. In the paper we present the minimal logic of knowability in which Knowability Principle is valid, but Fitch Paradox does not hold anymore. We characterize the logic semantically as well as by an axiomatic and tableaux procedure approach.
112. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 4
Dominik Klein, Ondrej Majer, Soroush Rafiee Rad Dominik Klein
Non-Classical Probabilities for Decision Making in Situations of Uncertainty
Nieklasyczne Prawdopodobieństwa na Potrzeby Podejmowania Decyzji w Sytuacjach Niepewności

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Analyzing situations where information is partial, incomplete or contradictory has created a demand for quantitative belief measures that are weaker than classic probability theory. In this paper, we compare two frameworks that have been proposed for this task, Dempster-Shafer theory and non-standard probability theory based on Belnap-Dunn logic. We show the two frameworks to assume orthogonal perspectives on informational shortcomings, but also provide a partial correspondence result. Lastly, we also compare various dynamical rules of the two frameworks, all seen as generalizations of classic Bayes’ conditiong.
113. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 4
Tomasz Jarmużek, Aleksander Parol Tomasz Jarmużek
On Some Language Extension of Logic MR: A Semantic and Tableau Approach
O Pewnym Językowym Rozszerzeniu Logiki MR

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In the article we present an extension of the minimal, normal positional logic, i.e., the logic with realization operator MR. Positional logic is a philosophical logic that makes it possible to relate sentences to contexts that can be understood in many ways. We enrich the basic language of minimal positional logic with additional expressions built with predicates and positional constants. We also accept expressions built with the realization operator and many positions, like: Ra1....an(A). Thanks to this, we increased the expressivity of minimal positional logic. In the article we point to many examples of the fact that, thanks to this small change, complex theories based on the proposed extension can be created. As a theory of proof for our logic, we assume tableau methods, showing soundness and completeness theorems. At the end, however, we show that the logic studied here is only a language extension of the MR: all theorems of the extension have their equivalents in pure MR theorems. However, theories built upon the proposed extension can express much more than theories built upon pure MR.
114. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 68 > Issue: 4
Anna Maria Karczewska Anna Maria Karczewska
Set-Theoretic Semantics for Many-Valued Positional Calculi
Semantyka Teoriomonogościowa dla Wielowartościowych Rachunków Pozycyjnych

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The objective of this paper is to formulate adequate set theoretic semantics for Tkaczyk’s positional calculi Rb, Rk and Rb (TKACZYK 2007).
115. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 63 > Issue: 3
Alexander R. Pruss Alexander R. Pruss
One Body: Overview
Jedno ciało: Przegląd treści

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I offer a reading of my book One Body on Christian sexual ethics as an application of Inference to Best Explanation based on theological and philosophical data.
116. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 63 > Issue: 3
N.N. Trakakis N.N. Trakakis
What’s Love Got to Do with It?
Co miłość ma z tym wspólnego?

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This paper contests an important assumption guiding Alexander Pruss’ One Body, that marriage is intimately connected with love, including romantic love. This assumption, I argue, is the product in part of a distinctively modern understanding of marriage. To show this, Pruss’ position is set against the premodern, and in particular the Byzantine Christian, view and practice of marriage, where marriage was not grounded to any significant extent on (romantic) love. Finally, some indication is provided as to why romantic love was disassociated from marriage in medieval Christian culture.
117. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 63 > Issue: 3
Mark C. Murphy Mark C. Murphy
Pruss on the Requirement of Universal Love
Pruss o wymogu powszechnej miłości

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Throughout his excellent book One Body, Alex Pruss relies upon the view that there is a requirement of universal love: each and every one of us is required to love each and every one of us. Although he often appeals to revealed truth in making arguments for his various theses, he supports the requirement of universal love primarily through a philosophical argument, an argument that I call the “argument from responsiveness to value.” The idea is that all persons bear a sort of nonrelational value, and because this value gives every agent reasons to respond to it positively, each and every person is bound to love each and every person. The aim of this paper is to criticize this argument. Pruss’s argument has two important gaps, one concerning the sort of reasons that the value of persons gives and one concerning whether the required response is the response of love.
118. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 63 > Issue: 3
Charles Taliaferro, Benjamin Louis Perez Charles Taliaferro
Feel the Love!: Reflections on Alexander Pruss’ Essay in Christian Sexual Ethics
Poczuj miłość!

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Throughout his excellent book One Body, Alex Pruss relies upon the view that there is a requirement of universal love: each and every one of us is required to love each and every one of us. Although he often appeals to revealed truth in making arguments for his various theses, he supports the requirement of universal love primarily through a philosophical argument, an argument that I call the “argument from responsiveness to value.” The idea is that all persons bear a sort of nonrelational value, and because this value gives every agent reasons to respond to it positively, each and every person is bound to love each and every person. The aim of this paper is to criticize this argument. Pruss’s argument has two important gaps, one concerning the sort of reasons that the value of persons gives and one concerning whether the required response is the response of love.
119. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 63 > Issue: 3
David Archard David Archard
One Body but Many Kinds of Sex and Procreation: A Liberal Response
Jedno ciało, lecz różne typy aktów seksualnych i prokreacyjnych

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I contrast a liberal and a conservative approach to the morality of sex, endorsing the former with a concession as to the special nature of sex, and note Pruss’ philosophical and theological endorsement of the latter. I criticize his argumentative strategy in three regards: first, he defends Christian love as equivalent to benevolence; second, he allows for only a moral evaluation of sex; third, he moves too quickly from some factual claims to others, and thence to normative conclusions. His account of the moral impermissibility of non-veridical pleasures trades on ambiguities in ‘real’ pleasure.I respond to three arguments Pruss offers against IVF : gamete donors can discharge their parental obligations; reproduction need not only be by coitus; and those who use fertility treatment need not thereby do wrong in treating any resultant child as an ‘artefact’.I conclude with critical observations about the distance between Pruss’ views and those commonly held by most people, including increasing numbers of Catholics.
120. Roczniki Filozoficzne: Volume > 63 > Issue: 3
Christopher Hamilton Christopher Hamilton
Alexander Pruss on Love and the Meaningfulness of Sex
Alexander Pruss o miłości i znaczeniu seksualności

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In this essay I explore Alexander Pruss’ conceptions of love and sexual desire. I argue that he fails to provide a convincing account of either and that one reason for this is that he ignores far too much relevant material in philosophy and the arts that needs to be taken into account in a thorough investigation of such matters. I argue further that Pruss’ understanding of love and sex is highly moralized, meaning that his discussion is not at all sensitive to the actual human experience of these, but consistently falsifies them. I also argue that the teleology to which Pruss appeals in order to ground his claim that, in the sexual act, the bodies of the lovers are striving for reproduction, is implausible and, further, that, even were it not, we could not infer from such teleology the moral conclusions that Pruss wishes to extract from it.