In the Nyaya view a causal condition is a non-superfluous invariable antecedent of the effect. Does this mean that causality for the Nyaya is a necessary connection as some scholars suggest? No. Invariable antecedence means that a causal condition is not the negatum of any absolute absence in the locus of the effect immediately before the latter’s origin (a causal condition is not absent where the effect arises immediately before origin). Non-superfluity means fulfilling requirements of economy three main kinds of which are economy in constitution (non-inclusion of anything redundant), economy in relation (something related directly is preferable to something related indirectly) and economy in cognitive order (being knowable in fewer steps). None of the above jointly or severally involve necessity.

This paper has three parts. The first part explains the similarities and differences between Frege’s distinction between sense and reference needed for the possibility of true and informative identity statements and the distinction between the reference and the limitor or specifier of reference of a linguistic expression in Navya Nyaya. The second part compares Frege’s definition of number to the Navya Nyaya definition of number. The third part shows how restrictive conditions for universals in Navya Nyaya anticipates some developments in modern set theory. Thus, the condition that two universals having neither more nor less members are the same is analogous to the thesis of extensionality. Again, the condition that no universal is admissible if there is a vicious infinite regress that rules out universal-ness as a universal would also rule out the so-called Russell set of all sets which are not members of themselves.

Indian logic is mainly devoted to the study of nyaya the logical structure of which is analogous to that of a categorical syllogism. In a nyaya it is inferred that since the probans (similar to the middle term) is pervaded by or never exists without the probandum (similar to the major term) and since the probans belongs to the inferential subject (similar to the minor term), the probandum belongs to the inferential subject. Many modern scholars hold that in early Indian logic a nyaya was an analogical argument from particular to particular. We disagree. Early Nyaya works say explicitly that what deviates is a pseudo-probans; this implies that a probans is non-deviant or pervaded by the probandum and thus that a universal premise stating the pervasion of the probans by the probandum is needed. Such a universal premise is also found in articulated arguments. Further, a counterargument based on mere analogy to a nyaya based on a universal connection is viewed as a pseudo-refutation.

This paper deals with psycho-physical dualism as developed by Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers. It is argued that internal states like pleasure, desire, etc. that are directly observable only by one’s own self and not by others and thus are private are not bodily states that are directly observable by one’s own self and others and thus are public. Common experiences such as I am happy, I want this, etc. testify, in the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary, that desire, etc. belong to the self. The self is not only non-physical but also a permanent substance contrary to the Buddhist-Humean view that there are only fleeting internal states and no abiding self. Desire, etc. presuppose that the person who experienced something in the past remembers it now and desires it so that the agent of previous experience and later remembrance is the same continuant person.

Rather than considering paradox in a literal sense to be unresolvable, both Bhartṛhari and the Daoists develop a distinctive hermeneutics to decipher them, always exploring an overarching meaning where the fundamental differences are contained within. The conversation on paradox escapes the boundary of paradox then, as it relates to interpreting negation, and above all, the philosophy of semantics. Being and non-being, one and many, or something being both true and false at the same time are examples found from their texts. Just as the static and dynamic domains of the Dao remain a key to address paradox in Chinese literature, the stratification of speech, wherein deeper layers of speech are capable of resolving the apparent tension found at the surface level, seems central to Bhartṛhari’s approach.

This article examines the basic content of the Brahmasutra and compares and contrasts the commentaries of Ramanuja and Shankara on it. Firstly the issue of possible errors or interpolations in the BSis addressed. Then the full contents of the BS is surveyed briefly but with important detail. Finally, the important disagreements between the commentaries of Ramanuja and Shankara on the BSare discussed. This includes discussion of selected sutras in question.

This article brings together the Aryan Semitic and Sinitic super-cultures in a comparative light in terms of religious numerological leitmotifs. Vedic Hinduism and Zoroastrianism together with the pre-Christian religions of Indo-European Europe belong to this group. Buddhism and to a lesser extent Jainism are also part of this grouping. Judaism and Islam belong to the Semitic group. Daoism and Confucianism come under the Sinitic group. Christianity and Sikhism are hybrid religions that have one leg in the Aryan group and one leg in the Semitic group. The numbers three, six and nine are the hallmarks of Aryan culture the numbers one five and seven are expressed throughout Semitic culture and the numerals three five and eight have received their expression in Chinese culture.

It is not easy to reconcile naturalistic philosophy with religion. However, naturalism can be applied to religion in two ways-either as a methodological approach or as a world view. Two religious thinkers of early 20th century America, Swami Vivekananda, the Hindu spiritual teacher from India and John Dewey, the great American pragmatist, exemplify these two strands of religious naturalism. This paper intends to show how the adoption of a naturalistic outlook towards religion enabled each thinker to interpret their core philosophies, as diverse as Hindu Idealism and American Pragmatism, in a way that appealed to the humanism of the age, thus securing the foundations of religion rather than weakening it.

Jnanasri, a famous 10th century Buddhist philosopher, holds that internal states like cognition alone are real and that there is no external, independent physical world. He argues that one may perceive something, say, a horse, irrespective of whether there is a horse or not. Accordingly, one cannot justifiably move from cognition to the external, independent existence of the object of cognition. Udayana points out that one misperceives only something that one in the ultimate analysis has perceived before. While the previous perception may be false, it cannot be false always for then there is a vicious infinite regress. So true perceptions must also be admitted. The best explanation of true perception is that it is perceiving something where and when it is and that of false perception is that it is perception of something that is elsewhere or elsewhen or both. Thus, the Nyaya claims, the object of misperception too is external and independent of perception. Since the Nyaya position is not refuted, the above argument of Jnanasri suffers from assuming the bone of contention.

Our aim Is to give an idea of the Nyaya and Advaita tlieories of perception and to note metapliysicai or ontological elements In them. We shall consider whether it is possible to sieve out features of the theories without such elements with a view to formulating a commonly acceptable platform for dialogue regarding a theory of perception. In recent times scholars have attempted to pick up common elements in the two theories. In our account we may, however, be allowed to use Sanskrit philosophical words in original. This is perhaps useful for philosophizing freely in a comparative setting.

The paper proposes to deal with the basic issues pertaining to consciousness and cognition as expounded in the original sources of Vaiśeşika, the Nyāya perspective will also be referred to wherever relevant.

In the acquisition of verbal knowledge, the Nyāya school outlines four conditions of a linguistic utterance that must be met: āsatti (temporal proximity), ākāṅkṣā (syntactic expectancy), tātparya (speaker intention), and yogyatā (semantic fitness). I will follow the traditional Nyāya view that is it one of the four necessary conditions that enable a hearer to gain verbal knowledge. The reasoning behind retaining tātparya as a condition (or cause) of verbal knowledge, is that it provides a resource with which to clarify ambiguity when contextual factors cannot. It also provides a context for a hearer so that the primary (abhidhā) or secondary (lakṣaṇā) meaning of the word, or sentence is understood. In this sense, tātparya imparts the meaning of a work. Examples such as “Bring saindhava” or “Hari” make the case for the importance of tātparya in that the meanings of these terms are ambiguous unless the context is provided or the speaker intends to mean one referent rather than another. In this paper, I present the case that tātparya is the most important component of an accurate paraphrase, and it must be retained in order to preserve the original intention of the work. In other words, tātparya should be the primary constraint of an acceptable paraphrase. As a side comment to my aim, I discuss the notion of why paraphrase only needs to be sufficiently similar to the original work.

As against the Buddhist view that everything is momentary Udayana argues that recognitive perception, such as that this is the same pot I saw before, provides evidence for permanence. Such recognitive perception is common experience and cannot be set aside without compelling evidence. The Buddhist objects that such experience is not reliable; even a burning flame is recognized to be the same, but it is clear from fuel consumption that it is not. Udayana agrees that in the case of a burning flame it cannot be the same flame because then it would have to have opposed features (such as being fueled by more oil before and less oil now). But there is no compelling evidence for the claim that the pot or I would have to have opposed features if enduring. The Buddhist claim that anything enduring must have opposed features such as being both capable and incapable of being productive is groundless. Such features are not opposed and may be explained as being due to availability or non-availability of auxiliary causal conditions and so on.

Rene Descartes (1596-1650) and Patanjali, author of the Yoga Sutras (c. 400 CE?), are both famous for articulating paradigmatic expressions of substance dualism, the view that the true self or mind is a fundamentally different kind of substance than the physical body. Typically, each is cited as the case study of dualism, for the Western tradition and for the Indian tradition respectively. This paper examines Desartes'and Pataiijali's conceptions of the self, the methods for how to discover it, and what its purpose and limitations are. It explores to what extent these two conceptions of the self are reconcilable and in the process of doing so, tries to illustrate the way in which such comparative philosophy, across traditions, helps to illuminate each tradition.

The Vedas, the Hindu scripture, make it clear that God is one, not only everywhere but also everything, has no name or form and prescribes a monistic and pantheistic perspective. Still devotees of different preferences and inclinations have the option to choose different names and forms for worshipping God. Thus, Hindus worship a very large number of gods and goddesses as aspects or powers of God promoting a distinctive monotheism. The most prominent goddesses are Durga and Kali both of whom are demon-slayers with unlimited power, Parvati a great wife and mother who is highly learned, Lakshmi, the goddess of wealth and Sarasvati, the goddess of learning. The most prominent gods are Brahma, the creator who supervises the beginning of each creative cycle, Vishnu, the god of preservation and Siva, the god of destruction. Vishnu has the largest following followed by Siva, a close second and Brahma, a distant third in following. Vishnu has many incarnations who come to the world to restore righteousness and order when there is great trouble. The two most popular reincarnations are Rama and Krishna, the lead characters respectively of the great epics Ramayana and Mahabharata.

Religion consists of a set of beliefs about supernatural; heaven, hell, afterlife, understanding acts of sin and piety, and belief in the existence of God through which people relate to the non-nnaterialistic world. Economics, on the other hand, deals with ways and means through which people make money and spend it to satisfy their materialistic needs. Evidences suggest that the former influences the latter and economic performance can be related to religiosity. In this situation can religion be used as an instrument for bettering economic and social performance in India? If so, are there any specific observed modalities for this phenomenon? The paper reviews and analyses selected studies and research from the West and one study from India which can help answer the million dollar question stated above. The paper concludes that a systematic study on assessing the role of religion in shaping economic performance in India is needed before a debate on the issue can start. A future research agenda is suggested in this regard.

In an episode in the Bhagavadgita Arjuna refuses to fight that would involve killing his teachers, elders, relatives and friends. Krishna argues that he should fight because it is the special duty of a soldier to fight in a just war, one should do one’s duty regardless of the consequences, one should act for the common good, one should build an unwavering character taking victory and defeat, pleasure and pain, friend and foe in the same way, etc. Some of these reasons may be taken to promote deontology, others utilitarianism, yet others virtue ethics that are often viewed contemporarily as incompatible ethical theories. We argue that these three theories are not necessarily incompatible and may be linked to three sides of human nature: deontology to cognitivity, utilitarianism to dynamism and virtue ethics to affectivity. We also argue that Krishna may be taken to promote ethical pluralism just as he may be taken to promote religious pluralism by recommending the path of knowledge, the path of action and the path of devotion from an inclusive perspective.