One can argue that the problem posed by difference/identity in contemporary philosophy has its roots in the persistent epistemological imperative to be certain about what we know. We find this demand in Plato’s Theaetetus and Sophist. But beyond this demand, there is a sense in the earlier dialogue that difference is not a passive feature waiting to be identified. “Difference” points towards an active differentiating. In the Sophist, difference appears in the method of dividing and gathering deployed to hunt for the elusive “sophist.” Difference is also one of the great kinds that weaves together other kinds. Practically, difference enables the sophist’s expertise of appearance-making as he knowingly confuses things with words. This paper then quizzes the concept of difference in all these guises in the two dialogues.

This essay critically considers the differences and complementarities between Emmanuel Levinas’s and Jean-Luc Nancy’s respective accounts of ontology and ethics. A comparative reading reveals that while both insist upon a relational conceptualization of subjectivity, they base relationality on differing notions of alterity. The simultaneous proximity and distance between these two thinkers’ respective transphenomological quests yield critical force that enables a mutual critique, while opening up productive avenues for overcoming some of the problems inherent to their views.

Women have played a prominent role in environmental preservation in all societies, including societies facing serious environmental problems. Women in places like Nigeria’s Niger Delta carry out tasks such as farming, fetching of firewood for domestic use, fetching of water, and the like. These activities involve the use of natural resources and thus make women more vulnerable when there are problems such as oil pollution, gas flaring, and other related activities that endanger the environment. In the Niger Delta women have protested against oil related activities that damage their environment. They have also participated in other events to conserve their environment. The paper adopts an ecofeminist perspective in critiquing environmental mismanagement in the Niger Delta. It highlights the fact that women are prominent in campaigning for a sustainable Niger Delta. There is need for writers from academic and social circles writing on the Niger Delta not to ignore the women’s voices.

Prompted by Heidegger’s search for great art in the modern times, this paper looks into crafts as answering the philosopher’s frustrated call. Using Soetsu Yanagi’s idea of a “religion of beauty,” which turns to the ordinary as beautiful, it suggests that crafts—carefully made by hand while considering its affinity with nature and the human body that uses it—is a way of being, the way Heidegger described the way of “dwelling poetically.”

The goal of a Christian, especially a regenerated Christian, in the 21st century is to tell the story of the various shapes that his religious position underwent with the hope that other unbelievers may follow his footsteps, that is, from a belief in God to atheism and agnosticism, and back to a belief in God. He tries to show by using the arguments of Paul Tillich how the limits of language enabled him to transcend the agnosticism of Bertrand Russell.

Women have played a prominent role in environmental preservation in all societies, including societies facing serious environmental problems. Women in places like Nigeria’s Niger Delta carry out tasks such as farming, fetching of firewood for domestic use, fetching of water, and the like. These activities involve the use of natural resources and thus make women more vulnerable when there are problems such as oil pollution, gas flaring, and other related activities that endanger the environment. In the Niger Delta women have protested against oil related activities that damage their environment. They have also participated in other events to conserve their environment. The paper adopts an ecofeminist perspective in critiquing environmental mismanagement in the Niger Delta. It highlights the fact that women are prominent in campaigning for a sustainable Niger Delta. There is need for writers from academic and social circles writing on the Niger Delta not to ignore the women’s voices.

This paper focuses on Simone de Beauvoir’s ethics. My aim is to discuss the intimate relation of freedom and rights in order to suggest that the ethical implications of her phenomenological-existentialist analysis of the human condition, developed mainly in The ethics of ambiguity, can make a valuable contribution to ethical value and corroboration of human rights, the conceptual grounding of which is sometimes received with intellectual skepticism. I argue that in Beauvoir’s ethical theory, grounded on the will to freedom, not only do rights become more intelligible but their significance also becomes more communicable. By making freedom conditional upon willing not only that oneself be free but that everyone else may also be free, Beauvoir advances a universal demand for the most basic conditions necessary for individuals to realize themselves. Accordingly, Beauvoir’s conception of genuine freedom, incorporating the value of freedom and the duty to act in recognition of this value, gives us the possibility to argue for the requisite freedoms as well as the necessity to substantiate these freedoms in human rights.

The damaging effects of the activities of corporations on the natural environment have given rise to the need to evaluate corporate policies, decisions, and actions affecting the natural environment on moral grounds. There are two important questions that need to be addressed in this regard. The first is whether corporations have a moral obligation to protect the natural environment, which is over and above their economic duty to maximize profits for their stockholders and their legal duty to obey environmental laws. And the second is, given that they do have this moral obligation, what sort of environmental ethical theory (homocentrism, biocentrism, utilitarianism) ought to guide the exercise of such an obligation? This paper argues that corporations do have such moral obligations, for they are moral agents in virtue of their nonmetaphorical possession of rational capacities. This, however, implies that the corporations’ exercise of this obligation can only be properly guided by a rationalist type of ethics.

Aristotle is credited with the first full-fledged robust philosophical discussion and presentation of substance. His account of substance presents different notions of substance, which were elaborated on and modified in the medieval and modern periods. Among those that elaborated on the conception of substance in the modern period are Rene Descartes, John Locke, Baruch or Benedict de Spinoza, George Berkeley, Gottfried Leibniz, David Hume, and Immanuel Kant. What is the nature of substance and how is it understood by these philosophers? In this paper I examine the notions of substance in the philosophical systems of Locke, Spinoza, and Kant. I go beyond this comparative and exploratory exercise to show why Kant takes on a more expansive notion of substance. In particular, for Kant the conceptions of substance we find in Locke and Spinoza do not allow the idea of substance to do the work that substance as a pure concept of the understanding should do.

The aim of this paper is to situate the notion of reification as a neutral foundation for the three spheres of recognition. Reification, as a negative concept, allows the possibility of recognition to take place in Axel Honneth’s three spheres of recognition; namely, love, law, and esteem. My argument is that the givenness of these positive aspects of recognition is made possible by the existence of necessary reifications to which pathologies allow a certain form of intersubjective realisations. This form brings about the possibility of an “otherwise” situation. Drawing from the intersubjective theory of recognition in Georg Hegel’s and Martin Heidegger’s instrumentalist hermeneutics (i.e., Vorhandenheit) of authenticity, I aim to pursue the necessary qualification to which reification is to be considered as a neutral ground for normativity to germinate. My contention is that the neutral state of reification is made possible when it is seen as a productive discourse situation in which recognition becomes possible.

Civic virtue is a bulwark against authoritarianism, but also against the worst excesses of democracy. It has been appropriated by the proponents of republicanism and communitarianism, focusing upon duties rather than rights, and the collective rather than the individual. This paper demonstrates, however, that republicanism and community values are not mutually exclusive with the concept of universal individual human rights. It considers traditional interpretations of civic virtue from both West and East, then introduces a conceptualization of the relationship between rights and responsibilities which alienates neither the liberal concept of individuals as universal human rights bearers, nor the communitarian perspectives.

Hominization theory speculates on the process and chronology of a human embryo’s ensoulment. Aristotle, a key ancient Greek thinker, presented his own hominization theory based on his hylemorphic metaphysics and pioneering researches in embryology. Thomas Aquinas, a medieval philosopher and theologian, built his Christian and Catholic hominization theory on the foundations laid down by Aristotle. The contemporary Roman Catholic Church, with its own prolife, anti-abortion and anticontraception agenda, modified the Aristotelian and Thomistic hominization theories by allegedly benchmarking on recent developments in human embryology. This paper uses the archeological and genealogical methods, as developed by the French poststructuralist and postmodernist philosopher Michel Foucault, in reexamining these three hominization theories as discourses, in comparing and contrasting their epistemic contexts, and in peering into their respective genealogies. Contrary to common assumptions, these three hominization theories have very few elements in common and are actually divergent. The underpinning intention of this paper is to demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of the contemporary Roman Catholic Church’s hominization theory.

Nigeria is one of the most religious countries in the world. The major religions are Islam, Christianity, and African traditional religion. Nigeria is also notorious for ethno-religious conflicts, especially in the North eastern part of the country. Many factors have been identified as causes of the conflicts, including religious intolerance, desertification, poverty, cultural differences, foreign influences, and political differences. This paper argues that, although the conflicts were usually triggered by flimsy incidents, the protagonists’ exclusivistic attitude as regards value is the root cause of the conflicts. Each of the protagonists in the conflict, the ethnic and religious groups, regards its own worldview as the only true one. Using conceptual analytical method to analyse the Nigerian situation, this paper uses process philosophical concept of truth to propose that differences in value may not necessarily lead to conflicts. In fact, it may lead to deeper religion, beauty, and depth of personality. “Deep” or “Complementary” pluralism is thus recommended for tolerance and peace in Nigeria.

I focus on a certain epiphenomenalist syllogism summarized by Sarah Patterson. Contemporary epiphenomenalists believe that (A) mental properties are distinct from physical properties, (B) the physical properties of mental events are causally sufficient for the physical effects of those events, (C) given (B), no properties of mental events distinct from their physical properties are causally efficacious in bringing about their physical effects, and (D) the mental properties of mental events are therefore not causally efficacious in bringing about the physical effects of those events. I argue that (C) is at tension with the principle of nomological necessity supposedly binding supervening to subvenient properties, and I argue that (B), upon which (C) is based, is contradicted by the reality of intentionality, a reality that I demonstrate through, among other ways, a thought experiment about a counterfactual involving the possibility of changes in society at the removal of morality and law.

The perennial problem of the exact nature of epistemic justification has recently become even more interesting upon Laurence BonJour's openly converting himself to foundationalism following a long and successful career built mainly around a strong defense of coherentism cum internalism. Even though the famous debate between foundationalism and coherentism is often associated with the "technical" issues of epistemic regress, basic beliefs, and so on, in this paper I will approach the debate from the standpoint of the post-Wittgensteinian literature and try to provide some useful insights about the justification of those beliefs alleged by the foundationalist to constitute our ultimate touch with reality. More specifically, I will offer a neo-Kantian interpretation of the subvenient basis of supervenience relations believed to take place between the world and our basic cognitive states, and claim that such an approach has a better chance of combining the strengths of the traditional rivals in epistemology and coming up with a viable synthesis on this matter.

I will challenge the manipulation argument, aiming to argue for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and determinism. By examining the intuition behind the first premise, stating that manipulated agents are not responsible, it will turn out that this statement can be traced to the manipulators themselves, who intentionally set up a plan against their subjects. The second premise, which states that there is no difference between determinism and manipulation concerning responsibility, will be argued to be false. In the deterministic worlds, actions are determined by blind causation. However, under the manipulation theory, agents are determined by the manipulator. I claim that the first premise is true, but the second premise is false.