D. Lewis asserts that 'We can agree with Parfit...that what matters in questions of personal identity is mental continuity or connectedness...At same time we can consistentlyagree with common sense...that what matters in questions of personal identity is identity', but D. Parfit believes that this cannot be done. The aim of this paper is to re-examinewhether Lewis's thesis, ‘the I-relation and the R-relation coincide', had been justified. In sections 2 and 3, I summarized Lewis' and Parfit's arguments separately. And the related cohabitationist's theory is introduced in section 4. After the discussion in section 5, I argue that Lewis's thesis cannot be justified.

This paper will do two things. First to argue that the logical connectives are used to express mental acts, to do speech acts and propositional acts. They are used to expreepropositional ties. Second, from the first things to to say that every sentence or proposition must contain at least one logical connective, and every relation must intrinsically contain a direction. Several relevant theories are also examined.

As Dewey came to Chcago in 1894, there were many conflicts of educational thoughts in the academic world. With Hegelian dialetic, Dewey has synthesized successfully the antithesis of the viewpoint of the individual and that of the society， the emphasis on the subject-matter of the curriculum and that on the contents of the child's own experience. The teaching methods of "pouring in" and "drawing out "are shown to be both justified and equally one-sided.With functional analysis, the conflict of the theory of amusement and that of effort can be synthesized dialectically by a theory of genuine interest. Dewey puts constructive activities as unifying center of all curricula and contends that the genuine interst consists in the interpretability of the subjectmatter for child or the adaptability of the child's impulses, habits and experience to the new environment.Dewey reinterpreted the evolutionary method as a genetic or historic method and applied it, being methodically different from Hegelian dialectic, but in the same spirit of harmonious unification as the Hegelian dialectic, to solve the conflict of new education and old education by removal or reform of the institutional conditions.

Theories of reference are the most salient objects of philosophical reflection in the areas of the analytic philosophy, the philosophy of language, applied logic, cognitive psychologg as well as linguistics. It is very natural to expect that every teachers, expert, philosopher, and every graduate student in these areas should be enlightened by such topics. We take a bird-eye view of recent theories of reference ( and name ) in this article, i.e., Millian theory/'Fido'-Fido theory, Fregean theory of sense and reference, Russellian theory of definite description and its modified theory (the cluster theary/the description theary), the rigid designation theory, the direct reference theory, the historical Chain theory/Causal theory and Minimalism. These theories are reviewed from their philosophical and historical aspects.Some of philosophic problems (which have been related to the research program of each theory, twenty problems in total) and their intended Solutions are briefly sketched by the author. The difficulties of all theories except the historical chain theory are presented and criticized. The difficulties of the latter 'will be discussed in a forthcoming paper. Finally, We present twenty useful problems/exercises for graduate students in the areas of the philosophy of language/theoretical linguistics/applied logic.

Confucius, being regarded as the greatest teacher in Chinese hisfory, is well-known for his teaching method, such as "to teach according to student's talent", “to teach without classification," etc. What really matters, however, is the substance of his teaching, and this inevitably leads one to consider his philosoophy.The present article, by connecting Confucius' philosophy and his teaching method, intends to describe the stages and qualifications in Confucius educational scheme. Four steps can thus be discerned, they are: 1) to establish a positive self-esteem and life goal; 2) to cooperate with others in following the path of goodness; 3) to properly and wisely deal with all kinds of situation; and 4) to rest with oneself in a peaceful and elegant way. Each step draws sufficient supports from the “Analects" and finds a correspondent place in the philosophical system of Confucius.

This paper attempts to study the Aesthetics of Wang Pi (王粥) . He was known as an outstanding young philosopher during Tsau-Wei (曹魏) period. He died at the earlyage of 24. He went beyond the realms of names and froms to ultimate reality, namely, original non-being (pen-wu 本無).This paper contents are:I . Discussion of yan (吉) and yih (意)II . The function of new philosophical method (the method of “Der yih wan yan" 得意志、吉)III. Propositional analys'is of“Der yih wan shiang" (得意志、象)and“Der shiang wan yan" (得象忘盲)Finally, we .discover the deepest meaning of Wang Pi's Aesthetics.

lfhe Lao Tzu has the distinction of having lots of directives and metaphors. This paper will make some modern analyses of these directives and metaphors. We will use theory of speech acts and moderm theory of metaphors to do this study. We hope these analyses will help us a better understanding to the Lao Tzu.

In giving lectures on the course of metaphysics, we can make use of the combined use of the Historical Reduction and the Transcendental Method as an effective approach.The Historical Reduction as introduced by Edmund Husserl is an investigstion into the various sets of metaphysics as appeared in history in different periods so as to evaluate their rationalities as well as their irrationalities. Whereas, the Transcendental Method as expounded by Transcendental Thomism is a method based on Kantian transcendental reflection into one's cognitional structure so as to determine how far our study in metaphysics can go.If we combine the use of the Historical Reduction and the Transcendental Method, we can have a deeper insight into the achievements as well as the weaknesses of various great metaphysicians in history such as Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Kant, Marechal, Whitehead, Heidegger, and Coreth. And, we can be in a better position to retain the good points as handed down by our predecessors while avoiding the pitfalls they had traversed before.

This article presents the arguments for and against liberalism concerning the justice and differences of cultures or social groups.Contemporary liberalism has been criticized by many theorists on its insensitivity to differences between cultures. and social groups. The topic concerning the demand for recognition by minority cultures and disadvantaged groups is one of the major concerns of both liberal and anti-liberal camps. According to anti-liberal theorists (mainly Marion Young in this article), the liberal conception of justice is inadequate in dealing with cultural minorities and marginalized groups. In order to accommdate non-liberal ways of life, some special rights attached to cultures or groups collectively should be recognized in addition to the equal rights accorded to each individual in a liberal state. To meet this challenge, many liberals (Joseph Raz, William Galston, and Will Kymlicka) try to argue that the so-called collective rights can be justified within a modified liberal theory of justice. Liberalism, therefore, can accommodate cultural minorities fully. Liberals' answer, however, does not satisfy Nancy Fraser. She tries to find a new way to solve the problem posed by the politics of recognition.

Max Weber is, as Leo Strauss puts it, “the greatest social scientist of our century". Regardless whethere he thought himself primarily as a politician or a scientist, he was at any rate a scientist in the modern meaning of the word. That Max Weber is a Scientist par excellence is no question. What is nowadays still controversial is his conception of science (Wissenschaft), especially his conception of the so-called “verstehende Sociologie".“Modern Science" is for Max Weber a product of modern cultural epoch. It can be properly characterized as the “disenchanted science in a disenchanted world". But he wasobviously against the widespread “positivist view of social sciences" and endeavoured to develop an alternative called “verstehende Sociologie". Why he must do that? What “more" can such a conception achieve than the positivist conception of social sciences? Is his conception of “verstehende Sociologie" a “science of man" (Wissenschaft vom Menschen)? And finally, what can such a conception mean for a scientist like Max Weber and for the “total life of mankind"? These questions should be discussed systematically.

In the last two decades, Searle has mounted two fronts of attack upon cognitive science. In the 80' s, Searle contended with his well-known “Chinese Room Argument" that a computer capable of producing the right answers to questions in Chinese did not really understand Chinese, whereas in the 90's, he took issue with the alleged mental reality of “unconscious rules of inference," the description of which is thought to define the main task of cognitive scientists. Suspecting that cognitive scientists borrow the idea of unconscious mentality only to saveguard the mental status of those rules of cognition, Searle imposes a constraint upon the notion of unconscious mentality, namely that unconscious mentality must be potentially conscious. This is the so-called “connection principle." The aim of this paper is to analyze and evaluate this constraint for unconscious mentality.In the paper, I contend that the connection principle is poorly argued for the following two reasons. First, it assumes implicitly a more fundamental principle, what I call the “intentionality/ consciousness principle" (IC), which implies that occurrent intentional states are necessarily conscious and which thereby excludes the psychoanalytic notion of the unconscious. However, Searle does not provide any explicit argument for this key premise at all. Second, as far as the notion of the unconscious it explicitly preserves, i.e. the rather uninteresting case of unconscious dispositions such as the sleeping believer's belief about God , the alleged connection between unconscious mentality and consciousness wouldn't hold either unless we assumed (IC) beforeha:td. Hence, the key factor lies in (IC). I thereby take up the hidden issue and introduce the psychoanalytic notion of the unconscious as a counter-exarnple against (IC). In the end, I return to Searle's original concern with cognitive science and conclude that the connection principle can't succeed in excluding the “cognitive unconscious," which may have to find further support in a somewhat controversial notion of “subdoxastic intentionality."Though sympathetic with Searle's intuition about the specialness of human mind, I find his notion of consciousness too narrow to capture a wide variety of “consciousness." Perhaps, the attempt to preserve the specialness of human mind can only be realized when we can successfully disentangle various notions of consciousness, intentionality, and subjectivity.

The Lao Tzu has the distinction of having lots of directives and metaphors. This paper will make some modern analyses of these directives and metaphors. I will use theory of speech acts and modern theory of metaphors to do this study. I hope these analyses will help us a better understanding to the Lao Tzu.

Based on the comprehensive reading of the Analects, the paesentarticle tries to reconstruct the value system of Confucius.A brief desciption of this value system runs as follows. The sytem has a structure of three stages , each of which includes two levels of value respectively. We have then (l) the ego-centred stage with the values of living and development in the sense of worldly success; (2) the human interactive stage with the values of socialorder (maintained by laws and ritials) and human feelings (that is, human affections and moral virtues); and (3) the idealized stage with the values of non-selfishness (or non-selfishness) and the supreme good (or the sagehood).

Some feminists assume that there are distinctively female ways of knowing, and the oppressed, marginalized people (unquestionably including women) are epistemically privileged. Therefore there should be a different women's epistemology. The first part of this essay summarizes some important assumptions and the content of “Feminist Epistemology", while in the second part we argue that there are no reasons to consider these assumptions are warranted, and because of these assumptions the feministepistemology is even self-defeating. We also point out that another theoretical difficulty of feminist epistemology, the “ bias paradox", was not successfully solved by Louise M. Antony, therefore, we conclude that the feminist epistemology is incongruous and not a legitimate subfield of analytic philosophy.