Key aspects of Mahatma Gandhi’s ethical theory can be understood by way of the framework provided by David Hume’s ethics. While respecting contextual differences as well as those in over all outlook between a Sanatani Hindu reformer and a Western empiricist, I show that Gandhi and Hume mutually illuminate each other’s thought on significant ethical matters. These matters are: (1) The inability of reason to produce action (2) The relationship of reason to the emotions (3) The importance of the commonality of moral sentiments among humans (4) Identification (a kind of sympathy) as the proper starting place for morality. I hope to show that a greater viability in each thinker’s views can be noticed by those schooled in traditions different from what each respectively represent.David Hume’s ethics provide a framework for understanding key aspects of Mahatma Gandhi’s ethical theory. Indeed, for certain students of philosophy in the West, Gandhian ethics may gain status as a viable approach in moral philosophy when seen from a Humean standpoint. In what follows, I will examine four significant aspects of Gandhian ethics: (1) The limitations of reason to produce moral action. (2) The secondary status of reason in relation to the emotions in morality. (3) The importance of moral sentiments in the general population for devising a system of morality. (4) The place of identification (a kind of sympathy) for the origin of morality. I will show that all four are not only significant aspects of Humean ethics but that when understood from David Hume’s framework these parts of Gandhi’s philosophy should appear all the more plausible to those steeped in the analytic tradition.

Using Kant’s argument that lies are evil and reprehensible in themselves regardless of the benefits that may result, I show that guns can be understood in similar terms. In a unique reading of Kant’s radical and often ridiculed ideas, I maintain that lies have this status because of the way they pervert our relationship to the truth and thus to morality and reason. Lies turn truth and reason into mere means to be used rather than to be obeyed. Kant believes that the result is arrogance, insincerity, and self-deception in the form of moral impurity and depravity. This gives way to the morally bankrupt logics of the passions for honor, dominance, and possession. I argue that this destruction of virtue and of our relation to the moral law can be found in our relation to guns. Guns are not just killing machines; they are deception machines. It is for that reason, regardless of the costs and benefits, that the Kantian should deny that we have any right to them.

Pacifists are often put on the defensive with cases—real or imagined—in which innocent people are threatened by violent criminals. Is it always wrong to respond to violence with violence, even in defense of the innocent? This is the “hard” question addressed in this article. I argue that it is at least permissible to maintain one’s commitment to nonviolence in such cases. This may not seem like a bold conclusion, yet pacifists are often ridiculed—sometimes as cowards, sometimes as selfish moral purists—for their refusal to use violence in defense of others. In this article, I try to show that such scorn is unjustified.