The drift of the electrons and ions leads to the deoxidation, desilification and dealkalization of the inner Earth. Ferrsmagnetics drift centre-wise. Consequently there arises a larger concentration of iron, first as peridotite, olivines, spinels, then in ferrooxides presenting various degrees of reduction, and at last, a layer of metal iron (fig. 1). Thus the outer core of the Earth is formed, enclosing primitive silicates (inner core). The formation of the layer of metal iron changes the conditions of differentiation in the inner core. Deoxidation, desilification and dealkalization come to an end; on the other hand, hydrogen diffuses through iron causing a gradual reduction of ferrooxides.The decomposition of conductors and semiconductors brought about in the Earth by tho radial drift of electrons and ions entails thermoelectric phenomena. As. a consequence, the Earth cools from the centre, while the outer coat undergoes warming (fig. 2). The author suggests a uniform division into zones and layers, taking into account seismic data as well as the chemical differentiation of the Earth (fig. 3). At the basis of the ultimate differentiation lie radially occurring processes : redox potential, electric and thermic gradient, O, Si, K, Na drift, converse drift of Fe, Ni, Co, and induced electromagnetic wave alternately enclosed in the spheric wave guide of the metal iron layer, then reflecting from the outer surface of the spheric wave guide into outer space.Geo-zones and layers form simultaneously. Consequently, the zones do not closely adhere to one another. The differentiation of the mechanical moments follows, characterized by the distribution of pressure (fig. 4). The common centre of gravity of the system Earth-Moon further complicates the mechanical conditions. A „gravitational wave” arises in the inner core (fig. 5). Ionized silicates of the inner core induce a magneto-hydro-dynamic (m-h-d) wave producing alternating magnetism in the iron layer and contributing to the formation of the geo-magnetic field.The author interprets earthquakes and volcanism as a local fusion of silicates on the principle of the magnetic lens. The accompanying longitudinal or transversal m-h-d wave transfers the fusion centres vertically or horizontally. The resorbed focuses cause a magmatic vacuum, the sinking of which induces earthquake. Clefts appear in the process preparing the way for volcanic eruption.

Modern interpretation of the quantum mechanics follows two main lines: probabilistic and causal. The first approach is usually expressed in terms elaborated by the Copenhagen school. It has been given its most systematic formulation in Bohr’s principle of complementarity. Within the Copenhagen interpretation this principle leads to the so-called principle of strict observability which postulates that only such beings should be assumed existing as can be observed. From the philosophical viewpoint, the Copenhagen interpretation of complementarity is an idealism of the esse-percipi type.Various causal interpretations have been proposed by many authors as alternative to the probabilistic explanation. Their common denominator is the notion of physical reality, borrowed from classical physics. What we witness here is then the return to the idea of an objective physical world, the least elements of which exist irrespectively of whether they are object of observation or not.In the last part of the article an attempt is made to classify various interpretations of the same mathematical formulation of the quantum mechanics, i.e. to classify various sets of rules of physical interpretation of the essentially identical scheme in the quantum mechanics. In the process, the author reviews different interpretations, both probabilistic and causal, of some basic problems regarding the fundamental principles of the interpretation of the quantum mechanics.

1. Les opinions avancées au cours des vingt dernières années par les néo-scolastiques polonais au sujet de la relation entre la philosophie de la nature ou cosmologie et la métaphysique forment plusieurs groupes.L’un d’eux, c’est le groupe d’auteurs tels que Jerzy Kalinowski et le P. Albert M. Krąpiee OP qui, d’une manière ou d’une autre, défendent la thèse de l’unité de la philosophie. La connaissance du domaine de la cosmologie néo-scolastique, réduite à l’extrême du reste, est incorporée par eux au tronc même de la philosophie, conçue unitairement, et confondue par eux avec la métaphysique.Quelques néo-scolastiques polonais, entre autres le P. Franciszek Kwiatkowski SJ, les Ab. Ab. Marian Kowalewski, Stanisław Mazierski et Stanisław Kamiński laissent entendre, explicitement ou implicitement, que la philosophie de la nature est de la métaphysique spéciale.Enfin, F Ab. Stanisław Adamczyk soutient que la connaissance cosmologique est une métaphysique appliquée.Pour approfondir le type épistémologique et méthodologique qu’est la cosmologie néo-scolastique convenablement conçue, on s’est adressé également, depuis la guerre, aux travaux de Jacques Maritain; ce dernier maintient la distinction spécifique entre la discipline en cause et la métaphysique (Ab. Kazimierz Kłósak).2. Quelle valeur présentent ces diverses positions? Kalinowski n’a pas été en mesure de prouver que la connaissance relevant de la cosmologie néo-scolastique appartient au tronc de la philosophie puisqu’il n’a pas su montrer effectivement la vérité de la thèse avancée par lui comme fondement de preuve, à savoir celle de l’unité de la philosophie-métaphysique. Il ne l’a pas démontré ne serait-ce que pour la raison que, même s’il était exact que l’objet formel de la métaphysique est l’être contingent en tant qu’être contingent comme il l’affirme, il n’en découlerait pas, pour autant, qu’une des fins de la métaphysique est l’interprétation parfaite de l’essence de l’être contingent comme tel, en montrant les causes matérielle et formelle. Ce qui justifie, en effet, l’attribution d’une composition hylomorphique ce n’est pas contingent comme tel mais bien le fait „philosophique” que l’essence d’un groupe d’êtres contingents, purement matériels ou à la fois matériels et spirituels, n’est pas simple. L’unité de la philosophie-métaphysique, conduisant à supprimer l’autonomie épistémologique et méthodologique de la philosophie de la nature, Kalinowski ne l’a pas prouvée pour cette autre raison non plus qu’il n’a montré la liaison organique entre les thèses philosophiques que dans un domaine très étroit, limité en effet à ces thèses seules dans le cadre desquelles, partant des êtres contingents, on parvient à l’idée d’existence de l’être nécessaire — Dieu.Des déclarations du P. Krąpiec on en a examiné deux: l’une exprimée dans l’ouvrage Realizm ludzkiego poznania (Réalisme de la connaissance humaine), Poznań 1959, p. 54, l’autre contenue dans la première partie, son oeuvre, du livre écrit en collaboration avec l’Ab. Kamiński, Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki (Théorie et méthodologie de la métaphysique), Lublin 1962, pp. 270—271.Le premier de ces textes pose que la connaissance dans la philosophie néo-scolastique de la nature a un caractère métaphysique, la cosmologie en effet fait partie intégrante de l’unique, au sens analogique, et indivisible science qu’est la métaphysique de sorte qu’une différenciation de la philosophie de la nature sur la base de son objet a un caractère secondaire et inessentiel, fondé qu’il est sur la mise en relief d’un état général des êtres. Cette conception n’est pas recevable car la mobilitas qui, n’étant aucunement un mode général d’être est l’unique perspective formelle que l’on puisse prendre en considération dans l’examen de la proposition ici analysée, ne justifie en aucune manière l’identification de la connaissance propre à la cosmologie avec la connaissance métaphysique. Il en est ainsi parce que les êtres soumis au mouvement au sens strict ne peuvent être, comme tels, objet d’étude métaphysique puisqu’ils ne sont« absolument pas pris en considération dans son objet formel qui est l’être en tant qu’être.Dans le second texte le P. Krąpiec, après avoir énuméré parmi les „éléments” composant l’être au plan métaphysique la matière première et la forme substantielle, pose la question si l’on ne peut formuler l’objection que l’analyse de ces deux „éléments” appartient à la philosophie de l’être matériel et non à celle de l’être en tant qu’être. Le P. Krąpiec répond qu’une telle objection serait sans objet car par -être en tant qu’être il faut entendre non une nature „détachée” mais bien „l’être en tant que possédant existence concrète” ou, plus précisément, les êtres matériels concrets, directement perceptibles.Cette forme d’argumentation non plus ne saurait nous convaincre. Si l’expression „être en tant qu’être” équivalait à l’expression „être en tant que doué d’existence concrète”, on devrait proscrire la première de ces expressions comme ne possédant le contenu différent de la deuxième. Or, dans une telle situation, on baserait la métaphysique, à prendre la chose strictement, non sur l’idée de l’être en tant qu’être mais sur l’idée de ce qui existe concrètement dans le domaine des êtres matériels.Ce qui a conduit le P. Krąpiec sur la voie d’une métaphysique du concret c’est d’abord sa façon d’entendre l’abstraction. Selon lui, elle „détache certaines parties du tout dans le but de mieux connaître ces parties ou même des éléments isolés quelconques”. Il est évident que l’abstraction ainsi conçue ne nous met pas en mesure de distinguer l’aspect d’être quelque chose d’existant, aspect qui peut constituer l’unique cor tenu propre de l’expression „être en tant qu’être”. Ce que cette expression désigne ne constitue pas en effet une partie qui se laisserait abstraire, détacher d’un tout car tout ce qui est, est être. L’aspect d’être quelque chose d’existant ne peut être isolé qu’au moyen de l’abstraction telle que l’a définie l’Ab. Louis de Raeymaeker dans sa Metaphysica generalis, Louvain 1935, vol. I, p 20, où l’on saisit l’entier objet de connaissance sous un aspect déterminé à l’exclusion de tous ses autres aspects, identiques au premier dans la réalité mais différents mentalement ou logiquement. A partir de cette définition nous pouvons en tout ce qui, d’une manière quelconque, est quelque chose et non néant, écarter toutes déterminations comme telles, caractéristiques à des objets concrets et des objets abstraits, pour nous arrêter uniquement à l’aspect le plus fondamental de ces objets, celui d’être quelque chose d’existant. Ce faisant, on n’écarte pas l’être quand on ne prend pas en considération les déterminations indiquées comme telles puisqu’on en tient précisément compte pour autant qu’elles sont être. Mais le P. Krąpiec, lui, ne connaît pas une telle voie menant à l’être en tant qu’être.Ce qui l’a de plus incliné à identifier l’être comme tel à „l'’être en tant qu’existant concrètement” c’est son interprétation personnelle des vues du P. L. B. Geiger OP sur le rôle de ce qu’on appelle séparation métaphysique au sens strict. Le professeur lublinien pense en effet qu’à la base de l’idée de l’être en tant qu’être apparaît la séparation mentionnée qui, distinguant à l’aide de jugements négatifs „prédicatifs” „l’idée-de l’être en tant qu’être de jugements existencieis donnés affirmant l’existence d’êtres, déterminés", „ne disjoint pas l’être en tant qu’être d’avec les êtres concrets".Avançant cette affirmation le P. Krąpiec oublie que si, selon le commentaire de St. Thomas au De Trinitate de Boèce, la séparation mentionnée doit s’exprimer en un véritable jugement négatif „prédicatif", elle ne peut se rapporter qu’ à ce qui est séparé de soi dans la réalité (in re, secundum re),alors que l’entité n’est pas séparée du concret des choses car tout ce qui les constitue est être. Ce n’est donc pas au moyen de l’abstraction strictement entendue, réalisée dans le cadre de jugements négatifs „prédicatifs" que nous pouvons isoler par la pensée l’être en tant qu’être. St. Thomas n’affirme nulle part dans le commentaire en question que la connaissance de l’être en tant qu’êtie se fait au moyen de l’abstraction au sens strict. Rien d’étonnant en cela puisqu’elle ne peut en fait établir que ce qu’exprime la proposition du P. Krąpiec que „être en tant qu’être, autrement dit l’être en tant qu’objet de la métaphysique n’est pas [...] l’être matériel en tant que tel — car seraient aiors exclus les êtres non matériels; ce n’est pas non plus l’être immatériel comme tel — car seraient alors exclus les êtres matériels; ce n’est pas la substance en tant que substance, ni l’accident en tant qu’accident; cet objet ne peut être le cheval en tant que cheval, ni l’homme en tant qu’homme, ni l’idée en tant qu’idée". (Teoria ana- logii bytu: Théorie de l’analogie de l’être, Lublin 1959, p. 138). Il est dommage que, formulant ee& justes remarques, le P. Krąpiec ne se soit pas aperçu que, quand nous établissons au moyen de la séparation au sens strict que „l’être [...] en tant qu’être n’est pas indissolublement lié à telle ou telle catégorie ou mode d’existence", nous sommes déjà en possession de l’idée de l’êtie en tant qu’être et ne faisons, que préciser davantage à quoi l’être en tant qu’être ne se réduit pas. Si le P. Krąpiec avait tenu compte de cette circonstance il n’aurait peut-être pas eu de sérieuses difficultés à admettre la thèse que s’il existe une voie pour arriver à la connaissance de l’être en tant qu’être, avant la détermination ultérieure de ce à quoi l’être ne se réduit pas, cette voie ne peut être que la séparation au sens large, en fait une espèce particulière d’abstraction grâce à laquelle dans l’idée, partant secundum primam operationem (inteile- ctus) potest separare [...] [aliqua] quae secundum rem separata non sunt. {In librum Boëtii de Trinitate expositio, cura et studio P. Fr. Mannis Calcaterra OP, lect. II, qu. I [VJ, p. 3, Opuscula théologien, vol. II, Taurini-Romae 1954, p. 371).Les néo-scolastiques polonais qui placent la philosophie de la nature au rang delà métaphysique spécial ne manifestent pas ces tendances réductionnistes que l’on note chez Kalinowski et chez le P. Krąpiec. C’est à n’en pas douter un élément positif. Pourtant faire de la cosmologie une métaphysique particulière peut facilement conduire à la perte de la perspective épistémologique propre, remplacée par le point de vue métaphysique (étude de l’être soumis au mouvement au sens strict sous l’angle de l’être) et la pousser à s’attacher à des thèses métaphysiques qui lui sont étrangères, celles notamment de la première cause efficiente et de la dernière cause finale du cosmos. Indépendamment de ce danger il faut encore remarquer que la philosophie de la nature dont la problématique se concentre traditionnellement autour de l’ens mobile ne saurait constituer aucune métaphysique spéciale: quand nous pen- soïis, en effet, à l’être en ta\nt qu’être, nous ne prenons en considération, ni directement ni indirectement, l’être soumis au mouvement physique.Les vues de l’Ab. Adamczyk, qui fait de la cosmologie une métaphysique appliquée, présentent le même danger presque que la position dont on vient de parler. Une fois de plus on risque d’introduire dans la philosophie de la nature des thèses métaphysiques et une perspective épistémologique métaphysique. Devons-nous donc, en présence de ce danger concevoir la philosophie de la nature comme de la métaphysique appliquée? Une telle nécessité ne s’imposerait que si l’on ne pouvait faire de la cosmologie autrement qu’en partant de la métaphysique. Or une telle construction „par le haut44 n’est nullement indispensable puisque l’on peut aussi bien la développer à partir „d’en bas", sans appel préalable à la métaphysique. A supposer même que l’on choisisse la voie „par en haut", légitime du reste, il faudra adapter strictement les formules métaphysiques à l’ordre physique, ce qui donnera en fin de compte non une métaphysique appliquée mais une authentique philosophie de la nature, celle-là même à laquelle on serait parvenu par „en bas".

It is beyond doubt that the term „individual” belongs to the vocabulary of physics. Yet, it is not the physicist but the philosopher that defines the idea of individual. Hence the necessary confrontation between its philosophical content and the meaning it possesses in physics. This precisely the problem discussed in the article.The philosophical definition — St. Thomas’s — is given first. Next, various basic characteristics of both classical and quantum mechanics are discussed, followed by the presentation of the main problem itself. The author analyzes in turn the characteristics of classical mechanics: definability of the position of points in space through the Cartesian three-dimensional system, controlability of the identity of the physical body examined as well as possibility to create macroscopic models of real bodies. He remarks that the quantum theory rejects these properties.Such a state of the matter causes a „natural” concordance between the classical, physical idea of individual and its philosophical content, while, on the other hand it seems to preclude the notion of a „quantum” individual. Closer investigation, however, shows that the conclusions reached by the quantum mechanics do not oppose the problem of individual or question the scholastic definition, either. On the contrary, the quantum mechanics enables us to reach the right interpretation of the definition of the individual, namely that in the following definition of the individual: individuum est id quod est in se indivisum, ab aliis vero divisum, the words: ab aliis divisum, cannot be left out.The example above may also serve as a contribution to the discussion of the interesting problem of the interdependency of philosophy and specialized science.

The guiding idea of the theory of biological systems is that, at the present stage of the knowledge of life, a hierarchy of systems can be distinguished in the biosphere; thus, speaking of multicell alar bëings, the elementary system is represented by the cell, while the organism is a higher order system, and biocenosis the highest order.Each of the biological systems mentioned is characterized by a defined structure, a function and fen evolution of its own.Cells, organisms and bioceneses, despite some autonomy as regards structure, function and development, form a constitutional whole, the organism being the link on which the continuity of existence of both cells and biocenoses depends. On the other hand, the survival of the organism is conditioned by the cell, through food assimilation, and to the ecosystem, through food storage. The constitutional unity of biocenosis is further confirmed by the biological evolution which is precisely conditioned by hereditary changes occurring at the cell level, and by natural selection appearing at the ecosystem level.

Piaget explains intelligence from the biological and logical viewpoint. Seen biologically, intelligence is the best form of the adaptation of the 'organism to environment. This adaptation appears 1. as assimilation by the individual of surrounding reality by means of more and more evolving conceptual schemes, and2. as accommodation, i. e. modification and development of the latter under the influence of the reality apprehended.Piaget’s logical viewpoint on intelligence is revealed in his statement that the laws of logic reflect those of thought. He attempts,, therefore, to find out, in the developing mind of the child, higher and higher mental functions which achieve their most perfect form in logistics.According to Piaget, mental functions derive from actual motor activity of the child which gradually interiorizes into thinking or mental operations. Piaget develops a whole theory of individual or grouped mental operations in more and more elaborate and elastic schemes of operations. These intricate systems preserve inner equilibrium owing to the laws of logic which rule them. That is wThy, Piaget’s investigations aim primarily at discovering the logical laws governing our thought and reflecting the laws of the latter.

The starting point in research is always a problem leading to cognitive operations. These operations are: reflection on the problems involved, choice of a working conception, method and way of elaboration, philosophical interpretation of the results. Hence the various trends in science should be divided according toa) problems, b) conception of work, c) method, d) type of elaboration (nomothetic, typological, analytic, etc.) and e) philosophy (idealistic or materialistic interpretation etc.). In developmental psychology conceptional trends appeared first, they differed as to the factors of child’s development (nativism, empirism, con- vergism, multi-or three-factor theories of mental development). Modal trends came next; use of a) longitudinal sections to represent quantitative differences in functional development (Thorndike, Meumann, Binet, Claparède) or qualitative differences in the development of such phenomena as game (Groos, K. Biihler, Stern, Koffka), b) cross sections to characterize developmental stages (Piaget, Kroh, Turmlirz, Spranger) or integral approach (Steiner, Ch. Biihler). Methodical trends joined in, such as Piaget’s clinical method, Biihlerism using statistics, psychometry using tests, structuralism expressing psychic layers in tables. Psychoanalysis, Gestalt psychology and Pavlovism bring in philosophical trends. In educational psychology, problems and conceptions remain the main concern, while methods and modes play only a second-rank part. Behavioral psychology differs from learning psychology as to the problems taken into account. Conceptional trends derive either from general psychology (ecologism, biologism, neurologism, psychologism) or from pedagogics (progressivism, esentialism, reconstructivism, perennialism) or even from philosophical systems which interpret mental integration in terms of Pavlovian cortical synthesis (materialism), Freud’s sublimation (naturalism), idealism or spirituality of a free and rational soul (Christian realism). The knowledge of the trends existing in developmental and educational psychology facilitates a better preparation of the students to teaching profession.

Jędrzej Śniadecki (1768—1838), an eminent physician and scholar of the Enlightenment period, proposed a theory of his own on brain localization in connection with Gall’s „cranial system”. The views of the Polish scientist on the matter were part of his general conception of life as expounded in his basic work Teoria jestestw organicznych (Theory of organic beings).Śniadecki maintains that only germs of psychic qualities are innate, not the qualities themselves. Therefore, external influences, especially education, have such impact on the development of personality. The fundamental organ of all psychic processes is the brain, yet other organs, and the physical constitution as a whole in particular, are not without influence on the psyche. Psychic efficiency does not depend solely on the size of the brain but on the differentiation of its parts as well. The brain is not a homogenous „thinking mass”; it consists of a number of parts, morphologically distinguishable. Each part performs probably a distinct role, as organ of a particular psychic function. Gall is wrong, however, when he affirms that each psychic function belongs to a separate cerebral organ, operating independently. The individual parts of the brain can perform some simple psychic functions only, while every psychic act we observe requires the cooperation of memory, reason, imagination etc.; hence the simultaneous action of all „brain organs”. The hypothetical „brain organs” appear, then, as interdependent. In other words, the brain always acts as a whole, though its individual parts do not share equally in this activity. In consequence, Gall’s diagnostic method itself is without value, since it is based on erroneous theoretical hypotheses. The fact remains, however, that Gall’s method of investigation of brain structures in association with the observation of psychic characteristics is very valuable and. should be pursued in further research. Śniadecki expects much of comparative anatomy in particular.The development of science has shown that éniadecki’s theoretical views were right, and further investigation along the lines suggested by Gall proved very fertile. Sniadecki’s theory however, failed to play a significant part in the development' of the science of cerebral functions. Often quoted by eminent European scientists, he soon fell into oblivion wh^n the partitioning powers destroyed Polish research centres. Calling back to memory the ideas of our great predecessors we wish to have them integrated into our common, nowadays universal, culture.

The confrontation of the two systems of thought, distant from each other in time, yet both characteristic of, and highly significant in their respective epochs, aims at showing their differences and similarities, while revealing common, time transcending problems, and kindred solutions, on the subject of thought, in mediaeval and in contemporary man.Thomism distinguishes sensual knowledge from intellectual knowledge, i. e. from thought, though it associates them functionally. Thought is of a spiritual character; it leads to knowledge transcending phenomenon, it forms the basis of man’s religious and moral life. The thomist conception of life stands half-way between sensualism, whose genesis of thought it accepts since it recognizes the dependency of thought on empirical cognitive material, and idealism, with which it agrees in the emphasis on the creative and immaterial character of the process of thought.Heidegger’s existentialism assumes a two-degree thought: basic thought and computing thought. It emphasizes the pragmatism of thought, its connection with material environment, and, above all, its ontic character. Thought is a vital necessity, an effort towards the explanation of the mystery of being; at the same time, it is an answer to the calling of the world, the announcement of and hope for its knowledge. Thought is not yet, strictly speaking, knowledge, but a peculiar sensitive experience which later on undergoes a reflective process and becomes computing thought. It tends to truth which is not, however, the conformity of mind to reality, as St. Thomas teaches, but a mere form of the revelation of being. Man conquers never and never truths because he himself exists essentially in truth, since he exists in the world and, by means of thought, achieves a gradual understanding of the meaning and usefulness of the things existing in the world.

1. Celem artykułu jest: a) charakterystyka poziomu rozwoju intelektualnego mongoloidów pozostających pod opieką wychowawczą rodziców, b) prześledzenie dynamiki ich rozwoju umysłowego i społecznego, oraz c) ujęcie dynamiki rozwoju pojęć liczbowych w zespole L. Downa.2. Metody badań. Zastosowano skalę Psyche Cattell, L. Termana i M. Merrill, 1937, wersję L. (umożliwiały one ocenę poziomu rozwoju intelektualnego), skalę E. Doiła dojrzałości społecznej, metodę eksperymentu (w celu ujęcia dynamiki rozwoju pojęć liczbowych), metodę obserwacji oraz wywiad. Pacjentów poddano rówmież badaniom lekarskim: psychiatrycznym, neurologicznym i w miarę potrzeby innym. Diagnostyka niedorozwoju umysłowego opiera się na pełnym badaniu psy- chologiczno-lekarskim.3. Materiał. Poziom rozwoju umysłowego bazuje na wynikach badań 155 osób w wieku od 7 mieś. do 36:4 lat, u których rozpoznano chorobę L. Downa (mon- goloidyzm). Większość pacjentów była leczona w Poradni Zdrowia Psychicznego w Lublinie. Częstość występowania poszczególnych stopni niedorozwoju umysłowego opiera się na badaniach 112 osób, które ukończyły 7 rok życia. Wyłączono dzieci poniżej 7 lat, gdzie rozpoznanie określonego stopnia niedorozwoju umysłowego nie jest jeszcze pewne. Dynamika rozwoju umysłowego opiera się na materiale 286 badań dokonanych przy pomocy skali Psyche Cattell oraz L. Termana i M. Merrill, 1937, natomiast dynamika rozwoju społecznego — na materiale 219 badań, dokonanych skalą E. Doiła. Autor omawia zmiany neurologiczne u badanych osób. Badaniem psychiatrycznym nie stwierdzono objawów choroby psychicznej. Nie ujawniono również głuchoty ani niedosłyszenia.4. Wyniki badań, a) Średni iloraz inteligencji całej grupy badanych osób (155) wynosi 34,1, zaś odchylenie standardowe 9,56. Mediana i modalna wynoszą 34,L Średni iloraz inteligencji kształtuje się w granicach imbecylizmu średniego stopnia. U wszystkich rozpoznano niedorozwój umysłowy. Ilorazy inteligencji całej badanej grupy osób wahają się w granicach od 5 do 58. Poziom rozwoju intelektualnego badanej grupy waha się w granicach od głębokiego idiotyzmu do debilizmu średniego stopnia. Z trzech stopni niedorozwoju umysłowego najczęściej spotykamy wśród mongoloidówT imbecylizm, gdyż w 91,l°/o (I.I od 21 do 50), później idiotyzm: 7,1% (I.I. od 1 do 20), zaś na końcu — debilizm: 1,8% (I.I. od 51 do 70). Z trzech stopni imbecylizmu najczęściej występuje imbecylizm średniego stopnia (41,96%), później imbecylizm głębokiego stopnia (36,61%), na końcu zaś lekkiego stopnia (12,53%). Natomiast z trzech stopni idiotyzmu najczęściej mamy do czynienia w zespole L.. Downa z idiotyzmem lekkiego stopnia; idiotyzm średniego i głębokiego stopnia wystąpił w takim samym odsetku. Debilizm głębokiego i średniego stopnia również wystąpił w takim samym odsetku przypadków. Krzywa wieku inteligencji mon- goloidów zdaje się wskazywać na względnie systematyczny rozwój umysłowy do 22 roku życia. Najwyższy wiek inteligencji: 48 mieś. — osiągnęła najstarsza grupa, w której były osoby w wieku od 16 do 36,4 lat (średni wiek 22 ;7 lat). Ponieważ nie było jeszcze starszej grupy,* stąd też nie można powiedzieć, czy osiągnięty wiek inteligencji jest już szczytowym osiągnięciem, czy też nie. Wymagane są dalsze badania prowadzone wśród jeszcze starszych wiekiem mongoloidów. U badanych osób obserwujemy powolny postęp w rozwoju sprawności intelektualnych. Badania te nie pozwalają na zakreślenie granicy, której nie są w stanie mongoloidzi przekroczyć. Badania zdają się również wskazywać, że u grupy mongoloidów, jako grupy, ilorazy inteligencji nie wzrastają z biegiem czasu, stąd nie zmniejsza się ich stopień niedorozwoju umysłowego. Stwierdzenie to dotyczy grupy, gdyż w jednostkowych, rzadkich przypadkach, zdarza się, że ilorazy inteligencji wzrastają. Stąd konieczność systematycznego śledzenia dynamiki rozwoju intelektualnego każdego mongoloidy. Autor wykazuje, że środowisko miejskie i wiejskie jako takie, nie oddziaływają na tyle na umysłowość mongoloidów, by móc spowodować istotną zmianę w poziomie intelektualnym, ujmowanym przy pomocy skali Psyche Cattell oraz Stanford-Binet, 1937. Badania te zdają się wskazywać, iż istnieje związek między wykształceniem rodziców a poziomem rozwoju umysłowego mongoloidów ujmowanym obu wymienionymi metodami.b) Średni iloraz dojrzałości społecznej 112 badanych mongoloidów wynosi 47,0, odchylenie standardowe 12,6, zaś błąd normalny średniej arytmetycznej 1,2. Średni iloraz dojrzałości społecznej również wskazuje na poziom imbecylizmu badanej grupy osób. Najniższym ilorazem dojrzałości społecznej był 10,1, zaś najwyższym 79,6. .4,5%) osób uzyskało I.D.S. od 10 do 20, 50°/o — od 21 do 50, 43% — od 51 do 70, oraz 1,8% od 71 do 80. Najstarsza grupa mongoloidów osiągnęła poziom dojrzałości społecznej: 7 lat. Trzeba więc wielu lat, by mongoloid mógł osiągnąć taki poziom dojrzałości społecznej, jaki osiąga prawidłowo rozwijające się dziecko w 7 roku życia. Badania wykazują, że wiek dojrzałości społecznej stale postępuje naprzód u badanej grupy osób; nie notujemy żadnych statystycznie istotnych obniżeń, ani też plateau, które świadczyłoby o osiągnięciu pułapu rozwoju. Badania zdają się wykazywać, iż dopiero od 3 roku życia mongoloidów występuje statystycznie istotna różnica między wiekiem dojrzałości społecznej a wiekiem życia oraz między ilorazami dojrzałości społecznej a ilorazami inteligencji, na korzyść tych pierwszych. Oznacza ona, że u mongoloidów lepsze jest przystosowanie życiowe oraz przystosowanie społeczne, niż na to wskazują badania ich rozwoju intelektualnego. Zdaje się ona również wskazywać na lepszy rozwój inteligencji praktycznej niż słownej w zespole L. Downa.c) W wyniku szczegółowej analizy statystycznej materiału autor dochodzi do wniosku, że rozwój pojęć liczbowych nie pozostaje w bezpośrednim związku z wiekiem życia mongoloidów, ale z wiekiem ich inteligencji mierzonej skalą Psyche Cattell oraz Stanford-Binet, 1937 Wykazanie powiązań między zasobem pojęć liczbowych a określonym wiekiem inteligencji pozwala na przewidywanie istnienia lub braku określonych pojęć liczbowych u danego mongoloidy w oparciu o wynik badania jego inteligencji ogólnej. Autor proponuje oparcie faz rozwoju pojęć liczbowych u mongoloidów nie na wieku życia (jak to czyni J. Kiihnel w stosunku do dzieci prawidłowo rozwijających się umysłowo), ale na ich wieku inteligencji. Charakteryzuje on poszczególne fazy oraz podaje wiek inteligencji, przy którym występuje określona faza rozwoju pojęć liczbowych u mongoloidów.

The methods applied so far in teaching the deaf develop to some extent the -capacity for understanding amf using verbal language in those subjects who have been placed in proper time under the influence of special schools.The investigations described in the article aimed at determining to what extent deaf children can perceive the meaning of sentences conveyed to them through spoken words. The subjects examined were communicated three sentences the apprehension of which was ascertained by analysing the pictures that the children were asked to draw to illustrate what contents they had grasped from the text transmitted to them through spoken and written words. In that way 120 pictures were gathered from a group of forty children, examined three times in the course of their 4-year stay at school.The pictures were classified in four groups: incorrect, syncretic, analytic, syn- thetizing or correct. The analysis revealed that the deaf understand verbal language primarily as a whole, i. e. syncretically. The general, schematic perception of the whole precedes the understanding of the particular elements of the sentence,i. e. words. Sometimes the whole context makes it possible to grasp- the meaning of a new word. Many significant particulars, e. g. the relationship expressed by prepositions, remain beyond the apprehension of the deaf; hence frequent misinterpretations of the spoken language, entailing a number of errors in thinking which, in such conditions, is little distinct, chaotic, while logical deduction is hampered. The syntax of sign language is different from that of verbal language, that is why the change from picture thought to abstract, symbolic thought, based on verbal language is made very difficult. Syncretic apprehension of verbal language in deaf children appears not only as a stage in mental development, it is also a phenomenon enabling them to know reality and adapt to it, despite the poverty of cognitive contents, an inevitable consequence of deafness.

The investigation described in the article aims at throwing more light on Piaget’s problem of „precausality”. On the basis of observation carried out on six groups, of thirty subjects each, of Polish children aged 7—12, the authors tried to ascertain wheter 1. pre-causal forms of thought exist, and whether 2. developmental stages, analogous to those distinguished by Piaget and other investigators, can be noticed. The method applied was that of Laurendeau and Pinard, based on materials collected mainly by Piaget. This method, akin to Piaget’s clinical method and having much in common with test methods, consisted in asking the children to explain such phenomena as dream, the idea of life, the genesis of night, the movement of clouds, why some objects float on water while others sink. The observation took place in Cracow in 1964 in a population of children belonging to a physical workers’environment. In the analysis of the results, the authors made use of the criteria give*n by Laurendeau and Pinard, slightly mody- fying them when it appeared necessary. The results were then compared with those obtained in Canada by the authors just mentioned (comparison restricted to children of 7—12). Both series of results were presented in tables. The differences revealed between Polish and Canadian results are discussed in the detailed analysis of the answers to the questionnaires.On the whole, the results obtained in the Polish population show the existence of primitive thought, of the pre-causal type, in children. Of the different forms covered by the 5-questionnaire investigation, animism appeared with the highest intensity. Other pre-causal forms such as realism, artificialism, finalism and dynamism were also revealed but in a fragmentary state and limited range. The reason why comparatively few pure forms other than animism were discovered is probably that the analysis did not extend to children of 4—6 years of age. Polish children, at least the sample tested, show a rather general tendency to explain, such phenomena as night, movement of clouds, floating on water and sinking, by physical and natural factors.The intricate problem of the existence of stages could not be solved, as the group examined included comparatively few subjects, little or not differentiated as regards sex and environment (180 boys, aged 7—12, workers’environment). The only regularity perceived in the answers was the gradual disappearance of pre-causal forms of thought, replaced by a more correct interpretation, parallel to the growing of chronological age. The fact may attest a continuity of mental development. The general level of causal and final explanation, as gathered from the data supplied by the Polish sample, depends more on the child’s experience and direct contact with objects than on chronological age.The scientific value of all results is always closely related to that of the method applied. It is probable that the characteristics of pre-causal thought In children, investigated here, would have appeared more clearly, had other kinds of problems or phenomena been proposed for interpretation. Among the items chosen by Laurendeau and Pinard, the dreams aroused the smallest interest in Polish children. The purely verbal character of the first four questionnaires also made it difficult to secure reliable results. It seems that such questionnaires cannot suffice for the investigation with children under 11—12 years of age since, according, to Piaget’s theory, thought is inseparably associated with action at this stage of life. The investigations should therefore tend first of all to find better methods. „Longitudinal” investigation, prolonged over a long period, and covering quantitatively larger groups of differentiated population, with a more extensive use of statistical methods, may yield the most effective results.

The question of how far God may be known is, in contemporary thought, extremely complicated and multiple-conditioned. Modern philosophical trends, first Kantism and Positivism and later Phenomenology an.d Existentialism, brought in new styles and methods and the intellectual atmosphere of our times.Three phenomena appear to be most symptomatic of the expression of the chief tendencies in this field: 1. The starting-point of considerations which are to lead us to a knowledge of God, is to be primarily man: his cognition, activity, situation, 2. prejudice against rational cognition. Intuition, instinct, feelings are held to be more adequate tools than the intellect, 3. an attempt to reach a kind of synthesis, to comprehend the whole, which leads to a blurring of boundaries between the various planes of cognition.The development of reflective philosophy (in both forms), the renaissance of the ontological proof, extreme revelationism and rejection of natural theology, and, above all, the development of the concept of the religious cognition of God are various forms of the realization of the tendencies indicated.

Henry of Ghent is commonly known in the History of Philosophy as one of the opponents of Thomism in the thirteenth century. The point discussed here is whether the „anti-thomist” Henry is to be considered as an essentialist as well.On the basis of Henry’s Summae Quaestionum and Quodlibeta the author endeavours to point out the two sources of misunderstanding leading to wrong conclusions, viz. 1. Henry’s terminology different from Thoma’s especially as regards ttie basic metaphysical concepts; 2. Henry interprets the real being in an entirely different manner from Thomas Aquinas.Nevertheless Henry remains on existential ground because: 1. his idea of God is wholly existential, and so is, too; 2. his analysis of concrete being, which he sees as a „limited existence”; 3. according to him the object of analysis does not consist in the content of being but solely and exclusively in the mode of being; 4. the modes of being are „instrumental” in the logical deduction and demonstration of the categories of being; 5. the theory of the analogy of being, as outlined in the Summae Quaestionum, is based exclusively on existence.

In addition to the classically essentialising so-called traditional (scholastic) Thomism, especially under the influence of the philosophic thought of Cajetanus, Suarez and Wolff, at the present time avant-garde Thomism has its own essentialising version. What E. Braun calls the neoessentialistic interpretation of the Thomistic concept of being, depends, generally speaking, on substantializing the transcendent act of being, in relation to nature, in such a manner that both the existential actuality and the formal actuality are present in the act of esse. The author of the present article, after considering certain neoessentialistic objection to the so-called existentialistic concept of being in E. Gilson, analyses the theory of ontic esse in the works of C. Fabro and J. B. Lotz. Insofar as, according to the author of the present article, the metaphysical views of C. Fabro supplement Gilson’s interpretation of the Thomistic concept of being, Lotz’s theory of the ontic esse is a classical example of scholastic neoessentialism. The article ends with suggestions for distinguishing, in the field of metaphysical cognition, the so-called, „ontologic” and „ontic” analyses of reality, relative to the Thomistic thesis of the overlapping of so-called infraontic factors.