The goal of this paper is twofold. First, it aims to identify in Heidegger’s work a determination of the history of metaphysics parallel to the famous onto-theological one, and which I will label onto-agathological. Based upon a text from the course of 1935, “Einführung in die Metaphysik,” I argue that for Heidegger the history of metaphysics is not only the Aristotelian onto-theology, but is also characterized by the Platonic pre-eminence of the good over being (Republic 509c). In short, it is an onto-agathological history. Second, and as a consequence of the first point, I will flesh out the hypothesis of another history metaphysics, and emphasize its strong phenomenological content which stands in opposition to the Neo-Kantianism of Windelband and Rickert.

In this article I shall largely make use of terms like “responding,” “responsive,” and “responsivity.” These terms are not part of traditional philosophy. They became indispensable for my own thinking when I tried to develop a theory of radical Fremdheit, of alienness or otherness. Hence I came to a sort of responsive phenomenology that does not replace current variants of phenomenology, but sets a new tone. This is what I try to show in my article. I shall proceed in four steps. In the first step, dealing with the formation of the theory, I try to show how our experience of radical otherness leads to the key concept of responsivity (sect. 1–3). In the second step, I shall describe the main features of responsivity and its pathological deviations (sect. 4–6). In the third step, this perspective will be expanded by referring to co-affection and co-responsivity as elements of proto-sociality (sect. 7). The fourth and last step will offer a practical outlook, raising the question to what extent responsivity can be organised and institutionalised (sect. 8).

Since his 1977 The Idol and Distance (L’idole et la distance), Jean-Luc Marion has almost continually drawn upon the work of the 5th-6th century Christian mystic Pseudo-Denys the Areopagite (Pseudo-Dionysius), not only within his explicitly theological considerations, but throughout his Cartesian and phenomenological work as well. The present essay maps out the influence of Denys upon Marion’s thinking, organizing Marion’s career into a three-part periodization, each of which corresponds to a distinct portion of the Dionysian corpus—in Marion’s work of the seventies the Celestial Hierarchy and the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy are foregrounded, in the eighties this emphasis is shifted to the The Divine Names, and in the nineties The Mystical Theology takes center stage. Insofar as these emphases directly correlate to the unique tasks that Marion has set himself in each of these various periods, Dionysius is revealed as a hermeneutical key, unlocking and clarifying crucial aspects of Marion’s theologically-inflected phenomenology.

This paper accomplishes two goals. First, the essay elucidates Husserl’s descriptions of meaning consciousness from the 1901 Logical Investigations. I examine Husserl’s observations about the three ways we can experience meaning and I discuss his conclusions about the structure of meaning intentions. Second, the paper explores how Husserl reworked that 1901 theory in his 1913/14 Revisions to the Sixth Investigation. I explore how Husserl transformed his descriptions of the three intentions involved in meaningful experience. By doing so, Husserl not only recognized intersubjective communication as the condition of possibility of linguistic meaning acts, but also transformed his account of the structure of both signitive and intuitive acts. In the conclusion, I cash out this analysis, by showing how, on the basis of these new insights, Husserl reconstructs his theory of fulfillment.

In this paper, I will reflect on the place of language within Michel Henry’s phenomenology. I will claim that Michel Henry’s position provokes an architectonic problem in his conception of phenomenology and I will discuss how he tried to solve it. At the end of the essay, I will try to clarify what I believe to be the ultimate root of that problem involving language.

What would be the result of reading Derrida from the standpoint of material phenomenology? And what would be the result of reading material phenomenology on the basis of the requirements of Derridean thought? These are the questions that this article endeavours to tackle by focusing on the two philosophers’ readings of Husserl’s Lectures on the Consciousness of Internal Time. At first strangely similar, these two readings soon display marked differences. Whereas Derrida, in his approach, is keen to demonstrate that there is never any pure presence, Michel Henry brings out an “Archi-presence” which he attempts to safeguard from any deconstruction. So perhaps material phenomenology functions as “quasi-deconstruction”, having the same relationship with Derridean thought as “negative theology” has with deconstruction.

Intuition is surely a theme of singular importance to phenomenology, and Henry writes sometimes as if intuition should receive extensive attention from phenomenologists. However, he devotes relatively little attention to the problem of intuition himself. Instead he off ers a complex critique of intuition and the central place it enjoys in phenomenological speculation. This article reconstructs Henry’s critique and raises some questions for his counterintuitive theory of intuition. While Henry cannot make a place for the traditional sort of intuition given his commitment to the primacy of life as the natural and spontaneous habitation of consciousness, an abode entirely outside the world, there nevertheless with some modification to Henry’s thinking could be a role for intuition to play in discerning the traces of life in the world.

In this contribution I want to sketch a phenomenology of music, expounding and expanding the philosophy of Michel Henry. In the work of Henry, several approaches to a phenomenology of music are made. The central question of the contribution is: “What do we hear when we hear music?” It is argued that there is an unbridgeable divide between the intentional sphere of the world and its sounds and what in Henry’s philosophy is understood as Life. Music is the language of Life itself and cannot be merely considered a composition of sound. Music does not imitate nor even represent the world, but is the inner movement of life itself. In this respect, Henry is close to Schopenhauer’s view on music, in which the Will is sharply contrasted to representation. However Schopenhauer’s thought needs a phenomenological elaboration in order to understand music as an immediate experience. In the article, music is compared to painting, since this is a recurring methodological theme in Henry’s thoughts on music.

Although most interpreters admit that Husserl was not guided by an interest in aesthetics when dealing with the various issues of image consciousness, his considerations are nevertheless usually interpreted in an aesthetic key. The article intends to challenge this line of interpretation by clearly separating between the neutrality of image consciousness, on one hand, and the disinterest of the aesthetic attitude towards reality, on the other hand, as well as by reviewing the elements in Husserl’s theory that led to their association.

The phenomenological tautology of life in Michel Henry’s works shows us that the radical concept of self-affection, in its own immanence, cannot be described in another way, either by metaphor or analogy for example, but only by that immediate relation like adequacy on itself: “life as life”. The reduplication of the fundamental concept in Henry’s last “theological” turn introduced a new Transcendence: the Self-Affection of the Absolute Life, the Christian God as Revelation. In this way, we can diversify the tautology of life trying to read it using Saint Maximus the Confessor’s theology: “Life as Life” like the Absolute phenomenological Life of Trinity in Unity; “life as Life” for the creation of the human living by the Living God; “life as life” for the existence of the man, ek-sisting in a world affected by the original transgression; “Life as life” for the Incarnation of the Logos of God; “life as Life — 2” for the rebirth of the human living into Christ and His Mystical Body.

This paper addresses a hitherto unexamined issue in the work of Michel Henry, namely, his critical interpretation of Martin Heidegger’s analysis of “appearing” and “speaking.” Throughout his distinguished career, Henry went to great philosophical lengths to distance himself from traditional phenomenology and from the work of Heidegger. However, for the most part, Henry’s critical reading of Heidegger has received little attention from phenomenologists and even that has been cursory. Hence, the central aim of this paper is twofold: (1) to show that Henry’s critique of the “appearing” and “speaking” of the world remains unanswered; and (2) to show that a proper reading of Heidegger throws light on the shortcomings of Henry’s own project. Hence, because the second objective follows necessarily from having achieved the first, this paper submits that what is first needed is a re-assessment of Henry’s critique in light of a more accurate understanding of the depth-dimension of “appearing” and “speaking,” which is, I argue, evinced in the analysis of the voice of conscience in Being and Time. The paper subsequentlyoffers what I see as a more appropriate interpretation of the call of conscience in terms of a radicalised “transcendence in immanence” which is not reducible to the mere exteriority of inner-worldly beings. The paper concludes by arguing that the voice of conscience underscores the shortfalls of Henry’s critique of the “appearing” and “speaking” of the world in Heidegger.

In elaborating his phenomenological project, Michel Henry refers to Søren Kierkegaard. After a brief survey of Henry’s phenomenology of the self, we will inquire whether this appropriation is accurate. It will be argued that Kierkegaard’s dialectics of existence can operate as a therapy or corrective in order to save Henry’s project of a radical immanent and passive self. If not, it suffers from incoherence both from a phenomenological as well as from a theological perspective. Each self-consciousness, even in its most extreme aff ective states, cannot dispose itself of refl ective remnants. On the contrary, it is precisely Kierkegaard’s proposition that refl ection intensifi es pathos. What appears as most near and dear to us, be it God, self or life, always touches from a distance.

Michel Henry, Worte Christi (Rolf Kühn); Michel Henry, „Ich bin die Wahrheit.“ Für eine Philosophie des Christentums (Sarah Helduser); Rolf Kühn, Subjektive Praxis und Geschichte — Phänomenologie politischer Aktualität (Sebastian Knöpker); Raphaël Gély, Rôles, action sociale et vie subjectives. Recherches à partir de la phénoménologie de Michel Henry (Eric Faÿ); Antoine Vidalin, La Parole de la Vie. La phénoménologie de Michel Henry et l’intelligence chrétienne des Ecritures (Rolf Kühn); John Mullarkey, Post Continental Philosophy (Michael O’Neill Burns); Sébastien Laoureux, Immanence à la limite. Recherches sur la phénoménologie de Michel Henry (Paul Terec); Francesco Saverio Trincia, Husserl, Freud e il problema dell’inconscio (Alice Pugilese).