RÉSUMÉ: Cet article propose une analyse critique de la conception du raisonnement pratique développée par John Broome. Suite à une présentation de certaines de ses thèses, j'expose quelques difficultés soulevées par la «double expression» et par certains aspects du cognitivisme qu'il endosse explicitement. Je présente deux conséquences qu'entraînent ces critiques, l'une portant sur le lien qu'il établit entre croyance et intention, et l'autre portant sur l'idée que nos raisonnements pratiques seraient nécessairement enchevêtrés à nos raisonnements théoriques. Finalement, j'essaie de montrer que la souree du problème auquel Broome semble être confronté réside dans la difficulté qu'il y a à distinguer clairement entre le raisonnement (relation entre des états mentaux) et la deseription du contenu du raisonnement (relation entre des propositions).ABSTRACT: This article offers a critical analysis of John Broome's conception of practical reasoning. I first introduce his main claims and then point out some of the difficulties raised by the notion of "double expression" and by some aspects of the cognitivism which he explicitly endorses. I then emphasize two consequences of these criticisms: one concerning the link he sees between belief and intention, and the other concerning the idea that our practical reasonings are inextricably linked to our theoretical reasonings. Finally, I argue that the problem Broome seems to be facing has its source in the difficulty of distinguishing clearly between reasoning (a relation between mental states) and the description of its content (a relation between propositions).

I submit what, I believe, is a fairly new definition of the nation, one which I call the sociopolitical conception. I try to avoid as much as possible the traditional dichotomy between the exclusively civic and ethnic accounts, and try to explain my reasons for doing so. I also adopt as a general framework a certain conceptual pluralism which allows me to use many different concepts of the nation. After that, I proceed by formulating some constraints on any acceptable new definition. My own sociopolitical conception is then finally introduced. The sociopolitical nation is a political community, most often composed, sociologically, of a national majority, national minorities, and individuals with other national origins. The concept of national majority is crucial for the account and refers to the largest sample in the world of a given population sharing a common language, history, and culture. National minorities are defined as extensions of neighbouring nations, while individuals of other national origins are those members of ethnic minorities that have come from immigration. There would be no sociopolitical nation if there were no national majority, but this is compatible with a pluricultural and multi-ethnic view of the nation, since the political community may also include national minorities and individuals with a different origin. lend the article by showing that this definition meets the constraints that were initially introduced.

Though Habermas explicitly rejected psychoanalysis as a model for a critical theory of society, it seems to have continued to shape his thought beyond the publication of Knowledge and Human Interests. The conceptual framework underlying his more recent social theory (Theory of Communicative Action,) would also be indebted to the psychoanalytical paradigm. This thesis is developed through the idea of the pathology of society, which represents the cornerstone of a specifically critical theory of society. In his demonstration, the author establishes a structural relationship between psychical and social organization, and between individual pathology and the diagnostic of modern societies.

The non-existence of fictional entities does not seem incompatible with their possible existence. The aim of this paper is to give an accornt of the intuitive truth of statements of possible existence involving fictional proper names in an actualist framework. After having made clear the opposition between a possibilist and an actualist approach of possible worlds, I distinguish between fictional individuals and fictional characters and between the fictional use offictional proper names and their metafictional use. On that basis, statements of possible existence involving fictional proper names appear to say of fictional characters conceived as abstact objects that they might have been exemplified.

We believe that, granting radical holism, a homophonie (or disquotational) definition of truth for a language achieves no progress towards guaranteeing the material equivalence of the left- and right-hand-side sentences for T-sentences. In order to avoid paradoxes such as the antinomy of the liar, Tarski requires that the metalanguage be semantically richer than the object language. For a radical holist, the difference in semantic powers of the meta- and object languages means that homophony is no guarantee of synonymy; therefore, worries about the indeterminacy of translation still apply.

This paper focuses on Heideggers 1937 lecture course on the Nietzschean doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same. Heidegger interprets the motive of recurrence in Nietzsche as the Moment (Augenblick) of the Eternal Recurrence. Through this key motive of the moment, we try then to examine the double function of the doctrine which, on the one hand, refers us back to some essential themes of the existential analytics, whereas, on the other hand, it paves the way for the new confrontation with metaphysics in the Beitrâge zur Philosophie. We hold that the turning away from the existential conception of the moment toward its “aletheiological” understanding in terms of a “site of the Moment” (die Augenblicksstàtte) takes place in the context of this very lecture course. This transition is even more critical as it constitutes the very heart of Heidegger s critique of subjectivity in the new perspective opened by the history of Being: Nietzsche's doctrine of time provides the basis for this questioning.