The term “rationality” is applied to many different things, from beliefs and preferences to decisions and choices, actions and behaviors, people, collectivities, andinstitutions. Therefore this paper will limit its considerations only to social preferences and choices in order to clarify the role of rationality in social explanation. The paper will focus on degrees of rationality, calling upon the concept of transitivity for help.

The aim of this article is to offer a contribution to our understanding of the way in which reason appropriated the idea of system at the beginning of the modernity and made from it one of its emblematical forms of expression. I will start with seminal remarks on the topic from Martin Heidegger, and will then move to the idea of the system in the works of René Descartes, the pathfinder of modern philosophy. After commenting on some Cartesian ideas, I will outline six points of support for and development of Heidegger’s conception about the system of philosophy and its roots in modern science.

This paper considers the rediscovery of Hegel currently taking place in the analytic philosophy. Going back to the Hegelian texts themselves, I will try to show how they can help to decisively solve some problems of contemporary philosophy. I will concentrate on the theme of knowledge, and especially mathematical knowledge, in relation to Hegelian dialectical logic.

In the 10th century, the Brethren of Purity conceived a henological arithmetic which they believed could explain the mathematical structure of the cosmos (as a macroanthropos), and could lead the student to the discovery of the real substance of his own soul (as a micro-cosmos), a discovery which is the first step towards knowledge of metaphysical and theological truth.

Since 1996, when David Chalmers introduced the zombie argument against physicalism in The Conscious Mind, numerous works of ever-increasing technical complexity and nuanced argumentation have been written on the conceivability and possibility of zombies. In this paper, I focus on the main points of the argument. First, I discuss the conceivability of zombies. I briefly outline three other thought-experiments in order to determine what is expected of a good thought-experiment and its workings. Next, I turn to Chalmers' defense of their conceivability, where the key consideration is to present conceivability as a credible a priori method that can entail metaphysical possibility. I conclude that Chalmers does not manage to create a credible link between conceivability and possibility, thus failing to show that zombies are not only conceptually possible, but also metaphysically possible. The most problematic idea is the identification of logically possible worlds with metaphysically possible worlds. Chalmers' main aim is to defend conceivability as an a priori method of acquiring modal knowledge, but by limiting it to the rational domain, the acquired knowledge is not knowledge of the objective reality, but of the content of our thoughts.

A common objection to coherence theories of justification comes from belief revision processes: in a system of knowledge, perceptual beliefs seem to bear more importance than other members of the coherent set do. They are more stable in the face of confronting evidence, and may be preserved despite their degrading effect on the coherence properties of the system. This appears to be inconsistent with coherentism, according to which beliefs cannot possess independent credibility. In order to abide by the coherence theory, one must explain the stability of perceptual beliefs in belief revision in a manner that does not rely on foundationalist premises. A suggestion about the personal justification of perceptual beliefs in terms of coherence is presented in the paper to explain their stability in belief revision processes. The coherence of perceptual beliefs and a network account of knowledge are advocated in order to avoid weak foundationalism and to provide a new perspective to the normative problems of epistemic justification.

Some of the information that we learn comes to us in a conditional form. This has proven to be a problem for philosophers, who try to explain how probabilistic beliefs change when one learns from conditional sentences. The problem is that a straight-forward solution is not possible: the partial belief in the antecedent and the partial belief in the consequent either increase, decrease, or remain the same. Two existing approaches to learning from indicative conditionals are considered: an explanatory one, and another that builds on relative information minimizing with regard to the causal structure. A novel method based on epistemic entrenchment is proposed to overcome the drawbacks of the competing approaches. The method solves all the standard examples and some other examples for which existing approaches have failed to provide adequate solutions.

The article discusses some of the consequences of choosing the radical constructivist epistemological point of view (as proposed by Glasersfeld and von Foerster). What happens when the role of the observer (author, philosopher, or scientist) is not ignored? What happens when observation is taken as interaction instead of one-directional copying? By explicating his answers to fundamental (or—according to von Foerster—“unanswerable”) questions, the author makes an attempt at outlining the changes that science of the mind should adopt if the constructivist concept of interactional nature of observation is accepted in its entirety.

The Second Enlightenment is a deep reflection and an immanent transcendence of the first Enlightenment (17th and 18th centuries). Although the great achievements of the first Enlightenment cannot be denied, its limits are increasingly being exposed. Among the many limitations of the Enlightenment, the suppression of beauty in general and natural beauty in particular is one of its main drawbacks, caused by its blind worship of reason and the domination of a modern mechanistic worldview. The suppression of beauty and natural beauty has produced destructive consequences which are responsible for the ecological, social, and spiritual crisis facing us today. In order to prevent ecological catastrophes and create an ecological civilization, a second Enlightenment whose core concept is beauty is needed. The Second Enlightenment challenges us to rethink the value and importance of beauty and natural beauty, and regards beauty as the aim of the universe, as well as of ecological civilization. In this sense, the Second Enlightenment can be seen as an aesthetic Enlightenment which not only helps us to resist consumerism, guard spiritual dignity, nurture our souls, find a sense of belonging, and lead a poetic life, but also helps Chinese society to overcome a defiant attitude toward rural civilization and farmers, and eventually to remove the Great Wall between city and country.

The present paper argues that although the problem of contradiction is particularly important within the domain of human sciences, a close examination of its function within the main methodological options has not yet been undertaken. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to provide an overview of a possible investigation into the function of contradiction in explanatory models of human sciences.

The purpose of this paper is to identify those characteristics that transform a common artefact into an artwork, especially in our postmodern contemporary world. My analysis is based on aesthetic principles which are used in artistic theories and debates.

Is self-deception something that just happens to us, or is it an intentional action of an agent? This paper discusses intentionalism, a theory claiming that self-deception is intentional behavior that aims to produce a belief that the agent does not share. The agent is motivated by his belief that p (e.g. he is bald) and his desire that not-p (e.g. not to be bald), and if self-deceiving is successful, the agent will end up believing not-p. Opponents of intentionalism raise two different objections: it seems that self-deceiver should then simultaneously hold two incompatible beliefs (namely, that p and not-p), as well as simultaneously intend the deception and be unaware of it. This paper reviews possible answers to anti-intentionalist objections (temporal partitioning, psychological partitioning, and the attentional strategy account) and offers guidelines to strengthen intentionalist claims.

This article examines some aspects of current republican philosophy, starting from its central idea of human freedom—freedom as non-domination—then describes in general terms its political agenda, attempting therein to undertake a critical analysis of its position in relation to the prevalent political philosophies of our time—liberalism and social democracy. Current republicanism is a school of thought cultivated by philosophers and historians of ideas such as Philip Pettit, Quentin Skinner, Frank Lovett, John Maynor, and others who—drawing on the classical republican tradition from Cicero to James Madison—propose a new political philosophy as a way to establish and legitimate some general, “ecumenical” positions on the major policy issues of contemporary societies. At its core, the central objective of this political philosophy is to rethink almost all substantial issues of legitimacy and democracy, welfare and social justice, public policy and constitutional design from within the conceptual framework that its central idea of liberty as non-domination provides. Formally, republicans aspire to articulate a universal language, a political lingua franca in which all individuals and social groups are able to have a voice in the current and ardent political debates, especially in order to express their diverse “complaints” or “grievances.” For unless different individuals and groups can find a common language in which to talk about their problems, the complaints of each group are nothing but noise in the ears of the others; in effect, they would have the status, and the (in)significance, of inarticulate mewlings. The paper will argue that republicanism, consistent with its (overly) “ecumenical” propensity, risks overshadowing its sui generis existence by being insufficiently different from Socialism, as well as by its exaggerated insistence on providing a comprehensive alternative to Liberalism.

Manipulation of the human mind is a topic that suggests a number of different discussions, but so far most of these have focused on the subject of crowd manipulation as if it were only a contemporary phenomenon that is carried out through the mass media. However, manipulation is a means of engaging, controlling, or influencing the desires of a crowd in order to direct their actions toward the manipulators’ best interests. It is clear that manipulation is an essential part of human nature and dates back to the founding of societies. Religion is one of the mechanisms aimed at unification of societies, and therefore unification of their supreme values, principles, and objectives. Unfortunately, there are extreme examples of the manipulation of societies by means of religion, and the Spanish Inquisition is a case in point. The objective of this paper is to draw conclusions regarding the mechanisms of domination and control over human common sense. It also aims to discover how the Inquisition restricted not only people's actions, but also their minds, and how it employed human minds to achieve not only its own goals, but also the goals of the government with which it was mutually dependent.

In this paper, I discuss neurotheology and its scope as defined by natural scientists. In my opinion, in denying the paranormal world this science has failed to present criteria to distinguish “genuine” from “non-genuine” religious experiences. However, this science can be used to recognize revelation, inspiration, true dreams, and feelings of no-space, no-time, and annihilation of the human body in mysticism, but we should not attribute genuine experiences to mental disorders, since genuine experiences can be distinguished from non-genuine ones.

This work analyzes the problem of the development of John Locke’s ideas on toleration, in particular the grounds of separation of church and state. The first part examines Locke’s arguments regarding the prerogatives of the magistrate towards ‘indifferent things’ and the religious sphere. I distinguish between three stages in the development of Locke’s view on toleration: a suspicion toward the plea for it (the Two Tracts); an implicit non-verbalized distinction between church and state, and support for toleration (An Essay on Toleration); and toleration as a political right (A Letter Concerning Toleration, the Two Treatises and the later letters). The second part focuses on the definition of ‘commonwealth’ in A Letter Concerning Toleration. I outline two fundamental sets of interdependent arguments that Locke uses for the separation of church and state. The third part is dedicated to the sphere of the church and the dimensions of the duty of toleration. The relation between Locke’s views on toleration and political practice explains the shift between the three stages, and is explored throughout the paper.

Cassirer’s philosophy of symbols is applied to Uexküll’s concept of “Umwelt” (meaningful environment). I argue that the vast domain of human symbolism extends the human Umwelt far beyond the Umwelts of animal species. We humans live and act in many intersecting symbolic worlds, one of the most important of which is our ethical Umwelt. I claim that against the background of ecological disaster and the uncontrolled accelerating incursion of our financial institutions and biotechnological industry into planetary ecology, the term “Umwelt” can no longer simply mean the part of our surroundings that is meaningful to us. Given the current severe ecological crisis, Cassirer’s idea of an “ethical Umwelt” must also be expanded, and an ethical imperative must be integrated into our understanding of “environment.” In other words, for us today the meaning of the term “Umwelt” or “meaningful environment” should be synonymous with “the living world to be saved” or “sacred environment.”

The first obstacle experimental ethics faces when it comes to its normative account is Hume’s guillotine, also known as the naturalistic fallacy. My objective is to show how experimental ethics can answer to naturalistic fallacy with the help of normative projections.In order to arrive at my objective, I will first explain what experimental philosophy (xphi) is, and how it is perceived as a movement against “armchair philosophy.” In the second section, I explain why experimental moral philosophy or experimental ethics is immune to many of the arguments that are raised against xphi, and why it is not necessary to be against armchair philosophers. After this, I argue that discussing the meta-ethical grounding of experimental ethics will not help us to answer to the naturalistic fallacy. The last section contains my own proposal for seeing people’s intuitions and decisions as normative projections that have an impact on normative ethics. In this way, Hume’s guillotine is no longer an obstacle for a normative account of experimental ethics.

In this paper I aim at questioning L. Buell’s politics of the environment, which relies on the assumption of unproblematic coexistence between man and nature. Analyzing Stanley Cavell’s reading of Henry D. Thoreau, I try to show that the natural is always already cultural and that a reengagement with nature in itself is the very process of becoming political. In this context, I will examine why Cavell’s Thoreau redirects us from biocentrism to humanism and provocatively turns political education away from anodyne aspirations for coexistence and towards a qualified isolation.

The article discusses the genealogy of 20th-century Norwegian ecophilosophies as deriving from a specific philosophy of climbing, one which is irreducible to philosophy of alpinism so far as it is based on the principle of cooperation and on the intrinsic value of interacting with the mountain rather than on competition, which makes the mountain an arena for sport activities. In this context, the expression to think like a mountain will be analyzed as something more than an impressive metaphor, and examined as a new way of thinking that avoids the extremes of both radical anthropocentrism and biocentrism.