Using the metaphor of a circle with its center, periphery, and radius, this essay explores William Poteat's understanding of the self, or "mindbody," in its dynamic and creative relation to the larger world, or cosmos, identifying the mindbody's prereflective radix with the "center," its boundary or point of interface with the larger world with the "periphery," and its dialectical evolution and articulation of a sense of coherence and meaning in terms of a pretensive and retrotensive "radius."

Polanyi’s post-critical epistemology is empirical and not transcendental but it grounds knowledge in perception; knowledge is thus primarily aesthetical and only partly conceptual. The conceptual is always embedded in the perceptual and comprehension or judgment always has an integrative structure. Polanyi’s tacit knowledge is pre-conscious and must be distinguished from the personal which implies conscious commitment. If knowledge produces a cathartic effect, then it is more than merely tacit. The Polanyian revolution in epistemology argues that the human ability to reach truth through use of our cognitive powers is an art.

An exploration of the relationship between imagination and intuition and the workings of visual perception, in light of Polanyi’s epistemology, helps us to understand aesthetic seeing. The artist and contemplative learn to see anew and accordingly grasp extraordinary coherences of meaning.

How do we know the degree of imagination involved in knowing a reality? This is essentially an epistemological question. This essay discusses first the role of imagination in Polanyi’s epistemology since it is used here as the basis of integrative reality. The essay then discusses the degree of imagination involved in three types of integrative reality that are found respectively in technology, science, and humanities. It concludes with a discussion on the role of imagination in education.

This paper conceives the distinction between human and animal identity in terms (drawn from theological anthropology) of distinctively human “habitation of a world.’’ It develops models for this using Polanyi’s account of the figure-ground polarity of acts of knowing in general. It identifies three distinct forms taken by this polarity, each offering its own model for human identity in its engagement with the world. Two of these models prove fatally one-sided. The third discloses the character of human identity in its relatedness and openness, its continuity and discontinuity with animal identity. This characterisation of human identity resonates with ideas found in Christian theological anthropology.

Contemporary associationistic psychology excludes poetic truth an all that it implies regarding the participation of the observer with the observed in building up our conception of reality.

Paul Tillich and Michael Polanyi had their only face-to-face meeting in Berkeley, in February, 1963. The author reports the circumstances of this conversation, which he arranged and in which he participated, and, on the basis of his participation, offers refelections on the postcritical and fiduciary dimensions in the work of Polanyi and Tillich as a means of identifying similarities and differences in the thought of each.

Michael Polanyi found in the thought of Paul Tillich an ally for Polanyi’s program of showing the fiduciary component in all knowing including science. Polanyi saw, however, a danger in Tillich’s distinguishing science as preliminary concern and religion as ultimate concern. In a significant dialogue in 1963, Polanyi and Tillich met and addressed issues, agreeing that science and religion share a common epistemological structure.

Using a critical framework developed by W. H. Walsh, this essay assesses Polanyi's theory of historical passage. It then compares Polanyi's views about history with those of Paul Tillich. The comparison reveals similar approaches to understanding ontology and epistemology.

Michael Polanyi made an original contribution in his reflections on tradition within the scientific community. Starting with his Riddell Lectures (Science, Faith and Society), he considered the role of authority and the transmission of tacit knowledge within the scientific community, an analysis that can be extended to other, often contrasting, realms of intellectual life.