This paper approaches the ‘Drexler-Smalley’ debate on nanotechnology from a neglected angle – the common denominator of ‘the frontier’ as a metaphor for scientific exploration. For Bensaude-Vincent, the debate exemplifies the clash of ‘two cultures’ – the ‘artificialist’ and biomimetic’ schools. For us, the portrayal of nanosphere as ‘new frontier’ stymies the prospect of genuine inter-cultural debate on the direction of molecular engineering. Drawing on Brandon, the‘dominium’ impulse of European imperialism is contrasted to the ‘communitas’ tradition of Native America. Proposing a single label – hybridist – for both schools, we juxtapose to this approach the holistic disposition of indigenous North American science.

The author of The Philosophy of Invention, Henry Dircks (1806–1873), was an English civil engineer, inventor and historian of technology. The Philosophy of Invention is a forgotten classic of the philosophy of technology, and its author a forgotten pioneer. This new discovery will correct the disciplinary consensus in the philosophy of technology.

This article presents an overview of discussions in the philosophy of technology on epistemological relations between science and technology, illustrating that often several mutually entangled issues are at stake. The focus is on conceptual and ideological issues concerning the relationship between scientific and technological knowledge. It argues that a widely accepted hierarchy between science and technology, which echoes classic conceptions of epistêmê and technê, engendered the need of emancipating technology from science, thus shifting focus to epistemic aspects of engineering design and design methodology at the cost of in-depth philosophical analysis of the role of scientific research in the engineering sciences. Consequently, the majority of current literature on this topic in the philosophy of technology presents technology as almost completely divided from and independent of science, thereby losing sight of the epistemic relations between contemporary scientific practices and technology.

This response paper begins by countering the contributions of Don Ihde and Robert Rosenberger to this special issue, making its case in existential terms. Then, addressing Darin Barney, these arguments are developed further in aesthetic terms, making use of the “modernist” educational theory of René Arcilla. This response article concludes by returning to the realm of the educational with the help of Albert Borgmann's and Estrid Sørensen's feedback.

In the lead article dissection is juxtaposed to simulation, but the problem is the example set on both sides is antiquated. I argue that a dynamic set of imaging technologies uses as in science documentaries is far superior to either the the 18th-19th century notions of biological education illustrated is what is needed.

Defenders of educational frog dissection tend to emphasize the claim that computer-simulated alternatives cannot replicate the same exact experience of slicing open a frog, with all its queasy and visceral impact. Without denying that point, I argue that this is not the only educational standard against which computer-simulated dissection should be evaluated. When real-world frog dissection is analyzed as a concrete technological practice rather than an assumed ideal, the particular educational advantages distinct to real-world dissection and virtual dissection can be enumerated and compared. Building on the work of John Dewey and Don Ihde, I explore the still-expanding advantages of computer-simulated dissection, and in this proper context of comparison it becomes clear that virtual alternatives are increasingly the more educationally beneficial option.

The increasing use of online simulations as replacements for animal dissection in the classroom or lab raises important questions about the nature of simulation itself and its relationship to embodied educational experience. This paper addresses these questions first by presenting a comparative hermeneutic-phenomenological investigation of online and offline dissection. It then interprets the results of this study in terms of Borgmann’s (1992) notion of the intentional “transparency” and “pliability” of simulated hyperreality. It makes the case that it is precisely encumbrance and disruption—elements that are by definition excluded from simulations and interfaces—which give dissection its educational value.

This response considers how Friesen’s account of simulation helps us to think through the situation of politics under technological conditions. The alleviation of material and corporeal risks entailed in simulated dissection is compared to the manner in which emerging media technologies facilitate experiences of political participation that are evacuated of the burdens of engagement. This dynamic is finally attributed not to digital mediation itself, but to its operation under the sign of simulation.

Friesen's comparison between classroom practices and digital dissection carries the flaws of treating the digital and non-digital learning materials differently when comparing. This reply paper argues for a symmetric comparison through a focus on the way in which comparability between digital and non-digital learning materials is established by the researcher. It is suggested that such comparison might have brought about a result more favorable for digital technology.

Friesen has presented an articulate and detailed account of the injuries of virtualized education and a convincing brief for the value of education that is face-to-face and engaged with tangible reality.

Following decades of maltreatment of women in obstetric care, professional respect for maternal autonomy in obstetric decision making and care have become codified in global and national professional ethical guidelines. Yet, using the example of birth after cesarean, identifiable threats to maternal autonomy in obstetrics continue. This paper focuses on how current scientific knowledge and obstetric practice patterns factor into restricted maternal autonomy as evidenced in three representative maternal accounts obtained prior and subsequent to birth after cesarean. Short- and long-term remedies to improve the current state of restricted maternal autonomy in clinical practice surrounding decision making on birth after cesarean are provided.