The two objects of moral judgement are man and conduct. there are accordingly two kinds of rnoral judgement. In order to distinguish these two categories some ethicist introduce the two terms “moral goodness" and “moral rightness": “moral-goodness" for the judgement of man's morality; and “moral rightness" for describing the moral quality of conduct. Such distinction can be traced back to G. E. Moore's “Principia Ethica". German scholar B. Schuller also adopted it to his study of moral theology.These two terms are widely used by modern ethicists nowadays. Nevertheless, there are few systematic discussions about them, and some ethicists still doubt about their plausibility and even their necessity. Therefore, it is essential to discuss the issue in width and depth before we use them. To this purpose this artical is divided into three parts: firstly, historical background of the distinction; secondly, detailed clarification of the definitions of “moral goodness" and “moral rightness" and their relationship: lastly, the importance of this distinction in foundamental ethics.

Ronald Dworkin introduces a tripartite classification into political theories, viz., duty-based, goal-based, and right-based theories. J. L. Mackie extends this classification into moral theores. He argues that in addition to duty-based moral theories (e.g. , Kant's theory) and goal-based moral theories (e.g., Utilitarianism), a right-based moral theory is both conceptually possible and morally more desirable. This paper first attempts to analyze the characteristics of Mackie's right-based nioral theory in particular, and any right-'based moral theory in general. The present author then contends that there are three major weaknesses of such theories: (1) They over-simplify the relation between duties and rights;, (2) they fail to provide adequate guidance to moral life; (3) they cannot account for the true moral significance of supererogation and virtue. Accordingly, the present author agrees that a right-based moral theory is morally truncated and impoverished. It captures only a minimalist ethics. This is because there is a two-fold fundamental error of a right based moral theory, viz., it misplaces the moral subject, and it captures the point or object of morality only partially.The rejection of a right-based moral theory does not imply a rejection of rights. On the contrary, this paper continues to argue for the importance of rights in moral life, andthe priority of rights over duties in some cases. In other words, though rights cannot furnish the sufficient basis of morality, it does provide its necessary basis.

本篇文章題目為『馬里旦道德判斷方法論』。許多人認為馬里 旦 (Jacques Maritain) 是本世紀多瑪斯學派的權威。他治學過 人之處，是能以創新的方法，將現代哲學及科學的精華曳融合於 多瑪斯偉大的哲學和神學理論中。馬里旦的思想廣博，涵蓋的範 圍包括形上學、認識論、自然哲學、政治與社會哲學及人學與倫 理學。他的政治思想和社會倫理觀念，對歐洲及拉丁美洲影響深 遠。馬里旦希望教導現代人概念及判斷的正確觀念。他撰寫過多 篇文章概述「判斷」的問題，而其中著墨最多的部份便是「道德 判斷」。任何道德判斷方法論都必須面對一個基本問題:如何將 普遍的道德概念，融合於道德主體特定的其體判斷中?換吉之， 基於個人獨特的倫理主體性 (moral subjectivity) ，在一特定情 況下， 「 人類主體」 (human subject) 是如何決定要運用哪些 普通準則?要如何將這些準則付諸實現呢?為了解馬里且如何將客體的普遍道德觀與倫理主體性相結 合，我們將探討下列主題:其一，馬里且對其體道德判斷之架構 及其動態過程 (dynamism) 的看法。 其二， 實際運用普遍道德 原則時的困難。馬里且認為康德和齊克果 (Kierkegaard) 皆未 能解釋道德判斷;我們將利用他在這方面的研究做為例子。其三，馬里且如何運用其對自然道德律的認識，來嘗試解決普遍規 範和個人主體性間的衝突。根據他的說法，如果對自然道德律有 正確的認識，便不會做出被個人主體性視為「武斷J (arbitrary) 的道德判斷， 也可避免過於主觀， 使普遍規範無法引導道 德選擇。最後，基於對馬里且學說的分析，我們將提出幾項道德 判斷方法論須考量的因素。雖然上述各點並不構成完整的道德方 法論，但我希望本篇初探的內容，能遵循馬里且學說的精神，使 讀者認識一位本世紀偉大哲學家的基本思想。

D. Lewis asserts that 'We can agree with Parfit...that what matters in questions of personal identity is mental continuity or connectedness...At same time we can consistentlyagree with common sense...that what matters in questions of personal identity is identity', but D. Parfit believes that this cannot be done. The aim of this paper is to re-examinewhether Lewis's thesis, ‘the I-relation and the R-relation coincide', had been justified. In sections 2 and 3, I summarized Lewis' and Parfit's arguments separately. And the related cohabitationist's theory is introduced in section 4. After the discussion in section 5, I argue that Lewis's thesis cannot be justified.

This paper will do two things. First to argue that the logical connectives are used to express mental acts, to do speech acts and propositional acts. They are used to expreepropositional ties. Second, from the first things to to say that every sentence or proposition must contain at least one logical connective, and every relation must intrinsically contain a direction. Several relevant theories are also examined.

As Dewey came to Chcago in 1894, there were many conflicts of educational thoughts in the academic world. With Hegelian dialetic, Dewey has synthesized successfully the antithesis of the viewpoint of the individual and that of the society， the emphasis on the subject-matter of the curriculum and that on the contents of the child's own experience. The teaching methods of "pouring in" and "drawing out "are shown to be both justified and equally one-sided.With functional analysis, the conflict of the theory of amusement and that of effort can be synthesized dialectically by a theory of genuine interest. Dewey puts constructive activities as unifying center of all curricula and contends that the genuine interst consists in the interpretability of the subjectmatter for child or the adaptability of the child's impulses, habits and experience to the new environment.Dewey reinterpreted the evolutionary method as a genetic or historic method and applied it, being methodically different from Hegelian dialectic, but in the same spirit of harmonious unification as the Hegelian dialectic, to solve the conflict of new education and old education by removal or reform of the institutional conditions.

Theories of reference are the most salient objects of philosophical reflection in the areas of the analytic philosophy, the philosophy of language, applied logic, cognitive psychologg as well as linguistics. It is very natural to expect that every teachers, expert, philosopher, and every graduate student in these areas should be enlightened by such topics. We take a bird-eye view of recent theories of reference ( and name ) in this article, i.e., Millian theory/'Fido'-Fido theory, Fregean theory of sense and reference, Russellian theory of definite description and its modified theory (the cluster theary/the description theary), the rigid designation theory, the direct reference theory, the historical Chain theory/Causal theory and Minimalism. These theories are reviewed from their philosophical and historical aspects.Some of philosophic problems (which have been related to the research program of each theory, twenty problems in total) and their intended Solutions are briefly sketched by the author. The difficulties of all theories except the historical chain theory are presented and criticized. The difficulties of the latter 'will be discussed in a forthcoming paper. Finally, We present twenty useful problems/exercises for graduate students in the areas of the philosophy of language/theoretical linguistics/applied logic.