There are two competing accounts for a theory for human action proposed by Catholic theologians working within the received moral tradition today: a hylomorphic account and an intentional account. In this article, the author compares each of the rival theories for its ability to explain both the structure and morality of the human acts surrounding the elective termina­tion of the pregnancy of a woman with pulmonary arterial hypertension. This scenario of PAH is a superb test case to compare the explanatory power of the two rival action theories. The author’s analysis reveals that the hylomorphic account is the superior account, which can explain better not only the norma­tive conclusions of the Catholic moral tradition but also our lived experience as acting persons in a world governed by cause-and-effect relationships. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.3 (Autumn 2011): 503–518.

What insights into Church teaching can be drawn from the biblical account of Abraham and Sarah’s experience with surrogate pregnancy? When Sarah’s maid, Hagar, conceives Abraham’s son Ishmael, negative conse­quences ensue. Hagar’s contempt for Sarah incites Sarah’s jealousy. Sarah’s abuse of Hagar leads Hagar to run away. Abraham is forced to banish Hagar and his son Ismael. These unhappy repercussions arise from the fact that surrogacy violates God’s plan for marriage and for the dignity of the human person. Although reproductive technologies continue to advance, human nature remains the same. The lessons learned from Abraham, Sarah, Isaac, Hagar, and Ishmael’s experience with surrogacy can be profitably applied to Church teaching on marriage and reproductive technologies. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.3 (Autumn 2011): 443–451.

By analogy to justifications offered for craniotomy by Catholic moralists (e.g., Germain Grisez and Rev. Martin Rhonheimer), a recent instance of casuistry (by the moral theologian M. Therese Lysaught) attempts to apply double-effect reasoning and, separately, the concept of a vital conflict to justify dilation and curettage in order to preserve the life of a pregnant woman. This paper examines and rejects these bases for justifying craniotomy and D&C. It concludes with a consideration of Pope John Paul II’s discussion of moral martyrdom in Veritatis splendor. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.3 (Autumn 2011): 453–463.

Many churches are being asked to support new environmental initiatives, including those of the new food movement. In today’s cultural environment, it requires courage even to raise a question about programs to save the planet, protect helpless animals, or feed developing nations. Yet it is important for Christians to be aware of the agenda behind these initiatives, which looks to creation not for visible signs of God’s power and divinity but with a view to immortalizing the earth itself as the source of life. It sees man not as uniquely made in the image and likeness of God, with the responsibility for stewardship over His creation, but as an animal himself, co-equal with other animals. Environmentalism has become in effect a new religion, with the food movement its frontier mission. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.3 (Autumn 2011): 465–475.

As the notion of artificial moral agency gains popularity among ethicists, it threatens the unique status of the human person as a responsible moral agent. The philosophy of ontocentrism, popularized by Luciano Floridi, argues that biocentrism is too restrictive and must yield to a new philosophical vision that endows all beings with some intrinsic value. Floridi’s macroethics also regards more sophisticated digital entities such as robots as accountable moral agents. To refute these principles, this paper turns to the thought of Karol Wojtyla, who argued cogently for an intimate correlation between personal action (actus personae) and moral agency. By examining the distinguishing characteristics of personal action, we can ascertain the necessary conditions of moral agency and demonstrate why artificial entities do not meet those condi­tions. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.3 (Autumn 2011): 479–501.

This is a response to criticism by Rev. Martin Rhonheimer of a critique by Rev. Benedict Guevin of Rhonheimer’s book Vital Conflicts. Rhonheimer insists that Guevin both misunderstood and misrepresented his action theory. Rhonheimer claims that his understanding of “direct” versus “indirect” killing, as well his use of “intention” finds its warrant in the writings of Popes John Paul II and Pius XII. Having examined Rhonheimer’s magisterial sources in detail, Guevin concludes that Rhonheimer’s claim that the object of the moral act is found essentially in the “intention,” that is, in what one intends to do by what one is doing, is baseless. Such a claim is idiosyncratic. The writings of John Paul II and Pius XII are clearly at odds with both Rhonheimer’s analysis and his conclusions. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.4 (Winter 2011): 679–688.

A wide variety of clinical situations can lead to the implementation of assisted nutrition and hydration (ANH). Both enteral ANH and parenteral assisted nutrition and hydration (PNH) serve to nourish and hydrate those who are incapable of normal eating and drinking. Although PNH via the intravenous (IV) route is comparable to enteral ANH in its intention, IV PNH bypasses the relevant body system—the digestive tract—entirely. Consequently, IV PNH is ethically comparable to mechanical ventilation and thus can be withheld or withdrawn following the ethical criteria that apply to any other extraordinary therapeutic measure. However, other alternatives to oral and enteral hydration that are proportionately less challenging than IV PNH (i.e., hypodermoclysis and proctoclysis) should be further evaluated as potentially ordinary means of keeping patients adequately hydrated at the end of life. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.4 (Winter 2011): 649–659.

Western society is steadily inundated by technology. Pope Benedict XVI has presented a positive but cautious analysis of biotechnological development. Within the context of man’s yearning for love and truth, Benedict explicates a vision of authentic human progress that recognizes that the telos of technical progress in biomedicine is the good of the human person. He criticizes the “consensus model” of bioethics, which is prevalent in our cultural technopoly, because it leaves science unfettered and emphasizes arbitrary consensus at the cost of an ethical evaluation, which honors the dignity of the person and the rights of man. Benedict XVI proposes a bioethical model which is open to God, is consistent with natural law, and views the human person as its telos. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.4 (Winter 2011): 669–678.

This paper examines contemporary Catholic higher education and its unique role in preparing graduates, who have been grounded in natural moral law, to respond to the bioethical questions of the day. The importance of the commitment by both administration and faculty to articulating and embracing the mission of Catholic higher education as they prepare graduates for a culture of relativism is presented. Curricular objectives, content, and teaching strategies are provided which address the most relevant bioethical dilemmas of the day. The importance of an integrated approach to examining these dilemmas, as well as a grounding in core content in philosophy and theology for all graduates, regardless of discipline of concentration, are presented. The interjection of government mandates into the void of bioethical resolutions is examined in relationship to the rights of conscience. The paper concludes with examples of best practices, showing the role of Catholic higher education as uniquely suited to advance the common good. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.4 (Winter 2011): 705–734.

Genomic interventions ex utero and in utero are already a reality in medicine. It is plausible to believe that this reality will lead to therapies at the preimplantation level, especially where such interventions are the only safe and effective way to truly prevent human suffering and disease in offspring. The plausibility of this type of genomic therapy is of particular interest for prospective parents who are Roman Catholic, since in vitro fertilization provides the only means by which an offspring’s genome may be accessed prior to implantation. The goal of this essay is to provide a review of two traditional methodologies in Roman Catholic moral thought and the potential moral quandary they present Roman Catholic parents: adherence to moral teaching prohibiting IVF or relief of gene-based disease in their child. After finding little resolution of this quandary through these two methodologies, the essay proposes as an alternative a third approach that leans heavily on John Henry Cardinal Newman’s understanding of doctrinal development. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.4 (Winter 2011): 735–756.

This article considers M. Therese Lysaught’s analysis of an apparent abortion that occurred in Phoenix, Arizona, in 2009. Since Lysaught invokes it, the article considers Rev. Martin Rhonheimer’s theory about the bearing of vital conflict situations on the object of the act performed. A vital conflict situation is present when, for instance, the life of a mother might be spared if her fetus is aborted, otherwise she and the fetus will die. The article argues that the use of such situations in this way by Lysaught and Rhonheimer (and possibly others) is incompatible with Church teaching. The article concludes by suggesting that certain cases might be analyzed in such a way that the mother’s life is saved and the fetus dies but there is no direct abortion. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.4 (Winter 2011): 691–704.

In “The Contralife Argument and the Principle of Double Effect” (NCBQ, Spring 2011), Lawrence Masek tries to use the principle of double effect to show that natural family planning (NFP) is morally justified. This essay presents a summary explanation of the principle of double effect. It demonstrates that Masek wrongly applies the principle of double effect to NFP. It presents the teaching of the 1968 papal encyclical Humanae vitae with regard to NFP, and contends that to apply the principle of double effect to the case of NFP is not only incorrect but also contrary to teaching of Humanae vitae. Because Masek implies that NFP involves the (justified) permission of evil, his article also counteracts the efforts of the Catholic Church to promote the practice of NFP. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.4 (Winter 2011): 661–667.