This article argues for the thesis that there is only one basic form of rationality, which is applied in different areas. First of all, there is one meaning of the term "rational" which applies to all situations in which the term is used: "justified." If "rational" means simply "justified", then rationality can be broken down into as many types as there are kinds of justification. Two distinctions between kinds of justification seem particularly plausible: 1. relative vs. absolute justifications and 2. theoretical justifications of opinions vs. practical justifications of actions. Taken together, these two distinctions yield a division into four types of rationality. I maintain, however, that these two distinctions collapse upon more careful examination. In this article I will simply assume that no form of ultimate justification is convincing; thus, the first distinction does not apply. Against the second distinction I try to argue in this paper that theoretical rationality represents a form of practical rationality. The idea of an optimal choice of aims, actions, and opinions, which nonetheless differs from the orthodox model of practical rationality, thus proves to be the comprehensive central ingredient of the concept of rationality.

Some principles of logic-oriented theories of argumentation are discussed. A sharp distinction is drawn between arguments in formal contexts and arguments in non formal contexts. It is argued, that the analysis of colloquial arguments cannot be based on the logic-oriented theories of argumentation. The outline of a more realistic theory of argumentation is given, by using defeasable inferences as a starting point. The model is applied to some everyday arguments.

J. St. Mill's System of Logic (1843) is reexamined from the perspective of present-day analytical philosophy of the social sciences. His naturalistic epistemology, "state", "general/universal laws", "social statics/dynamics" are discussed, as well as his four methods. His nomological-behavioral position is analysed, along with his theoretical approach.

For understanding human action rationality is a fundamental poin of point. A prototheory of social science elaborate the types of social action under the conceptualization of rationalization and human freedom in societies. On this way it must be distinguished two - not interchangeable - concepts of rationalization: the rationality of purpose e.g. the rational choice of means (Zweckrationalität) and the rationality of understanding (Verständigungsrationalität). Language behaviour has for this conceptualization the status of the frametheory. But actions are not identical with language behaviour and are based on language external ressources. The conceptualizations of concepts of rationality are basic-assumptions for the construction of a structure-model of societal rationalization.

The paper tries first to show that P. Strawson’s and J. Searle’s proposal of explicating the illocutionary meaning of speech-acts (or corresponding explicit sentences) in terms of the conditions of fulfilment or satisfaction (with regard to the underlying intentional states of mind) is unsatisfactory. It provides no full understanding of the meaning of speech-acts, at least not of non-constative acts, as e.g. orders, requests, demands, confessions, promisses, etc.; for, through its quasi-verificationist horizon, it provides no unterstanding of the illocutionary force in terms of the conditions of accepting the validity-claims that are connected with the performance of the act. Thus far the paper complies with Habermas’ approach. There remains however an ambiguity with regard to the good reasons for accepting a speech-act, since on the level of life-world communication and interaction not only validity-claims and pertinent arguments but also threats and offers are functioning as socially binding illocutionary forces (thus e.g. not only in coercions like "hands up" but in all kinds of negotiations and bargainings). How is it possible to show by a cogent argument that openly strategical acts as offers and threats cannot fulfill the role of providing good reasons for accepting speech-acts in the sense of unrestricted Verständigung (i.e. communicative understanding and coming to agreement) but are parasitic upon non-strategical ways of consensual communication by understanding and accepting validity-claims?The paper argues that this suggestive contention cannot be proved, i.e. grounded by a descriptive analysis of the normal function of communicative actions in the life-world but only - indeed - by transcendental pragmatic reflection on the normative conditions of argumentative discourse which cannot be denied without committing a performative self-contradiction.

This paper takes up again Grice’s Basic Model (GBM) for analysing communicative acts. We draw attention to a ’new’ fault in GBM, i.e. a fault not yet noticed in the literature: Grice’s deflniens for CA (= communicative attempt) is not only too weak (as it is not satisfying the reflexivity-condition according to which any CA implies the speaker’s intention of CA’s being understood by the hearer); it is also too strong - and just for the same reason.

The domain of pragmatics is to arrange in the architectonic of competences. Competences are to discriminate on the base of distinction between rule-following behaviour and action-rules. This can be understood as a critic of L. Wittgensteins conception of following a rule. The Frankfurter version of speechacttheory has argued - following partial K Bühler - that three fundamental properties (functions) of language can be identified: the representation of state of affaires, the generation of interpersonal relationship and the expression of intentional make happen someone (Erlebnisse). Further dimensions and explications for concerning this properties shall be elaborated. Steps to constructive pragmatics can be gone.

How operates communication with pictures? S. Kjörup has elaborated - follow up the analysis of pictorial symbolization in N. Goodman’s "languages of art" - a speechacttheory of picturing The problem of this approach is that Kjörup has no answer of pictorial fiction.

The relationship between reflection and language has become of main interest, not only in the area of philosophy. How is reflection by means of language on language possible?Firstly I want to discuss the possibility of linguistic reflexivity within the late philosophy of L. Wittgenstein.The next step will be a critical analysis of G. Frey's "linguistic theory of reflection". This will be followed by an outline of the importance of reflection in context of the speechacttheory (J.L. Austin, J.R. Searle).Finally I will analyse the problems around linguistic reflexivity within a discourse theoretical framework (J. Habermas, K-O. Apel).It will be questioned if the "discourse" would have to be understood as the linguistic equivalent to "reflection" . Then I will be looking at the relationship between discourse and metacommunication. The analysis will end in the attempt of a typology of discoursive-reflexive predicats.

Semantic implicatures are features for understanding the use of sentences. The status of this implementations of meaning is a quasi-logical relation as a "weak implication". They are determinated through types of lexical units and expressions in grammatical positions. But both are only necessary conditions for semantic implicatures. Further assumption for meaningful use of sentences are presupposed e.g. existence presuppositions, evidences, customs etc. So, the delimination to pragmatic (presuppositions) is indicated.