Wonder is undoubtedly a term that floats around in today’s academic discussion both on ancient philosophy and on philosophy of education. Back in the 4th century B.C., Aristotle underlined the fact that philosophy begins in wonder (θαυμάζειν), without being very specific about the conditions and the effects of its emergence. He focused a great deal on children’s education, emphasizing its fundamental role in human beings’ moral fulfillment, though he never provided a systematic account of children’s moral status. The aim of this paper is to examine, on the one hand, if, to what extent, and under what conditions, Aristotle allows for philosophical wonder to emerge in children’s souls, and, on the other hand, how his approach to education may shed light to the link between wonder and the ultimate moral end, i.e. human flourishing. We will, thus, 1) try to offer a unified outlook of the philosopher’s views on children’s special cognitive and moral state, and 2) illustrate how wonder contributes in overcoming their imperfect state of being.

Constitutions differ in kind, according to Aristotle (Politics, III), and the perverted ones are posterior to the nondeviant ones. This paper interprets Aristotle’s treatment of monarchy in light of his distinction in Posterior Analytics (I) between the order of being (constitutional types) and the order of experience (existing constitutions). The paper moves from an analysis of political definitions (Politics, III) and their psychological implications to Aristotle’s analysis of kingship as a species of constitutional correctness. It becomes apparent that, when discussing the relation between a political community and the rule befitting it, Aristotle is consistently using cognates of potency (dunamis) whereby a form already present in a thing becomes the principle of formal actualization of another. Such a mutual relation between rulers and ruled and between their psychological powers sheds light on Aristotle’s inclusion of kingship among proper constitutions, even in the absence of shared governance, and to his willingness to suggest policies that preserve even tyrannies.

Creativity is a developing topic in philosophy in recent years, and it raises a series of challenging questions both in theory and practice for us. In this paper, I will explore creativity with the lateral thinking techniques which aim to solve problems in a creative and lateral way. I will examine the meaning of lateral thinking and its three kinds, the conceptual lateral thinking, the emotive lateral thinking, and the diagrammatic lateral thinking, trying to find out how the space of possible solutions is affected by lateral thinking, which separates the creative from the problem-solver.

This paper discusses Kant’s prospect of ‘hope’ that entangles with interrelated epistemic terms like belief, faith, knowledge, etc. The first part of the paper illustrates the boundary of knowing in the light of a Platonic analysis to highlight the distinction between empiricism and rationalism. Kant’s notion of ‘transcendent metaphysical knowledge’, a path-breaking way to look at the metaphysical thought, can fit with the regulative principle that seems favourable to the experience-centric knowledge. The second part of the paper defines ‘hope’ as an interwoven part of belief, besides ‘hope’ as a component of ‘happiness’ can persuade the future behaviours of the individuals. Revisiting Kant’s three categorizations of hopes (eschatological hope, political hope, and hope for the kingdom of ends), the paper traces out Kant’s good will as a ‘hope’ and his conception of humanity.

Τhis paper addresses the issue of the metaphysical status of sets and their interconnections. It discusses a foundational approach of the iterative set theoretic hierarchy comparatively to a regressive approach. Then it takes under consideration some naturalistic accounts of set theory and presents certain difficulties naturalism faces. It claims that the ontological status of sets should be dealt with in non-naturalistic terms and suggests that the issue in question could rather be placed in the context of a metaphysical discussion concerning abstract objects. So it investigates the operation ‘set of …’ as governed by necessary ontological dependence. After comparing some of the platonistic views S. Cowling (2017) has discussed, it proposes one of them as an appropriate account of sets as abstract objects with a modal status.

Heidegger claimed that world beings, existing or extant, including artworks, become intelligible in the preservation of perceptual determinations instigated by some extraordinary art that stands apart in being world-disclosive. In the lack of adequate premising scholarship has found this claim so incoherent, that it dismissed its seriousness and has treated all art Heidegger pointed to as equal. Besides being an issue in itself, this relinquishing leaves unanswered the biggest liability in Heidegger’s philosophy, the so-called “Münchhausen circularity” between Being and Dasein in the creation of world. But there is evidence to actually validate the exorbitant claim, evidence Heidegger himself did not see emerging as a potential from within his own conjectures. A phenomenological reduction that allows the implementation of suprasegmental theory of prosody suggests that Blonde Youth, an early fifth century Greek statue is the missing art through which all art, and with it all world constituency, has become intelligible.

In this article, which considering the history of philosophy is an example of how Christianity meets Hellenism, we drew the following conclusions, relying on Leontius of Byzantium’s treatise entitled Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos:A) Throughout the entire approach, the Christian thinker uses both the philosophical concepts –such as “hypostasis”, “nature”, “universal”, “atom”, “form”, “subject”– and the arguments derived from the theoretical field of Logic in order to explain Christian questions, mostly related with Metaphysics. He is actually quite an eclecticist and that is why we may not allege that he follows a particular philosopher or that he expresses and applies an authentic philosophical theory with internal terms of justification.B) He attempts to implicitly show how necessary is both the syllogisms and the arguments to rely on particular methodological principles. There is a tendency in his work to define in clear terms his issues, mainly as regards how Logic is distinguished from Ontology, as well as how they combine one another. His theological direction, however, does not allow him to be completely consistent with the philosophical material that he uses. Either way, the goal of his research is not strictly philosophical.C) Although he applies analytical elaboration and explanation of the philosophical concepts that he uses with great accuracy, he does not actually insist on them. This is probably because either he has already elaborated them in other works of his or because his readers were familiar with them. Nevertheless, he constitutes a clear example to understand what could be defined as Byzantine Logic, which is influenced by Aristotle, Porphyry and Proclus, although they are not mentioned in his texts.