Jean-Luc MARION, De surcroît. Études sur les phénomènes saturés (M. Neamþu); Magda KING, A Guide to Heidegger’s Being and Time (R. Oancea); Andreas MICHEL, Die französische Heidegger-Rezeption und ihre sprachlichen Konsequenzen (A. Timotin); Alfred DENKER, Historical Dictionary of Heidegger’s Philosophy (G. Cercel); John B. BROUGH & Lester EMBREE (eds.), The Many Faces of Time (C. Ciocan); Daniel O. DAHLSTROM, Heidegger’s Concept of Truth (P. Balogh); Cristina LAFONT, Heidegger, Language, And World-Disclosure (P. Marinescu); Eliane ESCOUBAS & Bernhard WALDENFELS (eds.), Phénoménologie française et phénoménologie allemande (C. Ciocan); Eckard WOLZ-GOTTWALD, Transformation der Phänomenologie. Zur Mystik bei Husserl und Heidegger (A. Timotin); Martin HEIDEGGER, Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity (C. Ciocan); Arkadiusz CHRUDZIMSKI, Die Erkenntnistheorie von Roman Ingarden (A. Timotin); Jocelyn BENOIST, L’apriori conceptuel. Bolzano, Husserl, Schlick (V. Popescu); Dennis King KEENAN, Death and Responsibility. The “Work” of Levinas (C. Ciocan); Dan ZAHAVI (ed.), Self-awareness, Temporality, and Alterity. Central Topics in Phenomenology (A. Bozga); Sonya SIKKA, Forms of Transcendence. Heidegger and Medieval Mystical Theology (A. Timotin); Alfred DENKER, Omdat filosoferen leven is. Een archeologie van Martin Heideggers Sein und Zeit; Seán HAND (ed.), The Levinas Reader (B. Tãtaru-Cazaban); (H. Zaborowski); Ion MINCÃ, Informatica şi teoria cunoaşterii. O paradigmã fenomenologicã a domeniului hardware (M. Caplea); John van BUREN, The Young Heidegger. Rumor of the Hidden King (C. Ciocan)

This article is an attempt to retrieve phenomenological resources for the purposes of identifying and clarifying the lived situation of embodiment in an environing world (Umwelt). Drawn primarily from Husserlian resources, it identifies several essential perceptual features of the operative intentionality of environed embodiment. Through an engagement with Husserl’s analyses of instinctual experience, I identify an essential feature of environed embodiment: the principle of association governing the nexus among objects in an environing world that are animated toward an instrumental resolution of an embodied tension, a resolution that promotes the maximization of embodied equilibrium that is instrumental for self-preservation and well-being.

In this article we argue for the necessity of a new double alliance between phenomenology and cognitive sciences (through embodied theory) onthe one hand, and between phenomenological pedagogy and the embodiment paradigm on the other. We strongly believe that phenomenological pedagogyshould enter into dialogue with the cognitive sciences movement called “Embodiment” in order to renew its educational theories and practices. Indeed, thenew suggestions about the mind that come from the embodiment paradigm can already have a huge impact on learning and education, but a relatively structured “pedagogy of consciousness” is still missing. This topic will be discussed with a special focus on body and embodied consciousness, which nicelybrings together these different traditions. Finally, an actual example of how the embodiment paradigm and phenomenological pedagogy can converge will be presented through the practice of meditative experience.

If the absence and disappearance of the body have enjoyed considerable attention in the social sciences, the same cannot be said about its appearance, other than during dysfunctional states such as pain and illness. The present article draws from a large array of phenomenological studies and presents a situation in which the body comes to the fore in one’s consciousness during the learning of combat sports, a seemingly destructive practice. The argument that I will develop, starting from extensive ethnographic research in two distinctive combat sports, is that every type of bodily practice develops a specific type of reflective body awareness that has a significant impact upon both the way we feel our bodies and the way we feel the world. In other words, what we do with and to our bodies shapes the way we see and experience the world.

Hannah Arendt’s notion of public space is one of her most fruitful, yet frustrating concepts. Having employed it to analyze political freedom, she claims that such space has largely disappeared in the modern world. In what follows, I am going to argue that this pessimistic assessment follows from Arendt’s exclusion of labor and work from the public realm. Against Arendt’s claim that such activities are essentially private, I shall argue that they, like action, manifest our embodied being-in-the-world. When we think of public space in terms of our embodied presence, it becomes a concept applicable to modern democratic politics.

The article presents the transcendental reduction as a type of questioning, and by so doing formulates the problem of the structure and motivation of reduction. Transcendental questioning is presented as a permanent formulation and reformulation of questions, which, it is argued, make it possible to overcome the naïveté of the natural attitude. However, the phenomenologist does not overcome naïveté in the sense of excluding it; instead, he is conscious of it. It is argued that one should understand transcendental questioning as a practical activity that makes the phenomenologist responsible for knowledge by leading toward the essence, which seems to be “unquestionable.”

Ortega y Gasset’s old lament that no one had so far attempted a rigorous phenomenology of pain no longer holds since the appearance of Christian Grüny’s recent monograph Zerstörte Erfahrung. Eine Phänomenologie des Schmerzes. Grüny argues for the use of phenomenological categories from Merleau-Ponty in order to understand physical pain as a “blocked escape-movement” (“blockierte Fluchtbewegung”), concluding that corporeal suffering makes impossible both a clean distinction and a pure identification between the lived body and the physical body that I am. In my paper, I would like to suggest some improvements to Grüny’s approach through the utilization of the category of self-affection, as the material phenomenology of Michel Henry has developed it. In addition to the radical immanence in which hyle, noesis, and noema are unified into a “carnal cogito,” however, I argue that it is necessary to describe the painful self-affection not only in terms of any sensitive excess whatever (überhaupt), as Grüny posits, but also in terms of a mutation of the sensitive excess into the intra-tactile sphere of sensibility. Thus I endorse the Husserlian insight that makes tactility the primordial structure of sensibility.

This paper attempts to elucidate the exceptional stance Heidegger takes in Beiträge toward Hölderlin’s “poetizing.” On the one hand, Beiträge provides no specific guideline for understanding this exceptional stance. On the other hand, the text of a “Dialogue” Heidegger wrote almost a decade after Beiträge, providesthe hermeneutic guideline needed for understanding Heidegger’s exceptional position on this poet. This hermeneutic guideline is none other than what Heidegger calls the “Will.” Following this guideline, the paper proceeds to highlight the hermeneutic thesis according to which another appearing of being (Sein)—one not referentially dependent upon the “Will”—is sheltered and preserved in Hölderlin’s “poetizing.” Elucidating this thesis the paper concludes that Hölderlin’s“poetizing” unfolds from within the Other Onset (der andere Anfang) of thinking.

To compare Merleau-Ponty’s and Deleuze’s phenomenal bodies, I first examine how for Merleau-Ponty phenomena appear on the basis of three levels of integration: 1) between the parts of the world, 2) between the parts of the body, and 3) between the body and its world. I contest that Deleuze’s attacks on phenomenology can be seen as constructive critiques rather than as being expressions of an anti-phenomenological position. By building from Deleuze’s definition of the phenomenon and from his more phenomenologically relevant writings, we find that phenomena for him are given to the body under exactly the opposite conditions as for Merleau-Ponty, namely that 1) the world’s differences 2) appear to a disordered body that 3) comes into shocking affective contact with its surroundings. I argue that a Deleuzian theory of bodily-given phenomena is better suited than Merleau-Ponty’s model in the task of accounting for the intensity of phenomenal appearings.

French phenomenology focused on “the body” to avoid the supposed transcendental idealism of Husserl’s phenomenology, and to provide an “existential” or “empirical” account of the origin of meaning, as Ricoeur put it. In practice, however, this has implicitly presupposed a Cartesian problematic of the relation between body and mind or “subject.” This is the source of the ultimate frustration of this effort, as well as the persistence of a “mystery” of meaning (to cite Merleau-Ponty and Henry). This essay offers an alternative, considering the embodiment of any meaningful experience, suggesting finally that embodiment must be accounted for in terms of subjection.

Claudia Şerban, Claude Romano, Au coeur de la raison, la phénoménologie, Paris : Gallimard, 2010; Denisa Butnaru, Natalie Depraz, Francisco J. Varela, Pierre Vermersch, A l’épreuve de l’expérience – Pour une pratique phénoménologique, Bucarest : Zeta Books, 2011; Christian Ferencz-Flatz, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Edmund Husserl’s Freiburg Years 1916–1938, New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2011; Nicoleta Szabo, Frédéric Moinat, Le vivant et sa naturalisation. Le probleme du naturalisme en biologie chez Husserl et le jeune Merleau-Ponty, Dordrecht – Heidelberg – London – New York : Springer, 2012; Rolf Kühn, Antoine Vidalin, Acte du Christ et actes de l’homme. La théologie morale a l’épreuve de la phénoménologie de la vie, Paris: Parole et Silence, 2012; Rolf Kühn, Benoît Kanabus, Généalogie du concept d’Archi-Soi chez Michel Henry, Hildesheim-Zürich-New York, Olms Verlag, 2011; Cătălin Cioabă, Matthias Flatscher, Logos und Lethe. Zur phänomenologischen Sprachauff assung im Spätwerk von Heidegger und Wittgenstein, Freiburg / München: Karl Alber, 2011

One of the controversial issues in the development of Heidegger’s thought is the problem of the will. The communis opinio is that Heidegger embraced the concept of the will in a non-critical manner at the beginning of the thirties and , in particular, he employed it in his political speeches of 1933–1934. Jacques Derrida for instance speaks about a “massive voluntarism” in relation to Heidegger’s thought in this period. Also Brett Davis discerns a period of “existential voluntarism” in 1930–1934, in which Heidegger takes over a notion of the will in a non-critical manner. In this article, this interpretation is challenged and a stronger interpretation of Heidegger’s concern with the will is developed. Our hypothesis is that Heidegger’s concern with the will at the onset of the thirties is brought about by his confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) with the concept of the will. Based on his lecture courses from 1930 and 1936/37 and his Rectoral Address from 1933, enables us to discern three main characteristics of Heidegger’s destructed concept of the will in the early thirties.

The legacy of Husserlian phenomenology in France, as Paul Ricœur observes, has inspired a series of “Husserlian heresies.” This paper seeks to shedlight on the Husserl heretics through a study of two influential thinkers who introduced Husserl’s to French readers: Levinas and Ricoeur. Their introductionsgave rise to the “standard picture” of Husserl as an Idealist. Their criticism of Husserl’s Idealism then provides the springboard into their own originalthought. What ultimately emerges from this, however, are two different visions of how phenomenology should relate to its own limits.

Most scholars point out that Ricœur’s itinerary ends with a “phenomenology of the capable human being”. In this paper, I will try to propose a different hypothesis and explain why Ricœur’s last writings can be considered the starting point of a second Copernican revolution within phenomenology. A revolution of both method (from the analytic to the a-logical) and contents (from the theme of intersubjectivity to the theme of “giving” and loving), which, already in the Preface of Le volontaire et l’involontaire, Ricœur wished could follow after the first revolution of the reflexive phenomenology: a hermeneutic poetic phenomenology that develops the project that the early Ricœur had drafted, but not completed in the 1950s. This is the project of a Poetics of the Gift, in which is hidden, in my opinion, the fecundity of Ricœurian philosophy and the possibility for it to become paradigmatic for the philosophy to come.

In several texts, Paul Ricœur has elaborated different concepts of horizon: the horizon of tradition that shapes our perspectives, the horizon as a careful set of determinations of the future, the horizon as a divine call that comes from the future towards us. However, the connection of these three views on the horizon, together with the explicitly Christian interpretation of the third horizon are problematic elements in Ricœur’s thoughts on this topic. In this article his views are confronted with the criticism of Jacques Derrida, who uses a quite different notion of horizon: an enclosing limit that dominates the understanding of what seems to fit in its circle. Finally, the notions of horizon and history as formulated by Jan Patočka provide valuable alternatives to Ricœur’s problematic versions of the horizons of expectation, while leaving the underlying thread of his understanding of horizon intact.

This paper begins by arguing that Jean-Luc Marion’s desire to maintain the philosophical rigor of his analysis of revelation has led him to mischaracterizerevelation as a purely formal phenomenon devoid of any determinate content. The majority of the paper is devoted to showing that the approach to revelation off ered by Paul Ricœur—whose treatment of the phenomenon assumes all of the risks of a thinking exposed to its own historicity—represents an important and all-too-often ignored counterpoint to the prevailing methodological orientation among those associated with the so-called theological turn in phenomenology. The paper contrasts the prevailing methods concerned with uncovering fundamental or “originary” structures with a “hermeneutical” approach to revelation, concerned with the productive imagination and the effective nature of texts.

Luca M. Possati, Jean Grondin, Paul Ricoeur (Paris: PUF, 2013); Aurore Dumont, François Dosse et Catherine Goldenstein (éd.), Paul Ricoeur: penser la mémoire (Paris: Seuil, 2013); Paul-Gabriel Sandu, Gert-Jan van der Heiden, The Truth (and Untruth) of Language. Heidegger, Ricoeur and Derrida on Disclosure and Displacement (Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 2010); Paul Marinescu, Marc-Antoine Vallée, Gadamer et Ricoeur. La conception herméneutiquedu langage (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2012); Witold Płotka, Saulius Geniusas, Th e Origins of the Horizon in Husserl’s Phenomenology (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012); Delia Popa, Annabelle Dufourcq, La dimension imaginaire du réel dans la philosophie de Husserl (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011); Maria GyemantDenis Seron, Ce que voir veut dire. Essai sur la perception (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2012); Christian Ferencz-Flatz, Hans Friesen, Christian Lotz, Jakob Meier, Markus Wolf (Hrsg.), Ding und Verdinglichung. Technik- und Sozialphilosophie nach Heidegger und der Kritischen Th eorie (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2012); Bogdan MincăLarisa Cercel, John Stanley (Hrsg.), Unterwegs zu einer hermeneutischen Übersetzungswissenschaft. Radegundis Stolze zu ihrem 60. Geburtstag (Tübingen: Narr Verlag, 2012); Denisa Butnaru Johann Michel, Sociologie du soi. Essai d’herméneutique appliquée (Rennes: PUR, 2013); Ovidiu Stanciu, Jan Patočka, Aristote, ses devanciers, ses successeurs. Trad. fr. Erika Abrams (Paris: Vrin, 2011); Mădălina Diaconu, Emmanuel Alloa, Das durchscheinende Bild. Konturen einer medialen, Phänomenologie (Zürich: Diaphanes, 2011).

Descriptive foundations and a concern with origins are integral to both Husserlian phenomenology and Darwinian evolutionary biology. These complementary aspects are rooted in the lifeworld as it is experienced. Detailed specifications of the complementary aspects testify to a mutual relevance of phenomenology to evolutionary biology and of evolutionary biology to phenomenology. Exemplifications of the mutual relevance are given in terms of both human and nonhuman agentive abilities. The experiential exemplifications show that agentive abilities are rooted in the kinetic sequence: I move, I do, I can. The kinetic sequence in turn testifies to an ability to think in movement, a thinking that engenders corporeal concepts. It also, however, attests to the need for a veritable phenomenology of learning on the one hand and for a veritable recognition of mindful bodies on the other, mindful bodies that are a driving force both in the evolution of animate forms of life and in the evolution of repertoires of I cans.