This paper will analyze a specific stylistic issue in the Śrautasūtras, namely, the mark of quotation vijñāyate. In literature, a quotation is often introduced with a specific mark that shifts the attention of the reader to a specific work or paper from which the quotation originates. In the ancient manuals about ritual in Vedic culture we find a verb - vijñāyate. The ancient composers seem to use this verb to stress a connection to another text, i.e. to the maxima auctorictas in the Vedic world, the śruti. Our contention is that the link between the verb and what is being introduced by the verb is not always clear. Our survey covers a restricted selection of data; however, we believe that it may provide some interesting insights into one of the most important elements which served to build the concept of the Vedic and Hindū tradition.

This paper brings together two bodies of scholarly literature.It is a study in the nature and development of moral thought, but it is also an inquiry into the interpretation of the Mahabharata. The two subjects come together when we ask the question, “Do works like the Mahabharata contain within them the history of our ethical coming to awareness?”A philosophical archeology of the Mahabharata indicates that it was originally a war story or group of war stories that evolved over time into a moral and religious text. The Mahabharata is an excellent candidate for this kind of moral archaeology since it is a text that has developed over a long period of time, a long enough period of time to see the reenactment of different stages of ethical awareness.

In the Buddhist view there can be no affirmation without negation and positive universals that in the Nyaya view are independent and eternal common characters shared by all members of a natural class should be replaced by difference from others that is a negative entity and a non-entity, e.g. what is meant by a cow is not that it is possessed of cow-ness but that it is not a non-cow. Udayana points out that cognition of a negative entity presupposes cognition of what is negated, the negatum. Thus, cognition of cow if the same as not-not cow presupposes cognition of not-cow, but cognition of not-cow presupposes cognition of cow; hence the Buddhist view is open to the charge of mutual dependence. This difficulty does not arise in the Nyaya view. Even if there is no affirmation without negation, negation is not necessarily the content of affirmation. So far as common experience goes, cognition of positive entities does not always require cognition of negative entities, e.g. a cow may be recognized as a cow and possessed of cow-ness without reference to non-cows.

The prisoner’s dilemma is a fictional story that shows why individuals who seek only their personal benefit meet worse outcomes than those possible by cooperating with others. The dilemma provides an effective, albeit often overlooked, method for studying the Hindu principle of “desireless action” (niṣkāmakarma). In the context of the prisoner’s dilemma, a prisoner who wants to uphold the principle of “desireless action” may choose one of two decision-making strategies: to be indifferent and leave the decision to chance or to either pursue the common good or the other person’s benefit instead of his or her own. Assuming that followers of niṣkāmakarma can be goal-oriented, the second strategy is more appropriate than the first, as long as one pursues unselfish goals and remains both indifferent and uncommitted to personal benefit. This interpretation is tested and further discussed in this article in light of the values of the modern environmental and anti-consumerist degrowth movement.

This paper offers a critique of Krishnamurti’s Truth Is A Pathless Land doctrine, according to which all mystical mystical organizations and all mystical techniques, such as meditation, Koans, and Sufi whirling, obstruct rather than enhance mystical illumination. The paper criticizes both the empirical and the theoretical arguments Krishnamurti presents for this doctrine. It suggests that this doctrine is problematic even on the metaphorical level and that its ramifications confuse means with ends. Further, Krishnamurti's own program does not succeed in attaining what he claims other programs to have failed to attain, and his teachings are sectarian, theoretical, and authoritarian no less than others. Finally, the paper defends the legitimacy of criticizing Krishnamurti's views and arguments in a rational manner. It concludes that Krishnamurti's denunciation of all mystical techniques and organizations is unjustified and unhelpful.

Since publishing my argument for polytheisms over monotheism with Herman Philipse, I have encountered many monotheists who were perturbed, but who had not formulated a proper rebuttal. It is also hard not to notice that there is generally a dearth of publications arguing for monotheism's being more probable than polytheism, perhaps because it is generally taken for granted. As such, I am delighted that Mark Saward has taken up the challenge to address at least some of the original article's claims. Unfortunately, his critique fails to establish why polytheism is improbable, and why monotheism is to be privileged by philosophers of religion. I further reiterate that the threat of extreme agnosticism is a bizarre approach for the monotheistic evidentialist, posing no problems whatsoever for agnostic atheists, such as myself In fact, I assert that extreme agnosticism still allows discussants, even further encourages them, to declare monotheism (and also classical theism) to be epistemically improbable.

In decision-making the first step is to get knowledge about alternatives which can deliver "a" required objective. The second step is to choose one from the many options using a suitable "criterion". The third is to recognise the famous lesson from Bhagabad Gita that one can control his actions but not the result and be prepared with a "coping strategy" in case of a failure. The two central aspects in decision making are knowledge and choice. Choice is based on certain cost-benefit; which entail an intangible part where religion assumes importance in resolving moral conflicts. The religious principles of decision making according to four religions will be briefly documented and analysed. A "universal" decision making process consistent with the religious principles as well as applicable to the present day socio-economic panorama will be identified.

The design of Hindu temple follows the design of vastupurusha-mandala as described in several Hindu texts on architecture. The design of temple is divided into ground plan and vertical alignment, the superstructure. Herein the present study, our focus is on architecture of the superstructure, especially Shikhara style of superstmcture, in the temple of Nepal. Shikhara style architecture came into Nepal from Lidia over a millennium ago. The purpose of this research is to understand the significance of Shikhara Style temples in the capital of Nepal, the Kathmandu valley. The first segment of the study reports the overall architecture of Hindu temple and then the common styles of architecture of superstructure (vertical alignment/tower) applied in building the temples in Nepal, which involves the Shikhara Style, the Pagoda Style, and the Stupa Style. The Shikhara style architecture is described in detail while other two are briefly discussed. The second segment of the study introduces some of the recognized temples of the Kathmandu valley that have Shikhara style architecture. And finally summing up everything, the conclusion of this research tries to recognize, acknowledge and bring to the fore the significance of Shikhara style temples in Nepal and also wrap the research by understanding the concept of architecture through pre-ancient perspective.

Jnanasri argues: whatever does not reveal reliably presence or absence of something does not have that thing as the content. For example, perception of a cow does not reveal presence or absence of a horse and does not also have a horse as the content. The point is that perception does not provide reliable evidence for external objects for perception does not reveal reliably their presence or absence and does not have them as the content. Udayana claims that the general premise is false. Something may be perceived and be the content even if it is not revealed where it is present or absent (as is the case in the Nyaya view in misperception). Further, it has been argued that a substance and its features are different and that a substance may be the content of perception or be perceived even if some or most of its features are not perceived. Since these positions are argued for and not refuted, Jnanasri has made gratuitous assumptions.

This paper will compare some discoveries and debates within contemporary neuroscience to some of Advaita Vedanta's analyses of the mind, as presented in the work of Shankara and some of his followers. I will argue, first, that the conception of mind within Advaita Vedanta provides a better model for contemporary neuroscience than either Cartesian dualism, or its antithesis, reductivist materialism, does. Second, I will show how some discoveries and arguments within contemporary neuroscience could benefit from the Vedantic philosophical framework. Finally, I will show how Vedanta might profit from interactions with contemporary neuroscience, and suggest some areas for cross-fertilization between the Indian philosophical system and contemporary brain science.

This brief study employs Lacan's theory about the self and about the way that our self-image is constituted to highlight some crucial differences between one important Roman Catholic philosophical religious anthropology and one interpretation of the Theravāda Buddhist theory of anattā. It concludes that one persuaded of Lacanian theory would be likely to regard the Roman Catholic model of personal-identity as fostering a particularly tenacious and dangerous illusion, while being likely to view the Theravādan philosophy more favourably, regarding it as encouraging a similar process of ego-deconstruction to that available within Lacanian psychoanalysis.