In decision-making the first step is to get knowledge about alternatives which can deliver "a" required objective. The second step is to choose one from the many options using a suitable "criterion". The third is to recognise the famous lesson from Bhagabad Gita that one can control his actions but not the result and be prepared with a "coping strategy" in case of a failure. The two central aspects in decision making are knowledge and choice. Choice is based on certain cost-benefit; which entail an intangible part where religion assumes importance in resolving moral conflicts. The religious principles of decision making according to four religions will be briefly documented and analysed. A "universal" decision making process consistent with the religious principles as well as applicable to the present day socio-economic panorama will be identified.

The design of Hindu temple follows the design of vastupurusha-mandala as described in several Hindu texts on architecture. The design of temple is divided into ground plan and vertical alignment, the superstructure. Herein the present study, our focus is on architecture of the superstructure, especially Shikhara style of superstmcture, in the temple of Nepal. Shikhara style architecture came into Nepal from Lidia over a millennium ago. The purpose of this research is to understand the significance of Shikhara Style temples in the capital of Nepal, the Kathmandu valley. The first segment of the study reports the overall architecture of Hindu temple and then the common styles of architecture of superstructure (vertical alignment/tower) applied in building the temples in Nepal, which involves the Shikhara Style, the Pagoda Style, and the Stupa Style. The Shikhara style architecture is described in detail while other two are briefly discussed. The second segment of the study introduces some of the recognized temples of the Kathmandu valley that have Shikhara style architecture. And finally summing up everything, the conclusion of this research tries to recognize, acknowledge and bring to the fore the significance of Shikhara style temples in Nepal and also wrap the research by understanding the concept of architecture through pre-ancient perspective.

Jnanasri argues: whatever does not reveal reliably presence or absence of something does not have that thing as the content. For example, perception of a cow does not reveal presence or absence of a horse and does not also have a horse as the content. The point is that perception does not provide reliable evidence for external objects for perception does not reveal reliably their presence or absence and does not have them as the content. Udayana claims that the general premise is false. Something may be perceived and be the content even if it is not revealed where it is present or absent (as is the case in the Nyaya view in misperception). Further, it has been argued that a substance and its features are different and that a substance may be the content of perception or be perceived even if some or most of its features are not perceived. Since these positions are argued for and not refuted, Jnanasri has made gratuitous assumptions.

This paper will compare some discoveries and debates within contemporary neuroscience to some of Advaita Vedanta's analyses of the mind, as presented in the work of Shankara and some of his followers. I will argue, first, that the conception of mind within Advaita Vedanta provides a better model for contemporary neuroscience than either Cartesian dualism, or its antithesis, reductivist materialism, does. Second, I will show how some discoveries and arguments within contemporary neuroscience could benefit from the Vedantic philosophical framework. Finally, I will show how Vedanta might profit from interactions with contemporary neuroscience, and suggest some areas for cross-fertilization between the Indian philosophical system and contemporary brain science.

This brief study employs Lacan's theory about the self and about the way that our self-image is constituted to highlight some crucial differences between one important Roman Catholic philosophical religious anthropology and one interpretation of the Theravāda Buddhist theory of anattā. It concludes that one persuaded of Lacanian theory would be likely to regard the Roman Catholic model of personal-identity as fostering a particularly tenacious and dangerous illusion, while being likely to view the Theravādan philosophy more favourably, regarding it as encouraging a similar process of ego-deconstruction to that available within Lacanian psychoanalysis.

When discussing Eastern philosophy there is often a difficulty since characteristically Eastern ways of thinking do not map well onto Western philosophic categories. Yet, P. J. Ivanhoe suggests that a careful reading of Confucianism can illuminate and expand Western approaches to ethics. Ivanhoe maintains that the best way to understand Confucian ethics is as a hybrid of virtue ethics and consequentialism, a view he calls character consequentialism (CC). The paper will progress in the following way. First, I present Ivanhoe's conception of character consequentialism. Second, I discuss how C C , particularly as it is developed by Charles Goodman as a way to interpret Mahayana Buddhist ethics, relates to aspects of Mill's utilitarianism. This suggests that there is nothing especially new about CC. However, the similarities actually underscore the ways that Eastern and Western ethical theories can illuminate each other. Finally, I respond to Damien Keown's concern that CC is hopelessly confused.