In Avicenna's allegorical treatises humans are envoys of two worlds; on one hand, as products of natural evolution they are representatives of the earthly, physical world; on the other, as products of divine emanation they represent the cosmic principle. But in the process of spiritual contemplation they overcome theduality and split nature of their being and restore the fractured harmony between themselves and the cosmic world. Thus, having attained the highest form of cognition and moral beauty, the individual 'self becomes the universal essence identified in the language of Sufism as 'the perfect human'. Avicenna tries in hisallegorical treatises to makes his of becoming a perfect individual is not a sudden act of illumination, but a pyramid-like development, arranged, like the heavenly spheres, hierarchically, and calling for an incredible exertion of followers recognize that each person is able to rise to the level of the 'perfect individual', the road to which lies through moral purification and mastery of learning and the sciences, primarily philosophy. But the process strength, self-limitation and effort of will to pass through the stages of perfection and achieve the aim.

The following paper offers a brief discussion of Simplicius’ intriguing concept of “propensity” (epitedeiotes), an attempt to account for particularized qualities in terms congenial to a Neoplatonist. For although claiming to follow Aristotle, Simplicius ultimately explains the existence of particularized qualities in termsof a metaphysic of participation. Although his doctrine does not seem not have enjoyed much popularity in Late Antiquity, it will be adopted and expanded upon both late 13th century scholastic authors such as James of Viterbo who see Simplicius’ theory as offering a philosophically rigorous equivalent to Augustinian seminal reasons.

The concept of person arises in the conjunction of Greek Philosophy carried out by Saint Augustine. Both men and women are persons because they carry the image of God in their soul. On bearing the mind God's mark in its memory, it will wish for happiness. On bearing God's mark in its intelligence, it will wish for Truth and on bearing God's mark in its will it will wish for the Good since the desire for happiness is a wish or remembrance of God, the desire for Truth is a wish of God because He is the Truth, and the desire of Good and Beauty is a wish of God because He is the highest Good and the supreme Beauty. Human being's strongest motivations: happiness, truth, good and beauty, they all just come from being a person, from being the brightest bearer of the Trinitarian image which, on leaving its mark on him, at the same time marks the direction of his deepest desire. The anchorage of those metaphysical desires of man is in God and they can be thought of as anthropological universals.

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the ontological character of Friendship in Aquinas. The originality of Aquinas's theory is found in the ontological foundation expressed by Neoplatonic concepts (unio, unitas, communicatio). By integrating such Neoplatonic concepts with his analysis on the transcendentals(aliquid, unum), I will make a new ontological foundation to the theory of amicitia. In order that a man is a one (unum), he must establish himself as something different (aliud quid) in the midst of the relationship with others and then has to return to himself. So long as he stays self-contained without moving outward, he cannot constitute himself as an independent being which is different from other beings (aliquid). The ontological oneness (unitas) as an independent rational substance makes it possible for a man to form the mutual relationship of unity (unio) without losing himself in the midst of the deep relationship with someone else.

The goal of this paper is to show that Augustine’s Confessions, understood “sub specie dubitationis”, constitute a substantive argument for the philosophical position that may be described as “Augustinian skepticism”. The point is that, according to Augustine’s conversion narrative, what human beings can know becomes thematic only within the horizon of what they must believe, and therefore a doxic attitude other than rationality plays the primary and ultimate role in their quest for answers to questions about the meaning of life and death. An explication of the text of the Confessions suggests that a failure to understand Augustinianskepticism makes it impossible to account for a long list of big philosophical topics in Augustine’s thought.

This paper intends to show that our reception of Plato’s criticism of Anaxagoras’ philosophy of mind (noûs) is mediated by Thomas Aquinas’ conception of freedom. The Socratic-Platonic Metaphysical theory of mind as essentially connected to the best is transformed by Aristotle into a theory of the intelligence which, in its acting, necessarily records the possibility of performing the opposites or contraries. Therefore, ‘the (Platonic) best’ is now specifically understood as ‘the best possible’. Within this Metaphysical conception, Aquinas distinguishes two levels (which are also to be found in ‘freedom’). In the first or more superfical one–here called ‘horizontal’–, the mind chooses to perform the best possible or not, that is, it can fulfill the science which is within the mind itself or not. In the second or more radical one –here called ‘vertical’–, the mind has to perform a reflexive act, by means of which it chooses willing or not its necessary possibility of performing the science that the mind possesses.

Pantheist thinking in Islamic East and its adequacy to western pantheism is complicated and controversy problem. To make the problem somewhat clearer, it needs first of all to emphasize that it is possible to divide the development of the theories of world outlook and trends relied on essence of Koran’s esoteric meaning and religion towards inner world in Islamic East, into two direction: pantheist and “vahdat al-vujud”. The trend, in organization and formation of which ismailism, hurufism, nogtavism played important role and some sects of tasavvuf considered to be heretic may be referred to the first orientation. As far as the second one, only tasavvuf may be referred to it. Though some issues, categories of each of them (orientations) seem alike at first sight, however there are the important differences in their fundamental principles from both ontological and epistemological points of view, it stipulated that, first of all, by the factors and purposes of their formation. Each trends of the first direction, philosophy of which been significant part of thinking system in Islamic East, left its traces in history ofphilosophy and possessed a vast circle of influence. There were many prominent figures whose works ranked among the philosophical treatises of the period, need particular study to complete Islamic philosophical panorama.

This paper presents a way of rethinking the current thought and the medieval philosophy, understanding that we can define the actual philosophy like neo-romanticism. The challenges of this thought can be approached from a reading of to medieval philosophy of St. Bonaventure. St. Francis of Assisi can appear as a romantic personage and the access to the philosophy is done bearing other texts in mind as the Leyenda Maior.

In his Welcome Message for the XXII World Congress of Philosophy hosted by Seoul National University in August 2008 the President of the International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP), Peter Kemp, said that—inter alia—it will be an occasion “for rethinking the great philosophical questions.” Amongst there questions how we in the present understand the philosophical past is surely a perennial query before us. In this short paper I will refer to the endeavor of understanding past philosophical thought on its own terms or as presented in a current idiom as “philosophical translation.” The latter can take three forms: logical, analytical, or hermeneutic. This paper will briefly discuss all three forms vis-à-vis modern attempts to understand the medieval concept of “supposition” with special regard to the role metalanguage plays in philosophical translation.

Siger conçoit sa critique à l’encontre de la théorie thomasienne de l’intellect en s’appuyant sur les adages tels que « agere sequitur formam » et « potentia non potest esse simplicior aut immaterialior quam eius substantia ». Structurant son argumentation autour de ces deux principes, il tente de démontrer que la position de Thomas d’Aquin se réduit finalement à une position matérialiste ou, se révèle encore être philosophiquement intenable lorsque ce dernier soutientces deux thèses qui, pour Siger, sont contradictoires, à savoir que l’intellect est, d’une part, une des parties de l’âme humaine et d’autre part une puissance indépendante et séparée du corps. Or, Siger semble faire l’économie de l’une de ses arguments les plus puissants qui peut, a priori saper le fondement même de la théorie de l’intellect chez Thomas, à savoir le problème de se séparation du corps. Cependant, une analyse détaillée de la terminologie thomasienne nousrévèle la raison qui a poussé Siger à ne pas utiliser cette critique majeure ; en effet, il était conscient que cet argument qui semblait indiquer un possible incompatibilité entre l’intellect et le corps ne se réduisait en réalité qu’à un problème unsinnig. Cette retenue et cette maîtrise témoignent de de la perspicacité de Siger qui a su précisément demeurer à l’intérieur de la limite conceptuelle où il lui est possible de se présenter non pas comme un critique manqué deThomas d’Aquin, mais comme un véritable philosophe capable de mettre sa position en parallèl avec celle thomasienne concernant l’homme pensant ou « cet homme-ci qui pense ».

One of the most powerful tendencies of the World scientific thought development of XIX – the first half of XX century was analysing all sorts of knowledge, accumulated by mankind in the form of universal synthetic system combining science, religion and philosophy into the Universal Sphere of Knowledge that gives the humanity the possibility to achieve a new deeper level of understanding the reality. By the founder of the Classical Russian Systematic School of Philosophy (according to me – A.Sh.) V.S. Soloviev - for the first time in history - the Idea of the Universal Sphere of Knowledge which is depicted by the Greek term ΘεωΣοφιαwas descriptively defined. The followers of V.S. Soloviev’s school in the middle of XIX – the beginning of XX century worked out many aspects of the Concept of Ontological Synthesis of dispersed Spheres of knowledge, among which the Philosophy is an important and homogeneous part of synthesis of Science and Theology. This Spheres of Knowledge look different and it was aggravated in the course of historically developed separation of their methods, spheres ofexperience and types of thinking. Nevertheless to find the new ways to reach the new level of knowledge for the mankind they must be concentrated on the investigation of the Absolute Elements of the World : Truly-Existing [Λογος] (suprasystematic Element) in its real manifestation. The main (or the basic) method of knowledge is the inner experience of mystic origin. The findings of Russian Philosophers are confirmed by the studies of scientific methods which made it possible to achieve great staggering discoveries and inventions which will for a long time remain mysterious for the majority of human beings.

Contemporary research, across various disciplines, alludes to notion of complexity. Indeed, the phenomenon has even been accredited for comprising a new “world-view” that not only heralds theory construction but also instigates miscellaneous nifty yet practical avenues. On the other hand, however, the complexityparadigm has frequently been criticized of obscurity, contestation and scope imprecision. In addition, its various mutually incommensurable philosophical implications have lead to much heated debates regarding methodological pluralism and metaphorical applications, within literature. To elaborately discussand resolve these concerns, this paper will be organized in three sections: The first section will build on the idiosyncratic characteristics of complexity that differentiate it from related notions of chaos and complicatedness. The second section will shed light on the philosophical deliberations of individual complexityattributes, toward metaphysics of complexity, through elaborately drawn diagrams. Also, this section will draw attention to several conflicting perspectives encompassing the theological, epistemological and ontological domain of complexity. The third section will trace the origins of such paradoxical debates, in the complexity literature, through a ‘Super-System-Outlook’ (SSO) framework. The framework is likely to be of particular significance as it aims to not only divulge an eradicable joint cause of the disparity governing complexity studies but also to propose a possible assimilation of such deliberations.

My presentation deals with developments and transformations of the concept of the transcendental within Anglo-American analytical philosophy. According to Kant – the “founding father” of transcendental philosophy – the methodical domain of the transcendental is to denote and to expose the a priori epistemic structureof human mind and cognition (perception, experience, knowledge), as well as to provide a priori foundations for normative ethics. Analytical philosophy has adopted the term of the transcendental, mostly within sceptical argumentations or for sceptical refutations. What is the methodological function of the transcendental in these debates, in the context of philosophical scepticism? My contribution tries to show that the notion of the transcendental becomes concave in analytical contexts. It might be appropriate to refute scepticism, but in these analytical contexts it’s not possible to deduct epistemic structures (e.g. categories,epistemic schemes) of experience and knowledge or to bridge the gap to foundations in ethics – one of the core goals in Kantian transcendental philosophy. What is the importance in transcendental analysis and reflection or is this term obsolete all together nowadays? My paper tries to discuss and mediate between various positions and ideas.

One of the most powerful tendencies of the World scientific thought development of XIX – the first half of XX century was analysing all sorts of knowledge, accumulated by mankind in the form of universal synthetic system combining science, religion and philosophy into the Universal Sphere of Knowledge that gives the humanity the possibility to achieve a new deeper level of understanding the reality. By the founder of the Classical Russian Systematic School of Philosophy (according to me – A.Sh.) V.S.Soloviev - for the first time in history - the Idea of the Universal Sphere of Knowledge which is depicted by the Greek term Θεω-Σοφιαwas descriptively defined. The followers of V.S. Soloviev’s school in the middle of XIX – the beginning of XX century worked out many aspects of the Concept of Ontological Synthesis of dispersed Spheres of knowledge, among which the Philosophy is an important and homogeneous part of synthesis of Science and Theology. This Spheres of Knowledge look different and it was aggravated in the course of historically developed separation of their methods, spheres ofexperience and types of thinking. Nevertheless to find the new ways to reach the new level of knowledge for the mankind they must be concentrated on the investigation of the Absolute Elements of the World : TrulyExisting [Λογος] (suprasystematic Element) in its real manifestation. The main (or the basic) method of knowledge is the inner experience of mystic origin. The findings of Russian Philosophers are confirmed by the studies of scientific methods which made it possible to achieve great staggering discoveries and inventions which will for a long time remain mysterious for the majority of human beings.

This paper deals with the identity and individuality of material objects. In particular, the view that identity is derivative on the qualities of things, based on the endorsement of the Principle of the Identity of the Indiscernibles, is studied in detail. This provides what seems to be a much-needed unitary look at, and up-to-date critical analysis of, the vast literature on the Identity of the Indiscernibles. It is concluded that the ‘reductionist’ view, dating back to Quine and, earlier, to Leibniz, possesses no compelling justification, neither from the conceptual, a priori point of view, nor from the methodological perspective, nor as far as empiricalevidence (as the latter is described by our best current science) is concerned. That is to say, the Principle has not been (perhaps, cannot be) shown to be either a necessary or a contingent truth. Therefore, it can be argued that the whole reductionist view of the individuality of material entities can be dispensed with in favour of an interpretation of reality in terms of objects provided with primitive identity. A suggestion in this latter sense that preserves the appeal of a property-based ontology is very briefly made.

The key philosophic concepts - wholeness and duality - are analyzed on the basis of general scientific and vision ideas of H. Poincaré. His cellular structure with full set of topological invariants (cycles) can be considered as a model of dual arrangement of the World. The World is seen as a multidimensional process, consisting not of parts, but of local processes, adjoining each other. It is demonstrated, that a set of cycles at each structural level not only resolve paradoxes of wholeness and development, but represents a recommencing process, which reproduces its own environment. The wholeness – world is considered as a duality of flows and potentials, which arrange and produce absolutely different structures, being closely conjugated, as cycles and co-cycles within the whole. Thestreams are structured and coordinated towards decrease of structural level dimensions: from the general to the particular, from the concrete to the abstract, from the depth to the surface. This is the direction of differentiation of the whole. Potentials are coordinated in the opposite direction, with increase of dimension, through structural elements of higher dimensions. The world is gathered, integrated, joined, specified through stresses; differentiated parts tend to scatter, connections between them strain and turn them back to their whole. A penetration of the scientist into more complicated processes turns out to be a movement within a closed multidimensional surface (closed manifold), enriched with new dimensions with inclusion of new processes. Those concrete examples illustrate importance of Poincaré duality theorem for closed manifolds.

Semi-compatibilists intend to reconcile moral responsibility with causal determinism, even if determinism is incompatible with freedom to do otherwise. For them, moral responsibility does not require free will, which is not a necessary condition for moral responsibility. They agree with the view that causal determinism is incompatible with free will. Free will is incompatible with determinism as well as moral responsibility. Both compatibilists and semi-compatibilists argue for the compatibility between determinism and moral responsibility. However, the latter fails to prove sufficiently the reason why determinism is compatible with moral responsibility.

Author brings forward a BioCosmological (metaphysical) conception that primarily explores the reasons of present ongoing and increasing global crises. In the issue, author substantively arrives at the conclusion (‘diagnosis’) of the current ‘cosmological insufficiency’ of modern philosophical and cultural community,wherein the leading ‘clinical form’ turns out to be the modern mainstream ‘presentism’, while the ‘patient's treatment’ (perceiving that ‘the patient’ signifies the whole process of life on Earth) – proves to be the urgent rehabilitation of Aristotelism and Russian philosophy and science (neo-Aristotelism). Precisely in this course, author’s BioCosmological conception carries out a realistic and rational proposal that strives to construct a substantive comprehensive theoretical framework – for the tackling of these actual issues.

Information has usually been defined as one of the properties of substance and a reflection of the substance world. A new perspective is introduced in this paper concerning the nature of information and its role in the cosmos. The five characteristics of information are discussed in the first part of this paper. While the passivity allows information to be transferred, copied, recorded, and displayed, the other four characteristics of information (i.e. initiative, independent, expressive, and holographic) make it the fundamental element of the cosmos, which generates the cosmos, life, consciousness and human culture. Based on the findings of physics and astrophysics, this view is explored more by defining information as a pattern of orders throughout the cosmos, with series of parameters, functions and programs. It is argued that, the cosmos is the existence of process instead of things; the information is reality itself instead of a property of substance; and the substance is one of the forms in which information expresses itself during its evolution. An original framework named “Information Order N” (N is any integer between 0 and 7) is described in the second part of this paper. This scale of information evolution starts from initial information, which is an intrinsic pattern that inhered from maternal universes. The seven orders after that are dimension and superstring, substance and energy, life, consciousness, system of the earth (with a combination of eco-system and human culture), system of the Milky Way Galaxy, system of the cosmos. This “Information Order N” scale unifies substance,life, consciousness, human culture, and everything in the cosmos into one system of information evolution. In another word, the cosmos is information itself.

By means of comparison between Lao Tzu’s theory of Tao in ancient China and the concept of metaphysics originated from ancient Greece, the author redefined the concept of “form” and therefore, elaborated the meaning of metaphysics from its Chinese translation. According to the author’s re-interpretation of Tao Te Ching, Lao Tzu had resolved the ontological questions in a different way with that of ancient Greek philosophers, and he had answered the question of “One and Many”. In the past, people had omitted the fact that there are actually two different “ones” in this question, and hence, metaphysics and ontology had been remained in a confused state. By giving an example in natural science, the author had illustrated clearly what is the metaphysical Tao, and then extendedthe idea to metaphysics of morals. As a conclusion, the author suggests that it is better to use a new term to replace the imperfectly defined “metaphysics”, for example, metaformology.