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Sylvain Delcomminette
Platon et Aristote sur le bien en soi
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In this paper, I examine Plato’s and Aristotle’s contrasted treatment of the “Good itself ” and its relation to the human good. Contrary to a common view, Aristotle does not attack the very concept of a Good itself, but rather Plato’s interpretation of it as the Idea of the Good. One of his central criticisms is that such an Idea would have no practical use. By an analysis of the Philebus, I try to show why and how this Idea does have such a use in Plato, but in a way which could not satisfy his pupil, because for Aristotle, the Good itself must be an ultimate end which must have a direct efficiency on the whole world, without any need of the mediation of knowledge. In the Metaphysics, Aristotle shows that such an end can be identified with a purely active intelligence, which he names God. Although this Good itself is absolutely necessary and thus cannot be a “practical good” in Aristotle’s terms, its contemplation by human intelligence (i.e. what Aristotle calls sophia) can be, because it is for its part contingent. I conclude in assessing the main consequences of Plato’s and Aristotle’s different views of the Good itself on their philosophy as a whole.
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Fabienne Baghdassarian
Principe du bien et principe du mal chez Aristote
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This paper deals with Aristotle’s criticism of a metaphysical principle of evil. On several occasions in the Metaphysics, Aristotle notes that some of his predecessors, e.g. Empedocles and Plato at least, have been forced to admit the existence of a principle of evil, for the very same reasons that led them to define the good as a principle. Needless to say Aristotle too admits that the good belongs to the range of principles, but he obviously does not think he is committed to the same position concerning evil. This article tries to determine why it can legitimately be so, i.e. on which grounds Aristotle’s conception of the good as a principle can save him from having to make room for its contrary too among the principles. In the first part of this paper, I define the two main logical rules which, according to Aristotle, led Empedocles and Plato to admit the evil among the principles : the rule of homogeneity between a principle and its effect, and the rule of contrary principles. In the two following parts, I study how Aristotle manages to avoid the undesirable consequences of these logical rules : first, by providing a definition of an absolutely first principle which has no contrary ; second, by providing a new definition of the relation of contrariety itself, thanks to which the hypothesis of a principle of evil turns to be both useless and contradictory.
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Izabela Jurasz
Ce que les Gnostiques ont fait du Principe du Bien. Le cas de Basilide
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The article examines the metamorphosis of the Platonic Principle of Good in the doctrine of Basilides, the 2nd century Christian gnostic. The Basilidian doctrine represents a radical form of dualism, in which the universe ‑ physical and metaphysical ‑ is born from an encounter between Light (good) and Darkness (evil). In his effort to liberate the Light from all contact with Darkness, Basilide refers to several different mediators (eye, mirror, gleam, desire). Analysing the Basilidian myth in the light of the Platonic writings brings out the paradoxes inherent in any attempts to construct a dualistic metaphysics within the Platonic context.
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Laurent Lavaud
Y a‑t‑il, selon Plotin, une energeia du Bien ?
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Is there an energeia of the Good according to Plotinus ? The aim of this paper is to shed light on the tension between two conflicting perspectives concerning the Good in the philosophy of Plotinus. According to the first perspective, Plotinus claims that the the first principle completely transcends the energeia, which is strictly limited to the Intellect. According to the second, he ascribes a kind of immanent energeia to the One. I will examine the two series of texts in which these two perspectives are present and advance two hypotheses to explain the divergence between these two viewpoints.Firstly, the meaning of the term energeia is not unequivocal, depending on whether it is strictly limited to the intelligible realm or ascribed to the One. Secondly, the competition between two models of causality in the Enneads can explain why Plotinus has two divergent views on the relation between the Good and the energeia. According to the first model, the Good ≪doesn’t have in itself what it gives≫. In line with this principle, Plotinus claims that the Good stands epekeina energeias. The second model of causality is inherited from the peripatetic school. According to it, the cause already contains eminently in itself that which it gives. This model of causality helps explain the ascription of energeia to the Good and the so‑called ≪double‑energeia theory≫.
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Jean‑Claude Picot
Penser le Bien et le Mal avec Empédocle
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A ready answer to the question of Empedocles’ thinking about Good and Evil is to be found in Aristotle, who provides us with this simple rule of thumb : Good is associated with Love, and Evil with Hate. Fundamentally obvious as that rule may be (it makes us think in particular of Love’s masterpiece in the cosmic cycle, the Sphairos), we need to go beyond Aristotle’s words. This article investigates several topics : fire, the sun, water, the hoard of divine thought, reincarnation, Empedoclean ethics, and, finally, the Blessed Ones. Complexity rules our quest to determine what belongs to the Good and what belongs to the Bad. There are times when Love takes advantage of Hate’s ability to cause separation. The sun, manifestation par excellence of fire, is loaded with ambivalence in Empedocles – even though the high value placed almost universally on light is a commonplace in Greek thought. Empedocles is torn between his sense of wonder at the works of Aphrodite and his pessimism on recognizing the infernal cycle in which mortals are involved.
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Rossella Saetta Cottone
Le soleil comme reflet et la question de la connaissance dans la pensée d’Empédocle:
aux origines d’une image
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Questo articolo argomenta in favore della tesi di una collaborazione tra sensi e ragione nella gnoseologia di Empedocle. Il primo difensore di questa tesi, Sesto Empirico, distingueva nel pensiero empedocleo due forme di ragione (λόγος), una umana e l’altra divina. Viene sostenuta qui l’identificazione della ragione divina menzionata da Sesto con il dio protagonista del fr. 134DK, a cui il suo citatore, Ammonio, attribuisce il nome di Apollo. L’analisi proposta cerca di mostrare in particolare 1) che il dio menzionato nel fr. 134 e il sole della comologia empedoclea conosciuto grazie alla testimonianza di Aezio (A56) ; 2) che la costituzione fisica di questo dio solare, immagine luminosa proiettata sulla volta dell’etere, ne fa una figura velata della conoscenza, come relazione necessaria di esperienze sensibili e di contenuti intellettivi. La tradizione pitagorica che identificava il sole con Apollo troverebbe un prolungamento nella divinizzazione empedoclea della ragione.
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Fernando Rey Puente
Simone Weil, Platon et le Bien
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The aim of this article is to provide an overview about Simone Weil’s interpretation of the Good in Plato. The article has two parts. In the first one, we focus on her exegesis of the ancient Greek civilization and of the Pythagorean tradition. We also signalize that her interpretation cannot be confused with the one done in Neoplatonism. After that, we investigate her interpretation of Plato’s philosophy with special emphasis on two dialogues : Republic and Timaeus. In the second part we research two main concepts of Simone Weil’s philosophy, i.e., the notions of value and of lecture and finalize our text with the question of how we should situate her appropriation of the Platonic tradition.
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Michel Narcy
L’idée du bien chez trois platoniciens modernes:
Alain, Pétrement, Weil
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This paper consists in three case studies of modern French philosophers who drew their inspiration from Plato : Emile Chartier (1868‑1951), known under his nom de plume Alain, famous as a teacher in the twenties of the last century, and two of his pupils, Simone Petrement (1907‑1992) and Simone Weil (1909‑1943). Great admirer of Plato, Alain taught the survival of his main thoughts through all the philosophical tradition and their agreement with the rationalistic mood of 19th‑20th century philosophy. This implied that these thoughts were stripped of the allegorical or mythological way in which Plato often expresses them. In particular, Plato’s allegory of the cave, one of his core images, turned out in Alain’s interpretation to be a metaphoric description of the difficult ascent of the mind up to scientific or at least rational knowledge. Consequently in this interpretation it was no longer question of any transcendency of the idea of the Good.Petrement and Weil remained faithful to their teacher and therefore to Platonic inspiration. Nevertheless, both of them, although in different ways, have reacted against this exhaustion of transcendence and come into conflict with modern interpretation of Plato. Petrement, even before specialising in the history of Gnosticism, worked out a dualistic system in which truth is absolutely transcendent because, as universal, it is unattainable for any particular mind inasmuch it is a subject’s mind. Truth, therefore, is unattainable throughout this life. On Weil’s part, the interest in Plato took place after a period of left wing militancy, following her discovery of Christianity and some personal experiences of mysticism. Platonism was for her a means of combining her new faith with a properly philosophical, i.e. rationalistic, way of thinking. Of course in this view transcendency was crucial to the idea of Good as much as to that of God. Whether this transcendency is more a matter of faith than of reason is at least uncertain.
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Marilena Vlad
Denys l’Aréopagite et le principe donateur de bien
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In this article I discuss the perspective of Dionysius the Areopagite regarding the problem of the absolute Good. I begin with a short outline of the main Neoplatonic ideas concerning the identity between the One and the Good. I then try to show how, in Dionysius’ thinking, the role of the Good changes. The Good appears as the source of all procession and it aquires more and more names, as the procession advances. However, I also try to show the reverting manner in which these names (goodness, light, beauty and love) act.
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Sylvain Roux
Quel nom pour le Principe ? Un problème chez Plotin et Proclus
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The question to know which name to attribute to the First principle is a difficult question in the Neoplatonic tradition. Indeed, as this one is situated beyond being, no term can apply to him and thus it is only in a negative way that it can be described. But the problem also settles about another aspect because, as first term, it performs a causal function. Thus it is advisable to know if certain terms turn out more appropriate than others to indicate this function. By what name to indicate the First one as being a principle ? We would like to show that this question is approached and answered differently throughout the Neoplatonic tradition. If Plotinus admits the existence of different names, he does not really consider that they indicate different causal functions. For Proclus, in particular in the Platonic Theology, different names refer to different manners in which the principle manifests.
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Silvia Fazzo
Le manuscrit Laurentianus 87.12 comme le témoin le plus ancien du Commentaire d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise à la Métaphysique d’Aristote
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Prolegomena pour une nouvelle modalite critique d’edition et de reference concernant le temoignage d’Alexandre sur le texte de la Metaphysique d’Aristote. Methode et cas d’etude : ‘Alexandre’ et le ‘telephone sans fil’ des apparats critiques in Metaphysique 1072b2‑3. Quel ‘Commentaire’ d’Alexandre ? Un texte a re‑etablir. Les editions du commentaire d’Alexandre au XIXe siecle (1836, 1847, 1891) : le role du manuscrit Monacensis gr. 81, a. 1550 env. (sigle M). L’edition Hayduck 1888 du commentaire d’Asclepius comme etude de cas parallele et comme source supplementaire. Le commentaire d’Alexandre selon la recensio laurentiana (AlL). L’independance des deux recensiones comme dilemme. La tradition indirecte de la tradition indirecte de la Metaphysique : le commentaire d’Asclepius. L’analyse des parties communes entre Asclepius et la recensio laurentiana sur Δ29 : un cas particulier. Les arguments de Hayduck 1891 pour l’athetese du texte du Laurentianus. L’argument de Hayduck 1891 sur la recensio laurentiana in Arist. 985a18‑20 et ses developpements recents : la suppression des mots d’Aristote concernant la fonction du νοῦς chez Anaxagore. La nouvelle athetese de la recensio laurentiana : arguments pro et contra. Discussions de nos jours sur l’edition d’Alexandre : l’hypothese du Paris. 1878 comme branche β. Tradition d’exegese, souci de legitimation, perte d’information, normalisation du langage. L’hypertexte possible et autres perspectives.
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Marilena Vlad
De Principiis:
de l'aporétique de l'Un à l'aporétique de l'Ineffable
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153.
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José Mᵃ Zamora
La prudence du Patriarche Joseph
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Jean Jolivet
L'«augustinisme avicennisant» au XIIᵉ siècle:
un effet de mirage
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Maurice-Ruben Hayoun
Moïse de Narbonne (1300-1362) et l'averroïsme juif
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Kristina Mitalaïté
Les Latins face aux icônes (les Libri Carolini)
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Barbara Obrist
Le démoniaque dans l'iconographie cosmologique du XIIᵉ siècle
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Christian Trottmann
Le dépassement de toute représentation dans le De Icona
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Jean Jolivet
L'image selon les Chartrains
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Jean-Luc Solère
L'image comme philosophème
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