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161. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Наталья Мартишина Метафизика Как Учение Об Истинном Бытии
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Classic of Russian philosophy Alexandr I. Vvedensky proposed a definition of metaphysics as a study of true reality contrary to apparent one. This definition seems to be useful in contemporary issues. It's an apt definition because it describes an ancient metaphysics as good as classical tradition and concerns allbranches of the philosophical knowledge. A number of philosophical subjects are connected with the difference of true and apparent reality as their foundation. For instance, Philosophical Anthropology differentiates between real and formal personal existence. Epistemology discusses a problem of a criterion of real existence and notes that any language does not contain such internal criterion. The Philosophy of science analyses a conventional reality created by people, and so does the Philosophy of art. Social and Political Philosophy due to understand a nature of special phenomena which have no substance but are real and objective. Finally, contemporary Philosophy of technology concentrates on the virtual reality as a special kind of existence. So, the problem of the distinction between true and apparent reality manifests itself in all philosophical disciplines, and this fact determines a major meaning of the metaphysics in the philosophy.
162. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Erik Anderson Scientific Essentialism, Could’ve Done Otherwise, and the Possibility of Freedom
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Philosophers concerned with the problem of freedom and determinism differ strikingly over the analysis of the concept of human freedom of the will. Compatibilists and incompatibilists, determinists and indeterminists populate the conceptual landscape with a dizzying array of theories differing in complex and subtle ways. Each of these analyses faces an under-appreciated potential challenge: the challenge from scientific essentialism. Might all traditional analyses of freedom of the will be radically ill-conceived because the concept—the nature of freedom itself—is something discoverable only by empirical science? I explore this vexing question.
163. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Liu Lihua 论“哲学铁三角”及当今哲学丢了什么?
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As a reference frame for reflection on the past and future of philosophy, this paper offers a ‘Iron triangle of Philosophy’ category. Philosophy is defined as “A study of seeking or displaying Tao by a reasonable way ”. Though Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy are very different and highly supplementary in expression, structure, element and building way, as the studies of seeking or displaying Tao, both possess inherently unified ontology, axiology and epistemology, that is ‘Iron triangle of Philosophy’. These three legs mutually support and its structure of three legs is not from philosophers’ designing subjectively but decided by the essential needs of human life or human being nature. The ‘Iron triangle of Philosophy’ functions as the nuclear core or the soul of human spirit culture. Since the later half of 19th century, the main stream of Western philosophy has lost the most of the three legs, therefore could not enter the core or soul level ofthe culture and has been fringed in the culture. Also Chinese philosophy, since 1840, has slowly lost its broadly comprehensive ontology, its axiology with the universal ethics held by the ontology, and its epistemology or methodology of knowing that pursue harmony and suitability. It is not enough only to simply recover the old format for “regaining” what philosophy lost, we need to engage very difficultly rebuilding work for this.
164. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Daoerjixiribu Borjgin A Revolution of Philosophy: Bionomy - A Kind of New World Doctrine
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"I" will is the percondition of knowing, while "I" is identical lift of both substance and spirit. Life will reveals itself from chaos. knowing belongs to life cross-referenced an in fact, it is a indication theory of will rather than a pure theory of knowing. "I" is a narrow sense of life, but it also should indicate a broad sense of life. Word is a life creature life is the only absolute one. The showing of one thing is before existence. (Existence is a character of life rather than a certainessence transcending a life). Life spirit reflects the life of the life world. - Thought is life. Existence is experience, while the existence of experience is "human" - human is the product of experience of animals "human" is a personal from, and human doctrine is personal doctrine. A country is second person andgovernment officers are persons of great bulk. Power theory distories the world, while existence theory distories the life. Showing is the form of life and it is a duty - to show life, to show the life word, this is duty theory. It is compulsory struggle that can thoroughly guarantee the relative power. We human should set up a world country - a world life organization, to shake of counter action in a country. A country democracy is a false democracy, while back democracy is real world democracy. Life exists in a impulse way. This is the real final arrangement of life impulse. As soon as society get in to the life orbit the most ideal basicorganization for human is sex organization "Philosophy", in fact, it is life science, a broad sense of life science. (theory of life)
165. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Lee-Sun Choi Essence and Identity
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In this paper, I am going to ask what the general criteria for identity are and exactly how essence is related to that. Two notions are related to this question: Essential properties (necessary properties) and individual essences. Only the notion of individual essence has been involved in the criteria of transworld identity. The disputes of transworld have centered on the intrinsic properties necessarily connected to thisness. Through introducing a notion of part-rigidity, however, we can see that there can be an entity that does not have an individual essence as an intrinsic property necessarily connected to thisness, the non-part-rigid structure. Being this structure is an intrinsic property that is relational and compositional. An entity that has a relational and compositional intrinsic property as its necessary property seems to have no individual essence. For this kind of entities, just an essential property (or a necessary property) is involved in the criteria of transworldidentity.
166. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Shelud’ko Grigoriy Vladimirovich Metaphysics of Classical and Nonclassical Kinds of Social Realities
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The metaphysics of a social reality assumes definition ontology various plans of its realization as sorts of attitude to kinds. The last ones represent phenomena of a social reality - as classical and nonclassical. The economy, morals, religion, the right concern to classical kinds of a social reality. Attributes of a sociality of the given kinds: activity, attitudes, forms of social consciousness. A nonclassical kinds given attributes yet "do not possess" to the full. Their metaphysics is defined through parity with classical kinds of society. The structure of a social reality is mobile that is why "updating" of the list of classical kinds of a social reality is not soproblematic that is why the urgency of an explication ontology and metaphysics of a sort of a reality social and numerous kinds is undoubtedly rather productive and duly.
167. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Ming Wong Ying Yang Theory: A Metaphysics of Negative Entropy Being
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For the Life system, behind the physics being, there is a metaphysics being that poses a non-equilibrium thermodynamics system which consist high negative entropy. Western science, western philosophy, including Western rationalism, and the nonrational, post-modernism can not completely explain this being. Theyin and yang theory can clearly illustrate it. The Yin and Yang is the knowledge of metaphysics being of life, is the metaphysics theory under the law of negative entropy.
168. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
С.А. Нижников Преобразование метафизики в творчестве И. Канта и возможность веры
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The subject of author’s reflection is transformation of metaphysics in creativity of I. Kant and an opportunity of faith on the basis of new existential ontology. It begins from opportunity developing of new metaphysics in the works of Kant and then – Heidegger. There is a problem in understanding of metaphysics in Kant’s art. From author’s point of view Kant tried to create a new type of ontology as a real metaphysics that doesn’t destroy the faith if one understands it non-metaphysically. Even more – Kant’s and Heidegger’s new ontology can produce and have already produced a new type of faith understanding. This transcendental and aprioristic faith is the inner essence of different faiths, which objected in religions. Nowadays this faith must be opened and rethought,because it can helps to solve global spiritual problems of mankind. Only real (ontological) and humanistic knowledge can spiritually unite persons and peoples.
169. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Eduardo Bermudez Barrera El Babero Quine con la Navaja de Occam Afeitó la Barba de Platón
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The ontological question goes way back to Plato. In his Teetetus he already searched for the answer to question of “how is it possible that when a man stares at something he would not see anything anyway”. Quine is the author of a doctrine on ontology, “On what there is”. His work follows the path of medieval authors such as William of Ockham, who proposed the methodology that came to be known as Okcham's razor. The excessive proliferation of entities is known as “Plato's beard”. Quine, among others, has shaved Plato's beard searching for logical and scientific simplicity.
170. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
С. Л. Катречко Как возможна метафизика XXI века?
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The European metaphysics begins with opening by Parmenid a metaphysical reality of the Uniform in its difference from a physical reality of the Much. This sets its first border and defines the ontological modus of the metaphysics, developed in the Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Thinkers of New time occupy a reflectiveposition in the relation of antiquity’s asking “WHAT is the metaphysics?”. They interest no longer the fact of the presence of the metaphysics, but the bases of this fact — transcendental conditions of its possibility (resp. a question “How is metaphysics possible?”). If the Antiquity (Parmenid) considers metaphysics as the reality of an empirical subject, then Kant raises the question about the possibility of metaphysics as the activities of a transcendental subject. There is the second boundary of metaphysics, which transforms in its epistemological modus. The transcendental method becomes the criterion of the metaphysics: it makes possible to critic the metaphysics and to limit its claims. The new metaphysics (XXI c.) occupies the reflexive position to the epistemological modus of metaphysics. It attempts to reveal its basic “figure of silence”, i.e. the transcendental conditions of the transcendental subject. The bases of the transcendental subject are the natural capability of human reason to fall outside the boundaries of experience (metaphysica naturalis; Kant) and the language. The metaphysica naturalis can be correlated with Husserl’s intentionality, but its prototype is the Leibnitz’s monad. The question “How is homo metaphysics possible?” is determining for the anthropological modus of metaphysics of XXI century.
171. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Guo Yi The Philosophy of Yi: Reconstructing the Chinese Metaphysics
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The New Chinese philosophy should face the main issues in traditional philosophy and modern philosophy. The biggest issue in traditional Chinese philosophy during the last 800 years is Xing (Nature) is Li 性即理 or Xin (Mind) is Li 心即理. The biggest issue in modern Western philosophy is how to fortify value in thisera of knowledge explosion. This paper tries to do some exploration on these issues through reconstruction the Chinese metaphysics. It puts forward a theory of Four Substances 四體說. The so called Four Substances include Yi Ti 易體 or the substance of Yi, Xing Ti 性體 or the substance of Nature, Xin Ti 心體 or the substance of Mind, and Dao Ti 道體 or the substance of the Way. The sphere of Yi 易 is the origin of the universe and the root of the world. The substance of Yiis formed by three fundamental cosmic ideas or energies, namely Zhi 恉 or meaning, Li 理 or reason or principle, and Qi 氣 or matter. Zhi 恉 is the being of Value and meaning. Li 理is the being of knowledge. Zhi 恉 and Li 理 are forms, and Qi 氣 is matter. Yi Ti 易體 or the substance of Yi is an inexhaustible value source. Just like Confucianism has developed its Dao or the Way and Orthodoxy, other value systems in the world have also developed their own Dao or the Way and Orthodoxy.
172. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Popkov Valerian, Baturin Andrey Philosophic Rethinking of Poincaré Topological Complex
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The key philosophic concepts - wholeness and duality - are analyzed on the basis of general scientific and vision ideas of H. Poincaré. His cellular structure with full set of topological invariants (cycles) can be considered as a model of dual arrangement of the World. The World is seen as a multidimensional process, consisting not of parts, but of local processes, adjoining each other. It is demonstrated, that a set of cycles at each structural level not only resolve paradoxes of wholeness and development, but represents a recommencing process, which reproduces its own environment. The wholeness – world is considered as a duality of flows and potentials, which arrange and produce absolutely different structures, being closely conjugated, as cycles and co-cycles within the whole. Thestreams are structured and coordinated towards decrease of structural level dimensions: from the general to the particular, from the concrete to the abstract, from the depth to the surface. This is the direction of differentiation of the whole. Potentials are coordinated in the opposite direction, with increase of dimension, through structural elements of higher dimensions. The world is gathered, integrated, joined, specified through stresses; differentiated parts tend to scatter, connections between them strain and turn them back to their whole. A penetration of the scientist into more complicated processes turns out to be a movement within a closed multidimensional surface (closed manifold), enriched with new dimensions with inclusion of new processes. Those concrete examples illustrate importance of Poincaré duality theorem for closed manifolds.
173. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Yi Jiang Philosophical Topology: A Method or a New Branch in Philosophy?
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In this paper I will try to argue for a new version in philosophy entitled as Philosophical Topology. It is inspired by the thought of Peter Strawson as well as ones of some of so-called Continental philosophers like Heidgger. Unlike any of metaphilosophy in general, the philosophical topology focuses rather on analyses of processes of make-up in philosophers’ thinking, especially by revealing the internal logic of philosophical ideas in making and processing in order to explain the intrinsic continuation of philosophical ideas in particular philosophers’ thinking. In this sense the philosophical topology is not one of philosophical methodsbut a new branch in philosophy that is characterized as being concerned with continuation of ideas as its basic task. So, in this way, it is available to analyses of various doctrines in philosophy. Main issues in the philosophical topology are as follows: 1) to analyze the internal law-likes in the development of philosophy with the perspective of topology; 2) to interpret the general routes of Western philosophy in terms of the philosophical topology; 3) to view the philosophical topology as a way to inquire into metaphysics; 4) to deal properly with the relation of the philosophical topology to other branches in contemporary philosophy such as the philosophy of language, of logic, of science and ethics.
174. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Natalia Martishina Metaphisics as a Study of True Reality
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Classic of Russian philosophy Alexandr I. Vvedensky proposed a definition of metaphysics as a study of true reality contrary to apparent one. This definition seems to be useful in contemporary issues. It's an apt definition because it describes an ancient metaphysics as good as classical tradition and concerns all branches of the philosophical knowledge. A number of philosophical subjects are connected with the difference of true and apparent reality as their foundation. For instance, Philosophical Anthropology differentiates between real and formal personal existence. Epistemology discusses a problem of a criterion of real existence and notes that any language does not contain such internal criterion. The Philosophy of science analyses a conventional reality created by people, and so does the Philosophy of art. Social and Political Philosophy due to understand a nature of special phenomena which have no substance but are real and objective. Finally, contemporary Philosophy of technology concentrates on the virtual reality as a special kind of existence. So, the problem of the distinction between true and apparent reality manifests itself in all philosophical disciplines, and this fact determines a major meaning of the metaphysics in the philosophy.
175. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Andrew Moon Against Rea on Presentism and Fatalism
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T In [Rea 2006], Michael Rea presents an argument that presentism is incompatible with a libertarian view of human freedom and the unrestricted principle of bivalence. I aim to show that Rea’s argument fails. The outline of my paper is as follows. In Part I, I briefly explain the above three views and I present Rea’sargument. In Part II, I argue that one of the premises of the argument is unjustified.
176. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Ana Carrasco Conde Carácter Inteligible: Kant, Schelling y la Libertad Metafísica en el Freiheitsschrift
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The Platonic myth in Book X of The Republic tells us how the choice of “destinies” is carried out by human souls about to be born. The revenant Er, in his particular nekia, returns to life to tell all he has seen and heard: that what life bring us is related to the good or bad choice of our future life trough a draw carried out under the eyes of Necessity and her three daughters: Lachesis, Clotho and Atropo, who weave the destiny of men (The Republic, Book X, 617e): Theintelligible character of this choice has the burden of a determinism ab origine without possibility of rewriting it, making our fate an inalterable journey. Kant could say the same in KrV, although it is true that the doctrine of the “intelligible character” only appears specifically in 1781, in the light of the Third Antinomies, in the“Dialectic” of the Critique of Pure Reason. Anyway, its long shadow appears in other texts (as in Religion Within Limits of Reason Alone of 1793)– that each one of voluntary acts of men: “it is predetermined, well before it occurs, in the empirical character of man” (KrV, A 553 / B 581) would suppose that this intelligiblecharacter would have to be understood together with the problem of freedom and decision. That threshold pointed out by Kant will be trespassed by Schelling, who will form a concept of freedom of a metaphysical character (libertas ex) which will send us to an origin, beyond all times, in which the de-cision, as ex-cision, restructures and sets in order our time. Cut or beginning, it is a wound without stitches which implies the proper opening of being into existence.
177. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Sergey Demensky Time of Mentality: Reconsideration of Martin Heidegger's "Being and Time"
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From descriptive interpretation of "understanding" to abstract-gnosiological understanding of mentality. The historical deconstruction of the existential understanding introduced as ontologic property of constantly becoming stable "Being-in-the-World" allows us to interpret this concept as mentality. Through theprism of existential philosophy in general and its interpreters such as Jacque Le Goff it allows us to make a conclusion that mentality is one of complete formations of public consciousness. But in the course of such interpretation of mentality it is important to avoid the methodological situation in which Plato deadlocked, when he had decided to find out, what was beautiful itself. For the way out from this situation he had to introduce independently existing ideas and special space of ideas which define all the things and even gods. We, unfortunately, do not have such an opportunity which the history gave to Plato. Somehow to define structural and historical conditions for breaking out of mentality we shall be limited to the instruction that it is more complex, compound, but in the same time integrally complete formation historically actualized, unlike traditionally allocated kinds and forms of consciousness. Another important question is whether the concept "mentality" is acceptable for analysis of the current modern processes or it can only be used for the reconstruction of the completed formations. The mentality cannot be analyzed from inside. And we are inclined to consider that to operate the concept "mentality" in relation to a modern representative of civilization is inappropriate.
178. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Peter Loptson Naturalism and Truth
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In this paper I want to address themes in what has arguably become, through one or other of its facets, the single largest philosophical topic of our day, one which, possibly because of the ocean of ink which it has generated, has discouraged technically unengaged, or less engaged, arm’s length not-obviously committed expressions of assessment, possibilities of some sort of ecumenical conjunction, and, not least, of surprise, about the debate itself, and atthe impasse the literature referred to may be argued to have in fact reached.
179. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
Dan Simbotin About the Needlessness of the Verb “To Be”
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Semi-compatibilists intend to reconcile moral responsibility with causal determinism, even if determinism is incompatible with freedom to do otherwise. For them, moral responsibility does not require free will, which is not a necessary condition for moral responsibility. They agree with the view that causal determinism is incompatible with free will. Free will is incompatible with determinism as well as moral responsibility. Both compatibilists and semi-compatibilists argue for the compatibility between determinism and moral responsibility. However, the latter fails to prove sufficiently the reason why determinism is compatible with moral responsibility.
180. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 15
He Lai “形而上学批判”与“形上维度的拯救” - 论马克思哲学与形而上学关系的两个基本向度
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The critique to metaphysics has become one of the most important topics of contemporary philosophy. Marx’s philosophy has a special standing-point on this topic. On the one hand, Marx announces the end of metaphysics when metaphysics means a thinking-mode and philosophical form. But on the other hand, Marx tries to rescue the philosophical spirit behind metaphysics, namely the spirit of critique, the spirit of freedom and the spirit of transcendence. In the philosophical history, Marx establishes a unique way to criticize metaphysics, we can call it “the social and historical critique of metaphysics”, through this approach, Marx tries to discard the dogmatic side of metaphysics and save its active elements at the same time. This special standing-point of Marx on metaphysics makes him differ from classical metaphysicians and contemporary deconstructionist.