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Eleonore Stump
Eleonore Stump
The Openness of God:
Hasker on Eternity and Free Will
Otwartość Boga
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The understanding of God’s mode of existence as eternal makes a significant difference to a variety of issues in contemporary philosophy of religion, including, for instance, the apparent incompatibility of divine omniscience with human freedom. But the concept has come under attack in current philosophical discussion as inefficacious to solve the philosophical puzzles for which it seems so promising. Although Boethius in the early 6th century thought that the concept could resolve the apparent incompatibility between divine foreknowledge and human free will, some contemporary philosophers, such as William Hasker, have argued that whatever help the concept of eternity may give with that puzzle is more than vitiated by the religiously pernicious implications of the concept for notions of God’s providence and action in time. In this paper, I will examine and respond to Hasker’s arguments against the doctrine of God’s eternity.
Koncepcja sposobu istnienia Boga jako bytu wiecznego wprowadza istotną różnicę w rozpatrywaniu różnych zagadnień współczesnej filozofii religii, w tym na przykład tematu pozornej niezgodności między Boską wszechwiedzą a ludzką wolnością. Jednak w obecnej debacie filozoficznej koncepcja ta została zakwestionowana jako nieskuteczna w rozwiązaniu problemów filozoficznych, dla których została niejako powołana. Chociaż Boecjusz na początku VI wieku sądził, że może ona rozstrzygnąć problem niezgodności między boską przedwiedzą a wolną wolą człowieka, niektórzy współcześni filozofowie, tacy jak William Hasker, twierdzą, że jakiekolwiek wsparcie ze strony przyjętej koncepcji wieczności w rozstrzygnięciu tego zagadnienia ulega osłabieniu wskutek zadziałania niekorzystnych z religijnego punktu widzenia konsekwencji tej koncepcji dla takich pojęć, jak Boża opatrzność i działanie Boga w czasie. W artykule autorka analizuje i odpowiada na argumenty Williama Haskera sformułowane przeciwko doktrynie Boskiej wieczności.
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Paul Helm
Paul Helm
Divine Causation and Analogy
Boska Przyczynowość a Analogia
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Quentin Smith’s idea is that God being the originating cause of the universe is logically inconsistent with all extant definitions of causation, and thus logically impossible. Thus, for example the God of the Philosophers couldn’t have created the Universe, not even in both its senses, in both literal and analogical senses. The thesis is advanced by accounts of the usual views of “cause”. It is maintained these is successful. Such I shall then offer an account of divine causation of my own, and thus attempt to argue that Smith has not shown that the relation that God has to the universe is not a causal relation. Such as a Humean or that of David Lewis sense and of the “singularist” view of C. J. Ducasse would fail the analogical. And Malebranche’s “occasionalism” is surely an exception. If we turn to the other kind then it seems to be a case of “if the data are analogical-in, then the data will be that too”. Finally, it is argued that it is more productive to consider particular individual theistic powers and perfections, for these are mongrels which literality and of analogy are compounded.
Według Quentina Smitha Bóg jako przyczyna istnienia świata jest logicznie niespójny z wszystkimi znanymi definicjami przyczynowości, a zatem logicznie niemożliwy. Na przykład Bóg filozofów nie mógłby stworzyć świata ani w sensie dosłownym, ani w sensie analogicznym. Smith broni tej tezy odwołując się do typowych poglądów na temat natury „przyczyny”, i twierdzi, że ta obrona jest udana. W odpowiedzi autor przedstawia własną koncepcję przyczynowości Boskiej i próbuję pokazać, że Smithowi nie udało się dowieść, iż relacja Boga do świata nie ma charakteru przyczynowego. Autor argumentuje ponadto, że lepiej jest rozważać osobno poszczególne Boskie moce i doskonałości, ponieważ zawierają one w sobie pomieszanie dosłowności i analogiczności.
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Robert C. Koons
Robert C. Koons
Some Puzzles about Molinist Conditionals
Wybrane Problemy Molinistycznych Okresów Warunkowych
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William Hasker has been one of the most trenchant and insightful critics of the revival of Molinism. He has focused on the “freedom problem”, a set of challenges designed to show that Molinism does not secure a place for genuinely free human action (HASKER 1986, 1995, 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2011). These challenges focus on a key element in the Molinist story: the counterfactual (or subjunctive) conditionals of creaturely freedom. According to Molinism, these conditionals have contingent truth-values that are knowable to God prior to His decision of what world to actualize. This divine “middle knowledge” is supposed to enable God to execute a detailed plan for world history without any loss of creaturely freedom. Hasker has argued that this middle knowledge nonetheless deprives us of the power to do otherwise than we do, a crucial element in human freedom and responsibility.
William Hasker był jednym z najbardziej stanowczych i wnikliwych krytyków odrodzenia molinizmu. Skupił się on na „problemie wolności”, czyli na grupie wyzwań, które mają pokazać, że molinizm nie pozostawia miejsca na prawdziwie wolne działanie człowieka (HASKER 1986, 1995, 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2011). Wyzwania te koncentrują się na kluczowym elemencie narracji tego jezuickiego ruchu: kontrfaktycznych okresach warunkowych wolności stworzeń. Według molinistów, te okresy warunkowe posiadają wartości logiczne, które były znane Bogu przed jego decyzją o tym, który możliwy świat chce urzeczywistnić. Ta Boska „wiedza pośrednia” ma umożliwić Bogu realizację szczegółowego planu dla historii świata bez naruszenia wolności stworzeń. Hasker twierdził jednak, że owa wiedza pośrednia pozbawia nas zdolności do czynienia inaczej (niż czynimy), co jest przecież kluczowym elementem ludzkiej wolności i odpowiedzialności. Autor artykułu stawia sobie trzy cele. Po pierwsze, zamierza zbadać naturę okresów warunkowych wolnych decyzji stworzeń, ukazując niektóre trudności w określeniu ich zakresu i natury. Po drugie, chce rozpatrzyć konsekwencje różnych odpowiedzi na ważne pytanie, które jak dotąd nie zostało poruszone w literaturze przedmiotu: czy posiadamy kontrfaktyczną władzę nad okresami warunkowymi boskiej wolności? I po trzecie, autor chciałby zarekomendować molinistom pewną poprawkę, która pozwoli na rozwiązanie problemu wolności.
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Jacek Wojtysiak
Jacek Wojtysiak
A Bigger God and the Pre-Creation Situation:
Some Remarks Inspired by William Hasker
Większy Bóg i Sytuacja Przed Stworzeniem
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In the present essay, while entering into discussion with William Hasker, I addressed two divine dilemmas in “the pre-creation situation.” My considerations focused on the reasons for creating a world—the love (grace) reason and the manifestation reason—which in some way prevailed over the reasons against creating a world (the no need reason and the imperfection reason) and whose concurrence prompted the image of an (rather relatively) optimal creatable world. It turns out that the latter resembles both our world and the world suggested by Hasker’s theism. In that world, God has brought to existence both what is unworthy (thus showing his grace in a special way) and what displays high degrees of excellence (thus manifesting his glory). On this view, the eschatological conclusion of the world would be the full actualization of divine grace and of the manifestation of God. In the final part of the essay, I attempted to show that my view does not entail the rejection of the idea of divine impassibility.
W niniejszym eseju autor, dyskutując z Williamem Haskerem, rozpatruje dwa Boskie dylematy w sytuacji przed stworzeniem świata. Centralnym przedmiotem tych rozważań są racje za stworzeniem świata – racja miłości (łaski) i racja manifestacji – które jakoś przeważyły racje przeciw stworzeniu świata (rację braku potrzeby i rację niedoskonałości) i których współwystępowanie wyznaczyło obraz (raczej relatywnie) optymalnego świata do stworzenia. Okazuje się, że świat ten przypomina nasz świat oraz świat teizmu Haskera. W świecie tym Bóg powołał do istnienia zarówno to, co jest jego niegodne (okazując tak w szczególny sposób swoją łaskę), jak i to, co odznacza się wysokimi stopniami doskonałości (manifestując w ten sposób swą chwałę). Eschatologiczne zwieńczenie świata ma być przy tym pełnią realizacji łaski i manifestacji Boga. W końcowej części tekstu próbuje się uzasadnić tezę, że przedstawiona koncepcja nie wymaga odrzucenia idei Boskiej niecierpiętliwości.
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Dariusz Łukasiewicz
Dariusz Łukasiewicz
On William Hasker’s Theodicy, the Doctrine of Continuous Creation and the Nature of Morality
O Teodycei Williama Haskera, Doktrynie Ciągłego Stwarzania i Naturze Moralności
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In the article, I present the main assumptions of the natural-order theodicy and the free-will theodicy defended by William Hasker. Next, I pose the question of whether Hasker’s theodicies are compatible with the Christian doctrine of continuous creation accepted by Hasker himself. I consider several different ways of how the doctrine of continuous creation can be understood and the difficulties associated with them. Finally, I propose a modified conception of continuous creation and I claim that it is consistent with the main assumptions of William Hasker’s theodicies.
W artykule autor przedstawia główne założenia teodycei porządku naturalnego i teodycei wolnej woli Williama Haskera. Następnie zadaje pytanie, czy teodycea Haskera jest kompatybilna z chrześcijańską doktryną ciągłego stwarzania. Rozważa różne sposoby rozumienia pojęcia ciągłego stwarzania i związane z nimi trudności. Na końcu proponuje zmodyfikowaną koncepcję ciągłego stwarzania i stawia tezę, że jest ona zgodna z założeniami teodycei Williama Haskera.
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Joseph Jedwab
Joseph Jedwab
A Neo-Lockean Theory of the Trinity and Incarnation
Neolocke’Owska Teoria Trójcy Świętej i Wcielenia
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I present two problems: the logical problem of the Trinity and the metaphysical problem of Incarnation. I propose a solution to both problems: a Neo-Lockean theory of the Trinity and Incarnation, which applies a Neo-Lockean theory of personal identity to the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation.
W artykule autor omawia dwie kwestie: logiczne problemy dotyczące Trójcy Świętej i metafizyczny problem Wcielenia. Autor proponuje rozwiązanie obu tych problemów – neolocke’owską teorię Trójcy Świętej i Wcielenia, która stosuje neolocke’owską teorię tożsamości osoby do doktryn o Trójcy Świętej i Wcieleniu.
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William Hasker
Reply to My Friendly Critics
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Stefan Swieżawski
Stefan Swieżawski
Beginnings of Modern Christian Aristotelianism
Beginnings of Modern Christian Aristotelianism
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The paper focuses on four main topics: (a) increased theological standing of Aristotle in the 15th century; (b) critical concerns over the compatibility of Aristotle’s philosophy with Christianity, as well as over its interpretation by Averroes; (c) search for the “historical Aristotle” and an objective assessment of the resultant interpretations of Aristotle’s philosophy; (d) identification of Thomism with Christian Aristotelianism.
The paper focuses on four main topics: (a) increased theological standing of Aristotle in the 15th century; (b) critical concerns over the compatibility of Aristotle’s philosophy with Christianity, as well as over its interpretation by Averroes; (c) search for the “historical Aristotle” and an objective assessment of the resultant interpretations of Aristotle’s philosophy; (d) identification of Thomism with Christian Aristotelianism.
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Stanisław Wielgus
Stanisław Wielgus
The Medieval Polish Doctrine of the Law of Nations: Ius Gentium
The Medieval Polish Doctrine of the Law of Nations: Ius Gentium
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In attempting to summarize in a few sentences the achievements of the medieval scholars of the Polish school of ius gentium, we must emphasize that by employing the inherited legal and philosophico-theological tradition and intellectual achievements of the University of Kraków, coupling it with their own genius, they manager to create a coherent and universal system of international law. It was a system so modern, wise, tolerant and universal that it was able to be applied not only in solving the painful problem stemming from the lengthy conflict between Poland and the Teutonic Knights but was also used in resolving global problems of the contemporary Christian’s world conflict with the non-Christian one. That legal system, based upon the eternal principles of Divine and natural law, taking account of the Gospel Law of Love and inseparably connecting law with morality and justice with truth, remains valid even today
In attempting to summarize in a few sentences the achievements of the medieval scholars of the Polish school of ius gentium, we must emphasize that by employing the inherited legal and philosophico-theological tradition and intellectual achievements of the University of Kraków, coupling it with their own genius, they manager to create a coherent and universal system of international law. It was a system so modern, wise, tolerant and universal that it was able to be applied not only in solving the painful problem stemming from the lengthy conflict between Poland and the Teutonic Knights but was also used in resolving global problems of the contemporary Christian’s world conflict with the non-Christian one. That legal system, based upon the eternal principles of Divine and natural law, taking account of the Gospel Law of Love and inseparably connecting law with morality and justice with truth, remains valid even today
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Juliusz Domański
Juliusz Domański
Fausto Sozzini’s Explicatio Primae Partis Primi Capitis Euangelii Ioannis and Its Erasmian Exegesis
Fausto Sozzini’s Explicatio Primae Partis Primi Capitis Euangelii Ioannis and Its Erasmian Exegesis
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The paper compares the method of Biblical interpretation used by Erasmus of Rotterdam with the method of Socinus, raising the question of the extent to which the method outlined by Socinus in his Explicatio primae partis primi capitis Euangelii Joannis can be seen as continuous and and consonant with the method of Erasmus, and to what extent it should be seen as its rejection or modification. In addition, the essay outlines similarities and differences, with respect to both method and content, between Erasmus' Adnotationes and Socinus’ Explicatio
The paper compares the method of Biblical interpretation used by Erasmus of Rotterdam with the method of Socinus, raising the question of the extent to which the method outlined by Socinus in his Explicatio primae partis primi capitis Euangelii Joannis can be seen as continuous and and consonant with the method of Erasmus, and to what extent it should be seen as its rejection or modification. In addition, the essay outlines similarities and differences, with respect to both method and content, between Erasmus' Adnotationes and Socinus’ Explicatio
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Zbigniew Ogonowski
Zbigniew Ogonowski
Antitrinitarianism in Poland before Socinus. A Historical Outline
Antitrinitarianism in Poland before Socinus. A Historical Outline
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The paper takes an in-depth look at an early, pre-Socinian stage of Polish antitrinitarianism. First, it outlines the historical reasons for the emergence of antitrinitarianism in Poland. Second, it explains how the early Polish antitrinitarians were able to develop a view substantial enough to provide a basis for Socinianism, a philosophical and religious movement with a pan-European reach. Third, it discusses similarities and differences between the two stages of Polish “Arianism”, pre-Socinian and Socinian.
The paper takes an in-depth look at an early, pre-Socinian stage of Polish antitrinitarianism. First, it outlines the historical reasons for the emergence of antitrinitarianism in Poland. Second, it explains how the early Polish antitrinitarians were able to develop a view substantial enough to provide a basis for Socinianism, a philosophical and religious movement with a pan-European reach. Third, it discusses similarities and differences between the two stages of Polish “Arianism”, pre-Socinian and Socinian.
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Marcin Iwanicki
Marcin Iwanicki
Johann Crell on Religious Tolerance and Salvation
Johann Crell on Religious Tolerance and Salvation
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The essay discusses the defense of religious tolerance presented in Johann Crell’s treatise On Freedom of Conscience, pointing to the tension between Christian exclusivism on the one hand and religious practicalism and rationalism on the other inherent in Crell’s views. This tension can be resolved by adopting theistic minimalism or extreme practicalism.
The essay discusses the defense of religious tolerance presented in Johann Crell’s treatise On Freedom of Conscience, pointing to the tension between Christian exclusivism on the one hand and religious practicalism and rationalism on the other inherent in Crell’s views. This tension can be resolved by adopting theistic minimalism or extreme practicalism.
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Nicholas Jolley
Nicholas Jolley
Hobbes and Religious Freedom
Hobbes and Religious Freedom
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This paper seeks to examine Hobbes’s credentials as a defender of religious freedom along three dimensions. The first section analyzes what might be called Hobbes’s core position on freedom of conscience and worship; it is shown how, by means of a characteristically reductionist strategy, he seeks to persuade the reader that the absolute state allows room for freedom of conscience and worship in all ways that they have reason to care about. The second section turns to Hobbes’s praise of Independency and addresses the issue whether it is consistent with his core position; it is argued that though it supplements this position it does not represent a fundamental departure from it. The final section takes up the perennially fascinating issue of the relationship between Locke’s mature defence of religious toleration and the teachings of his great precursor in the social contract tradition. Without seeking to minimize the differences I argue that Locke is able to adapt Hobbesian themes to his own distinctive purposes.
This paper seeks to examine Hobbes’s credentials as a defender of religious freedom along three dimensions. The first section analyzes what might be called Hobbes’s core position on freedom of conscience and worship; it is shown how, by means of a characteristically reductionist strategy, he seeks to persuade the reader that the absolute state allows room for freedom of conscience and worship in all ways that they have reason to care about. The second section turns to Hobbes’s praise of Independency and addresses the issue whether it is consistent with his core position; it is argued that though it supplements this position it does not represent a fundamental departure from it. The final section takes up the perennially fascinating issue of the relationship between Locke’s mature defence of religious toleration and the teachings of his great precursor in the social contract tradition. Without seeking to minimize the differences I argue that Locke is able to adapt Hobbesian themes to his own distinctive purposes.
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Edwin Curley
Edwin Curley
Locke on Religious Toleration
Locke on Religious Toleration
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The paper analyses and criticizes Locke’s arguments for religious toleration presented in his Letter concerning Toleration. The author argues that the epistemology Locke developed in his Essay concerning Human Understanding made a more constructive contribution to the case for toleration.
The paper analyses and criticizes Locke’s arguments for religious toleration presented in his Letter concerning Toleration. The author argues that the epistemology Locke developed in his Essay concerning Human Understanding made a more constructive contribution to the case for toleration.
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Matthew J. Kisner
Matthew J. Kisner
Spinoza’s Defense of Toleration: The Argument From Pluralism
Spinoza’s Defense of Toleration: The Argument From Pluralism
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Spinoza’s bold, spirited defense of toleration is an animating theme of the Theological- Political Treatise (TTP) and an important reason for the significant historical impact of the text. But Spinoza’s arguments for toleration can be challenging to discern. True to its title, the TTP offers two main arguments for toleration, one political, the other theological. This paper argues that Spinoza’s theological argument for toleration is closely connected to a distinct and often over looked argument from pluralism. This paper examines Spinoza’s argument from pluralism and defends that it is more attractive to similar arguments for toleration offered by Bodin and Bayle. It is more attractive than Bodin’s pluralism argument because Spinoza’s allows that religious beliefs and doctrines of faith have a rational justification, which makes possible a more optimistic picture of the prospects for religious disputation. Spinoza’s pluralism argument is also more attractive than Bayle’s argument because Spinoza’s does not regard religious beliefs as justified by sincerity, which means that he does not need to recognize any problematic rights of erroneous conscience, nor is he forced to accept as justified sincere beliefs in persecution or obviously immoral or irreligious beliefs.
Spinoza’s bold, spirited defense of toleration is an animating theme of the Theological- Political Treatise (TTP) and an important reason for the significant historical impact of the text. But Spinoza’s arguments for toleration can be challenging to discern. True to its title, the TTP offers two main arguments for toleration, one political, the other theological. This paper argues that Spinoza’s theological argument for toleration is closely connected to a distinct and often over looked argument from pluralism. This paper examines Spinoza’s argument from pluralism and defends that it is more attractive to similar arguments for toleration offered by Bodin and Bayle. It is more attractive than Bodin’s pluralism argument because Spinoza’s allows that religious beliefs and doctrines of faith have a rational justification, which makes possible a more optimistic picture of the prospects for religious disputation. Spinoza’s pluralism argument is also more attractive than Bayle’s argument because Spinoza’s does not regard religious beliefs as justified by sincerity, which means that he does not need to recognize any problematic rights of erroneous conscience, nor is he forced to accept as justified sincere beliefs in persecution or obviously immoral or irreligious beliefs.
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Elainy Costa Da Silva, Nythamar De Oliveira
Elainy Costa Da Silva
Spinoza’s Geometry of Affective Relations, the Body Politic, and the Social Grammar of Intolerance: A Minimalist Theory of Toleration
Spinoza’s Geometry of Affective Relations, the Body Politic, and the Social Grammar of Intolerance: A Minimalist Theory of Toleration
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In this paper, we set out to show that the relationships between individuals, including the intersubjectivity inherent to the body politic, are also affective relationships, so as to reconstruct Spinoza’s minimalist theory of tolerance. According to Spinoza’s concept of affectivity and bodily life, affection refers to a state of the affected body and implies the presence of the affecting body, while affect refers to the transition from one state to another, taking into account the correlative variation of affective bodies, that is, the affect is always a passage or variation in the intensity of our power to exist and act—the increase or decrease, the favoring or the restraint of our power to exist and act. We argue that Spinoza’s geometry of affective relations decisively contributes to a political theory of democracy, insofar as it anticipates modern, liberal conceptions of tolerance.
In this paper, we set out to show that the relationships between individuals, including the intersubjectivity inherent to the body politic, are also affective relationships, so as to reconstruct Spinoza’s minimalist theory of tolerance. According to Spinoza’s concept of affectivity and bodily life, affection refers to a state of the affected body and implies the presence of the affecting body, while affect refers to the transition from one state to another, taking into account the correlative variation of affective bodies, that is, the affect is always a passage or variation in the intensity of our power to exist and act—the increase or decrease, the favoring or the restraint of our power to exist and act. We argue that Spinoza’s geometry of affective relations decisively contributes to a political theory of democracy, insofar as it anticipates modern, liberal conceptions of tolerance.
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Charles Ramond
Charles Ramond
Beyond Tolerance? Spinozist Proposals on Preferences and Justifications
Beyond Tolerance? Spinozist Proposals on Preferences and Justifications
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The term “tolerance”, strictly speaking, does not belong to Spinoza’s vocabulary, and the notion of “tolerance”, in its modern sense, is not part of his concepts either. However, the separation of theology and politics, which is the subject of the Theological-Political Treatise, envelops an even more radical separation between immanence and transcendence. An entirely immanent policy would be indifferent to “values” and “justifications” of any kind (moral, religious, rational). It would be based only on the “accounts” of individual “preferences”. We show that Spinoza’s philosophy can help us conceive (perhaps one day achieve) such a form of radical, or “absolute” democracy.
The term “tolerance”, strictly speaking, does not belong to Spinoza’s vocabulary, and the notion of “tolerance”, in its modern sense, is not part of his concepts either. However, the separation of theology and politics, which is the subject of the Theological-Political Treatise, envelops an even more radical separation between immanence and transcendence. An entirely immanent policy would be indifferent to “values” and “justifications” of any kind (moral, religious, rational). It would be based only on the “accounts” of individual “preferences”. We show that Spinoza’s philosophy can help us conceive (perhaps one day achieve) such a form of radical, or “absolute” democracy.
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Sonja Lavaert
Sonja Lavaert
Passive Tolerance versus Political Engagement. Antistius Constans, Koerbagh, Van den Enden, and Spinoza
Passive Tolerance versus Political Engagement. Antistius Constans, Koerbagh, Van den Enden, and Spinoza
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This article investigates the contribution of Spinoza and authors of his circle (Antistius Constans, Van den Enden and Koerbagh) on the modern conception of tolerance. In his Tractatus theologico-politicus (1670), Spinoza launches the libertas philosophandi-question integrating two kinds of freedom between which there is a tension: freedom of thought and speech and freedom of religious conscience. As freedom means living and acting in society in light of one’s own interests, tolerance becomes a political issue that depends from political perspectives and priorities. This insight leads Spinoza to bringing together the control of political authority on religious affairs and a political regime of religious plurality and toleration. These ideas seem to be reminiscent of texts published in his immediate circle: the anonymus De jure ecclesiasticorum (1665); the political pamphlets Kort verhael (1662) and Vrye Politijke Stellingen (1665) of his teacher Van den Enden; the subversive dictionary Een Bloemhof (1668) and the systematic philosophical Een Ligt (1668) of Koerbagh. In these texts the question of religion and religious authority shifts to the question of the nature and origin of political authority. The authors all criticize the abuse of power in light of the idea that there is no freedom without equality and no equality without freedom. Together with Spinoza’s Tractatus politicus (1677), they thereby form an anomaly within the anomaly of the Calvinist Low Countries that regards specifically this radical democratic view. They are not so much talking about tolerance but about everyone’s active participation in political life which is necessary for the rescue of the republic.
This article investigates the contribution of Spinoza and authors of his circle (Antistius Constans, Van den Enden and Koerbagh) on the modern conception of tolerance. In his Tractatus theologico-politicus (1670), Spinoza launches the libertas philosophandi-question integrating two kinds of freedom between which there is a tension: freedom of thought and speech and freedom of religious conscience. As freedom means living and acting in society in light of one’s own interests, tolerance becomes a political issue that depends from political perspectives and priorities. This insight leads Spinoza to bringing together the control of political authority on religious affairs and a political regime of religious plurality and toleration. These ideas seem to be reminiscent of texts published in his immediate circle: the anonymus De jure ecclesiasticorum (1665); the political pamphlets Kort verhael (1662) and Vrye Politijke Stellingen (1665) of his teacher Van den Enden; the subversive dictionary Een Bloemhof (1668) and the systematic philosophical Een Ligt (1668) of Koerbagh. In these texts the question of religion and religious authority shifts to the question of the nature and origin of political authority. The authors all criticize the abuse of power in light of the idea that there is no freedom without equality and no equality without freedom. Together with Spinoza’s Tractatus politicus (1677), they thereby form an anomaly within the anomaly of the Calvinist Low Countries that regards specifically this radical democratic view. They are not so much talking about tolerance but about everyone’s active participation in political life which is necessary for the rescue of the republic.
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179.
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Roczniki Filozoficzne:
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70 >
Issue: 4
Przemysław Gut
Przemysław Gut
Spinoza’s Critique of Religious Intolerance
Spinoza’s Critique of Religious Intolerance
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This article presents a new interpretation of Spinoza’s account of religious intolerance. According to Rosenthal and Steinberg Spinoza explains the origins of religious intolerance in two ways. The first is in the Ethics, which is grounded on the affect of ambition; the second in the Theological-Political Treatise, which is based on the opposed affects of fear and hope. I agree with this interpretation, yet I considerably modify and supplement this account. The interpretation I propose rests on the observation that in order to understand Spinoza's view we need to draw the subtle distinction between the explanation of the psychological causes of religious intolerance and the elucidation of why religious intolerance appears to appeal so much. First, I shall discuss Spinoza’s account of the origin of religious intolerance. Second, I shall discuss what it is about us, according to Spinoza, that makes us exposed to religious intolerance. Third, I shall consider the measures which, in his view, should be taken in order to curb religious intolerance effectively.
This article presents a new interpretation of Spinoza’s account of religious intolerance. According to Rosenthal and Steinberg Spinoza explains the origins of religious intolerance in two ways. The first is in the Ethics, which is grounded on the affect of ambition; the second in the Theological-Political Treatise, which is based on the opposed affects of fear and hope. I agree with this interpretation, yet I considerably modify and supplement this account. The interpretation I propose rests on the observation that in order to understand Spinoza's view we need to draw the subtle distinction between the explanation of the psychological causes of religious intolerance and the elucidation of why religious intolerance appears to appeal so much. First, I shall discuss Spinoza’s account of the origin of religious intolerance. Second, I shall discuss what it is about us, according to Spinoza, that makes us exposed to religious intolerance. Third, I shall consider the measures which, in his view, should be taken in order to curb religious intolerance effectively.
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180.
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Roczniki Filozoficzne:
Volume >
70 >
Issue: 4
Georg Gasser
Georg Gasser
Pluralism is not Enough for Tolerance. Philosophical and Psychological Reflections on Pluralism and Tolerance
Pluralism is not Enough for Tolerance. Philosophical and Psychological Reflections on Pluralism and Tolerance
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The issue of religious tolerance is increasingly raised in a globalized world with societies becoming more and more religiously diverse and inhomogeneous. Religious tolerance can be defined as the practice of accepting others as acting in accordance with their religious belief system. Philosophers have recently begun to study more thoroughly the relationship between religious pluralism and religious (in)tolerance with a main focus on the epistemic question of whether the recognition of and reflection on religious pluralism might lead to greater religious tolerance. The major thrust of this idea is that any genuine reflection of a person about her epistemic peers adhering to other religions will weaken the person’s epistemic justificatory basis for believing that her own religious beliefs are better warranted than the religious beliefs of her peers. The rational consequence of the recognition of this justificatory fact, in turn, should lead to more religious tolerance and to a weakened dismissive attitude towards adherents of other religions. The main aim of this paper is to investigate the plausibility of this account against the background of existing empirical, in particular psychological literature: Does increased contact with adherents of other religious traditions indeed lead to more tolerance? How are we able to show a deeper understanding for people with different religious beliefs and to take on—at least partially—their perspective? What are potential psychological obstacles to these achievements? Resources from research on intergroup toleration, social identity-theories, developmental psychology and personality traits will be used for tackling these questions. This shall help to broaden the so far rather narrow epistemic philosophical perspective on religious pluralism and (in)tolerance by embedding it into the larger context of constitutive traits of the human psyche.
The issue of religious tolerance is increasingly raised in a globalized world with societies becoming more and more religiously diverse and inhomogeneous. Religious tolerance can be defined as the practice of accepting others as acting in accordance with their religious belief system. Philosophers have recently begun to study more thoroughly the relationship between religious pluralism and religious (in)tolerance with a main focus on the epistemic question of whether the recognition of and reflection on religious pluralism might lead to greater religious tolerance. The major thrust of this idea is that any genuine reflection of a person about her epistemic peers adhering to other religions will weaken the person’s epistemic justificatory basis for believing that her own religious beliefs are better warranted than the religious beliefs of her peers. The rational consequence of the recognition of this justificatory fact, in turn, should lead to more religious tolerance and to a weakened dismissive attitude towards adherents of other religions. The main aim of this paper is to investigate the plausibility of this account against the background of existing empirical, in particular psychological literature: Does increased contact with adherents of other religious traditions indeed lead to more tolerance? How are we able to show a deeper understanding for people with different religious beliefs and to take on—at least partially—their perspective? What are potential psychological obstacles to these achievements? Resources from research on intergroup toleration, social identity-theories, developmental psychology and personality traits will be used for tackling these questions. This shall help to broaden the so far rather narrow epistemic philosophical perspective on religious pluralism and (in)tolerance by embedding it into the larger context of constitutive traits of the human psyche.
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