El problema “biología e inteligencia”, considerado filosóficamente, forma parte de un problema más amplio, que provisionalmente podría denominarse “organismo y psiquismo” y debería ser tratado desde très puntos de vista distintos, mas estrechamente entrelazados: el de las acciones, el de la habitud-actividad y el de las estructuras. El terreno de los actos es el más aparente y se refiere a todo el enorme campo de las acciones del hombre - no distinguimos aquí entre actos y acciones- , que tejen la vida del ser humano; el terreno de las habitudes, y con él el de la actividad, es más profundo y alude al modo esencial de habérselas el ser humano consigo mismo y con lo que le circunda en las acciones que realiza; finalmente, el terre no de las estructuras es todavia más profundo - tan sólo en el sentido de más radical- y alude a aquellas realidades, de la índole que sean, por las que el hombre posee modos específicos de habérselas con las cosas y puede realizar determinadas acciones. En este trabajo nos vamos a ceñir lo más posible al problema “biologia e inteligencia” y al solar de las acciones y de las habitudes, dejando para otra ocasión el problema de las estructuras, que nos conduciría al planteamiento más englobante de “psique y organismo”. Por la unidad de los tres niveles y por la unidad de lo que es el ser humano y de lo que es su actividad, en ocasiones tocaremos aspectos que desbordan la “ inteligencia” y que desbordan también el nivel de las acciones y de la habitud.

The same criticism of unreal abstraction, and empty universality repeats from Hegel to romandes, and from Kierkegaard to them and to him. The current article aims at inquiring the conceptual consistence of that criticism, approaching the essential content of their thoughts, and finally setting forth a possible speculative continuity, which would extend from first Romanticism to Hegel, and from him to Kierkegaard, for coming at last even to us.

The substantial vinculum is for Leibniz the relation where the simple substances (monads) join to create a compound from which a collective substantiality arises, and it is not the simple addition of individuals substantialities. The vinculum is essential, determinant for the compound, but not for the simple thing. The connective thing turns definitive in the compound thing, so that the ontology of Leibniz bets strongly for the simple thing, for the individual thing, as update of the infinitesimal thing.

En el contexto de la pregunta por el destino de la Teoría Crítica, la discusión entre Honneth y Habermas sobre el cambio en el paradigma de la Filosofía Política y Social con la tesis “de la comunicación al reco nocimiento” gira aquí en torno a una reconstrucción critica de la filosofía de Kant, un Kant ‘moderado’ en un modelo ‘explicativo’ o ‘hermenéutico’, y así ‘irrebasable’ del progreso moral, rompiendo su sistema, y un Kant ‘destrascendentalizado’, apto para fundamentar la necesidad de un diálogo entre la razón y la fe. ¿Por qué Kant y no Hegel, central este último para los dos filósofos alemanes en su superación de las aporías de la primera generación de la Teoria Critica? Pero ¿donde queda Marx, tan importante para los fundadores de la Escuela de Fráncfort? Y ¿no había exigido Habermas en 2009 con motivo del aniversarío de su discípulo, que Honneth, después de su viaje de Marx a Hegel, hiciera el necesario regreso? De tal maner a que en esta vuelta, Honneth trajera en su equipaje lo rescatable rescatado del Idealismo Alemán. Así la historia de la Teoría Critica queda inconclusa.

A logical reading on Aristotle’s Organon discovers some inconsistencies in the text which have to be solved by reducing them to metaphysical decisions of the author, if they are not just identified as deficiencies in the exposition that should be corrected. The present article tries to display a line of reading paying attention to those so-called inconsistencies, in an attempt to understand them as specific steps in Aristotle’s research. In order to this goal it focuses on the exposition procedure of the Aristotelian figures: the use of variables, whose introduction by Aristotle has been celebrated all over logical tradition. An analysis of the distinctive and internal features in this procedure will allow us to link Aristotle’s logos research and the “being qua being” investigation, and to determine also - though in a negative way - the connection between this reading and the logical-traditional one on Aristotle’s Organon.

The article tackles with the role that Kantian notion of temperament plays within his theory of practical freedom. With this purpose, we will connect Kant’s approach to temperaments with the classical Greek approach to this principle of classification, in order to recognize in it the means to feel the passage of time and also the conditions of our relation to the world, that is, a physiological-empirical background for the exercise of freedom that, without being moral, shelter contents which reason will only try to reform, without expecting to silence it entirely. Our final goal is to extract relevant observations to answer adequately to Kant’s question What is Man?

The philosophical point of view of Rawls is here analysed; and how Rawls’s philosophical position implies an epistemological cut with the classical conceptions that were joining the social contract to a determined natural idea of man or of society. In his proposal, the idea of Justice, in a society, is established in the fact that men accomplish a social pact fireely in itself, with another reasonable men, using various goods, and possessing equal politic rights. Rawls prefers not to choose the disjunctive “freedom or equality”; but for the option enunciated like “freedom and justice”. Equality is not a value as such in itself, yet contingent upon the idea of Justice. Nevertheless this justice from his social point of view is a politic justice. This is constituted freely for the associates, with equal rights, in a pact. His conception is not revolutionary in order to solve injustices right now historically established, but a progressive conception that utilizes the freedom to advance toward a fair equality, and here is now examined.

Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics that pleasure accompanies the perfect activity, doing it more desirable, and that the activity of contemplation is the most divine and pleasurable. On the other hand, he says in the Metaphysics that God’s activity is the most pleasurable, because his activity is perfect. In this article I try to study the relation between pleasure and activity in contemplation and its relation with God’s activity, in order to understand intellectual pleasure: is it possible to speak about a “spiritual” pleasure? Are there sensations which do not depend on material organs?

The present paper aims to examine the development of Fichte transcendental idealism, studying particularly his notion of freedom, following the reading and comments of Fichte made by the Italian philosopher Cornelio Fabro. Issues to be discussed have a defined framework: first, it will be tried to shown Fabro’s interprétation of Fichte; second, it will be gave account of Fabro’s judgment about some particular points of Fichte idealism; and finally - but indirectly - it will be shown the influence of Fichte over Fabro him self notion of freedom.

To clarify the definition of “Genius” which Kant employs in the § 46 of the Critique of Judgment is the motto of the considerations of the present article about the meaning of the “innate” in the transcendental philosophy.

The purpose of this article is to examine Baumgarten’s proposal - Aesthetica §140; analyzing the catalogue of the sensitive faculties of the human mind as well as the Topics of artistic production. Certainly, this would be equivalent to the conversion of the aesthetic subject and the artist natural talent into beauty and art criteria. This does not imply, however, reducing the latter to mere expressive subjectivity of feeling and emotion. Contrary, Baumgarten is still thinking that art and beauty are subject to rules; only those rules are based on the human psyche nature and, the rather peculiar function of her own cognitive abilities. Such conviction encourages his idea of an artistic creation founded up on Natural Topics; which is based on the “Empirie Psychology of the Moderns”. This article considers the presumption that the philosophical elaboration of that idea implies an historical rising of internal sense; both, as an authentic art’s abode and, as a supreme cognitive resource thanks to his conception in terms of “analogon rationis”. On the other hand, this article shows that Baumgarten did not develop the Psychological Topics of invention on his Aesthetica (1750-58); rather he developed the Psychological Topics from his first poetological writing - Meditationes de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus (1735).

The aim of this research is to propose a reading of Aristotle’s Metaphysics understood as an answer to the problem of non-being. This orientation will reveal the validity of the Aristotelian ontological approaches for the present, because today also the movement, the difference, the inidentity and the time constitute fundamental philosophical problems. We know that Aristotle displayed his ontology in dialogue and discussion with his predecessors. In this paper, I point out certain aspects of this debate to the extent that they contribute to highlighting those topics of the first philosophy that constitute a solution to the problem of non-being.

Le projet de Spinoza d'une philosophie de la joie se développe dès une position hipersubjectiviste, presque hobbesienne, laquelle aboutirait à une contraposition entre les subjectivités, vers une autre position dont les traits collectifs sont remarquables. Cette dernière ouvre la porte à une théorie démocratique radicale, munie de tout un batiment épistémologique et ontologique. On peut trouver, dans notre siècle, une autre philosophie, celle de J.-P. Sartre, qui a parcouru un chemin très prochain et qui présente des problèmes politiques parallèles à ceux de la théorie spinozienne, en concret en ce qui concerne la question de la liberté. Le présent article veut penser les limites de la conception spinozienne et sartrienne de la liberté et la dimension politique de la question.

The aim of this paper is to investigate a crucial period in the development of the young Hegel (Jena, 1801-1803). Watching the decline and fall of the Holy German-Roman Empire and the Napoleonic Wars, Hegel laid a first theoretical foundation of the modern State through an allegorical interpretation of Orestes' myth (Eumenides, Aeschylus) as a sort of study-case of the "tragedy in the ethical life". Hegel atempts in this way to overcome the decomposition of the old classical ideals, which takes place at the time of the emerging egoism of the bourgeois capitalism. The proposed solution by Hegel in 1803 is the last attempt to build a new religion on the basis of the reconciliation of the People with their own destiny.

Up to the middle of the 20th Century, studies of metaethics were the main object of study of the analitical current which covered that area, leaving aside fundamental problems, considered meaningless at that time. Even though Rawls is heir of this philosophical current, he supports a new approach which goes back to the substancial nature of ethics, though set in a framework whose political basis supposedly is liberal democracy, his methodology of contractualism and content, and a constructivism lacking metaphysical presuppositions, strongly influenced by Kantian thought. Taking these elements, Rawls designs a theory of justice whose main aspiration is faimess, a theory by which he tries to disprove the two main ethical currents of his time: Utilitarism and Intuitionism. To all this he adds a clear intention of considering an ordered society the one where Right is above Good. According to him, only then a pluralist society will be possible, a society where the ends of liberal democracy can be accomplished.

This paper is about the integration between metrical clausulae and rhetorical structure. First, there is a comparison of Waszink’s results using the Zielinski method with Laurand’s system, and my findings on the same group of clausulae. Secondly, we analyze the concluding words of every book of Tertullian, to identify the more frequent clausulae, and the initial words, in which we can find often a cretic. Thirdly, we analyze the metrical prose of Tertullian’s De testimonio animae, to establish a rhetorical scheme for the very first time.

The article discusses the meaning of chaos in the series of four elements introduced by Irenaeus in haer. 1, 30, 1 to characterize the system of the so-called “Ophites”. Contrary to the explanation that renders this Gnostic system dualistic, it is argued here that, in reality, the “Ophites” of Irenaeus anticipates what we find in other Gnostic families (Naassenes, On the Origin of the World, The Hypostasis of the Archonts) and continues the Orphic tradition that appeared in the Theogony of Jerome and Hellanicus, in which the eternal chaos had been domesticated with the Jewish monotheism of Genesis, and, according to which, this chaos would come to be something like a “hollow”, not eternal, which precedes the material world, shelters it and then favors the appearance of the corporeal. Its status as a Principle should always be understood in a derivative sense, with no obstacle to monism: the Primordial Light (Lumen primum), the only absolute principle, provokes the appearance of the region of the shadow (chaos), but it does so indirectly through the intermediate veil (Spiritus Sanctus). Nothing justifies speaking, therefore, of the “Ophite” system as an ontologically dualistic system.

The letter from Arius to Alexander of Alexandria, also known as «Arius’ profession of faith», has been transmitted in its original language, Greek, by Athanasius (De Synodis) and Epiphanius (Panarion). Also, Hilary of Poitiers quotes a Latin translation of the letter twice (De Trinitate IV and VI). The comparative study of the two Greek versions and the Latin translation reveals small textual variants, which points to the independence of the three testimonies. The textual variant (κτιστὴν, instead of κριτὴν) is the most interesting; it comes from a Greek version that has not been preserved. However, our work has been able to reconstruct this lost textual variant using an ancient and forgotten conjecture of Erich Klostermann.