The four chapters of the Guanzi embody the adaptation and further development of Laozi's theory of the dao by the Daoists in Qi. The paper first shows, where Guanzi builds on the theory of dao in the Laozi. Then the further development of this theory through the notions of “non action" and “emptiness" is analysed. The notion of emptiness is incorporated into the cosmological framework in such a way as to describe the origin of all things. In an epistemological context the “emptiness." describes a certain state in which the subject should be.The Jixia Daoists as presented in the four chapters of the Guanzi on one hand concretise the dao with the help of the notion jingqi. On the other hand they implement the dao in the social realm by the means ofthe rites (Ii) and the law (fa). Thus by the combination of the metaphysical dao with the empirical dao the Jixia Daoists are puttingthe dao into practice. Furthermore the concept of following (yin) is a major focal point in the four chapters of the Guanzi. Not only should one “Give up oneself and follow the things", but under the premise that “the dao values following" the principle of“following the times and reacting to the things" is put forward. In an epistemological context the concept of “following" as exemplified in “the dao of following quietly" also plays an important role. Xunzi later on is to adopt this concept into his thinking.

The paper is divided into six sections. 1. Introduction, 2. The contents of the yidao thinking, 3. The relationship between the tianrui chapter and qianwei-chenzaodu, 4. The thinking ofthe tianrui chapter, 5. The distinctiveness of the yidao thinking in the tianrui chapter， 6. Conclusion.This paper builds on the essay “Emptiness in the Liezi" by the same author.There the author already argued that Liezi was written in Pre-Qin times. Thus we can use the tianrui chapter to discuss the thinking of Liezi. In this paper it is argued that then yidao thinking does not only exist in the Zhouyi, but also in the tianrui chapter ofthe Liezi.As far as the relationship between the tianrui chapter and the qianwei-chenzaodu is concerned, the paper advances new arguments that support the view that the qianwei-chenzaodu copied from the tianrui, not the other way around. At the same time it argues that tianrui should be read as tianduan.When tracing the yidao thinking through the Yizhuan, the Laozi and the Liezi the author finds differences and similarities. In the Yizhuan Confucianists use the hexagrams ofthe Yijing to express the notion ofthe mutuality of yin/yang and gang/rou. Although the Laozi does not refer to the hexagrams, the notions of “returning to the roots" and “being empty and quiet", as expressed in the sun and the fu hexagram in the Yij ing, are being adopted by the Laozi. Liezi builds on these notions in the Laozi and further develops them.

The contents ofthis essay include: (A) Three Levels ofKnowing: by the Eye, by the Heart, and by Reason; (B)The Horizons Known : Heavenly Principle, Cosmic Nature, Human Destiny; (C) From “the Cosmic exhaustive investigation ofthe principle", to “the total fulfillment ofthe Cosmic Nature", to “the reaching of one's destiny". These were all embedded within Shao lung's Huang-chi ching-shih (The Grandest Ultimate Way of Ordering the World), Chapter 62, which further suggests that “experience", “understanding",“judgement", and “decision" constitute the main items of human cognitional structure.

The concept of hermeneutic circle appears in the works of Schleierrmacher, Heidegger and Gadamer. In this essay I argue that although Heidegger, in Being and Time, thinks that his concept ofhermeneutic circle belongs to the structure of understanding, it still possesses a characteristic of Schleiermacher's hermeneutic circle, namely, bothof them are methodological concepts. However, although Gadamer claims that his concept of hermeneutic circle is developed out of Heidegger's philosophy, I show that it is no longer a methodological concept, but is the happening of truth.

In this paper we discuss the relation between critical thinking and education. J. McPeck thought that critical thinking is the necessary condition for education. Education logically entails critical thinking. But H. Siegel believes that critical thinking is the ideal of education. (1) We argue that because the concept of 'knowledge', which is in the firstpremise of McPeck's argument, is ambiguous, so the truth of conlusion that education logically entails critical thinking cannot be warranted. (2) Then we argue that the four reasons which Siegel used to justify the proposition that critical thinking is the ideal of education could also be used to justify the proposition which states “care is theideal of education." (3) But we did not deny that critical thinking as the ideal of education, and even when we believe that care is the ideal of education, we still need critical thinking to measure what is the appropriate manner to care someone. Therefore, critical thinking still is one of the ideals of education, and might be the most important ideal of education.

This is one of the essays on the reflection on logic. The author points out some well-known concepts and principles, with their limitation in application, of the classicallogic are almost neglected by most users, in particular, in the areas of information processing and engineering, philosophical and linguistic analysis , and even in (college levelof) mathematical education in the present Taiwan.In retrospect to Quine's critique (during 1943-1970), which is still influential in Taiwan, ofthe propositional and the quantified modal logic, the author first, reflects on and then reformulates some conceptually foundational thought (central claims) in modallogic, and furthermore, propose some philosophico-technical problems in the boderlinedarea of (philosophical) logic, philosophy, philosophy of language, third, the author presents a bird-eye view on the source of the main concepts concerning inquiry in philosophical logic, the conceptions in and approaches to mathematical / formallogic and philosophical logic. Finally, his own perspectives on philosophical logic and its application.

The so-called Critical Buddhism was originated by two Buddhist scholars at Komazawa University: Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shiro. It stirred up great controversyby its claims that the teachings of Tathāgatagarbha, Buddhanature, original erllightenment, and the philosophy of Kyoto School are not Buddhist, and aroused great interest and responses from Buddhists and Buddhologist in Japan, North America and Taiwan.The criticism of Hakamaya and Matsumoto aimed at a number of different targets which touched on four levels: Buddhological, sectarian, social criticism, and philosophical. The main issues include: Tathāgatagarbha thought, Dhātu-vāda, Karma, original enlightenment, “Wa" thought, Buddhism," social discrimination, etc.These issues are too broad to be dealt with in a short article; therefore, this article focuses only on the issues in Buddhist doctrine and social discrimination. Hakamaya and Matsumoto maintain that Tathāgatagarbha thought goes against the most basic Buddhist teachings of causality (pratityasamutpada) and non-self (anātman) , and thus is a form of dhatu-vada. The first half portion of this article, based on the 'Srīmālā-devi Sūtra, Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, Ratnagotravibhāga 'Sāstra and Buddha-nature Treatise, refutes their claims.At the level of social criticism, Critical Buddhism blamed the idea of Wa (harmony), which derives from Tathāgatagarbha thought, for social discrimination and injustice. Thesecond half of this article refutes this claim by giving exampIes in which Tathāgatagarbha (Buddha-nature) thought is in fact the bases of social equality, freedom and justice.

It certainly is difficult to grasp the intentions of the late Confucius. Everything hinges on the adequate choice and interpretation of the historical sources that have come down to us. This essay takes the analects as a basis to further explore Confucius' later thought as expressed in the Yizhuan and the Chunqiu. As the author's analysis of the difficult "late spring" passage in the analects shows, Confucius in his later life was primarily concerned about the way of heaven (tiandao). The dao in the Yizhuan and the theory of the three ages in the Chunqiu elaborate on this theme. It is time for us to realize the value of the historical material such as the Teng Wengong chapter in the Mencius, the Kongzi shijia chapter in the Shiji and the recently unearthed Yao chapter of the Yizhuan to get a clearer understanding of the late Confucius.

According to her major research on death and dying, Elisabeth Kubler-Ross proposes that the final phases of a terminally ill patient may undergo such stages as denial and isolation, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance. From our dialogue with Dr. Kubler-Ross, we come to realise that each stage IIlay prove to be an occasion for one to learn his lesson concerning the meaning of life. If a person manages to make good use of the opportunity, he may attain such an edifying transfiguration of life that reveals that dying can be a challenge for one to confront one's ultimate concern, a chance for achieving spiritual growth, and a pathway through which one may appropriate for oneself the value of love.

This essay is divided into three sections. In the first section, I point out that in Heidegger the nature of language is monologue, then I analyze the characteristics of it. In the second section, I show that in Gadamer the nature of language is dialogue, and I then analyze the concept of dialogue. In the last section, I argue that the concept of monologue contradicts the nature of language, while a dialogical concept of language is acceptable.

Since the end of 19th century, it's undoubtedly well-known between the so-called "Platonforscher" that a lot of the hermeneutic difficulties exist in various interpretations on Plato's Cratylus, especially in respect of the unsolvable contradiction between the conventionalistic - nominalistic and naturalistic - realistic interpretations. I try to reduce the discussed problems of this dialogue to the following 9:1. For what purpose does Plato write Cratylus?2. Who is Plato's antagonist?3. What does Plato claim on the correctness in name (ὀν ομάτων ὀρθότητα)?4. Is Socrates' etymology strictly meanful?5. In what chronological period does Plato write this dialogue?6. What are Cratylus' and Hermogenes' propositions for the correctness of name?7. What differences between Plato's and Aristotle's assertions about the correctness in name?8. As a younger disciple of Heraclitus, is Cratylus' stand point the same with Aristotle's report in Metaphysics?9. Does Cratylus understand Heraclitus' doctrine correctly?There are various answers to the above-mentioned problerns between the "Plaotnforscher", because they tempt to solute these problems on the basis of analytical method, which inevitably arises hermeneutic difficulties by interpreting CratyIus. By Plato, philosophizing means "dialegesthai" (διαλέ γεοθαι) and dialectic is a method of asking and answering. Platonic dialogues are the results or literal records of the to-and- fro-oration. If one wants to conceive Plato's philosophy, then he must comtemplate argumentative speculation between the partners in dialogue. If one predeterminated his studies with analytic tendence, then he should miss Plato's dialectic activity and its appearantly antinomic consequence.The problems are treated by following theoretical steps: 1. An analysis of the dialectical roles of Socrates, CratyIusand Hermogenes in this dialogue.2. An anlysis of the different assertions of the correctness in name.3. On the basis of these two analyses, I try to answer the above-mentioned problems.

Quine and Davidson advocate tile thesis that assignment of semantic contents and intentional states is underdetermined by the totality of behavioral evidence. More specifically, given all the empirical data, the decision as to how to attribute semantic and intentional content is arbitrary. Given the indeterminacy thesis and Davidson's contention that semantic and intentional content are, in principle, publicly accessible, it follows that there is no such things as unique reference, determinate meaning and definite mental content. Furthermore, since such things are not factual matters in anyone's language and mind, they are not objects for anyone, including the agent himself, to know of. However, Davidson also endorses the view that even though we sometimes are not certain about what other speakers believe and mean, we are nonethelessusually certain about what we ourselves believe and mean. This view seems to be at a conflict with the thesis of indeterminacy as it applied to the first person case. It has been argued, most pointedly by Malpas, that in Davidson's account there is no incompatibility between the indeterminacy in the first person case and the intuition that we usually have knowledge of our the content of own utterances and intentional states. In this paper, I mainly argue for two points: first, Malpas' reconciliation for Davidson is based on a seriously misunderstanding of some of Davidson's own ideas and is therefore inadequate; second, so long as we distinguish two kinds of knowledge involved in the seemingly conflict propositions, the conflict will be proved to be merely apparent.

The political ideal of liberalism is to construct a stable society on the assumption that there are different and contradicting views about a good life. Presumably a liberal society tolerates and even celebrates differences and diversity. But is there a limit on liberal toleration? It seems obvious that in order to accomplish a stable and tolerating society, liberal state has to ensure all of its members acquire some virtues (especially toleration) necessary for the health and proper operation of the society. Therefore, itseems civic education for all members is inevitable. However, within a liberal society there are illiberal (religious) minorities who neither celebrate toleration, nor do they favor diversity. As a matter of fact, any form of civic education sponsored by the liberal state will undermine their ways of life and threaten their survival. Can they, therefore, refuse the kind of civic education imposed on them by the state? Various answers to this question are examined and evaluated in this article, and Jeff Spinner's idea of “partial citizen" is introduced as an adequate solution to this practical Issue.