The political ideal of liberalism is to construct a stable society on the assumption that there are different and contradicting views about a good life. Presumably a liberal society tolerates and even celebrates differences and diversity. But is there a limit on liberal toleration? It seems obvious that in order to accomplish a stable and tolerating society, liberal state has to ensure all of its members acquire some virtues (especially toleration) necessary for the health and proper operation of the society. Therefore, itseems civic education for all members is inevitable. However, within a liberal society there are illiberal (religious) minorities who neither celebrate toleration, nor do they favor diversity. As a matter of fact, any form of civic education sponsored by the liberal state will undermine their ways of life and threaten their survival. Can they, therefore, refuse the kind of civic education imposed on them by the state? Various answers to this question are examined and evaluated in this article, and Jeff Spinner's idea of “partial citizen" is introduced as an adequate solution to this practical Issue.

Virtue and principle are two important subjects in Mencius's ethics. This paper deals with them from viewpoint of ethics of virtue and of principle. The author indicates that Mencius' four virtues, i.e. hearts of compassion, of shame, of courtesy and modesty, and of right and wrong are universal human endowments and essential to human life. There are four “principles" derived from them. That is ， “jin" ， “yi" ， li" and “ chu." The first two are essential ethical virtues while the others enabling ones. The author contends that Menciusian ethics is consequentialistic. Mencius believes his principles have universal and objective validity. But they are overridable. Moral agent has to choose a correct principle in the particular moral or political context by the principle of utility. This is a kind of utilitarian moral reasoning that is ignored by most of interpreters.Moreover, Mencius is a naturalistic and realistic moral philosopher. “The good" is defined by “that is desired." But he conceives that good is a kind of property in thing itself being perceived by human being. In fact, what the good is is not an issue in his philosophy. But it is important to moral reasoning since it is dependent up the principle of utility.

While it is generally reckoned that religious beliefs can reinforce or purify our intentions in moral respect, some religious critics believe the opposite. According to them, religious people do good deeds not just for the sake of the good but also, if not more so, for the reward they may have in the future. Associated with the idea of deserts, religion seems to encourage heteronomous rather than autonomous motivations behind good actions. Whether this criticism is justifiable in the Judeo-Christian context is the main issue of this article. The article is divided into four parts. Firstly, the ideas of autonomy and heteronomy are introduced as a basis for further discussions. Secondly, the opinions and arguments of significant religious critics are presented and examined as we tackle with the question whether or not and to what extent Judeo-Christian religion is heteronomous. In the following part, it is shown that Judeo-Christian religion has a long tradition of respecting motivational autonomy even though it affirms the idea of deserts in the eschatological sense of paradise or hell in afterlife. The last partof the article deals with the possibility of integrating selfand other-regarding interests, or, integrating motivational autonomy and heteronomy, in thedomain of religious ethics.

The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the following main theses of Almeder's blind realism: (TI) Even if we abandon the correspondence theory of truth, we would still know that there is an external world. (T2) At any time, some of our presently completely authorized beliefs about the external world must correctly describe the external world. (T3) We cannot justifiably pick out which of our presently completely authorized beliefs do correctly describe the external world. I try to show that Almeder's argument for T1 is based upon his misunderstanding of Peirce's well-known Harvard experiment and it also fails to support T1. Moreover, T2 is not well elaborated and, even worse, incoherent with T3.

我們的心智如何掌握世界?最近之相關哲學論述的主要關 懷是要指出事實、經驗和判斷之間具有某種證成之關係。本論文 檢視三個經驗證成之理論:推演論、概念論及社會踐行論。此三 理論不同於傳統之基礎論、融貫論及可靠論，在於它們不企圖對 知識論概念(如「知識」和「理據J )提供抽象之分析;這些新 興理論深受維根斯坦之影響，強調知識概念與「語言踐行」之密 切關連。本文首先說明推演論與概念論之間的論爭，釐清其主要 論證和反駁，最後展述社會踐行論，並指出其對推演論與概念論 之修正及補強。

The goal of this essay is to give a textual interpretation and a comprehensive system-inherent analysis of the basic principle of the theoretical core from Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, that is, to explore the historicity of understanding of “Dasein ", especially the first crucial element of this hermeneutical theory, the hermeneutical circle. The central part of Truth and Method, “Rudiments of a Theory of Hermeneutical Experience", is the core of the theoretical exposition of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. He begins this part by transforming his fIrst theoretical element, the “hermeneutical circle", from Heidegger's “circle of understanding", and then develops this to the basic thought pattern of his hermeneutical thinking. This essay examines the following main points from this part of Truth and Method:1. The primary ground-presupposition of the philosophical hermeneutics; that is the historicality of understanding, Heidegger's “hermeneutics of facticity" and Gadamers presuppositional absorption of it. First, this essay looks over the system-inherent context of Gadamer's ontological adoption of Heidegger's historicity of understanding of Dasein as the first presupposition of philosophical hermeneutics.2. The “hermeneutical circle" as the “forest ructure" of understanding, i.e., Gadamer's philosophical-hermeneutical transformation of Heidegger's “circle of understanding". On the basis of Heidegger's historicity of understanding as the primary Presupposition of philosophical hermeneutics, Gadamer introduces the “circle of understanding" from Heidegger's Being and Time, and transforms it to his own theory of a “hermeneutical circle" as the “forestructure" of understanding. This circle concentrates no longer on the existential depth-structure of the Dasein's understanding of itself in its Being, but first picks out the understanding of text in the ordinary “lifeworld" or academic activity on the horizon of human science as a central theme. Although there are some implied theoretical problems in Gadamer's exposition, he describes the ever-present hermeneutical circle in the phenomenon of understanding as the concrete context of experience of “text-reading" . He points out the quasi-circular process that starts from the fore-projection of the text-reader to the penetration into the meaning of matter-of-factness in text, and leads to this new understanding, which finally repulses the fore-projection and corrects it. With this, he discloses the orienting pattern of his philosophical hermeneutics: first the awareness of the forestrucuture of understanding, and then the revelation of the matter-of-factness of the subject of understanding itself.3. The hermeneutical circle as the starting point of the exposition of philosophical hermeneutics. From this Gadamer develops the essential features of his hermeneutical thought, i.e. the description of the experience of “text-understanding" as the theoretical language and approach for the fundamental phenomenon of hermeneutics.

本文旨在探討舒茲的「純粹我們關係」概念，本文的出發點 在於認識到此概念往往被當作「具體我們關係」而導致其涵義未 能被適切的理解。本文指出，舒茲將「純粹我們關係」奠定在「對 你態度」之上，並視之為「極限概念J '亦即將它當作無任何具 體內容的抽象概念，而且主張它是任何社會關係的最終基礎。此 一論述導致理念化與自我中心化的批評。本文指出，舒茲此一觀 點在晚期的生活世界論述中依然保留，並試著指出此一概念所導 致的批評或許可以藉由「相互準備投入關係」來加以化解。

The aim of this essay is to show that Dasein in Heidegger's Being and Time is not a humanistic concept. In doing this I will separate my work into three sections. In the first section I will probe the concept of humanism by an analysis on Heidegger's essay entitled “Plato's Doctrine of Truth." I will conclude that humanism, on Heidegger's view,is the claim that man, in his thinking, has forgotten Being and presupposes himself as the ultimate ground. In the second section I will show, by an analysis on the methodology and the Being of Dasein Heidegger invokes in his Being and Time, that the ground of Dasein is not itself, but facticity-that is, something beyond Dasein. With these conclusions in mind, it will be reasonable to assert that Dasein is not a humanistic concept. In the last section I will indicate that only when we presuppose that Dasein is not a humanistic concept can we coherently explain the development of Heidegger's thought.

賴特 (Crispin Wright) 於其1992 年之文章中， 為實在論與 反實在論之爭提出了一個新的看法，也因此，吾人實可對實 在論者與其對手間之爭論焦點有一番新的認識。賴特認為: 實在論者與其對手間之爭論，實非針對「語句是否能具真理 傾向(truth apt) J 此一問題而發， 而係針對「語句究竟能有何 種真理述詞」此一問題而發一亦即:吾人可謂實在論者與其 對手之爭，實為對於「語句之真」究竟是「直率 ('robust') 之 真」抑或僅是「最小之真」之爭O對翩因 (Quine) 著名之「指 稱之不可測」 (the Inscrutability of Reference) 主張， 賴特之探 究進路實有重要之哲學理趣。對此，本文擬指出:賴特於其 1997 年之文章中提出「真理之最小論」 (minimalism about truth) 論證' 並藉以反對捌因之「指稱之不可測」主張， 整體 而言並未成功，此為本文之主要重點所在。儘管如此，賴特 之探究進路與「語意理論之形上地位」間究竟有何關係，亦 為一重要問題。此為本文最後所將著墨之重點。

For Śaṅkara, the most renowned teacher of the Advaita Vedānta school of Hinduism, Brahman or Ātman as the sole ultimate reality underlying all beings is attribute-less, indivisible, unconceptualizable and unverbalizable. In other words, Brahman-Ātman is for him ineffable, well beyond the reach of human language. Yet, referring to the reality in words seems on many occasions inevitable, and the scriptures of the school do contain positive statements about the reality. How, then, should we understand the referring function of the scriptural language? How can one speak meaningfully of something that is unspeakable? In this paper I propose to expound Śaṅkara’s views on these issues.Śaṅkara, indeed, sets forth three methods by means of which one can make linguistic references to the unsayable: (1) the method of negation (netivāda), (2) the method of indication (lakṣaṇa-vṛtti), and (3) the method of imposition-cum-negation (adhyāropa-apavāda). The three methods will be closely examined in sequence with their mutual relationships exposed thereafter. The author is of the opinion that Śaṅkara’s linguistic approach toward ‘saying’ the unsayable is rather instructive and really worth our attention.

過去數十年來，諸如Hacking 和Giere 等哲學家在討論科學 哲學時，已不再專注於科學理論本身，而是從實驗操控和建造模 型等方面來進行論述。就催生實作和技術取向的科學哲學而言，不管是Hacking 的實驗主義或是Giere 的模型論都貢獻良多。本 文要論證的是，科學哲學和工程技術學科的方法論兩者之間其實 可以彼此借鏡而相互受益。此外，不同的方法論進路也有必要整 合成一個更普遍的詮釋架構理論，而實作-理解-認知乃是被詮釋 和觀點所形塑而成的。

像古典力學一類的科學理論如何被檢驗？這個問題有個長 遠的歷史。在本文中，我將提議一個檢驗理論，建基在吉爾關於 科學理論結構的研究上。但我的模型觀點與吉爾有些微不同。我 將從理論性和歷史性兩個不同角度來展示：科學理論總是可以被 理解為擁有一個分類的模型體系的理論，其中包括高層的模型與 可落實模型；而且科學家總是透過可落實模型來檢驗理論。但 是，透過可落實模型把檢驗的結果傳送到高層的模型或原理，乃 是一件非常複雜的機制。因此，就算有一些可落實模型被印證或 否證，整體理論完全被印證或否證實際上不太可能。最後，我將 以說明牛頓理論的檢驗史為例，來佐證本文提議的檢驗理論。以 拉卡托斯的話來說，這個檢驗理論在本質上也是個針對歷史的 「合理重建」。

There is a important principle in the problem of free-will. This principle is called “the principle of alternate possibilities” (hereinafter : PAP) which states that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. Harry G. Frankfurt has presented a series of putative counterexamples to PAP. (“Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” Journal of Philosophy 66,1969,pp.829-39)The “Frankfurt-style” examples have evoked considerable discussion. One general form of response to the examples is in the examples there are alternative possibilities. Our aim in this paper is to discuss that whether Frankfurt –style examples undermine PAP? (1) Are there alternative possibilities in Frankfurt–style examples? (2) Is an agent moral responsible for a decision although he could not have avoided making it? Or whether Fischer on alternative possibilities and responsibility is correct? (3) And we also discuss Van Inwagen’s three principles which is established the link between ability to do otherwise and responsibility.

This essay analyzes the concept of time in the philosophy of Heidegger and Gadamer in order to show its relationship with both philosophers’ discussion on “Being”. I point out that no matter in his early or later writings, Heidegger’s concept of time is in conflict with his concept of understanding. Therefore, Heidegger’s quest for the meaning of Being cannot be accomplished. In contrast the Gadamerian concept of time makes the understanding of the meaning of Being possible.In the first part of this essay Heidegger’s concepts of time are revealed by an analysis on his two major works: Being and Time and On Time and Being. I argue that the concept of time revealed in these two books makes the understanding of Being impossible. In the second part Gadamer’s concept of time is discussed by an investigation on the following terms: contemporaneity, time in festival and fulfilled time. I show that the Gadamerian concept of time is in harmony with the understanding of Being. ThereforeGadamer’s philosophy can accomplish the task of illuminating the meaning of Being. Finally I show that it is justified to accept the Gadamerian concept of time in the interpretation of Being.

The present study examines Buddhist doctrine of "neither increase nor decrease in the realm of sentient beings" in the Anūnatvâpūrṇatva-nirdeśa in terms of a doctrinal development focusing attention on keywords from the realm of sentient beings (sattva-dhātu), dharma-dhātu, dharma-kāya, to tathā-gatagarbha. The Mahāyāna has sometimes been associated with the doctrine that there is neither increase nor decrease in the realm of sentient beings, a doctrine which is often linked to the Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtras or the Mādhyamika school. In this paper, I look into just such a doctrine, as it is found in a Chinese traslation of the Anūnatvâpūrṇatva-nirdeśa, a Buddhist scripture translated by Bodhiruci in 525. Several passages of this scripture were cited in the Ratna-gotra-vibhāga, a treatise still preserved in Sanskrit, Chineseand Tibetan, and give us textual sources for research into the Chinese translation of this scripture.In the Anūnatvâpūrṇatva-nirdeśa, the very way in which the doctrine of neither increase nor decrease in the realm of sentient beings is defined and verified through the employment of the dharma-dhātu theory, a theory which, in turn, is verified by reference to theories of dharma-kāya and tathā-gatagarbha. So in order to understand this scripture's discursive construction of the doctrine of neither increase nor decrease in the realm of sentient beings, we must explore its conception of such keywords as dharma-dhātu, dharma-kāya, and tathā-gatagarbha.It is my hope that an examination of such a scripture with the focus on the doctrine of neither increase nor decrease in the realm of sentient beings may contribute to the study of the various ways in which the contours of the Mahāyāna have been drawn from a doctrinal perspective.

The dilemma we are in when we reflect on the free power of choice in our person and our place in the causal world can be dissolved if the relationship between action and event causation is appropriately described and explained. The present study examines three approaches to the dilemma: The first is based on how to interpret freedom given event causation, the second based on having leeway given probabilistic causation, and the third based on a postulation of agent-causation. None of them is found satisfactory.By finding out and negating their common assumption, the present study proposes a way of fine-tuning our conceptualization of what it is to act, and to choose, in a world enmeshed with causality. The core idea of the proposal is that, at bottom, event causation and the ways we act and choose are inseparable from each other in our embodiedinteractions with the environment. The philosophical basis of the proposal is made explicit and defended.