Though not a conscious philosopher, yet Sri Aurobindo’s contribution to world philosophy can hardly be over-estimated. His invaluable gift to posterity has been to show humankind the way to rise to higher levels of consciousness. For he was a Yogi who verified the Truth of the scriptures in the laboratory of his own soul, and upon it based his philosophy of dynamic, progressive spirituality. In the course of his Yoga he came to realize that Man, as he is today, is in a transitional phase. The journey of evolutionary man is from animality to Divinity and the final goal, the return to God. Man must be superseded by Superman, the next evolutionary emergent. In the Aurobindonian scheme, supermanhood is not an option, but a compulsion, satisfying a teleological necessity. My paper seeks to explore what this ‘supermanhood’ entails in terms of cosmic salvation and world transformation.

Many schools of Indian philosophy stress the importance of knowledge on the path to liberation, but what kind of knowledge is meant? Is it the kind of knowledge that can be had through philosophical thinking, through a path of intellectual inquiry? In this presentation I will sketch the position of Niścaldās (ca. 1791–1863), a late Advaita Vedāntin whose magnum opus, The Ocean of Inquiry, though not well known today, was once referred to by Vivekananda as having “more influence in India than any that has been written in any language within the last three centuries.” For Niścaldās, the central practice on the path to liberation is inquiry, an intellectual process of raising and removing doubts which, I argue, is closely related to the dialectical method (of pūrva-pakṣa and siddhānta) employed throughout Indian philos­ophy. The practice of inquiry presupposes a high level of moral and spiritual qualifications, but once these qualifications are met, philosophical thinking itself becomes, for Niścaldās, a spiritual practice. This practice is the chief means for bridging the gap between purely theoretical awareness and a deeper, liberating knowledge.

The law of karma is widely and popularly accepted in India. In the process of change and development of human potentiality of creativity, unfortunately man has reached a mental state of homo- fabricus, making and re-making false things as if they were real in order to deceive others. The law of karma has been stated prominently in Vedic literature, the Bhagavad Gita and in Indian traditional philosophical literature. According to this, no man can escape the consequences of his actions. To discuss it, which is relevant and important in the present conditions and circumstances, I would like to adopt the hermeneutic- phenomenological and holistic methodologies. The Bhagavad Gita is the quintessence of Vedic literature and Vyasa’s Mahabharata; there, Arjuna is taught by Srikrishna to perform his svadharma by fighting a battle. One has to perform one’s actions for the sake of duty in a detached and disinterested (anasakta) way without desiring the consequence (karma-phala), with love and devotion (bhakti), and integral fifth dimensional human reality. Beliefs in rebirth (punarjanma)-metempsychosis, and in the supreme Being (paramarthika satta) are the two implications of karma. In order to realise permanent peace, bliss and joy, man has to lead an alternative way of spiritual life of anasakta yoga.

The advancement of Science and Technology has attained so much height that the present age is rightly called the age of science and technology. But we have forgotten that the aim of science and technology is only the promotion of well-being and all round development of human life. Today the whole world faces a crucial problem of violent activities and we are under fear that if all these new research and technology attacks as a boomerang on society, there will be the possibility of destruction of human life. For Gandhi cooperation, inter-religious harmony and peace rather than conflict and struggle constitute the fundamental law of the universe. In modern times on the eve of twenty first century we have gained a lot of material progress, but we are not able to satisfy the human being in its real sense. The present society is facing the vary crisis of social integration. The civilization of mankind could be saved from destruction only through the means of non-violence. In order to establish social peace and order, the individual minds should be molded in such a way that there remains no room for communal hatred and social fragmentation. Therefore, approaching by the way of Gandhiji cannot be regarded only as an ethical or moral virtue but it is rather a growing demand of sustainable world.

As pointed out by Sidgwick, in his Methods of Ethics (I-9), the nature of moral value assumes two fundamentally different forms. These two views of morality are historically distinct. The priority of the Good was central to Greek ethics whereas modern ethics emphasized the Right rather than the Good. Corresponding to these two perspectives, we find in Western Ethics, Virtue Ethics and Duty Ethics are construed as opposed to each other and Gita Ethics is conventionally believed to be Duty Ethics expounding gospel of Duty. In my opinion, a fresh look is required rather than adopting the traditional one. Gita-Ethics can be construed on the lines of not only Duty Ethics but also Virtue Ethics. Bhagavadgita is known for its spirit of reconciliation: Action (Karma), Knowledge (Jnana), and Devotion (Bhakti); Renunciation (Nivrutti) and Activism (Pravrutti); Individual good (Moksa) and Social good (Lokasamgraha). So the paper attempts to show that the Gita Ethics can be depicted as virtue ethics.

In the Universe, there is a particular order. This order is known as ‘rta’. Since its very beginning, the order of a system prevails in the entire universe and cosmos. This cosmic order is known as ‘Mahan Rta’. Corresponding to this ‘Mahaman Rta’, there is an empirical order which is known as ‘Moral Rta’. To maintain the Mahan Rta it is imperative to follow and protect the ‘moral øta’. Out of all living beings on this earth, only human beings have consciousness and therefore there is a possibility that they only can violate the Mahan Rta. Rta the universal, all-pervading principle for maintaining the order in the society, nature and cosmos at large. It is also an ecological principle which sustains the balance and interrelationship of all life. Now the question is, what are the ways to follow this empirical order? Dharma is identified with rta. Rta is the natural order which reveals itself in and through the world and reveals itself as a moral law, governing and regulating the human conduct. Thus, violating this adharma which is sinful and results in destruction or chaos. Rta is also identified with Satya, Yajna etc.

Right from the beginning Vedas stand for essential monism. The existence of ‘That one in many and many in one’ forms the very core of Vedic thought. The sublime truth of the identity of the individual self with the absolute is established on the basis of firsthand experience of woman sage like Vak. This epoch making is truth is firmly established in the Chandogya Upanishad through the Mahavakya “Tat tvam asi” (“That thou art”) which is repeated eleven times by the sage Svetaketu . He explains the emergence of the whole visible universe from the invisible subtle essence and also establishes the all pervasiveness of this subtle essence. On the basis of essential oneness, interconnectedness of one with everything and everything with everything is established in the Upanishads and as a consequence it further establishes mutual dependency of everything on everything in the cosmos. Grounding on this metaphysical truth love, reverence and kindness was extended to all sentient and non sentient beings. Vedic ethics has been holistic in its approach to God man and nature.

What does the term ‘Perception’ denote in Epistemology? Is it a first hand, indubitable cognition as the hardcore epistemologists regard or is it very close to ‘interpretation’ or ‘perspective’ as poststructuralists like Michel Foucault regard? The philosophical analysis of perception tries to give an account of what it is to perceive something. It also tries to give an account of the nature of object of perceptual experience. Perception raises special problem if it is supposed that there is necessarily a gap between our perceptual experience and the objective world around us which we claim toknow. If perception is an entirely subjective matter, then there seem greater reasons for scepticism concerning our claims to know the so – called external world. But what exactly perception is like? It has to be said that the conceptual problem, viz. the problem of the nature of our concept of perception, is in a sense prior to the epistemological problem, viz. the problem of the relation between perception and the knowledge of the external world. There is a very wide tendency among philosophers to offer an analysis of perceptual experience which splits up perceptual experience into the awareness of some private data, i.e. into sensations, and the act of interpreting this data as objects or object – properties. Philosophers differ in opinion about the genuine nature of perception with regard to these two elements, viz sensation and judgement. Some assimilate perception to sensation. In their opinion, perception means pure sensation. In this, the object is only presented to the senses. This awareness of the object is the genuine perception. The interpretation of the data, which the knower does after being aware of the object, is not perception because that is done by another faculty, viz. intellect and not by the senses. This controversy is found in booth Indian and Western philosophical traditions. Naiyayikas, the bahyartha – vadins, i.e., the realists in Indian tradition are of the opinion that savikalpaka pratyaksa, i.e. determinate perception is the genuine perception. They are the supports of the commonsense view. According to them perception is the direct cognition of the things as they are, and only determinate perception can provide us the knowledge of the things as they are. They have accepted the doctrine of nirvikalpaka pratyaksa only as a logical requirement. As against this, the Buddhist philosophers Dinnaga and Dharmakirti opine that nirvikalpaka pratyaksa is the genuine perception and the so – called savikalpaka pratyaksa’ is a pseudo – perception. According to the Buddhists, the function of sense – perception is only to present the object to the senses. And that is done by nirvikalpaka pratyaksa. In determinates cognition, the object is known as associated with name, from, attributes etc., But the name, from, attributes are not known through sense – perception, they are the products of conceptual construction. The nature of the ‘purely given’ in sense – perception is devoid of all attributes and categories. Therefore, nirvikalpaka pratyaksa is the genuine perception, and the savikalpaka jnana is included in the inference in broader sense. Present paper proposes to discuss the ancient Indian debate regarding perception between the Buddhists and the Naiyayikas from the epistemological point of view. And the attempt will also be made to trace the roots of this debate in the respective paradigms of reality. It will be brought to light that here is essential reciprocity between the ‘Episteme’ and the ‘Real’. And this is not the invention of the contemporary philosophy; it was realized from the early times of philosophy.

The discussion about abhava or non-existence is an important as well as an interesting issue in Indian philosophy both from the logical and epis­temological points of view. The reality of non-existence cannot be denied. According to the Nyaya-Vaisesika thinkers an absence is as much an item of reality as any presence. It is to be noted that I shall discuss the problem of non-exis­tence from epistemological point of view. My discussion will centre round the question ‘how is abhava known?’ Both the Nyaya and the Bhatta Mimamsakas admit the reality of non-existence, but differ as to how abhava on non-existence is known. According to the Naiyayikas, abhava is known by sense-perception while according to the Bhattas abhava can never be known by perception but by a distinct pramana (source of knowledge) namely anupalabdhi or non-cognition. So the bone of contention between these two schools of philosophy is about the process of knowing non-existence. Both perception and non-cognition are essential for the knowledge of abhava. According to the Naiyayikas perception is the karana or special cause and non-cognition is the karana or cause, while according to the Bhatta Mimamsakas non-cognition is the karana or special cause and perception is the karana or cause for knowing non-existence. And for me the position of the Naiyayikas is better than that of the Bhatta Mimamsakas.

This paper is inspired by a small manuscript, Vyākaraṇakhaṇḍanam by Vacaspati Bhattacharya. Though my paper is absolutely based on works of Pāṇini’s Astadhyayi, Kātyāyana’s vṛtti and Patañjali Māhābhāṣya, culminating to the works of Nāgeśa and Bhartṛhari.In this paper I have attempted to show two ways of learning a language. First, one can adopt the grammar of a particular language and then can have the mastery of that language. Or one can live within the community of that language group and can acquire the mastery of that language. This latter view is supported by ancient Indian tradition of Trimuni---Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjalis who gave much importance to the lokavijñāna and lokavyavahāra. It is the popular usages that determine the rules, grammatical operation and syntactical-semantic relationship among the words. The two methods mentioned by Nāgeśa are Lakṣaṇaikacakṣuṣa, and Lakṣyaikacakṣuṣa. It has been concluded with Bhartṛhari that two methods are not separated from one another; they complement and supplement each other.

Corruption, which seems to thrive at all levels, is the single biggest threat to India’s ethical and economic health. There has been a steep rise in corruption in the recent past because pleasure has lopsidedly become ultimate end of human beings. Indian ethics and philosophical traditions prescribe four main ends of human life (Purushartha), namely enjoyment (Kama), wealth (Artha), Virtue (Dharma) and liberation (Moksha). The attainment of pleasurable objects is the steadfast end of human life because it is congenial to the body. As a means to enjoyment and livelihood, wealth is the second end of life. Without wealth, we cannot acquire objects nor can we have subsequent enjoyment. But in attainment of wealth and enjoyment we cannot be reckless. It is the duty of every individual to follow the laws which are imposed by society and state. Here comes virtue which is the third end of man as a social being. People have forgotten virtue and liberation in the mad run after wealth and enjoyment. This is the main aggravating factor of widespread corruption. This has to be avoided. We must adhere to our philosophical traditions. Some other factors of corruption and their possible remedies have also been delineated in this paper.

A believer, an atheist, an agnostic, a monist, a monotheist, a polytheist, an absolutist or even a hedonist can debate and discuss Spirituality. Is Spirituality a synonym for Religion and religious belief or does it spell different? Can one be spiritual and not be religious? Does being religious imply or presuppose the individual being spiritual? Is not Spirituality an antithesis for Materialism? Can one be spiritual and yet enjoy the sensual and phenomenal pleasures? Does it not imply that spirituality necessarily insists on austerity and does not allow people to be led by Artha and Käma? Are Dharma and Spirituality two names meaning the same concept and reality? Can Spirituality and business go together? Does the Indian concept of Puruñärthas lead one to holistic approach to life? These and many more questions lead us to the path of Truth, the very essence of Spirituality. Spirituality is not for the ascetic, the sage and the seer, and the old and the weak. It is the very substratum that keeps the nectar of life sustenance and evolution of the entire race and cosmos. It is the cornerstone of every business and industry. Let us understand what India has given to the world, through Spiritual teachings to make the ideal of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakaà or a global village, a universal reality.

Although argumentation as a method was developed initially by the authors of the Nyaya school, one may claim that this was a general philosophic method acceptable also to other schools. There was a tacit agreement among the philosophers of ancient and classical India regarding the efficacy of the Nyaya method. The Nyaya method of philosophical argumentation known as katha, in fact was the result of an intellectual climate pervaded by public discussion, debates, arguments, and counter arguments. Katha consists of three types of debate: vada, jalpa and vitanda. The first kind corresponds to the friendly and congenial debate. Vada is usually to be held between the teacher and the students or between friendly philosophers where each participant is a seeker after truth. Jalpa is held between two rival parties, and the explicit goal here is victory. Vitanda, the third type is characterized by the lack of any attempt to prove the counter thesis. This paper makes an effort to establish Indian method of argumentation as a social veritisitc method.

Mankind has always been deeply interested in resolving the mystery of our existence and the world. Human life is very short and has two poles-birth and death. The experience of phenomenal world brings many questions, such as – ‘what it is?’ and ‘who we are?’ The question ‘what it is?’ is existential and ‘who we are?’ is related directly to our being. This paper is a humble attempt to expound these questions in context of Greek and Indian viewpoints. Fantasy begins with these two simple questions, which have been existent since centuries. Broadly speaking, Greek philosophers have been considered to be existential in nature and they want to describe the relation between our life and the world. On the other hand, Indian philosophy or ‘Darshan’ begins with ‘that what really exists’. There are so many answers but matter or consciousness is the chief points of debate. Matter is something phenomenal and it changes, so it is not really existential. According to Indian philosophy, the reality (Sat) never changes. It is an absolute entity (Brahman) or consciousness (Ātman). Now, we can say that the basic problem of philosophy has been the same in Greece as well as in India. Both systems of thoughts want to resolve the mystery of existence, yet the methodology of philosophical enquiry has been different. For the sake of clarity and precision, the whole exposition has been divided into three sections: i. Exposition of Greek Metaphysics, ii. Exposition of Indian Idealism, iii. Comparison and Contrasts. On the basis of a detailed discussion, we arrive at the conclusion that there are several striking similarities between these systems worth reviewing and a lot of further work is required in the field.

This paper intends to show that Advaita Vedanta is one of the most misunderstood philosophies of India. There is a popular allegation against this philosophy that it is world-negating. An attempt has been made, in this paper, to probe into the underlying principles of this philosophy. There are sufficient grounds to prove that it has a profound social philosophy which deals with worldly life. Such grounds are found in both classical and modern exponents of Advaita Vedanta. In classical Advaita Vedanta, the Prasthanabheda of Madhusudan Saraswati has been discussed in the paper. Among modern thinkers, the views of Vivekananda and Gandhi have also been analyzed. The concepts of classical Advaita Vedanta have been interpreted and applied by these thinkers in a new perspective and these applications justify the theme of this paper.

Advaita metaphysics is founded upon the theory of non-duality. In order to establish non-duality, the diversity in the mundane world has to be criticized. The Jaina theory of Anekāntavāda, or the theory of ‘multifoldness,’ is supported epistemologically by Saptabhaṅgīnaya, their theory of ‘seven ways to prove the validity of knowledge’. Ācārya Rāmādvaya (1400 CE), in his text the Vedānta Kaumudī, finds Saptabhaṅgīnaya to be an extreme challenge to Advaita theory and knowledge, so he profoundly criticizes the Jaina theory of Saptabhaṅgīnaya. The present paper is the study of Rāmādvayācārya’s arguments from the Vedānta Kaumudi. In this paper, Ācārya Rāmādvaya’s ideas and arguments are consolidated and systematized to present them before modern academia, as his arguments are an important contribution to the tradition of Advaita Vedānta, which majorly influenced the succeeding thinkers of Advaita tradition.

Since later 1990’s, a large number of researchers of information science have engaged in the systematization of credibility assessment of online information. On the other hand, Indian philosophical tradition has a 2000-year history of discussion on credibility assessment of others’ reports, which is called śabdaprāmāṇyavāda in Sanskrit. The discussions of these two disciplines share the same interest, but their methodology is substantially different: the former is based on descriptive analysis of the information that we tend to credit, and the latter gives normative formulation of information that we ought to credit. This paper tries to show that the former methodology is not sufficient for the purpose shared by information scientists. It seems necessary for information science to incorporate normative approaches to credibility, and Indian philosophy may be able to help it. I will introduce some theories of Naiyāyika-s (logicians) such as Jayanta (9C), Udayana (10-11C) and Gaṅgeśa (14C) for assessing the credibility of other’s reports, and examine their applicability to the contemporary issues. I will also show the possibility of getting benefit from the studies of information science to improve understanding and evaluation of Naiyāyika-s’s theories.

The paper is devoted to the philosophical terminology of Yamunacharya (10th-11th century CE). This thinker was a key-figure of medieval Indian thought, which symbolized a new period in the history of Indian philosophy characterized by its prominent religious component as an essential part of Vedanta Philosophy. The main goal of the paper is to expose the terminological structure of Yamunacarya’s philosophical system (on the base of his main philosophical works), which became a foundation of all later branching of Vishnu Vedanta. Comparative study of the basic religious-philosophical concepts of Yamunacarya System asks a question, how the religious concepts can be correlated with the specific world of Vishnu Vedanta Philosophy.

In this paper the conception of liberation (moksha) in different systems of Indian philosophy is discussed in the light of the hedonistic doctrine that happiness or pleasure is the supreme end of life. All systems of Indian philosophy, except Charvaka, accept liberation as the highest end of life (purushartha). The Vedanta and Jaina philosophers clearly enunciate that Liberation is the state of bliss or happiness (ananda). Some later Buddhists, Naiyayikas and Mimansakas also regard liberation as a state of bliss. Thus, we see that according to the advocates of positive conception of liberation and hedonism happiness is the highest end of life. The original Buddhism, Nyaya – Vaisheshika, Mimansa and Sankhya regard liberation as a state of freedom from suffering without presence of happiness. Cessation of pain is the highest end of life. J. S. Mill says that by happiness is intended pleasure and absence of pain. Thus, we see that advocates of negative conception of liberation and the hedonists seek cessation of suffering in their own ways. Similarity can also be seen between the conception of Jivanmukti (liberation of soul while living in this body) and Mill’s substitution of general happiness for the happiness of the individual.

Śabara (5th or 6th century CE), in the oldest known commentary to the Mīmāṃsā-sūtras states that the primary meaning of a word is ākr̥ ti, or form, different from both default answers to the question of meaning; individual and class. Śabara’s concept of ākr̥ ti is strictly connected with his word oriented towards metaphysics - just as the phenomenal world is derived from the Vedic Word, so is every cognition based on a verbal (lingual) component. And ākr̥ ti is this very verbal component, present in every act of cognition and in every object. It is a base and a source of individual world-objects (seen in Śabara-bhāṣya as mere manifestations of eternal word-objects). It is also a medium that makes recognition of an individual possible. Thus every pramāṇa, method of cognition, is based on a verbal component; even perception. In Śloka-vārttika, a later commentary written by Kumarila Bhaṭṭa, ākr̥ ti is admittedly identified with jāti, or ‘class’, yet it is seen as more complex. Kumarila introduces an idea of a double character of objects and meanings. Every word’s meaning has two intermingled components; individual and common, just as objects are in fact dual - different from others (an individual) and bearing some similarity to others (a member of a class). None of the two meanings can be treated as secondary. Thus ākr̥ ti becomes a single, yet not unitary, answer to the question of meaning. It keeps its verbal character, for a class, too, has for Kumarila a double character - linguistic and real. What is more, the existence of a class makes reasoning and verbal cognition possible, and the class itself is cognised in a basic, direct act of perception.