This paper analyses the coevolution of the concept of 'Bildung' (inner-formation, selfcultivation) and the structures of education and society. Although a newcomer to the German language, with a still somewhat obscure meaning, 'Bildung' becomes a key concept in social discourse around 1800. In this paper, I will focus on the concept and its social role in a mainly European context. This paper will deal with the meaning of the concept and with the coevolution of 'Bildung' and societal structures.

L'acüon educative repose sur un double fondement: d'une part, la nature et la vocation de l'etre humain, et d'autre part, la societe humaine ä bätir. L'homme a des traits specifiques qui exigent et en meme temps permettent son education: il est imparfait, inacheve (il ne sait pas tout, il ne se comporte pas for cement bien), il faut done l'amener ä s'ameliorer; il est perfectible e'est-a-dire qu'il peut devenir meilleur; il a la volonte de se depasser, de tendre vers l'ideal, ideal qu'il n'atteint, bien sür, jamais; il est capable materiellement, intellectuellement (grace ä sa formation, ä son experience) d'agir sur autrui, de le mener vers cet ideal; enfln, il est conscient de devoir le faire, car l'homme ne peut et ne doit etre eduque que par l'homme. Et, second justificatif de Taction educative: la societe des hommes et les rapports devant exister entre eux. L'homme, par essence, Vit et est fait pour vivre en collectivite. Celle-ci doit etre harmonieuse, bien organisee, de preference sous forme d'Etat, pour le bonheur de tous les membres, lesquels doivent etre ä meme de concourir ä l'edification d'une societe egalitaire, toutes choses qui necessitent Taction educative.

In this essay, I shall both inquire into the relationship between democracy and education in general and concentr ate on education in philosophy for children in the Turkish cultural context. I argue that education in philosophy for children is useful for teaching the acquisition of knowledge from the information provided, for questioning of rules in different contexts, and for the analysis of facts encountered in daily life. Ethical attitudes can neither be derived from the information provided about the moral rules, nor do they result from a practice of unquestioning obedience. However, during a classroom discussion children can learn to make moral evaluations by taking into account basic rights and values. My experience as a teacher in philosophy for children, which I gained during my time working in childcare institutes, has enabled me to observe the positive effects of this program on children who were awakened to consciousness of their rights by means of it.

Here I seek to define creative teaching in Philosophy. I argue that creative teaching must be distinguished from efforts that are merely novel, offering no gains in student learning or that offer faculty no gain as alternatives to standard methods. I discuss efficiency and productivity in teaching Philosophy and our ability to adopt creative methods.

Este articulo tiene el objetivo de cuestionar los sentidos del aula de filosofia, sobre todo en la educaciön secundaria. Para eso, parte de la definiciön de filosofia expuesta por Deleuze y Guattari en Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?, donde la senala como una actividad de creaciön de conceptos, hace critica a las concepciones del aula de filosofia como momentos de reflexion, de contemplaciön o incluso de diälogos, una vez que ninguna de estas tareas se hace especfficamente filosöfica. Para garantizar esa especificidad, intenta caracterizar el aula de filosofia como un "taller de conceptos", un espacio donde el maestro y los alumnos se hacen creadores de conceptos, alrededor de problemas vividos, tomando como herramientas los conceptos histöricamente producidos.

Divldimos este trabajo en tres partes. A) El momento histörico, para resaltar la importancia de la educaciön para la vlda de la persona. B) El momento antropolögico o explicativo del concepto de autorrealizaciön. C) El momento etico-pedagögico.

The philosophical understanding of moral conscience should constitute one of the most significant concerns of any modern theory of moral education that wishes to be credible and reliable in all morally demanding situations. The purpose of this paper is not to contest the widely accepted notion of conscience as the absolute mark of our moral and spiritual integrity. The purpose of the paper is to postulate and stress the importance of certain "contextual" factors without which modern teaching of moral conscience could very easily lose its certainty and significance. It is argued that unless we make such assumptions, our following the dictates of individual conscience could become a trivial and redundant affair, because nothing could prove that this act is something more than "listening to one's inner voice". In the light of this, the paper proposes a qualified theory that avoids looking at individual conscience as a formal schema and embraces it within the broader framework of the educational demands raised by modern democratic culture.

There are essential differences between the Eastern and Western models of education. The Eastern model of education aims at the perfecting of an individual to reach his moral purity. Therefore it applies teaching and teacher-student relations on the individual scale, and primarily prefers didactics. The Western model of education considers an individual as a product of the social environment. Therefore it aims at the perfection of the environment itself, of the society, and so it concentrates its attention on socio-economic reforms and considers education as a component of society. It is impossible to find pure Eastern or pure Western models of education. Secular education was formed in the new period. Besides the social structure and peculiarities of relationships with society, educational systems are primarily differentiated on the basis of their purposes. The relationship between the Eastern and Western educational systems is not one that obtains between religious and secular schools. Educational systems depend on the characters of relations between science and practice, science and philosophy, science and religion. Therefore the development of education is closely connected with the nature of the development of science.

Informal logic offers a radical new perspective on the evaluation of arguments. But little work has been done on how deep concepts in the logical foundations of argument need to be modified in light of such efforts. This paper offers an indication of what might be done by sketching a new approach to the theory of entailment, truth and relevance.

Many historians and philosophers of logic have claimed that during the modern classical era there was a long period of stagnation or even of decline in the field of logic. The aim of this paper is to convince the audience that this standard evaluation of the development of modern logic during the period from Leibniz to Frege is misdirected and needs to be corrected. Even though it is true that the now usual way of understanding logic merely as the doctrine of syntax and semantics of explicit languages would not have appealed even to most 19th century logicians, it is still not the case that there is nothing worth discussing with regard to the development of logic during the modern classical period. The algebraic period culminated with Schroder's contribution and neither Herbartian formal logic nor Trendelenburg's critical epistemology aroused much interest among the 20th century mathematical logicians and analytic philosophers. Nevertheless, the development of symbolic logic can only be understood properly by relating its emergence to the immediately preceding philosophically-oriented discussion about the reform of logic.

In this paper I argue, contrary to the modern paradigm of rational choice theory in sociological theorising, that Dürkheim was correct to think that collectivistic notions are required if there is to be sui generis social science. However, Durkheim's anti-individualism must be naturalised to be compatible with modern monistic ontology. I argue that the required naturalisation is offered by the notion of humans as strongly social animals in general and the notion of collective intentionality in particular. I argue that such a collectivistic but ontologically naturalistic notion is (i) a fundamental building block of social reality, (ii) supported by empirical studies, (iii) required by theoretical analyses of social action dilemmas and, finally, (iv) capable of providing the key to the construction of a more humane world of the future.

The origin of Paraconsistent Logic is closely related with the argument that from the assertion of two mutually contradictory statements any other statement can be deduced, which can be referred to as ex contradict!one sequitur quodlibet (ECSQ). Despite its medieval origin, only in the 1930s did it become the main reason for the unfeasibility of having contradictions in a deductive system. The purpose of this paper is to study what happened before: from Principia Mathematica to that time, when it became well established. The main historical claims that I am going to advance are the following: the first explicit use of ECSQ as the main argument for supporting the necessity of excluding any contradiction from deductive systems is to be found in the first edition (1928) of the book Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik by Hilbert and Ackermann. At the end, I will suggest that the aim of the 20th century usage of ECSQ was to change from the centuries long philosophical discussion about contradictions to a more "technical" one. But with Paraconsistent Logic viewed as a technical solution to this restriction, the philosophical problem revives, but now with an improved understanding of it at one's disposal.

One of the key concepts in the Philosophy of Logic is the notion of inference. In this paper we expand the notion of logical inference and describe its role in a comprehensive theory of rationality. Some recent rationality theories either presuppose an unattainable logical capacity or they minimize the role of logic, in light of the vast amount of data on fallacious inferential performance. In this paper we defend the view that logical acuity, redefined to include heuristics, is a necessary factor in rationality. We evaluate some presuppositions of algorithmic models and some normative and metatheoretical properties of heuristic models, and defend our model against possible objections. Our revised notion of logical inference functions as the nucleus of the notion of logical acuity which in turn is a necessary building block for a realistic model of rationality. This model emphasizes the logical role of inferential heuristics, cognitive constraints and contextuality, introduces concepts such as "obvious inference", "cautious deductive closure", and "familiarity", and develops the notions of cognitive economy and contextual limitations as tools for evaluating and predicting rational behavior.

Many wonder at the abundance of disputes, opposing views and schools in philosophy. This abundance is surprising in view of the fact that philosophers are known for their striving and high regard for rationality. (There are, of course, philosophers who attempt to oppose, mostly by rational argumentation, the view that philosophy should be a rational discipline.) Why are all these admirably smart and rational people in so much disagreement with each other? Suvar Köseraif argues that the explanation of this phenomenon may lie in the fact that when two perfectly rational agents A 1 and A 2 disagree about matters of truth, there seems no way they can settle their dispute in purely rational ways. For suppose A1 believes in the truth of claim Q on the basis of premises P and a valid argument P.'.Q, and A 2 believes that ~Q on the basis of premises R and a valid argument R.'. ~Q. Then it would seem on logical, hence rational, grounds that A 1 must reject A2 ' s reasons R, since P.'. ~R is also valid. Thus the reasons P, which led Ai to rationally accept Q, also constitute rational reasons for A 1 to reject R, and consequently reject the argument A2 adduces for ~Q. Symmetrically, A 2 cannot but reject the reasoning A1 adduces for Q. So the dispute between A1 and A 2 concerning the truth of Q cannot be resolved—unless either side compromises its rationality and yields to such nonrational methods as threats, brainwashing, offers of money, etc. If all this is right, we have (rational) reason to be pessimistic about the value of rationality not only in philosophy, but in any sphere of thought, including science. I attempt to offer a rational counterargument against Köseraif's.

Henry W. Johnstone (1996) attempts to use a notion of postponement to give a general account of viciousness of infinite regresses. Though some of his examples suggest that his notion applies to only beginningless regresses (...eRdRcRbRa), I will show that it also applies to endless ones (aRbRcRdRe...). Unfortunately, despite this expanded application, it does not apply to all vicious regresses, even to some of his own examples; it is cumbersome and unnecessary, and it fails to explain how some infinite regresses entail a contradiction.

Using conjunction as an example, I show a technical and philosophical problem when trying to conciliate the currently prevailing views on the meaning of logical connectives: the inferientialist (also called 'syntactic') one based on introduction and elimination rules, and the representationalist (also called 'semantic') one given through truth tables. Mostly I show that the widespread strategy of using the truth theoretical definition of logical consequence to collapse both definitions must be rejected by inferentialists. An important consequence of my argument is that there are different notions of conjunction at play in standard first order logic, and that the technical and philosophical connections between them are far from well established.

The search for living (relevant and significant) values in societies has become increasingly widespread and institutionalized through the last decades. The paper argues that there are serious theoretical limitations (biases) inherent in the most widespread survey techniques, which jeopardize their very reason for existence: to foresee directions of social and political change. In fact the predictions made on the basis of these techniques manage to reach partial confirmation, but none are uncontested on theoretical and/or empirical grounds. Starting from the statement that empirical value inquiry continues to be very fragmented, the paper proceeds from critiques formulated on the basis of a hermeneutic analysis of survey methods to a comparison of these critiques with other attempts in the social sciences to treat the phenomenon of value. The third section of the paper relates the moral outlook of these surveys to another moral outlook seemingly operative nowadays: a global ethical vision. The section concludes that the value surveys fail to grasp both the ways values are organized and their dynamic because of their bias toward a Developmentalist ideology of world progress.