The article presents the essential ideas of the steady-state theory of the Universe together with an attempt at an appraisal of the criticisms which have been levelled against it. The hypothesis of the „continual creation of matter“ is objected to as metaphysical and foreign to the spirit of the natural sciences. However, an analysis of steady-state cosmology as a physical theory indicates that it does not lose its place among the natural sciences so long as it is not demonstrated that 1. nothing can be foreseen from it which is capable of experimental verification (the cosmological indeterminancy principle of Mc Créa), or 2. that what can be foressen from it is contrary to the present state of things.

The article is a philosophical attempt to solve the problem of quantum space. The problem has not been solved by experiment nor by arithmetical formalism so that the author makes use of analogy. The starting-point is the electromagnetic wave (EM). Hitherto, our ideas about the EM wave are the result of macroscopic mathematical operations. The EM wave should be subjected to logical analysis and abstraction if we wish to grasp its essential features. The essential features may be considered as: 1. the dualism of the energie natures E and H, 2. the perpendicular relation E ┴ H, 3. the impossibility of determining the priority of E or H (electromagnetic unidentifity), 4. the most generally accepted symmetry E = h (E = not H) and H = Ē (H = not E), 5. the passage is made from E to H and from H to E by reflection and turning in another plane, 6. the passage is made through „electromagnetic zero“, 7. an element of the EM wave is E ┴ W ┴ H, where W is the vector of propagation, 8. an element of the EM wave realizes tetradic geometry, generally quadrupol (fig. 1 and 2).The elementary unit of space also probably realizes tetradic geometry. We shall continue to call the hypothetical quantum of electromagnetic space a magnel (abbrev. mgl.). It corresponds to a quadrupol. The author analyses the constructive geometry of a tetrahedron. Two polar sections, perpendicular to each other, at a distance W, give the tetrahedron of forces, in other words the quadrupol. The construction of a tetrahedron is an example of the passage from one dimension to space.What type of geometry is there in matter? For the appraisal of crystalline bodies the right tetrahedron is generally accepted (fig. 3). In certain conditions matter is always crystalline. Many crystalochemical substances have a tetradic configuration (table 1). At least 90% of matter has tetradic geometry. The spaces between the maximum close — packing of atoms are also tetrahedrons (fig. 4).Within the atomic nucleus we find tetradic geometry on the basis of the quadrupol electric moment. Complete atoms also give out quadrupol radiation. The form of the system is concluded from the radiation. Matter in quantities increasing from the atomic nucleus up to the crystalochemical groups, uses tetradic geometry. Similarly it can be assumed that the same geometry is in force within the scale of a quantum of space — a magnel — just as on a megascopic scale. A ray of light does not go round the Universe on the inner side of a sphere, as Einstein held, but on the inner plane of a tetrahedron (fig. 5) and thus in a closed system of 3 hyperbola.The arisal of a photon depends on the zero movement of a vacuum (the interior movement of a magnel). It polarizes neighbouring magnels. In view of the symmetry of matter and the tetradic geometry of matter, there ought to exist magnels (fig. 6a) and antimagnels (fig. 6b). The antimagnel is an ideal figure of infinitely thin walls separating 4 negative hyperboidal planes. Polarisation is transferred as a fluctuation of the vacuum. With interference and superposition of fluctuation energetic condensation may arise. The springy deformation of the magnel gives the quantum of radiation EM. The photon moves like the recombination wave of the magnel. The return to the normal granularity of space is linked with the emission of the photon. The laws of condensation of energy and geometrical contraction are general laws of matter from the magnel through elementary particles (the arisal of pairs and annihilation), atomic nuclei, atoms, to nebulae inclusive. The effect is the same — the emission of a quantum of light.The author discusses the method of analogy which he has used. It is based on three principles: abstraction, proper analogy, interpolation. By abstraction essential elements, in this case the EM wave, are comprehended. By analogy, the results of abstraction are applied to matter of another order of size. Interpolation fills in the missing elements in some level (fig. 7). A philosophical method so conceived, for investigating physical phenomena, may be useful in cases where it is not possible to use the experimental method, or where a formal method is missing.

Everything that exists (every being) in philosophical considerations, should, in Ingarden’s opinion be seen from three different points of view: a) the means of existence, b) the form, c) the material possessions. It then appears that a critical analysis of the solutions of Ingarden on the structure of reality ought to be preceded by a clear realization of the substance which is contained within these three concepts. The aim of the present article is to examine the question from the viewpoints of matter and form.It is necessary primarily to state clearly that the concepts of matter and form, in the conception discussed, have nothing in common as regards meaning with analogical concepts of Aristotle; in connection with this, Ingarden speaks of catégorial matter and form, or of matter and form in the sense of formal ontology. Matter, according to Ingarden, is everything in being which possesses a qualitative character (all qualities), while form is here a collection of functions which are filled by the various „moments“ of qualitative character. Qualities which are matter should be understood in the broadest sense; so here belong, e. g. redness, smoothness, spatial form etc. Formal moments are such „functions“ as defining something, being an subject, being a property, filling the role of constitutive nature or of the essence (both terms with a special meaning), acting in some manner or being acted upon, unambiguous defiriition or heving something missing from one’s attributes etc. Differences in formal structure allow us to segregate reality into certain groups while form is like a schemat occurring in all identities belonging to a given group. Ingarden’s concept of form appears therefore to be similar in content to the Peripatetic concept of category. It is also possible to observe a certain analogy to that understanding of the term „form“ which we find in contemporary logic.Among various formal moments, a particularly important one is that of subject of property — property. These belong closely together, forming one „basic form for every object“. In addition to objective form, in beings there are yet other formal structures with analogical contrast, and the necessary complementary moments, such as: subject of action — action (process), whole — part, sphere or class — element of the sphere or class. Analysis of the various formal structures shows, however that they are all in some way based upon individual objects, which may be the basis for other entities in a two-fold manner: as „carriers“ of processes and as „part“ of objects of o higher orders. At first there seems to be a certain analogy to the Aristotelian differentiation between substantial and affective beings. Closer comparison of the two conceptions of „basic form“, however, shows essential differences.Matter and form, for Ingarden, are two „sides'" of the same entity and as such are existentially non-independent and indivisible. Material attribute (especially of a constitutive nature) is always basic to being, and it, in some way, determines formal structure. A more exact explanation of the connection between the two factors is very difficult.In his conception of matter and form Ingarden deliberately and directly refers to Aristotle and combines the exposition of his own views with a critique of the standpoint of the Stagirite. The essence of this is a demonstration of contradictions in Aristotle’s concept of matter. It appears, however, that the whole of this critique is based on a misunderstanding and is the result of making non-independent „elements“ of being into „rei“, treating first matter as a „concrete object“. But in Aristotle’s view, matter is an „element“ of its nature non-independent, only real in real existence. The cause of these misunderstandings appears to lie in the specific structure of the language, not adapted to the conceptual grasping of non-independent states of being.

Aristotle distinguished three kinds of categories of quantity: continuum, con- tiguum and consequenter se habens. The Stagyrite also gives their definitions. In this note it was shown that the Aristotelian division of quantity and7the definitions themselves are no longer adequate today. In modern mathematics there are known sets which cannot be included in any of the kinds of quantities distinguished by Aristotle. In addition, the definitions themselves are not, in view of known concepts in settheoretical topology, sufficiently accurate and precise. In this note the distinction is proposed between a unified quantity in the integral and local sense. Definitions of the concepts mentioned are also given.

Anatomopathological, physiological and clinical examinations clearly indicate that so-called rhinencephalon, independent of smell, has other, possibly more important functions in the organism. Seuntjens puts forward the hypothesis of the „ammonic sense”, with an anatomical basis in the cornu Ammonis on which affective, intuitional motivation of the behaviour of animals or man depends, in distinction from logical, intellectual, specifically human motivation. The hypothesis is advanced that particularly intensive growth of certain areas of the rhinencephalon in man is connected with the specific type of adaptation necessary to life in a community.

The article presents the views of four representatives of existentialism on who is the „man-neighbour, and how one man reacts to another as a human being. B. Pascal believes that man is by nature egoistic and therefore his neighbour disquiets him, for he inclines man to take note of him and to aid him.M. Heidegger holds that man exists „in the world”, that the proper background for human existence is the human race, and therefore man leans towards this background and must live socially; simultaneously the individual is lost in the crowd, extroverts too much and becomes exhausted , in verbosity, curiosity and ambiguous speech. In order to preserve his individuality, the unitary man should keep at a distance from the crowd of „coexistences”, help others and yet be himself.J. P. Sartre thinks that in the nature of man there is enmity to his fellow man. The „neighbour” opposes another man and considers him to be a contradiction of himself. The relations between them are full of conflicts, trickery, for man is basically hostile to his fellow man, and this can be seen, for example, in his views on man. By nature man is solitary and will remain so. Despite this, he must respect the liberty of others and help then.G. Marcel-(a Christian existentialist) supposes that man by his nature is disposed towards God, to contacts with men and to social life. His existence is by nature „coexistence”. The man who has faith in and fidelity to other men already acknowledges the existence of God. The man who devotes himself to other people expands and enriches his own „ego”.

The article is concerned with the question of the process of solving problems and the part played in this process by training and chance. The aim of the investigations is the verification of the hypothesis that the solution of a problem is a process of gradual acquirement and selection of information in agreement with the accepted hypothesis, where so-called chance (an attempt not clearly directed by a definite hypothesis) and training play an important role. Experimental investigations were carried out 32 persons tested received 30 problems of the same type and degree of difficulty successively. The idea of the experiment was borrowed from J. Bruner, J. Goodnow, and G. Austin (A Study of Thinking). But the author’s own modifications were introduced into the plan of the investigations. Each experiment followed the same pattern: the investigator formed a „conception” according to precisely defined rules, and the task of the individual tested was to discover this conception, also according to previously strictly defined rules. The repetition — 30 times — of the same problems gave scope for the observation of changes, development and perfection of methods of solving problems. In these experiments, it was aimed to investigate very elementary detection and invention, and to follow this process in simplified problems. An undoubted advantage of these investigations was that the problems given to those tested were precisely formulated and all attempts made during the problem — solving were objectively and accurately recorded, and could be reconstructed successively by the investigator.It is, of course, true, that in these experiments only a narrow section of the manifold and various forms of human thinking could be investigated, but it appears that the results obtained in the experiment confirm the suppositions put forward in the introduction to the article. The present investigations could be a starting — point for the better understanding of the problem — solving mechanism. Further investigations will deepen our knowledge of this question.

In this article the theoretical basis of projective tests is discussed. Psychology has taken many of its assumptions from psychoanalysis and the psychology of personality. The functional, holistic and dynamic nature of the tests is indicated, while the author simultaneously shows that these elements can be found in other trends in the psychology of personality. The concept of personality is very generally described, as also the behaviour and observations which are relevant to the theory of projective psychology. Finally, the general assumptions are discussed and a description of projective tests is given which indicates the double interpretation of test data: the formal analysis of the utterance and the qualitative analysis of the contents. The lack of a suitable method of testing accuracy and reliability of projective methods is emphasized, and this is admitted to be the most serious charge against projective psychology. The problem requires further theoretical considerations, but also empirical investigations.

The aim of the article is briefly to present the present state of investigations on language development in individuals with Down’s disease, and a discussion of the results of the author’s investigations on the times at, which melody, a word, a short sentence, and childish talk appear in individuals with Down’s disease who are under the care of their parents, as also to learn whether the various stages of language development in Down’s disease are closely connected with the mental age.The author employed the following methods in his investigations: observations (he noted verbal utterances), directed conversation, experiment (the aim was to bring about a verbal reaction by showing attractive toys, pictures, the creation of experimental situations), the use of L. Kaczmarek’s questionnaire for establishing the presence of speech disorders (dyslalia) in children, and interview. The Psyche Cattel Scale and the Stanford-Binet, Scale 1937, Form L., were used to measure intelligence, including language development.The article is based on material from 150 individuals aged 7 months to 32 years. The average age of those tested was 8;2 yrs. In a considerable number of the patients, language development had been followed for several years (up to 10). The mental handicapping of the group investigated varied from severe idiocy (I. Q. = 5) to moronity of the medium degree (I. Q. = 58).Basing himself on the "results of his own investigations, the author gives data on the age of the mongoloids when they begin to coo, babble, say one word, say 2 words and more, utter a 2 — words sentence, a 3 and more word sentence. It states with what mental age the given stage in language development is associated. The investigations show that from the chronological age we cannot predict the appearance of a given stage in language development in individuals with Down’s disease, but from the mental age, the phase can be predicted. The author gives a formula whereby the age of the patient investigated can be calculated, in which he will reach a given stage of language development. He also indicates speach disturbances of the dyslalia type, stuttering agrammatism and difficulties in using adverbs and conjunctions, to be found in Down’s disease. He demonstrates the poverty of abstract concepts in mongoloids.

The article is concerned with adolescent-family conflicts. It is based upon empirical material collected by means of the author’s own questionnaire, psychological conversation, interview and the Liischer colour selection test.In the analysis of the question, the symptomatic side of the conflicts experienced was considered, as also their conditioning and the character of their influence on the outlook of those tested. The chief emphasis was placed on the search for reasons: among these were personality-situation factors and data from the anamnesis. Particular attention was paid to the connection between the subject of the conflicts, the way in which they were experienced and resolved, and the age of those tested, the structure of the family, number of siblings, and social origin. The same correlations were sought in personality and situational conditionings.In the final stage of the investigations the author distinguished: 1. conflicts the existence and course of which are explained by changes in the mental development of adolescents and 2. conflicts arising in specific environmental conditions.

Experimental investigations of the mentality of the blind were begun by Biir- klen in 1924, but their intensive development has taken place only after the Second World War. Investigations on the mental level, personality and social adaptability have been carried out in the U.S.A., U.S.S.R., Great Britain, Germany, and Japan. In Poland this sphere has been neglected. Horst Suhrweier (1963) in Germany has carried out investigations on the vocabulary of blind children. Comparative investigations on the vocabulary of blind and seeing children in Children’s Homes (orphanages) were carried out for, the present article, by means of the Alice Descoeu- dres test. They demonstrated that the vocabulary of the group of blind children is quantitatively richer than the vocabulary of the group of seeing children. A significant difference was noted in the adjective test, and in the final result of all series of tests — to the advantage of the blind children. This result is rather surprising in view of the impoverishment of cognitional possibilities for blind children, through the absence of visual impressions. However, their vocabulary may be richer because of 1. activization of the cerebral cortex, which appears in the attempt to isolate the essential characteristics of the object experienced, and the wish to compare and find analogies in the experience possessed, 2. the development of processes of higher analysis and synthesis, 3. rich development of a second signals system which facilitates the process of abstraction (Grzegorzewska). The result of the investigations is also conditioned by the high pedagogical-didactical level of the Institute for the Blind in Laski, where the children were investigated.The result of the investigations, therefore, supports the thesis that the blind child is normal mentally; and it also places emphasis upon the possibilities and role of education and learning in mental development. The source of this child’s cognition must in many cases be exhaustive verbal information, connected with action, and by means of cognition based on the law of compensation of the senses. The word, gradually in the development of the child, has a function increasingly generalizing, which in large measure eliminates the need for imagining in the cognitive process and has the dominating role in the formation of new cognitive associations in man (Szuman, Łuria). Particularly striking illustrations of this thesis are the mental development of the deaf and blind (Heten Keller, Laura Bridgman, Olga Skorochodowa).In the pedagogy of the blind, it is essential to act upon the intensive development of speech in blind children, and to enrich their vocabulary. Successes in this sphere may be very great, since the psychological dispositions of the blind predetermine the development of speech. This makes possible the full mental development of these people, since the functional use of the word is the means of the active direction of attention and the processes of analysis, abstraction and synthesis, ąnd thus of adequate mental cognition, despite the impoverishment óf the concrete — sensual cognition of the world, due to the lack of visual elements.

The article considers three problems: 1. the aims of mental health as applied to character-formation; 2. the value of character to the mental health of pubescent young people; 3. the bases of character-formation from the view-point of principles of mental hygiene. The developed aims of modern mental hygiene, such as diagnostic, prophylactic, immunizational, and revalidational, are directly connected with character-formation in young people, while the psychotherapeutic aims proper go far beyond this problem in medical and clinical psychotherapy as carried out by physicians and psychologists. However, educational psychotherapy together with group psychotherapy frequently carried out in schools by teachers, and autopsychotherapy in the self-educational process of the young, are essentially connected with self-betterment in the young, and with the formation of a dispositional-directive centre in the individual’s personality. Traditionally in pedagogy this centre has been called moral character; it is a complicated developmental structure, which, based upon a strong will, inhibits drives and puts into practice in the individual’s behaviour, the principles he has received from his environment. Thanks to this, character plays the part of a stabilizer of behaviour, which has particular significance for maturing young people, who at this time are subject to the disorders of frustration, neurotic states, over-excitability and emotional instability; young people then instinctively feel the need to have character and of their own will begin attempts at self-control, in order to attain mental equilibrium. The psychotherapeutic role of character thus gives rise to the formation and persistence of homeostasis in mental experiences. However, in adolescents’ attempts at the betterment of their own characters, the aid of pedagogues is essential to include a programme of controls, consequences, the ability to solve'interior conflicts, to adapt to the environment, to supply motives for volitional acts, the establishment of a hierarchy of values, control of temperament, the channelling of the organism’s energy, the harmonization of inner characteristics. This is because character is formed on the principle of polarity, and mental health requires equilibrium between contradictions, which lead to psychical disorders and pedagogical difficulties with the behaviour and studies of adolescents.

St. Augustine's idea of wisdom partly studied by H. I. Marrou, F. Cayre, J. Maritain and E. Gilson, is more universal that Aristotle’s or Thomas Aquinas’. For the Bishop of Hippo the term sapientia can designate, on the supernatural plane, God’s nature, the life of grace, contemplation of God, and, on the natural plane, contemplation of truth or even man’s ethical life.The purpose of this paper is to examine in what relationship theoretical wisdom, which Augustine identifies with philosophy, and learning stand to each other. Wisdom is a universal and genetic knowledge of the world, while learning is the know^dge of the particular and phenomenon. The object of wisdom is the world of the spirit, that of learning is the material world. Wisdom and learning, even though they may be opposed, do not exclude one another. Their development precisely depends on their mutual harmonious cooperation, sapiential knowledge keeping the guiding role.

Dans l’idée qu’elle produit du monde environnant, la connaissance humaine mène les uns à un subjectivisme exagéré, d’autres à un objectivisme total. S’il est vrai que l’idéalisme de toute espèce, suivant les pas de Platon, tombe dans un subjectivisme démesuré, le thomisme, lui, sorti de l’aristotélisme, maintient l’objectivité de notre connaissance. Ce bref article se propose de montrer que la doctrine d’Aristote et de Thomas est juste à cet égard.La première partie, appuyée principalement sur le texte du Stagirite affirmant que notre esprit ést comme une table rase sur laquelle rien n’est ecrit (III De Anima, 4, 429b 31), s’efforce de montrer, à l’encontre de l’idéalisme extréme (dont l’hégélianisme a marqué le point culminant) que les idées des choses extérieures, reconnues sur la base de l’expérience intérieure, exigent l’existence du monde extérieur.Le second point s’avance un pas plus loin. A partir de l’enseignement d’Aristote et de Thomas, l’auteur affirme, contre l’idéalisme acosmique (Leibniz, Berkeley, Leszczyński) que les idées que nous créons de choses étendues nous forcent à admettre qu’il existe un mon de matériel extérieur.Le troisième point, dirigé au premier chef contre l'empirisme de Locke et le réalisme d’une fraction néoscolastique entreprend d’établir le bien-fondé de la thèse péripatéticienne en ce qu’elle souligne l’existence d’un monde matériel extérieur, ćorrespondant à l'objet propre de notre connaissance, même sensible.Enfin, dans le dernier et 4me point, pour mettre davantage en relief l'objectivité de notre connaissance, l’auteur ajoute quelques remarques témoignant de la perception immédiate par nous du monde extérieur, que nous atteignons „propre- ment” c.' à. d. ,,au premier rang et en soi”, et avec pleine conscience dans l’acte même de la connaissance.

In the light of quotations from De syllogismo hypothetico the author shows that, in Boethius’ logic, the conjunction „si” functions as strict implication, while „cum” as truth-implication. When Boethius negates a whole sentence beginning with „si” or „cum”, he places the particle „non” before the word ,,est” in the consequent. The interpretations of Boethius’ hypothetical propositions and syUogisms by K. Dürr and R. van den Driessche are not in agreement with his intentions as expressed in De syllogismo hypothetico. In this study all Boethius’ hypothetical syllogisms have been verified as formally valid in C. I. Lewis’s system of strict implication.

The ways of pursuing metaphysics have become so numerous and varied today that the need for some classification is obvious. In fact they differ so much that one may doubt whether they can still be ranged under the common name of metaphysics. That is why, we must first explain how this term should be understood so as to cover all modern trends and styles adopted in this discipline. Next a distinction must be drawn between actually applied methods and others which are simply suggested or advised in a particular metaphysical approach. The paper is essentially devoted to both kinds.Following the introductory terminological remarks, the choice of the principles governing the systematics of the methods of metaphysics today is examined. Ultimately two principles have been accepted: a more historical one — according to the most distinct philosophical trends — and a second one, more systematic, according to the accepted starting point in metaphysics and the tasks ascribed.The first part of the study, presented here, gives a cyclopedic description of the characteristics of metaphysical methods, grouped in the main philosophical trends of today. In the first set are grouped methods belonging to a very large trend which may be called scientistic and intuitive philosophy (among others, Bergson, Teihard de Chardin, Whitehead, Collingwood, Gonseth, G. Martin and N. Hartmann). The second group represents analytical philosophy developing in three stages: I — Moore, Russell; II — Wittgenstein, Russell and some neopositivists; III — Wittgenstein, Wisdom, Ryle, Lazerowitz, Strawson. Phenomenology and existentialism are grouped together because their methods intercross: phenomenological method — Husserl, Scheler, Conrad-Martius, Ingarden, Landgrebe, Fink, Ricoeur; phenomenological and existential method — Heidegger, Sartre, Mer- leau-Ponty; existential method — Jaspers, Marcel and the so-called Philosophie de Vesprit (Lavelle, Le Senne, Guitton). The last group, Peripatetic philosophy, will be considered in part II.

L’article représente un premier essai d’analyse de Poeuvre d’Hannibal Rosseli. II cherche à découvrir la source d’inspiration philosophique de l’auteur du commentaire sur les écrits hermétiques, le seul publié en Pologne.Selon Rosseli, les écrits hermétiques eurent pour auteur Hermès Trismegistos, roi, prêtre, et sage égyptien, ayant vécu avant les prophètes juifs. II enferma la sagesse qu’il possédait dans Pimandre (14 traités du Corpus hermeticum dans la traduction de M. Ficino) et dans Asclepius; c’est une sagesse divine, révélée. Hermés est done le premier, le plus ancien d’entre les „prisci theologi”; après lui vinrent successivement les prophètes juifs, Zoroastre, Orphée, Pithagoras et Platon. De Panalyse du commentaire sur les écrits hermétiques il apparaît que Rosseli est à placer dans le courant de l'hermétisme religieux et philosophique, e’est-à-dire de l'hermétisme séparé de la magie. II met un accent particulier sur les valeurs apologétiques des textes hermétiques en montrant la concordance entre les vérités fondamentales de la religion chrétienne et celles de la „doctrine d’Hermès” et des autres „prisci theologi*’. II cherche l’unité religieuse de tous les chrétiens en propageant un christianisme moins rigoureux, du point de vue du catholicisme orthodoxe, christianisme appuyé sur quelques vérités fondamentales de la doctrine chrétienne, qui se trouvent déjà dans la „prisca theologia” (irénisme). Rosseli développe le contenu philosophique des écrits hermétiques avant tout à l’aide des doctrines philosophiques chrétiennes (augustinisme, thomisme et scotisme). La multiplicité et la diversité de ces doctrines l'inquiète, aussi cherche-t-il à en opérer la synthèse.