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161. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 2
Jürgen Trinks Der symbolische Stifter Gott und das Phanomen der Liebe in Kleists „Amphitryon“
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Th is analysis of Heinrich von Kleist’s comedy „Amphitryon“ develops the thesis that its comical can be seen in the correlation but insoluble difference between the phenomenality of love and the “symbolical institution” (Marc Richir) which goes along with the diff erence and connection between the symbolical institution of language-system (langue) and its phenomenological life (langage).
162. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 2
Michael Staudigl The Many Faces of Violence A Phenomenological Inquiry
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This article investigates phenomenology’s potential to deepen our understanding of violence. Its major aim consists in elaborating an integrative approach to the many faces of violence, i.e. to physical, psychic, social, and cultural violence. Approaching these various forms from the unifying viewpoint of the subject’s embodiment opens a renewed perspective on understanding violence. Displacing the very architectonics of Husserl’s “constitutive analysis,” this undertaking requires far reaching revisions of phenomenological method, which will be explicated respectively.
163. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 2
Hans Rainer Sepp Urpraxis der Epochē
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This is an attempt to analyze the process of practising a non-theoretical epochē by a phenomenology of transcendental-bodily emotion. It will be realized in four steps pointing out 1. the possibility of epochē within the scope of the structure of the life-world; 2. the conditions to carry out the epochē; 3. the response of the epochē to the threats for life; and 4. possible results of a non-theoretical epochē.
164. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 2
Notes on Contributors
165. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 2
Andrzej Leder Borders of Consciousness in Husserl’s Logical Investigations: Can Husserl’s Concept of Consciousness Serve as a Starting Point for the Development of a Th eory of Not-Conscious?
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We intend to prove that the concept of consciousness is impossible without assuming the existence of what is not conscious. And that the need of such assumption stems from a rigorous analysis of intuitive data. We wish to put phenomenology to its own test and to demonstrate that in its essence Husserl’s analysis radically goes beyond the sphere of what is understood as “conscious”. Our argument is that in his studies on the structure of the object of consciousness Husserl developed highly creative and important ideas which may be used as a starting point for the reformulation of the concept of the unconscious which has so dominated contemporary thinking, and the relation between conscious and what is not conscious.By viewing an intentional act, or even its ideal object, as a certain phenomenon of consciousness, we entirely change its nature and its ontological status. It ceases to be an act by which an object was constituted and it turns to be an object constituted by another act. We shall demonstrate that Husserl was, at least partly, aware of that.We wish to demonstrate that the metaphor of the absence, an empty space in which an object of consciousness is constituted corresponds with Husserl’s notion of the intention which he developed in his “Logical Investigations”. It is also a metaphor which makes one recognise some intentional space, the space where an intuitive object of consciousness constitutes itself, the space which is a prerequisite for the object to be constituted, the space which is itself not intuitive and not conscious.
166. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 1
Kim Hongwoo Living in the Risk World: Ulrich Beck in the Shadow of Husserl and Heidegger
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Th is essay is an attempt to inquire into the recent literature on risk and bring out a fundamental category of humanity, which is the unpreparedness of man’s Being-in-the-World. It will begin with Ralph Nader’s Unsafe at Any Speed (1965) and follow through to Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society: Toward a New Modernity (1986). These points will then be related to the arguments of Husserl and Heidegger. In this way, the fundamental category of modern man is disclosed in its Being-in-the-World-for-which-no-one-Being-prepared.
167. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 1
Kohji Ishihara Reductionism in the Synthetic Approach of Cognitive Science and Phenomenology: Rethinking Dreyfus’ Critique of AI
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Drawing on Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Hubert Dreyfus criticized classical AI in 1970s. While classical AI was based on symbolic manipulation, AI research of recent years has been based on the neural network approach and the synthetic approach. In this essay I would like to reexamine Dreyfus’ critique of AI and his Heidegger interpretation to suggest another aspect of Heidegger’s thought and Husserl’s phenomenology of reciprocal recognition which would provide a perspective from which to resist the reductionism in the recent approaches in cognitive science.
168. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 1
Ke Xiaogang Heidegger's Da and Hegel's Diese: A Destructive Reading of Hegel's "Sense Certainty"
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Heidegger diff erentiates the aspect of referencing from the aspect of substituting in the demonstrative pronoun “this.” This is a hermeneutic of “This” from the phenomenology of “Da.” On the contrary, Hegel determines “Da” from the logic of “This.” Through a reading of Hegel’s analysis of sense certainty in Phenomenology of Spirit, this paper tries to lay bare the free time-space of “Da,” in which the Hegelian dialectic movement of “this” or “meaning [Meinen]” could then be possible to take place. The pivot of this reading is to bring the Hegelian speculation of “meaning” or consciousness back onto the ground of lifeworld.
169. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 1
Holenstein Elmar Natural Ethics: Legitimate Naturalism in Ethics
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It is no accident that the anti-naturalistic objections to an inference from is to ought emerged in the modern era. They presuppose an extremely lean ontology. They presuppose that nothing is necessarily what it is, and accordingly that everything that occurs in sequence is similarly contingent in this sequence. In particular, they presuppose that there is no natural teleology. The objections to the foundation of the ethically good in happiness, pleasure, utility, conduciveness to life, harmony with nature, and the like are similarly guided by predilection for simple concepts. An autonomous value independent of natural desires is presupposed.
170. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 1
Lester Embree, Ion Copoeru, Yu Chung-Chi Preface for All Volumes + Introduction
171. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 1
Cheung Chan-Fai Phenomenology and Photography: On Seeing Photographs and Photographic Seeing
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Although photography is believed to be a copy of reality and an icon for memory, it has attracted scrutiny from philosophers concerned with its semiotic structure and its phenomenological impact. Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre have made reference to the photographic image without any detailed phenomenological analysis. With the help of Roland Barthes’s refl ection on photography, this essay attempts to give a phenomenological description of photographs as seen and on seeing in photographing.
172. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 1
Cho Kah Kyung Husserl and Kant on Intuition
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Husserl recognized the question of the possibility of object in general as the common de jure problem of knowledge for Kant and himself. By insisting that object must be “received” (Kant) or “self-given” (Husserl), both philosophers turned to intuition as the focal point of their inquiry. However, concerning the actual function and range of intuition, their views grew apart. Kant restricted intuition to sensibility, thus erecting the barrier between phenomenal and noumenal world. Husserl, on the other hand, held essence inseparable from fact. Accordingly, intuition crosses over from a merely receptive function of fact to “ideate” or grasp the essence of fact and factual world. Husserl’s intuition is not only “intellectualized,” but also expanded in such a way as to make the division between concept and sensibility—even theory and practice questionable.
173. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 1
Kimura Masato From Intimacy to Familiarity: On the Political Constitution of the Life-World
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The correspondence between A. Schutz and E. Voegelin finally came into print in 2004 through the editorial efforts of Gerhard Wagner and Gilbert Weiss. Taking the comments made by the political philosopher on Schutz’s theory of multiple realities as a clue, this contribution will cast light on the political character of our daily lives possibly delineated by a phenomenological approach. We will especially turn to Schutz’s concept of familiarity which provides us a scope to grasp the political beyond the “animal” description of the life-world.
174. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 1
Jin Xiping Had he to understand the meaning the Being, so far as he is a human?: A critical assessment of Heidegger’s Idea on language in 1928
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Heidegger said in 1928: “die Frage nach dem Sein [ist] keine beliebige und [wird] nicht von aussen dem Menschen zugetragen, sondern in ihm mehr oder minder wach ist, sofern er ueberhaupt als Mensch existiert…” The author is very critical of this assertion. If it is really the case, are the people who speak non Indo-European language still human beings or not? Is it possible the non-Indo-European language speaking people could have latent understanding of the meaning of being without the word being at all in their language? If the second one were a reality, could the assertion of Heidegger be correct that Sprache is “das von Sein ereignete aus ihm durchgefuegte Haus des Seins”?
175. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 1
Hama Hideo Sauntering through HIROSHIMAs
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While “HIROSHIMA,” as the symbol of “Japan, the first and only atom-bombed nation in the world,” is a centripetal force that mobilizes people to nationalism, it is at the same time a centrifugal force that scatters people. HIROSHIMA exists as the arena where those centripetal and centrifugal forces encounter one another. I sauntered through HIROSHIMA as that arena on August 6, atomic bomb memorial day.
176. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 1
Huang Shin-Yang The Social Formation of Psychic Systems
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The sense of solitude is the special feeling that people have on occasion. How is the sense of solitude created? For Luhmann, the operation of conscious systems will oscillate between consciousness and phenomenon, that is, between self-reference and hetero-reference. Husserl considers that philosophy is the privacy of the meditator. This means that the meditator has to live a solitary life, because everything in question can be sought only in his mind.
177. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 1
Inagaki Satoshi Ich, Leben und Trieb: Das Problem des Ich und des Bewusstseinsstroms bei Husserl
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In the Phenomenology of Husserl it is certain that the concept of “I” frames an important sphere of problems. But it is still difficult to say that his concept of “I” is clearly defined. Therefore, in my paper I will illuminate the definition of Husserls concept of “I”. According to Husserl the following thesis is fundamental: The transcendental “I” is always presence (dabei) in all experiences of consciousness. Nevertheless this does not mean that “I” constitutes all experiences of consciousness. Consciousness is nothing else than the consciousness of “I”, but even “I” generates in some kind from consciousness. In the analysis of the stream of consciousness the “generation” of “I” is implicated. During the progress of the genetic analysis it becomes clear, that the stream of consciousness can not be analysed detailed by the egological approach. In the stream of consciousness a phenomenon occurs, alongside the passive synthesis of consciousness, which Husserl described as “Life of drive”.
178. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 1
Kwan Tze-wan The Over-dominance of English in Global Education: The Contemporary Relevance of Leibniz’s Notion of “Language Care”
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It a commonplace that the English language has over the past century become the dominant lingua franca of our increasingly globalized world. In face of this dominance of English, peoples of the world can hardly aff ord to underestimate the importance of English, in whatever walk of life, if they do not want to be marginalized by the global community. Yet, while the dominance of English today is unavoidable, the world is now facing an additional challenge—the over-dominance of English. By the “over-dominance” of English, I mean the danger of individual languages being self-estranged through an overemphasis on English at the cost of the mother tongue. While dominance is an externally imposed challenge, over-dominance is largely a self-infl icted endangerment of their mother tongue by peoples of various linguistic communities. In addition to widely discussed issues of language policies and language planning, the paper makes a detour via some German experience while introducing the notion of “language care,” which was proposed by Leibniz at a time when the prospect of German as an academic language was heavily overcast by the dominance of French. In the main section, this paper refl ects on the various background factors and consequences of this socio-linguistic phenomenon of the overdominance of English and proposes some “glocal” responses for the consideration of the global educational community.
179. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 1 > Issue: Part 1
Kodama Hakaru Grundwort ≫Gerechtigkeit≪: Heideggers Nietzsche-Interpretation
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In this essay I will investigate justice, which is one of the five fundamental words in the metaphysics of Nietzsche, as Heidegger points out in Nietzsche II. Compared with the other four words, this word ‘justice’ is the one most worthy of note. Through the confrontation with Schopenhauer Nietzsche sees justice as sincerity for oneself based on superfl uous power-feelings. In this case, justice means truly knowing. Heidegger sees the justice as truth in the meaning of correctness, but this truth forgets the original sense, i.e. ‘unconcealment,’ and accordingly insists that Nietzsche is the last metaphysician.
180. Phenomenology 2005: Volume > 4 > Issue: Part 1
Vakhtang Kebuladze Transformation des Intentionalitatsbegriffs in der Phanomenologie und ihre Relevanz fur die Sozialwissenschaft
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At the very beginning of my article I explain the concept of intentionality in the realm of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. In this explanation I analyse the phenomenological concepts of noesis, noema, sense, appresentation, object and try to show the relationship between intentionality, temporality, and intersubjectivity as transcendental structures of experience. Than I review a tendency in phenomenological literature (namely in the works of Heidegger, Sartre, Hildebrand, and Schmitz) which lead to a radical transformation of the concept of intentionality. In the last part I examine a possibility of usage of this transformed concept in the conception of Alfred Schutz’ finite areas of meaning.