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181. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Vasily Markhinin Philosophy and Philosophics: Substantiation of Research Program
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Philosophy remains philosophy, as long as it is loyal to the ancient Greek model. The modern era produced a tendency to subordinate philosophy to science and created conditions for the science – in this context the history of philosophy – to become an effective extra-philosophical cognitive means of philosophy’s self-awareness of its essence. However, one should remember that the reconstruction of the essence of philosophy sets a special goal and singles out a special object domain, which means there must be a special historical and philosophical subdiscipline. Thus we suggested naming this philosophical science philosophics. The research hypothesis of what the essence of philosophy is, in the subject sphere of philosophics, must allow the formation of empirical basis from the texts that are identified as philosophical archetypes. First, it is in such texts where the meaning – the whole world of meaning – of the ancient Greek word-concept φιλοσοφία (the work, which was begun by M. Heidegger) is uncovered. Secondly, it is Plato’s works, in which he sums up all the previous thought, acquiring it by means of the φιλοσοφία concept, and where he creates philosophical teaching for the first time.
182. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Gregg Osborne A Crucial Passage in Kant’s First Analogy
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This paper is concerned with a passage that has long intrigued interpreters of Kant’s First Analogy. the passage in question can be found at A188/B231 of the Critique of Pure Reason. In order to perceive that some item x comes to exist or ceases to exist, asserts Kant in this passage, you must connect the coming to exist or ceasing to exist of x to things that already exist before it takes place and continue to exist until it is completed. But if you do so, he further asserts, it must be the case that x is only a determination of such things and that the coming to exist or ceasing to exist of x is a mere change in the determinations of such things. These assertions are cryptic and give rise to several questions. In what way must you perform the act described? Why must you do so in order to perceive that x comes to exist or ceases to exist? And how does this entail that x is in fact only a determination of such things and thus that its coming to exist or ceasing to exist is not in fact ex nihilo or in nihilo? The answers given in this paper serve both to clarify Kant’s argument and to identify the main issues that would have to be faced in its assessment.
183. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Konstantinos Polias Kant’s “Introduction of the Critique of Practical Judgment”
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The paper opposes one of the founding common places of the historiography of Pragmatics during the last 40 decades according to which Kant’s Critique “of pure Judgment” signifies the break of modern Rationalism with the tradition of practical judgment that gets restored with Hegel. Against that the paper shows that Kant’s reference to the “Einleitung der Critik der pract.[ischen] Urth.[eils]Kr.[aft]” in the letter to his editor of 2nd October 1792 that accompanies his corrections of the manuscript of the Introduction for the 2nd edition of the Critique of Judgment [CoJ] is more than justified and that Hegel’s infamous idea that self-consciousness is “desire in general” (Phenomenology of Spirit, ¶167) can be almost fully traced in the Introduction to the CoJ not only textually, but also historically and systematically. The paper closes by pointing out a systematical consequence of its mainly historical argument for contemporary neo-Hegelian pragmatic theories of concept formation and conceptual change (Robert Pippin) and related so called “transformative” theories of rationality (Matthew Boyle).
184. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Sergey Peruanskiy Specific Difficulties in Interpreting the Teachings of the Great Philosophers and a Method of Overcoming Them
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The interpretation of the texts of the great philosophers is complicated by the fact that they communicated their ideas in a peculiar language that is far from modern scientific terminology. Plato often used metaphors. They could cause false associations, if we would understand them literally. Hegel often used the philosophical categories in unconventional meaning. The method of the Contextual Translation allows to overcome these language difficulties. Its purpose is to define what terms of the modern language we would use in a context, in which the philosopher used such terms. After that it is necessary to analyze the meaning of the text, using modern scientific language instead of terms used by the philosopher. This method helps us to visualize the historical situation in which philosopher lived and, conversely, to look to what extent the words of the philosopher apply to our reality. It allows you to show the injustice of accusations of Plato in commitment to the totalitarianism and hostility to the personality. This method allows us to show that Hegel’s doctrine of the concept is a general theory of programmed processes that take place in the world.
185. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Evangelia Sembou Where Does the Significance of Hegel’s Phenomenology Lie?
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This paper advances the view that Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is an experiential philosophy. It starts with an examination of what Hegel’s 1807 Phenomenology consists in. It is argued that Hegel’s Phenomenology is an experiential philosophy because it constitutes the immanent development of truth as it is experienced (of “phenomenal knowledge”); both because it is about the “experience of consciousness” and because it requires of the philosopher that he surrender to the development of the subject-matter. Put differently, the philosopher’s role is to live the “experience of consciousness” from within. The philosopher (Hegel) does not import any external criteria by means of which to assess the validity of each one of consciousness’s claims and worldviews. He merely observes consciousness’s self-examination and comments on it. In this way he turns consciousness’s phenomenological experience into a science. Simultaneously, Hegel guides the observing consciousness of the reader(s) into comprehending the “experience of consciousness” as its own education (Bildung). So the readers, too immerse themselves into the immanent development of consciousness and, as a result, adopt an inside perspective. It is this engagement of the philosopher (Hegel and the reader(s)) with the account that is the most significant aspect of Hegel’s Phenomenology.
186. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Juan Santos Virtue and Happiness: The Humean Connection
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A marked concern about happiness (i.e., eudaimonia) and an equal preoccupation with the way virtue contributes to such state are key features of virtue ethics (Hurtshouse 2012). Interpretations that place Hume within the virtue ethics tradition are not rare (Swanton 2003, Taylor 2006, Welchman 2006, Garret 2007), although it is common to qualify such affiliation. Admittedly, Hume gives moral pride of place to character traits and uses virtue and vice as central notions; but he emphasizes practices of evaluation, rather than the deliberative experience of the moral agent, and defines virtues and vices as observer-dependent qualities (Brown 1994, Swanton 2007, Abramson 2011, Taylor 2012). In this paper I want to consider a different way to qualify Hume’s membership in the virtue ethics tradition. My case study is Hume’s treatment of virtue’s contribution to happiness. I claim that, accepting Hume’s empirical notion of happiness, there are grounds to doubt that he even believed that virtue serves one’s happiness achievement.
187. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Wei Song Mill on Function of Art in the Cultivation of Virtue
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On Mill’s view, aesthetic education or the education of the feelings and the cultivation of the beautiful, like intellectual education or moral education, is an important ingredient of human culture, which is indispensable to the completeness of the human being. By historically analyzing the difference of ideas of virtue, which may have been existing between the British people and those of the European Continent, namely, for the former, virtue is almost exclusively an affair of duty, but for the latter, virtue is an affair of the sentiments, Mill believes that a higher and nobler form of expressing the feelings and the beautiful, i.e. Art, enables both sides to aim at a complete and perfect virtue. His reason is as follows, since the perfection is itself the object of Art, Art enables the human mind to maintain a high tone, consequently, the human mind with a high tone will regard human life as a work of Art and will strive for improving it. Mill’s this view of life as Art fully conforms to his belief on self-development and moral progress, and both of them represent his profound understanding and insights of individual person and individual life.
188. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Elvira Simfa Being Moral and Loving Oneself: Kant on Self-Love, Self-Conceit and Morality
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Kant’s moral theory is often perceived through opposition of reason (morality) and inclinations. I argue that this opposition has to be reconsidered by taking in account the complex character of inclinations and differ between self-love and self-conceit. Self-conceit violates prudential rationality and is not compatible with morality. Self-love, due to its particular structure that presupposes ability to overcome oneself, can be interpreted as enabling and preparing humans to obey moral commands and successfully aim at happiness.
189. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Martin Thibodeau Tragedy and Ethical Agency in Hegel’s The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate
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In recent years much attention has been devoted to Hegel’s interpretation of Greek tragedy. Admittedly, authors dealing with Hegel’s understanding of tragedy have adopted different perspectives and pursued different goals. Yet they do share a common view: tragedy plays a crucial role in shaping some key features of Hegel’s philosophy. In my paper, I focus on the particular feature of ethical life and I argue that Hegel’s later ‘retrospective’ theory of action finds some of its key insights in his interpretation of Greek tragedy as developed in The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate.
190. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Stanley Tweyman Hume on Space, Geometry, and Knowledge
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At the end of Book 1, Part 1, Section IV of A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume informs us that the topics in Book 1, Part 1 “may be consider’d as the elements of this philosophy”. (T.13) Among the topics discussed in Part 1 of this Book is distinctions of reason, which he covers briefly toward the end of his treatment of abstract ideas. While other topics treated in this Part of Book 1 are clearly utilized in subsequent Sections, Parts, and Books of the Treatise (for example, impressions and ideas, philosophical and natural relations), distinctions of reason are rarely mentioned beyond his discussion of this topic toward the end of Section V11 of Book 1, Part 1 of the Treatise. My paper has several aims: First, I will attempt to show the role that distinctions of reason play in providing our awareness of space; second, I will show how Hume’s empiricist account of Geometry in the Treatise is developed through his account of our awareness space; and third, I will briefly address the altered account of Geometry in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
191. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
B. J. van der Walt Exploring Philosophical Historiographical Problems and Methods
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How to study and portray the long history of Western philosophy is the main aim of this paper. The reconnaissance develops through the following four stages: (1) The introduction surveys the major problems confronting any historiographer of philosophy. (2) The second section provides a critical overview of some earlier and contemporary methodologies of describing philosophical history, identifying their strong and weak points. (3) In the light of what is regarded as deficiencies in these methods, the next section formulates a few essential criteria to be followed by the historiographer. (4) The consistent problem-historical method, first developed by Prof. D. H. Th. Vollenhoven and afterwards also applied by his followers, are then evaluated against these guidelines. From a brief description of this method it becomes evident to be consistent in the following respects. It is consistently developed from the clearly stated presuppositions of the historiographer; consistently philosophical; consistent in its problem-historical approach; consistent in the terminology used, and has also being experimentally tested.
192. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Andrew Ward Has Kant Answered Hume’s Causal Scepticism?
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Do Hume and Kant hold strongly divergent views about the causal principle, viz. the principle that every event or change of state in nature must have a cause? It has traditionally been held that they do, and on the ground that while Hume claims that there is no justification for the principle’s acceptance, Kant claims that the principle can be shown to be necessary for the possibility of experience. However, I argue that, on Hume’s account of how we come to believe in the existence of external objects, it is not possible for us to perceive any external object that is changing its state randomly or acausally. Accordingly, Hume is no position to deny that the causal principle can be justified, given he acknowledges, like Kant, that we do believe ourselves capable of perceiving events, or changes of state, in nature. Equally, Kant is no position to claim to have answered Hume’s scepticism about the causal principle given he acknowledges, like Hume, that the objects of the senses are, in reality, merely appearances and not things in themselves.
193. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Ekaterina Zbrozhek The Topicality of Hegel in Zizek’s Philosophy
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As a rule, any philosopher begins the intellectual activity with criticism of previous tradition or its reconsideration. Nevertheless he always has figures which are reference points of his own reasoning. For Zizek’s philosophy of one of such figures is Hegel. But it is not Hegel of ordinary perception. Zizek addresses to Hegel through Kozhev and Lakan. He is not orthodox Hegelian. Zizek takes some important concepts from Hegel, seeming him an actual for a modern philosophical context. They are concepts of distinction, totality, recoverability and negativity. How Zizek uses these concepts in his own philosophical reflection we tried to show in the article.
194. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Marceline Morais La dimension philosophique de l’amour selon Platon et Simmel
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À partir d’écrits très connus de Platon sur l’amour, soit le Phèdre et le Banquet, et d’un ouvrage posthume de Simmel, intitulé Philosophie de l’amour, nous tenterons de révéler les liens étroits qui unissent la recherche philosophique et le sentiment amoureux. Contre le caractère uniquement rationnel et objectif de la philosophie, nous ferons ressortir la part de délire et de folie qui l’habite, son ancrage dans un sentiment et son origine pré-logique. On verra notamment que chez Platon l’amour pour un être humain témoigne de notre aspiration à la beauté et guide notre passage vers l’intelligible où se trouve la vérité et l’être. Parallèlement, chez Simmel, l’amour apparaîtra comme une force intérieure à la vie qui pousse toutefois à la dépasser vers un monde de l’esprit. La philosophie et l’amour auraient ainsi comme objectif de dépasser le monde immanent, empirique, des buts rationnels et pragmatiques, le cercle des besoins vitaux, pour s’élancer au-delà de cette sphère. Enfin, nous verrons également comment, né de la vie et de la nature, l‘amour qui en possède la fécondité, est ce qui pousse à créer, à innover, tant au plan artistique que philosophique.
195. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Kyriakos Katsimanis De la définition de la philosophie à l’énumération de ses fonctions principales
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La méditation rétrospective inhérente à l’attitude philosophique nous mène à la question suivante: qu’est-ce que la philosophie elle-même? La raison principale pour laquelle une définition logiquement rigoureuse de la philosophie est extrêmement difficile sinon complètement impossible est que cette notion s’avère particulièrement générale, vague, fluide et changeante. Il en résulte que toute différence spécifique qui est condition indispensable à toute définition valable se révèle incapable de spécifier, de préciser et d’éclaircir la notion de philosophie. Pour surmonter cette difficulté, il serait préférable de considérer le problème sous un angle visuel différent, à savoir la catégorisation adoptée par le sujet du 23me Congrès Mondial de Philosophie. Ainsi, au lieu de répondre à la question: «Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?», il vaudrait mieux essayer de répondre à la question suivante: «Quelles sont les activités ou plutôt les fonctions principales de la philosophie en tant que “Questionnement” et “Mode de vie” ? L’énumération de ces fonctions nous fait penser que l’initiateur de la philosophie proprement dite serait Socrate. Aussi, tout en réaffirmant la première apparition de la philosophie avec les philosophes dits «présocratiques», serait-il plus exact de soutenir que la philosophie au sens moderne du mot est née à Athènes, avec Socrate.
196. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Adrian Nita Réalité et actualité chez Kan
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L’une de très importants idées sur l’idéalisme transcendantale kantien vise les notions qui sont impliquées dans cette démarche philosophique: l’espace, le temps et la réalité. On a ici le motive pour lequel nous nous proposons de presenter les relations entre l’existence et la réalité, d’une partie, et l’actualité (Wirklichkeit) et la réalité, d’autre partie, dans le conditions que la plupart des traductions de Kant usent dans un mode indistincte les termes “réalité ” et “actualité”.
197. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Gennady Samuylov Aristote et Joseph de Maistre
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Presque 200 ans se sont écoulés depuis la mort de Joseph de Maistre, mais ‘intérêt de son héritage ne s’est pas éteint. Toute l’oeuvre de Maistre est fondée et développée sur la base de l’histoire de la philosophie. Il se trouve au coeur du développement de la civilisation universelle et il exprime toutes ses idées dans le courant européen de l’histoire de la pensée occidentale. Il place ses idées dans le contexte historico-philosophique. De plus, il cherche dans l’histoire des principes communs qui existent depuis toujours et sont partagés au fur et mesure par toutes les cultures. Dans notre étude il s’agira de mettre en évidence la dimension historico-philosophique des idées principales de Maistre et leurs liens avec les systèmes théologico-philosophiques de l’Antiquité, à savoir d’Aristote. Maistre rejette l’interprétation matérialiste de la philosophie d’Aristote. Dans l’intention de défendre la thèse sur ‘existence de la connaissance innée, Maistre interprète et utilise la philosophie d’Aristote. Maistre tente de présenter les formes et les lois du jugement comme les formes transcendantes et immanentes de la raison, c’est-à-dire semblables aux idées innées. Il fixe principalement son attention sur le syllogisme, pour lui, le syllogisme et la raison sont des synonymes. Pour démontrer l’existence d’un principe spirituel de l’existence du monde, qui est immatériel, actif et intelligible, il s’appuie sur les réflexions d’Aristote dans le livre Lambda de la Métaphysique. La nouveauté de cette étude consiste en ce qui suit: ce travail a comme objectif de présenter les liens des idées philosophiques de la théologie “universelle” de Joseph de Maistre avec la philosophie d’Aristote. Jusqu’à aujourd’hui il n’existe pas de recherche systématique et complète sur ce sujet, bien que ces liens soient implicitement et explicitement présents dans tous les livres du penseur savoisien.
198. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Katsutoshi Kawamura Der Crusius’sche Freiheitsbegriff und seine Voraussetzungen
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Der Leipziger Pietist Chr. A. Crusius (1715-1775) setzt sich mit dem von Leibniz und Wolff festgelegten „Satz vom zureichenden Grund“ auseinander, nach dem nicht nur jedes Naturgeschehnis, sondern auch jede Handlung des Menschen a priori determiniert zu verstehen ist. Zunächst kritisiert Crusius die Vieldeutigkeit des Begriffs „Grund“, wo er zunächst zwischen „Realgrund“ und „Erkenntnisgrund“ unterscheidet, und weiterhin ersteren in „wirkende Ursache“ und „Existentialgrund“, und letzteren in „Erkenntnisgrund a priori“ und „Erkenntnisgrund a posteriori“ einteilt. Nach Crusius hat menschliche freie Handlung keinen eindeutig determinierenden Grund, sondern nur wirkende Ursache, die jeder seinerseits ablehnen kann. Crusius gründet seinen Freiheitsbegriff auf die Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre, nach der freie Handlungen wegen der Endlichkeit des Menschen nur a posteriori erkannt werden. In meinem Beitrag versuche ich zu zeigen, dass im Freiheitsbegriff von Crusius, der „Grundtätigkeit der Freiheit“, ein Muster der Vereinbarkeit von der empirisch orientierten Freiheit und dem Determinismus einzusehen ist.
199. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
Nicolae Rambu Das Leben als ein Geschäft. Überlegungen zu Schopenhauers Eudämonologie
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Mein Beitrag wird versuchen, die inneren Spannungen der Aphorismen zur Lebensweisheit Schopenhauers darzustellen. Zuerst geht es um den axiologischen Bankrott des Lebens, dann um ein moralisches Dilemma, in dem sich der Leser Schopenhauers befindet: Idealismus oder Weisheit. Am Ende des Beitrags stellt sich die Frage, ob die Aufgabe der Philosophie darin besteht, gegen „die moralischen und intellektuellen Ungeheuer“ auf unserer Welt kämpfen zu sollen. Kann also die Philosophie eine Therapeutik des Geistes sein? Das bleibt eine offene Frage.
200. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 14
José Antonio Giménez Lust, Sprache und das gute Leben in Platons Philebos
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Die Platonforschung hat sich immer wieder mit den interpretatorischen Schwierigkeiten des Philebos befasst. Wahrscheinlich besteht die ernsthafteste Schwierigkeit dieses Dialogs darin, die Vielfalt der Themen, die hier behandelt werden, miteinander zu verbinden. Im Philebos wird die Frage nach dem guten Leben als Hauptthema vorgestellt, aber im Laufe des Dialogs werden sowohl dialektische Überlegungen über das Problem des Einen und Vielen als auch eine Klassifikation der ontologischen Gattungen des Kosmos eingeführt. Angesichts dieser Situation haben sich viele Interpreten ausschließlich auf die theoretischen Fragen konzentriert, ohne den Zusammenhang zwischen diesen Fragen und der ethischen Fragestellung zu berücksichtigen. Dieser Beitrag versucht zu erklären, wie die Frage nach dem guten Leben mithilfe der Begriffsanalyse behandelt werden soll, sodass die dialektische Reflexion über die Bedingungen der Sprache durch die Sachorientierung der ethischen Fragestellung erforderlich wird. Der Philebos kann demnach nur als eine kompositorische Einheit betrachtet werden, sofern man zunächst die hier vorliegende Verbindung von Ethik und Dialektik versteht.