The aim of this contribution is to acquaint readers with responses to Karel Kosík’s most influential work, the Dialectics of the Concrete, that were published in former Czechoslovakia by philosophers and other thinkers between the years 1963 and 1969 with an emphasis on the journals Filosofický časopis, Kulturní tvorba, Literární noviny and Plamen. This paper also outlines a criticism of Kosík and his book by the Commu­nist Party of Czechoslovakia.

This text is an attempt to reflect a discourse on the problem of the role of opposition in history. On the background of the “Velvet Revolution“ anniversary, it deals with the question of the necessity to analyse deeply the dissent phenomenon as part of opposition structures. It represents an important aspect of the critical study of our latest history.

In the review of 100 myšlenkových experimentů ve filozofii (2013) Jakub Mácha raises several questions concerning our approach to thought experiment analysis. We address all of his remarks; particularly, we answer three questions: Which type of imagination do we use in our definition of thought experiments? How is the cognitive aim of thought experiments related to their cognitive value? Is the analysis of Plato’s Cave proposed in our book appropriate?

In this work I attempt to provide a materialist interpretation of Berkeley’s view of the world. In my opinion, we can already see this view in his early writings A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710) and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713). My belief is based on Berkeley’s emphasis on common sense and the concept of God as the guarantor of the recognizability of the world. I also show that Berkeley understands the concepts of real and material as synonyms. I explain why Berkeley refers to things as ‘ideas‘ in his two main metaphysical writings and how to understand Berkeley’s notion that God imprints ideas of the world into our minds. The main question is to how understand the material substance, which Berkeley rejects. Through the rejection of philosophical material substance Berkeley is trying to avoid scepticism in which, according to him, philosophy must fall and at the same time he is trying to re-create a plain view of the world.

Odsúdenia z roku 1277 predstavovali zásah do vedeckého výskumu mnohých scholas­tických autorov. Duns Scotus tvoril po roku 1277. Cieľom tohto príspevku je preto iden­tifikovať filozofické motívy, v ktorých sa filozofia Dunsa Scota a Odsúdení z roku 1277 prelínajú, a preskúmať, či Scotovo myslenie bolo pod priamym vplyvom Odsúdení, alebo nie. Autor príspevku tvrdí, že hlavná príčina Scotovej filozofie je v samotnej františkánskej tradícii a že vplyv Odsúdení z roku 1277 bol na Scotovo myslenie nepodstatný.

Článek představuje ústřední téma polemiky, které spočívalo především v otázce významu školské katedrové filosofie pro novodobou českou kulturu, a zároveň představuje tento spor jako metafilosofickou diskusi o významu a úlohách filosofie ve společnosti vůbec. Na základě Čuprova souhrnného sborníku a dobových periodik se příspěvek snaží postihnout vlastní vývoj problematiky v celé jeho komplexnosti, a sice od počátečního filologického hlediska, kdy je konstatován nedostatečný jazykový aparát českého jazyka, přes následně diskutova­nou otázku po podobě a inspiračních vlivech vznikající české filosofie, která nakonec vyústila ve spor stoupenců školské německé filosofie s utilitním stanoviskem zdravého rozumu.

In our contribution we continue our discussion with L. Novák, who criticised our paper “Různá pojetí matematiky u vybraných autorů od antiky po raný novověk.” Novák’s critique titled “Tomáš Akvinský instrumentalistou v matematice?” served as an incentive for us not only to clarify certain points, but also to deepen our original exposition. We focused on Aquinas’s understanding of mathematics, the middle sciences and philosophy. We still insist that two substantially different interpretations of these disciplines are possible. On the one hand, there is much evidence for Aquinas’s realistic approach to mathematics and the middle sciences. On the other hand, ideas can also be found in Aquinas’s texts supporting an instrumentalist reading. In our opinion, it is important to point out these two approaches to the mathematical sciences in order to adequately understand the subsequent evolution of the history of ideas, especially in the modern period.

In this article I consider two aspects of Moore’s philosophical method which lead to the turn to natural language. These are his interest in the meaning (not the truth) of problematic philosophical theses and his interest in common sense philosophy. However, Moore himself did not completely achieve the linguistic turn: he merely prepared the way for it. In the conclusions I show that Moore’s themes were developed by N. Malcom. The deeper sense of my paper is to show that the linguistic turn as begun by Moore does not conflict with the spirit of the Aristotelian tradition.