Jędrzej Śniadecki (1768—1838), an eminent physician and scholar of the Enlightenment period, proposed a theory of his own on brain localization in connection with Gall’s „cranial system”. The views of the Polish scientist on the matter were part of his general conception of life as expounded in his basic work Teoria jestestw organicznych (Theory of organic beings).Śniadecki maintains that only germs of psychic qualities are innate, not the qualities themselves. Therefore, external influences, especially education, have such impact on the development of personality. The fundamental organ of all psychic processes is the brain, yet other organs, and the physical constitution as a whole in particular, are not without influence on the psyche. Psychic efficiency does not depend solely on the size of the brain but on the differentiation of its parts as well. The brain is not a homogenous „thinking mass”; it consists of a number of parts, morphologically distinguishable. Each part performs probably a distinct role, as organ of a particular psychic function. Gall is wrong, however, when he affirms that each psychic function belongs to a separate cerebral organ, operating independently. The individual parts of the brain can perform some simple psychic functions only, while every psychic act we observe requires the cooperation of memory, reason, imagination etc.; hence the simultaneous action of all „brain organs”. The hypothetical „brain organs” appear, then, as interdependent. In other words, the brain always acts as a whole, though its individual parts do not share equally in this activity. In consequence, Gall’s diagnostic method itself is without value, since it is based on erroneous theoretical hypotheses. The fact remains, however, that Gall’s method of investigation of brain structures in association with the observation of psychic characteristics is very valuable and. should be pursued in further research. Śniadecki expects much of comparative anatomy in particular.The development of science has shown that éniadecki’s theoretical views were right, and further investigation along the lines suggested by Gall proved very fertile. Sniadecki’s theory however, failed to play a significant part in the development' of the science of cerebral functions. Often quoted by eminent European scientists, he soon fell into oblivion wh^n the partitioning powers destroyed Polish research centres. Calling back to memory the ideas of our great predecessors we wish to have them integrated into our common, nowadays universal, culture.

The confrontation of the two systems of thought, distant from each other in time, yet both characteristic of, and highly significant in their respective epochs, aims at showing their differences and similarities, while revealing common, time transcending problems, and kindred solutions, on the subject of thought, in mediaeval and in contemporary man.Thomism distinguishes sensual knowledge from intellectual knowledge, i. e. from thought, though it associates them functionally. Thought is of a spiritual character; it leads to knowledge transcending phenomenon, it forms the basis of man’s religious and moral life. The thomist conception of life stands half-way between sensualism, whose genesis of thought it accepts since it recognizes the dependency of thought on empirical cognitive material, and idealism, with which it agrees in the emphasis on the creative and immaterial character of the process of thought.Heidegger’s existentialism assumes a two-degree thought: basic thought and computing thought. It emphasizes the pragmatism of thought, its connection with material environment, and, above all, its ontic character. Thought is a vital necessity, an effort towards the explanation of the mystery of being; at the same time, it is an answer to the calling of the world, the announcement of and hope for its knowledge. Thought is not yet, strictly speaking, knowledge, but a peculiar sensitive experience which later on undergoes a reflective process and becomes computing thought. It tends to truth which is not, however, the conformity of mind to reality, as St. Thomas teaches, but a mere form of the revelation of being. Man conquers never and never truths because he himself exists essentially in truth, since he exists in the world and, by means of thought, achieves a gradual understanding of the meaning and usefulness of the things existing in the world.

The methods applied so far in teaching the deaf develop to some extent the -capacity for understanding amf using verbal language in those subjects who have been placed in proper time under the influence of special schools.The investigations described in the article aimed at determining to what extent deaf children can perceive the meaning of sentences conveyed to them through spoken words. The subjects examined were communicated three sentences the apprehension of which was ascertained by analysing the pictures that the children were asked to draw to illustrate what contents they had grasped from the text transmitted to them through spoken and written words. In that way 120 pictures were gathered from a group of forty children, examined three times in the course of their 4-year stay at school.The pictures were classified in four groups: incorrect, syncretic, analytic, syn- thetizing or correct. The analysis revealed that the deaf understand verbal language primarily as a whole, i. e. syncretically. The general, schematic perception of the whole precedes the understanding of the particular elements of the sentence,i. e. words. Sometimes the whole context makes it possible to grasp- the meaning of a new word. Many significant particulars, e. g. the relationship expressed by prepositions, remain beyond the apprehension of the deaf; hence frequent misinterpretations of the spoken language, entailing a number of errors in thinking which, in such conditions, is little distinct, chaotic, while logical deduction is hampered. The syntax of sign language is different from that of verbal language, that is why the change from picture thought to abstract, symbolic thought, based on verbal language is made very difficult. Syncretic apprehension of verbal language in deaf children appears not only as a stage in mental development, it is also a phenomenon enabling them to know reality and adapt to it, despite the poverty of cognitive contents, an inevitable consequence of deafness.

The investigation described in the article aims at throwing more light on Piaget’s problem of „precausality”. On the basis of observation carried out on six groups, of thirty subjects each, of Polish children aged 7—12, the authors tried to ascertain wheter 1. pre-causal forms of thought exist, and whether 2. developmental stages, analogous to those distinguished by Piaget and other investigators, can be noticed. The method applied was that of Laurendeau and Pinard, based on materials collected mainly by Piaget. This method, akin to Piaget’s clinical method and having much in common with test methods, consisted in asking the children to explain such phenomena as dream, the idea of life, the genesis of night, the movement of clouds, why some objects float on water while others sink. The observation took place in Cracow in 1964 in a population of children belonging to a physical workers’environment. In the analysis of the results, the authors made use of the criteria give*n by Laurendeau and Pinard, slightly mody- fying them when it appeared necessary. The results were then compared with those obtained in Canada by the authors just mentioned (comparison restricted to children of 7—12). Both series of results were presented in tables. The differences revealed between Polish and Canadian results are discussed in the detailed analysis of the answers to the questionnaires.On the whole, the results obtained in the Polish population show the existence of primitive thought, of the pre-causal type, in children. Of the different forms covered by the 5-questionnaire investigation, animism appeared with the highest intensity. Other pre-causal forms such as realism, artificialism, finalism and dynamism were also revealed but in a fragmentary state and limited range. The reason why comparatively few pure forms other than animism were discovered is probably that the analysis did not extend to children of 4—6 years of age. Polish children, at least the sample tested, show a rather general tendency to explain, such phenomena as night, movement of clouds, floating on water and sinking, by physical and natural factors.The intricate problem of the existence of stages could not be solved, as the group examined included comparatively few subjects, little or not differentiated as regards sex and environment (180 boys, aged 7—12, workers’environment). The only regularity perceived in the answers was the gradual disappearance of pre-causal forms of thought, replaced by a more correct interpretation, parallel to the growing of chronological age. The fact may attest a continuity of mental development. The general level of causal and final explanation, as gathered from the data supplied by the Polish sample, depends more on the child’s experience and direct contact with objects than on chronological age.The scientific value of all results is always closely related to that of the method applied. It is probable that the characteristics of pre-causal thought In children, investigated here, would have appeared more clearly, had other kinds of problems or phenomena been proposed for interpretation. Among the items chosen by Laurendeau and Pinard, the dreams aroused the smallest interest in Polish children. The purely verbal character of the first four questionnaires also made it difficult to secure reliable results. It seems that such questionnaires cannot suffice for the investigation with children under 11—12 years of age since, according, to Piaget’s theory, thought is inseparably associated with action at this stage of life. The investigations should therefore tend first of all to find better methods. „Longitudinal” investigation, prolonged over a long period, and covering quantitatively larger groups of differentiated population, with a more extensive use of statistical methods, may yield the most effective results.

The question of how far God may be known is, in contemporary thought, extremely complicated and multiple-conditioned. Modern philosophical trends, first Kantism and Positivism and later Phenomenology an.d Existentialism, brought in new styles and methods and the intellectual atmosphere of our times.Three phenomena appear to be most symptomatic of the expression of the chief tendencies in this field: 1. The starting-point of considerations which are to lead us to a knowledge of God, is to be primarily man: his cognition, activity, situation, 2. prejudice against rational cognition. Intuition, instinct, feelings are held to be more adequate tools than the intellect, 3. an attempt to reach a kind of synthesis, to comprehend the whole, which leads to a blurring of boundaries between the various planes of cognition.The development of reflective philosophy (in both forms), the renaissance of the ontological proof, extreme revelationism and rejection of natural theology, and, above all, the development of the concept of the religious cognition of God are various forms of the realization of the tendencies indicated.

Henry of Ghent is commonly known in the History of Philosophy as one of the opponents of Thomism in the thirteenth century. The point discussed here is whether the „anti-thomist” Henry is to be considered as an essentialist as well.On the basis of Henry’s Summae Quaestionum and Quodlibeta the author endeavours to point out the two sources of misunderstanding leading to wrong conclusions, viz. 1. Henry’s terminology different from Thoma’s especially as regards ttie basic metaphysical concepts; 2. Henry interprets the real being in an entirely different manner from Thomas Aquinas.Nevertheless Henry remains on existential ground because: 1. his idea of God is wholly existential, and so is, too; 2. his analysis of concrete being, which he sees as a „limited existence”; 3. according to him the object of analysis does not consist in the content of being but solely and exclusively in the mode of being; 4. the modes of being are „instrumental” in the logical deduction and demonstration of the categories of being; 5. the theory of the analogy of being, as outlined in the Summae Quaestionum, is based exclusively on existence.

In addition to the classically essentialising so-called traditional (scholastic) Thomism, especially under the influence of the philosophic thought of Cajetanus, Suarez and Wolff, at the present time avant-garde Thomism has its own essentialising version. What E. Braun calls the neoessentialistic interpretation of the Thomistic concept of being, depends, generally speaking, on substantializing the transcendent act of being, in relation to nature, in such a manner that both the existential actuality and the formal actuality are present in the act of esse. The author of the present article, after considering certain neoessentialistic objection to the so-called existentialistic concept of being in E. Gilson, analyses the theory of ontic esse in the works of C. Fabro and J. B. Lotz. Insofar as, according to the author of the present article, the metaphysical views of C. Fabro supplement Gilson’s interpretation of the Thomistic concept of being, Lotz’s theory of the ontic esse is a classical example of scholastic neoessentialism. The article ends with suggestions for distinguishing, in the field of metaphysical cognition, the so-called, „ontologic” and „ontic” analyses of reality, relative to the Thomistic thesis of the overlapping of so-called infraontic factors.

In this article the author attempts to support the thesis that among so-called „definitions” formulated in a typical text-book lecture on scholastic metaphysics, on the whole there are none which could explain the sense of the term defined by confronting it with a combination of meanings (different from it and differing among themselves) of several, or even two, terms. The analysis of the above — mentioned alleged definitions shows that the plurality of concepts included in their definienses is merely apparent. They are simple translations of one non-complex term into ar. other complex term, i. e. this is the use of the so-called method of synonyms, where both synonyms are equally derived from common speech and their sense is equally metaphoric. In addition, these definitions are, in the majority, translations of one language form (logico-grammatical) into another equivalent language form. Thus they are concretisations of generally important logico-grammatical schemats. This article draws attention to the illusive and strictly verbal nature of such an explanation of metaphysical terms.