This study deals with the issue of Plato’s political interest. Some say he had none. We’ll try to show that in fact he was very political, to the extent that the core ofhis work is a political agenda, and is politically orientated. There’s also the aspect of the relation between metaphysics and politics in his work; that is a delicate issue, as some consider that Plato “disguised” his political convictions in myths. That too will be taken into consideration.1. The number of metaphysical dialogues is small, compared to the vast majority of the platonic dialogues2. No only the writings, but also the life of Plato show him as political3. Even the “metaphysical” dialogues have a political agendaThere are authors that consider Plato to be no less than a forerunner of Christianity, a mystic conscious of the contemplation of an ideal “beyond”. One should bear in mind that Plato has even been declared a saint by the Orthodox Church. We choose to be more cautious in dealing with the interest that Socrates’ pupil is supposed to have taken into mystics (theory or practice). In the following pages, we’ll try to explain these reserves.

Looking closely at Adam Smith’s account of the spectator perspective – along with the compatible spectator accounts in Hutcheson and Hume – is especiallyhelpful to understanding one of the main themes of the Scottish Enlightenment. The Scots in response to Hobbesian egoism described a morality that does not need to overcome a human nature that pits individuals against each other. Rather each of the three Scots describes the empirical formation of our humanity and our moral sentiments in the context of relating to and observing others. The three spectator accounts of Smith, Hutcheson, and Hume clearly describe this involvement of others in the formation of morality. Adam Smith explicitly gives an accounting of the importance and, in fact, necessity of others in the formulating of not only our moral evaluations but also the very possibility of understanding one’s humanity and having an idea of morality at all. In this paper, I explain Smith’s account specifically along with its similarity to Hutcheson’s and Hume’s and argue that these empiricists ground moral sentiments in person to person relationships. For the three Scots, being human and developing a morality is begun in interactions with others. We formulate who it is we are and can be and determine acceptable ways to interact in the company of others.

The culture defines some of the elements that we consider identity guide marks. The continuity of the identity is very closely bonded to these cultural elements.The understanding of the modality to represent the identity is possible through the analysis of some of these cultural elements and of the correlations that these establish in the context of memory and oblivion. This paper analyzes the dynamics of these three elements: memory, identity and oblivion, in literature.

This article discuss the origin of the Byzantine Cultural Model, influenced by the patristic anthropologic perspective, which discerns that present-day man is notgeneric man, but is at an intermediate stage, between a lost condition and one that could be attained. A dimension of the Eastern Christian understanding of man that is less known nowadays is related to the theme of the garment of skin. This is connected with another one, the theme of the simplicity of the mind.

This paper bases on a (great!) wrongful act which was made to Greek philosophy, and especially to the pre-Socratic one: the unilateral abatement of thestudies to those of cosmological nature. The big mutation would take place in Socrates’ time, who by the anthropology of the discourse takes philosophy to a theory of knowledge, through a program which would be perfected by Plato and especially by Aristotle. This is a point of view co-substantial to history of philosophy, which some times risks to charge in an alethic (good/bad) way a paradigm based on false discussions. Pre-Socratics were not only preoccupied by ontology, or even cosmology, as well as Aristotle was not a radical empirist. In the economy of thought the nuances are more important than a classification often made for our epistemological comfort.