Science or myth? This question contains the basic problem, arising from the analysis of evolutionary psychology. The problem in question refers to the status of the interpretations of reality promoted by the evolutionists, in particular in reference to the human being. This article is an attempt to present an argument for the following thesis: firstly, that there are no scientific criteria for evaluating hypotheses in evolutionary psychology; and secondly that the theses of the discipline contain certain cultural contents - which until present times were carried by myth.

Most Westem scholars define Sufism as the spirituality of Islam or the mystical version of Islam. It is thought to be the inward approach to Islam that emerged and flourished in the non-Arab parts of the Islamic world. Most scholars like William Stoddart think that Sufism is to Islam what Yoga is to Hinduism, Zen to Buddhism, and mysticism to Christianity (Stoddart 1976, p. 19). In this essay, I will shed light on the major lines and elements in the philosophy of Sufism. I willtry to give a concrete account of Sufism by introducing its major features within the relevant Islamic tradition and history.

Ziel des vorliegenden Aufsatzes ist es, die Existenz von eventuellen Berührungspunkten zwischen Wittgenstein und Ingarden nachzuweisen. Nach einer kurzen Einfuhmng wird anfangs der Hintergrund der Analyse des Problems formuliert. Darauf hin werden die Positionen Wittgensteins Ontologie mit wenigen Begriffen und Ingardens dreistufige Ontologie jeweils skizzenhaft dargestellt und kritisch auf das Vorhandensein von gemeinsamen Gmndlinien geprüft. Als Gesichtspunkte gelten dabei folgende Begriffe: Ontologie, Weh und Mensch, Sprache und Ästhetik. Abschließend werden die charakteristischen Merkmale vonBerührungspunkten genannt.

The leap from primitive to scientific time represented as the „time" in „relativity physics", or in „thermodynamics" or perhaps in „quantum physics" or even within „Statistical mechanics" is large. Large also is the conceptual difference between these various understandings of the nature of time. How are we really to understand these physical perspectives on time: As knowledge about the real nature of time represented by the objective concepts: Or as epistemologicaloperational abstractions that cannot avoid elevating their results to the level of full-fledged reality, to ontology?

What determines whether the procedures for proving the affirmative statement of God's existence may be called a proof? Certainly, it is necessary that all premises be true and that a reliable inference schemata be applied. One premise appears to be the most critical in the theistic argument. This premise is theprinciple of sufficient reason. I hold the view that the principle of sufficient reason cannot be found among the premises of any metaphysical explanation of reality,so I suggest that the terms 'proof and 'argument' not be used. Instead, we could speak of ways of acquiring discursive knowledge of God and ways of indirectsubstantiation of God's existence.

The article is primarily concemed with the ambiguities which surround the concept of the person. According to the philosophical tradition taking its roots from Locke's definition, personhood depends on consciousness. Therefore, 'personhood' can be ascribed to different entities, and only these entities acquire a moral standing. This can entail that a human being may or may not be considered as a person, as well as higher animals and even artificial machines. Everything depends on manifest personal characteristics. In order to sort out different meanings ascribed to 'person,' I distinguish between being a person and acting as a person. Then, I show that a human being is a paradigm of the person and his being always precedes his acting.

L'article aborde la question de la fonction cognitive de la fiction. Le dernier terme englobe le langage métaphorique vif aussi bien que ce que l'on appelle «textes». La question considérée implique une théorie générale du discours, présentant celui-ci comme dialectique de I'événement et du sens. La métaphore,en tant qu'innovation sémantique, renvoie à la médiation d'un travail inventif de rimagination. Le problème qui s'ensuit conceme la référence des énoncés métaphoriques. Le récit, avec sa composition interne, introduit le thème du temps. C'est en lien avec l'expérience temporelle de l'action humaine que le récit de fiction s'entrecroise avec I'historiographie. La notion même de fiction en sort transformée par l'intermédiaire de l'activité heuristique de l'imagination.

Gradually emerging from the so-called 'linguistic turn', philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century witnessed what we might follow P. M. S. Hacker in describing as a 'naturalistic turn'. This change of direction, an abandonment of traditional philosophical methods in favour of a scientific approach, or critics would say a scientistic approach, has met with widespread approval. In the first part of the paper I look to establish the centrality of the normative to the discipline of epistemology. I then turn to examine Quine's attempt to reduce normative discourse to instrumental rationality, and the more fully developed accounts provided by Stich, Kombiith and Papineau. I argue that these accounts fail because they insist on a constitutive connection between desires and the ends of epistemic activity. I conclude with the suggestion that a more plausible position severs this connection, in favour of an objective, externalist account of ends and reasons.

The theories of Darwinian evolution and Intelligent Design appear to be locked in an intractable debate, partly because they offer rival scientific explanationsfor the phenomenon of descent with modification in biology. This paper analyses the dispute in two ways: firstly, it seeks to clarify the exact nature of thelogical flaw that has been alleged to lie at the heart of Intelligent Design theory. Secondly, it proposes that, in spite of this error, the Intelligent Design theory advocated by Michael Behe takes at least one significant step in the right direction. Although Behe's suggestion is promising, it is shown to be not nearly radicalenough.

Contemporary proponents of theodicy generally believe that a theodical reply to the evidential argument from evil must involve some appeal to the afterlife. In Richard Swinburne's writings on theodicy, however, we find two arguments that may be offered in opposition to this prevailing view. In this paper, these two arguments - the argument from usefulness and the argument from assumed consent - are explained and evaluated. It is suggested that both of these argumentsare rendered ineffective by their failure to distinguish between the different ways in which persons may be of-use in the attainment of some good state of affairs.

I argue that the following two claims provide us with sufficiently strong reason to conclude that God came into existence from nothing a finite time in the past: (1) that God is omnitemporal; and (2) that there is a first moment of time. After defending the possibility of God beginning to exist ex nihilo from various objections, I critique two alternative attempts at providing an account of the relationship between an omnitemporal God and the beginning of time (that of Alan Padgett and William Lane Craig). I show that these either fail to be an alternative to my own model or are less supported by the relevant evidence.

Since the very dawn of its history, modern philosophical anthropology has been addressing the issue of the human body. As a result of those efforts, Descartes,de Biran, Husserl, Sartre, Marcel, Merleau-Ponty and others have brought forward a variety of conceptions concerning various aspects of human corporeality.Anthropological explorations concerning the question of the human body, appear in a particularly interesting way, when they are considered in the context ofthose points of view which, in an essential way, refer to the subjective character of the human being. It is a matter of reconstructing and analyzing how the subject’s corporeality is given to the subject, originarily, according to the phenomenological rule zu den Sachen selbst. The aim of this paper is thus to put into some order the concerns of a variety of anthropologists with regard to the question of the human body, as it is given to, or experienced by, the subject. A metatheoretical analysis of this field proves it is possible to do so with the use of a tool, which is called here, a dimension of corporeality.

Thomas Aquinas understands providence as the reason of directing things to ends (ratio ordinis rerum in finem), and as the execution of that directing, i.e. governance (gubernatio). Thus, providence is one of the fundamental attributes of the person that reveals the person’s perfection and dignity. Providence consists in a free and reasonable directing of oneself and the reality subject to oneself in order to actualize potentialities of oneself and of other beings in the context of the ultimate goal of existence. Human providence joins the providence of the Absolute with regard to the world. In spite of its deficiencies human providence reveals the essential dignity of the human person.

Benedict XVI’s first encyclical, Deus Caritas Est, treated the different characteristics of human love and their expression. The first section discusses erosand the second shows how agape provides the essential framework for Catholic charitable organisations. I will be arguing that by omitting any reflection on therole of philia, he missed a significant opportunity to retrieve an important part of the Tradition and expand our usual understanding of the elements of social ethics. Part I briefly gives the background of Benedict’s non-use of philia in his encyclical and indicates the basis for the view that philia has no place in Christian social ethics. The favoured approach is that of agape. Part II presents Thomas Aquinas’ view of friendship and how it might counter the shortcomings identified by the authors in Part I. Part III applies his view of friendship to the key principles in Catholic social teaching of solidarity and preferential option for the poor. Part IVconcludes with some general summary remarks.