This paper critiques John Noonan’s recent attempt to show the compatibility of Humanae Vitae and contraception. Although Noonan’s arguments are rejected, an alternate approach for showing that sort of compatibility is explored.

Following brief accounts of Möhler’s version of dialectic and his influence upon Vatican II, I argue that much of his ecclesiology is based upon a concept of “essence” derived from romanticism. I conclude that current theology must return to some basic questions posed by the Reformation.

Trying, a central human concern, is actualized and beheld in rather pure form in athletic endeavor, where successful trying interests us as a revelation of a waxing kind of human being, full of promise. In the moral life trying is not so openly displayed, yet one’s standing in the moral system of evaluation is determined by it. The honor attaching to athletic success models the moral community’s confirmation of individuals’ commitment to it.

FoIlowing an historical oveview of problems which have affected an aesthetic account of God, I examine several contemporary approaches (including that of J.-D. Robert), and conclude with a cautious defense or the use or aesthetic judgement as a means or approaching the existence of God.

The first part of this study is a reflection on the writings of Lowi and Briefs, and deals with the transition from the ideal of liberty to interest-group liberalism in the United States. In the second part I offer an analysis of Hegel’s attempt to combine the ideals of justice and liberty within a political economy. The third part deals with further issues of economic justice raised by the Bishops’ recent Pastoral Letter.

The basic argument of this paper is that Feuerbach’s “materialist critique” of Hegel’s speculative philosophy was misguided, and that the source of some of Feuerbach’s confusions about Hegel lie in the former’s early discipleship of the latter. In particular, I examine certain purported Hegelian themes in Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel and argue that they are distortions of Hegel’s views. Next I explore two stages in Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel, the first dealing largely with the issue of presuppositions and starting points in philosophy, and the second concerning the transformative method by which Feuerbach “inverts” Hegel’s philosophy. In the first case I argue that Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel is really only a self-critique, and in the second that his subject-predicate analysis of the relation of thought and being is incoherent. Finally, I offer an interpretation of Hegel’s speculative logic which views it as non-mystifying.

This essay offers a set of personal reflections on the relation of creature consciousness to the general philosophical issues of knowledge. morality. and humannature.

I argue that baptism and the Lord’s supper were two closely connected and central notions for the Gospel authors. The way in which baptism was connected to forgiveness also provides clues to interdependencies among the Gospel narratives. Following summary examination of the doctrines in Matthew and Paul, I conclude that Mark and John provide a fully developed doctrine of the two sacraments.

The article discusses current philosophical issues in foundationalism and anti-foundationalism as well as their ramifications for theological epistemology. Thestrengths and weaknesses of the anti-foundationalist theological current are also assessed.

This essay offers a philosophical analysis of the role of the father-figure in the family. I argue that a Cartesian approach to this question is useless, and that Hegel, while he offers the beginning of an adequate analysis, falls short of the multiple-function model which an adequate analysis requires.

I offer an argument for the claim that there is a transcendent dimension in music. The argument begins with one offered by Augustine in the De Musica, and adds additional support from contemporary discussions in musicology.

Following a short summary of the free-will problem as it applies to the question of God’s prescience, I offer a detailed analysis and critique of Plantinga’s and Maritain’s efforts to reconcile these two notions. I end by arguing that a process interpretation, similar to that of Whitehead, is also incapable of providing the needed reconciliation.

During the latter part of his career, Kant proposes three different accounts of evil. In these accounts are found psychological, logical, and teleological elements intetwoven in such a way as to give a coherent reading of evil as a complex philosophical issue. Recent commentators have emphasized one or the other of these two elements and consequently have only given a partial picture of Kant’s struggle with evil. I argue that Kant’s use of scripture needs to be taken much more seriously than it has been taken in order to unify these psychological, logical, and teleological aspects of his treatment.

Following an introductory examination of possible reasons why past researchers have overlooked Kierkegaard’s debt to Kant, two specific areas of influence are documented and analyzed: the ideality of ethics, and the notion of faith as a leap. Closing remarks suggest that there are other areas as yet undocumented.

I first argue that Kant must consider the question of forgiveness by tracing his thought from the concept of the purity of practical reason, through the postulate of God’s existence, and to the relations between God and humanity as both merciful and as just. I then examine the text where he recognizes the paradoxical relation of justice and mercy. Ultimately, the existence of the world displays a mercy which suspends strictest justice. Kant refuses to think through this paradox, and I argue that his refusal reflects his more basic compulsion to make ethics rational. The consequences of the paradox are a limitation of autonomy.

I argue that, although it is probably not possible to construct a thoroughly consistent interpretation of Kantian metaphors, there is a perspective in Kant’s later writings which provides a framework for selecting and sorting central metaphors. Following a discussion of the work or Lakoff and Johnson on metaphor, I provide an examination of Kant’s distinction between noumenon and phenomenon as an example of a metaphor grounded upon spatio-temporal experience, and conclude with suggestions concerning the role of metaphor in Kant’s account of personhood and community.

This is a series of two articles examining Kant’s attitude toward mystical experiences and the relation between his interest in these and his interest in constructing a Critical system of metaphysics.“The Critical Dreams” begins by questioning the traditional division between “Critical” (1770 onwards) and “pre-Critical” periods in Kant’s development. After explaining Kant’s Critical method, his 1766 book, Dreams of a Spirit-Seer ... is examined and found to contain all the essential elements of that method. The onlykey element which is missing is his “Copernican” insight. Although Hume may have played an important role in the early 1760’s in awakening Kant to the importance of his Critical method, this Copernican insight seems to have its roots more in Swedenborg than in Hume. Moreover, [DREAMS] itself should no longer be interpreted as evincing a sceptical or empirical stage in Kant’s development, but can now be seen as setting for Kant the problem which his Critical System was intended to solve. [DREAMS] suggests the two strands of this problem: (1) How is mystical experience possible? and (2) How is metaphysics possible? [DREAMS] offers a Critical answer to the first question, but does not fully develop its implications.