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Garry L. Hagberg
Wittgenstein, Music and the Philosophy of Culture
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Wittgenstein’s scattered remarks on music, when brought together and then related to his similarly scattered remarks on culture, show a deep and abiding concern with music as a repository and conveyer of meaning in human life. Yet the conception of meaning at work in these remarks is not of a kind that is amenable to brief or concise articulation. This paper explores that conception, considering in turn (a) the relational networks within which musical meaning emerges, (b) what he calls a discernible “kinship” between composers and styles, (c) the embodied character of musical content, (d) the close and too-little-appreciated intricate connections between our capacity to make sense in music and in language (and the frequent dependence of the former on the latter) and the interaction of the musical theme with spoken language, and (e) music as a culturally-embedded phenomenon that is, as he said of language, possible only in what he evocatively, if too briefly, called “the stream of life.”
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Alexis Burgess
What Is It Like To Be Asleep?
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183.
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Robert Merrihew Adams
No-Fault Responsibility for Outcomes
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184.
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Alexander George
Quine’s Indeterminacy: A Paradox Resolved and a Problem Revealed
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185.
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Ayoob Shahmoradi
A Critique of Non-Descriptive Cognitivism
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186.
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Cora Diamond
Between Realism and Rortianism:
Conant, Rorty and the Disappearance of Options
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187.
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Lilian Alweiss
Kant’s Not so “Logical” Subject
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188.
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Peter Baumann
Defending the One Percent?:
Poor Arguments for the Rich?
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This paper discusses the philosophical view proposed by Gregory Mankiw in his recent article “Defending the One Percent” (JEP 27-3, 2013): the just deserts view in application to income distribution. Mankiw’s view suffers from three unsolved problems: the Criteria Problem, the Measurement Problem, and the Problem of the Missing Desert Function. The overall conclusion is that Mankiw’s normative “Defense of the One Percent” fails quite drastically.
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189.
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Simon Critchley
The Tragedy of Misrecognition:
The Desire for a Catholic Shakespeare and Hegel’s Hamlet
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190.
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Oliver Cronlinde Wenner
Editor's Note
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191.
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About The Harvard Review of Philosophy
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192.
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Garrett Lam
Note from the Editor
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193.
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Terry Horgan
Newcomb's Problem Revisited
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194.
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Peter van Inwagen
Some Thoughts on An Essay on Free Will
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In this essay I record some thoughts about my book An Essay on Free Will, its reception, and the way analytical philosophers have thought about the free-will problem since its publication 30 years ago. I do not summarize the book, nor am I concerned to defend its arguments—or at least not in any very systematic way. Instead I present some thoughts on three topics: (1) The question ‘If I were to revise the book today, if I were to produce a second edition, what changes would I make?’; (2) Aspects of the book I should like to call to the attention of readers (aspects that, in my view, readers of An Essay on Free Will, have been insufficiently attentive to); and (3) The course of the discussion of the problem of free will subsequent to the publication of the book.
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195.
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Eric Mandelbaum, Jake Quilty-Dunn
Believing without Reason, or: Why Liberals Shouldn’t Watch Fox News
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196.
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Todd May
From Subjectified to Subject: Power and the Possibility of a Democratic Politics
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197.
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Andrew Koppelman
Does Respect Require Antiperfectionism?:
Gaus on Liberal Neutrality
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198.
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Jody Azzouni
Conceiving and Imagining: Some Examples
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199.
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Agnes Callard
The Weaker Reason
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Issue: 1
Arthur M. Melzer
Rousseau and the Modern Cult of Sincerity
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