Relativism has usually been presented as linked to the limits of translation and understanding. The Principle of Charity was developed to decide the reference of words or the best translation of a sentence. However, the principle has been defined in, at least, two different ways: a naturalistic one, as a pragmatic maxim that guides the interpreter generally; or a transcendental one, as an a priori, necessary condition for someone to be understood. In this paper I will focus on the latter approach, taking Donald Davidson's arguments and his transcendental interpretation of the Principle of Charity as a representative case. Although different versions of the principle can be found in Davidson's writings, and some of them would seem flexible enough to give an account of how interpreter and speaker have different beliefs, all of these versions put understanding and intelligibility at risk. The reason is that the Principle of Charity has a wide scope: to conceive a person as rational, as having beliefs and desires, or as saying something, we have to interpret his/her utterances as revealing a set of beliefs consistent and true, and that maxim is applied to the whole system of sentences. So charity is necessary, we cannot choose it and if we spell out the Principle of Charity in sociological or psychological terms, that is, in empirical terms, we are changing the subject. The transcendental character of the principle has received criticism from various authors who understand it in a naturalistic way. I will conclude that an empirical description of how we use the Principle of Charity when we interpret a speaker's utterance would show the psychological and sociological relevance of relativism.

Sufism, as a mystic sect of Islam, can be defined as a philosophy of inner experience. The process of inner thought and experience plays an important role in sufism. Existentialism is also a philosophy of being. In existentialism being cannot be rationalized; it can be experienced in a personal venture which philosophy is the way to achieve. The aim of this paper is to compare sufi philosophers with theist existentialist philosophers mainly on the concept of person. How religious elements play a role in forming the concept of person in each philosophical system is investigated by means of several basic parameters such as being, existence, transcendent self, despair, death, knowledge and freedom. Both in sufism and theological existentialism a religious significance is given to the concept of existence. In both philosophical systems, the finitude a person experiences in this world drives one to an alienation from one's essential being to the more profound dread of guilt and anxiety, and salvation can be reached by the unification of oneself with God.

One of the classical systems of Indian Philosophy is specially concerned with the problems of logic c This system is called Nyaya which has a long history of about two thousand years. In the extent of the literature it has produced and in the depth of the philosophical problems it discusses, it is of considerable interest and importance. However, the spirit of pure rationality in which Nyaya discusses these problems and the techniques it makes use of in handling them are quite different from other systems of Indian thought and at once renders it a unique achievement of the Indian mind. The term Nyaya means the method of coming to a conclusion with certainty and the system of Indian philosophy in which philosophical problems are discussed according to this method came to be called Nyayadarsana or just Nyaya. Nyaya has been sedulously cultivated in restricted circles of traditional learning. Nyaya and in particular, Navyanyaya studies with unparalleled rigour and exactitude the nature, the dimensions and conditions of human knowledge. And by common consent the philosophical problem par excellence is the problem of knowledge. With rare insight, both the old and modern Nyaya analyse the problems connected with human knowledge and sets forth in detail the exact conditions in which valid knowledge is possible. This essay highlights the nature and scope of Nyaya logic comparing and contrasting it with other systems of logic especially the Buddhist and Aristotelian.

The purpose of this paper is to discover an important contribution of classical Chinese ontological conceptions for the future world philosophy and the modern human Weltanschauung in the process of its globalization. Through a brief mosaic of a development of mutual Euro-Chinese encounters, from the Middle Ages to the present, the paper presents the view that both Chinese and European philosophical complexes were quite indispensable parts of the history of world philosophy; and in the future, perhaps, they will be the leading factors that decide (in their serious confrontation) the basic determination of the roots of the global world metaphilosophy. At the same time the author, long having carried out scholarly research and published translations of Laozi 's Dao De Jing, Confucius' Lunyu, the Books of Xunii, Huang Lao, Huang di si jing, etc., wants to demonstrate, on the basis of specific examples of original Chinese dialectical metaphysics, their unique philosophical value for the future world philosophy and the modern human Weltanschauung.

Has comparative political philosophy progressed beyond crude generalizations and scattershot explorations of traditions perceived as exotic and other? In commenting on the current condition of comparative political philosophy, I will treat two of the main methodological questions which arise in the encounter with texts from traditions unfamiliar to philosophers in the West. First, I survey the difficulties of translation, between both languages and cultures. Second, I examine the problem of comparison, the associated dangers of distortion and the effects of power asymmetries.

In this paper, I give a metaphilosophical examination of three major orientations in comparative studies (i.e., historical one, interpretation-concerned one, and philosophical-issue-concerned one) and four 'sins' that are oft-cited in critically evaluating a comparative study, namely over-simplification, over-use of external resources, exaggerated distinction, and blurring assimilation. I argue that the appropriateness of these 'sins' depends on orientations, purposes and methodological approaches in comparative studies and that, in those comparative studies with the interpretation-concerned and philosophicalissue- concerned orientations, due simplification, use of external resources and assimilation are not merely legitimate but also adequate or even necessary. In so doing, I explain how constructive engagement between Chinese and Western philosophy, or, more generally speaking, between different philosophical traditions, is related to contemporary development and resources of philosophy.

If the problem of evil is one of justifying how a perfect God could create evil, then there is no problem of evil in early Chinese thought, but my claim in this paper is that the problem of evil is one manifestation of a deeper problem, which is the conflict between the world and human values and desires. This deeper problem appears in early Chinese thought in ways analogous to the problem of evil in theistic traditions. Daoists respond to this problem with a call to harmonize with heaven by overcoming conventional values and desires. Mencius, a Confucian, offers a more complex response, in which it is natural to cultivate virtue and certain desires even though nature itself is indifferent to them. My paper focuses on this Confucian response.

The idea of a philosophical Other as comparativists have often historically used it to signify radical alterity, although sometimes a remedy and correction for the erroneous generalizations which originate from a presupposition of human sameness, merely shifts the center of philosophy's unchallenged assumptions in at least two ways. First, the notion of a philosophical Other avoids an explicit characterization of how one recognizes that one is philosophizing in the sphere of this Other and of what "otherness" is philosophically interesting. Second, the notion of a philosophical Other is unable to capture and describe the dynamic, ever-changing relations that serve to demarcate philosophical traditions or spatio-temporal webs of thinkers in the first place. For the sake of the comparative project of exposing the comparativist's own culturally-embedded assumptions, comparative methodology should allow for the possibility of analyzing more than one place where similarities and differences can present themselves at the same time. In short, comparativists would serve their own interests better if they began to approach their projects in recognition of a complex, limitless, and dynamic array of sameness and difference, instead of with premature assumptions of radical alterity.

In Anbetracht der jüngsten biotechnologischen Forschung, die das Klonen des Menschen konkret in Aussicht stellt, wird im Folgenden die Haltung der buddhistischen/ Traditionen, soweit sich diese bisher dazu geäußert haben, zu Fragen des "therapeutischen" und "reproduktiven" Klonens vorgestellt und diskutiert. Bestimmte Aspekte der buddhistischen Ethik und Anthropologie führen dazu, dass aus Sicht buddhistischer Ethiker das Klonen des Menschen eine insgesamt weniger dramatische Herausforderung darstellt. Aus ihrer Sicht wird durch die Idee und mögliche Praxis des reproduktiven Klonens kein normatives "anthropologisches" Prinzip wie jenes der menschlichen Natur, des Geschöpfseins oder der menschlichen Identität bedroht. Dennoch stehen auch buddhistische Ethiker dem Klonen skeptisch gegenüber, wenn z.B. durch den Vorgang Lebewesen in großer Zahl verletzt und getötet werden. Dass hingegen die traditionellen europäischen Wertvorstellungen der .Natur der Person' auch in den philosophischen Diskurs mit einfliessen, zeigt ein komparativer Blick auf die bioethischen Argumente von Jürgen Habermas (2001). Der Vergleich beider Positionen zeigt, dass es lohnt, in Bezug auf Techniken, die derzeit sowohl in Asien, wie Europa und den USA entwickelt werden, kulturübergreifende Perspektiven einzubringen, durch die mögliche Grunddifferenzen wie auch ethische Grundübereinstimmungen besser sichtbar werden.

This paper focuses on the philosophical analysis of interculturality. Globalization involves the problem of the universal and its relation to the particular in cultures. In some interpretations, universality is sharply opposed to particularity (Arjun Appadurai's theory of "break" in culture). In contrast to this, there are authors who allow for both particular and universal, focusing on their interrelation. Roland Robertson shows that diversity and multiculturality do not exclude forms of cultural unity. The analysis involves the current debate regarding the term "intercultural philosophy" (Ram Adhar Mall, Franz Wimmer). Intercultural philosophy raises questions about philosophy itself, and involves the revision of the whole concept of philosophy. It brings to the forefront the problem of the interrelations between the cultural-specific and the universal in philosophy. For some philosophers, the notion intercultural seems to be incompatible with philosophy as universal knowledge. However, the adherents of interculturality develop a broader and more pluralistic concept of philosophy, viewed as embedded in certain cultural and philosophical traditions while dealing with perennial questions and aiming to give universally valid answers. Two main paradigms of interculturality are distinguished: one is Raimundo Panikkar's "intercultural-interreligious paradigm"; the other is the "intercultural-liberation paradigm" developed by Raul Fornet-Betancourt. At the heart of this analysis is Fornet- Betancourt's concept of the intercultural transformation of philosophy. It is related to interculturality, or the dialogue of cultures. It challenges the Eurocentric philosophical historiography and claims the necessity of the reconstruction of the history of ideas in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, thus creating a new view of the history of philosophy. The concept of intercultural dialogue is also considered as a "regulative idea" in creating an alternative to current globalization.

Muhammad Iqbal propounds a much wider view of knowledge and the universe than does Immanuel Kant. According to him, the fundamental pattern of knowledge remains the same whether we are dealing with the perceptual type of knowledge of everyday life or with a special type of knowledge called mystic or religious knowledge. This insight was not within the purview of Kant, who was working his way through specific limitations imposed by his Western legacy. Iqbal, no doubt, drew inspiration from his Muslim legacy as bequeathed by thinkers like al-Farabi, according to whom higher thought (or 'intellect' as he called it) "rises to the level of communion, ecstasy, and inspiration". It was under the inspiration of Muslim Sufis and thinkers that he could enlarge his vision regarding the knowledge of man. In fairness to Kant, however, it may be said that Iqbal accepted his epistemic model in toto and extended its application beyond the pale of sensible and empirical knowledge into the non-sensible realm of entities with which religion deals - a venture which, if accepted, will extend human knowledge beyond its present limits into various directions and dimensions.

The term 'culture' has more than one meaning in different contexts. The paper attempts to show certain consequences, resulting from the ambiguous use of the term 'culture', for the protection of human rights, by comparing the use of the term in the Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation (UNESCO 1966), with its use in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It examines the meanings of the term 'culture' used in the UNESCO Declaration and the impact of this understanding on the protection of the relevant right or rights.

According to philosophical naturalism, the main anti-naturalism in philosophy derives from Kant and depends on transcendental arguments, which are invalid or polemically toothless. Many of naturalism's characteristic features follow from this repudiation of Kantian method. Anti-naturalists should be aware that the rationale for naturalism depends on this attack on their own position. There remains for philosophy a distinctively philosophical role that depends on the indexical element in our thought, the role of elaborating a scientific worldview.

Far from having overcome the human, all too human essence of knowledge the West has replaced its modern objectifying subjectivity by what may be called a postmodern subjectifying subjectivity. The modern will to power and its drive for controlling the Other has given way to a postmodern form of 'unavailability', a key concept in the ethical reflections of the Christian Socratic philosopher Gabriel Marcel. This paper attempts to highlight the degree to which fundamental features of Postmodernity, from instrumental technology to fragmented temporality and decentered subjectivity are infiltrating our existential condition. It is argued that one of the most striking symptoms of such a phenomenon is unavailability, especially in the artistic sphere.

The powerful images of the events^ of 9/11 have made an indelible impression on the world psyche. It has given rise to a pervasive rhetoric in practically all fields attempting to explain, interpret and understand the underlying causes and world changing consequences of the events. In a post-modern and secular world it has led to a refocusing on the religious fervour and ideals at work in established religions and in movements that are ostensibly devoid of all religious motivation, such as expansive globalization and American free enterprise capitalism. I argue that similar ideological and "religious" notions are at work in the conflict of worldviews represented by this historical event. In order to substantiate this claim and an identification of the ideological sources of the malaise at work in the world requires a clear distinction between religion, myth and ideology and the legitimate role played by constitutive root metaphors in culture, science and society. Root metaphor analysis reveals the underlying 'war of worlds' at work in the foundational symbolizations of the world (Gibson Winter, 1981) which function as fundamental building blocks of the "cultural cosmologies" of society (Harrington, 1995, 360). It is not only religious convictions that shape the world but the choices of metaphors by scientists, educators and politicians are not random and innocent but fraught with root metaphorical notions as religious as those of their ostensibly secular counterparts and thus laden with frameworks that dramatically alter the perception of phenomena and the behaviour and actions of groups. Harrington's (1995) analysis of the role of holism in the shadow of the Third Reich shows this very clearly. Recognition of the presence and influence of root metaphors of an ideological nature will contribute to the dies-enchantment with their allure. This paper attempts to develop a methodology on the basis of which it is possible to distinguish between the legitimate function of root metaphors in science and society and their hypostatization.

Hajime Tanabe (1885-1962), the Kyoto- School philosopher of modern Japan, attempts to interpret Aristotle's ontology as being involved in the logic of self-identical being without self-negative conversion in action from his own dialectical perspective. For Tanabe, the eternal essence or Form is to be mediated by the dynamic character of matter, i.e., the temporality pertinent to the changing movement. For Aristotle, however, the essence or pure activity as the principle of being is devoid of such a dynamic mediation, but is rather regarded as the past being, i.e., what it should be originally and eternally. In other words, for Aristotle, evil and matter are the lacks of goodness and the eternal Form that are identical with the essence of the individual substance. Evil is to be self-negatively mediated to goodness in free action through conversion in Tanabe's perspective. Movement pertaining to matter is not simply an incompletion of pure activity, but is rather self-negatively converted into the activity as the transcendent principle of the dialectical unification of time and eternity, matter and Form, evil and Goodness. The individual existence has freedom to unify the self-contradistinctive opposed moments, i.e., subjective action and objective being in a way of mutually negating conversion. The difference between Tanabe and Aristotle lies in that for Tanabe practice is relevant to the future, whereas for Aristotle contemplation is concerned with eternity as invariable and imperishable being since the past. While Aristotle's logic is confined to the self-identity of being in contemplation, Tanabe's logic is structured by the triadic elements of individuality, species as the relative universal, and genus as the absolute universal in terms of the negative conversion in action.

The golden mean metaphor is suggested as a key to understanding the universal and the particular in moral philosophy since finding metaphorical links provides a way of seeing different traditions in a manner that does not erect absolute boundaries. The choice of the golden mean is made keeping in mind that all cultures recognize the worth of moderation. The prime reason for that lies in human nature which sets human beings apart from all the other living creatures by a goal-oriented activity. As a rational being endowed with will, a human person cannot move toward a goal without adopting a certain strategy of actions. An instinct for self-preservation and astute prudence, personal experience and that of one's own ancestors are all prompting a human being to moderate and commensurate in dispositions and actions for an optimal attainment of the goals. Yet, the same principle is concretized in a particular cultural context (Ancient Greek, Indian, Chinese, Muslim and Russian cases are considered). Along with cultural distinctions, situational, temporal factors are of importance: much depends on whether it is the human person guided by own free will or a certain driving force, public, government, etc., outside and above defines the content of the golden mean.

The paper is an attempt to understand the nature of political religion using Russian Orthodoxy as an example. Political religion is different from the use of religion for political purposes: from "public religions" seeking to be a part of a pluralistic society; from "civic religion" (sacralization of political processes and institutions) and from fundamentalism. Contrary to fundamentalism, political religions aim not at revitalizing the past, but at addressing the most vital issues of modernity. Politicization of Orthodoxy in Russia may seem unlikely due to obvious political passivity of the Russian Orthodox Church and to the fact that people in Russia are rather religiously indifferent and theologically ignorant. But the paper demonstrates that political activity is typical not for the leaders of an institutionalized religion but for a religiously minded intelligentsia. Global experience also shows that politicization is most likely to occur in an area where people have just returned to their semi-forgotten religious beliefs and where the majority of population does not observe the rituals and does not know the fundamentals of religion. Growing number of people who identify themselves as Russian Orthodox, having, at the same time, no sufficient knowledge of this religion provokes the emergence of mediatory ideologies, which are Pan-Slavism (the idea of a union of all Orthodox Slavic nations) and Eurasianism (the idea of a union between the Orthodox and the Islamic world). From the fundamentalist viewpoint both ideologies should be defined as heretic. Pan- Slavism is heretic because it views Orthodoxy as a kind of Slavic tribal religion and strips Orthodoxy from its universalism. Eurasianist vision of Orthodoxy is so broad that any difference between "Orthodoxy" and "non-Orthodoxy" disappears.