To reach the right understanding of Proclos’ philosophy one needs to draw the distinction in his writings between the erudite, methodical inheritance of Neoplatonic tradition, and his own contribution to Neoplatonism. This consists not so much in the logical ordering of the learning of the Masters within the framework of Neoplatonic schemes, as in the analysis of possibilities, eliminated with the help of the principle of sufficient reason, implicitly accepted. The application of this principle in the field of possibilities a’lows Proclos to pursue a metaphysics of possibilities. What makes such metaphysics a specific one is the problem of cause, developed within the compass of a trichotomic scheme (the One, intermediaries, matter), which makes necessary the acceptance of an infinite number of hypostases between the One and matter.The proper insight into Proclos’ thought further requires the distinction between the affirmations which he accepts and the tendencies derived therefrom, and the consequences of these statements and tendencies. The hypostases of philosophy often characterize Proclos’ philosophy in the light of these consequences.Tendencies of Proclos’ philosophy: hierarchy of hypostases, tendency to exhaust the list of intermediaries between the One and matter.His basic statements: causation of hypostases, trichotomic structure of reality (the One, intermediate hypostases, matter).Consequences derived from these statements and tendencies: contradiction between the necessity of accepting an infinite number of intermediaries and the actual acceptance of a limited number of these; a nearly infinite separation of the One from plurality and, at the same time, a pantheistically emanating identification of the One with plurality in the nature of hypostases.The consequences here described have been drawn on the basis of the analysis of the passus „on cause” and that „on the immutable” from Institutio theologica. Showing thaft the problems of cause and infinite continuity of causes were pursued by Proclos on the ground of the analysis of possibilities, enables us to state that, contrary to handbook information, he not only marshalled the material of the School, but also, independently of the Masters, brought new elements into Neoplatonic philosophy (analysis of possibility, Aristotelian problem of the continuity of causes within Neoplatonic metaphysics). His solution of the thesis on the intermediaries brought him more explicitly than other Neoplatonists to essentialistic solutions.

The author assumes that the aspect and character of a given conception of ethics is determined by the way in which its fundamental problem, i. e. the criterion of the moral value of human activity, is dea't with. From the viewpoint of this assumption he proceeds to analyze and characterize the most representative historical systems of ethics. In the course of the analysis he finds that the way of putting and solving the problem of the criterion of the value of conduct is itself conditioned by the way in which philosophy in general is approached. This leads him to the conclusion that, despite far going differences among them, the ethical systems built up in the course of history may be reduced to three man types: metaphysical, peculiar to Antiquity and Middle Ages; epistemological, characteristic of Modern Times and of some systems of our times; linguistic, which is the style adopted by neopositivism and the British school of the analysis of colloquial language. In the conclusion, the author remarks that though, de facto, the epistemological approach excluded the metaphysical one, and the linguistic approach both of them, there is nothing de iure to prejudge that such should be the case; on the contrary, there are grounds for recognizing each of them a significant roe, in correlation with the others, in the process of integral knowing of the field which is the object of ethics.

L'article étudie la définition du droit naturel et les sources de celui-ci dans la doctrine de Duns Scot. Cette analyse est menée sur deux plans: théologique et philosophique. Dans les deux aspects, il apparaït que le contenu du droit naturel est en principe indépendant de la nature de l’homme. II est lié soit à la structure ontique de Dieu (droit naturel sensu stricto), soit à la libre décision de la volonté divine (droit naturel au sens large). La nature de l’homme, en tant qu’être contingent, ne fait que postuler la nécessité de l’existence du droit naturel.Au droit naturel sensu stricto appartiennent les premiers principes pratiques, c.-à-d. toutes les normes qui règlen t l’activité de l’homme par rapport à Dieu, et qu'exprime la première table du Décalogue. Elles conduisent d’une manière naturelle et nécessaire à la fin ultime et au bonheur. Les préceptes du droit naturel au sens large, contenus dans la deuxième table du Décalogue, ont trait à l’activité morale de l’homme au plan naturel. Ils conduisent au bonheur et à la fin ultime non de leur nature mais en raison d’une décision de la volonté divine.L’article relève également certaines incohérences dans la doctrine de Duns Scot et les dangers découlant de sa façon de présenter le problème; il mentionne aussi l’influence que le scotisme a exercée sur les courants philosophiques ultérieurs, jusqu’à notre époque.

Les attributions de l’Etat en matière de la politique des salaires découlent de sa tâche principale qu’est le souci du bien commun. Les salaires étant l'une des formes principales de la participation des citoyens au revenu social, la part qui en est attribuée aux divers troupes de citoyens dépend de la politique des salaires, ce qui ne saurait être indifférent du point de vue du bien commun de l’Etat.L’auteur envisage le problème sous trois aspects: a) ce'ui de la relation entre le niveau et la structure des salaires et la réalisation de la polrt!que du plein emploi; b) celui du principe d’égalité (entendu dans le sens d’une proportionnalité définie) dans le partage du revenu social; c) ce’ui de la fonction naturelle de l’entreprise, qui est avant tout d’assumer les risques des mesures économiques décidées.L’Etat, considéré dans le rôle de répartiteur des avantages et des fardeaux sociaux, partant comme sujet de la justice distributive, a le devoir d’intervenir dans la politique des salaires en accord avec les principes de cette même justice. Et il doit le faire non en vue de son propre bien commun seul mais encore de celui de toute la communauté humaine.

L’article aborde le problème du côté des principes généraux de la protection des droits de l'homme; il examine ensuite la spécificité des droits de l'enfant, les considérant à la lumière de la Déclaration adoptée par l’Assemblée Générale de l'ONU; il étudie enfin les réalisations concrètes, celles en particulier qui sont liées à l'activité l'UNICEF. C’est la première fois que cette problématique se trouve présentée dans une publication polonaise d’une manière aussi ample et aussi exhaustive. L’article s’appuie surtout sur les documents de l'ONU. L’auteur se livre à une analyse détaillée du texte de la Déclaration des Droits de l’Enfant, et examine le contenu des principes qui s’y trouvent énoncés, les comparant avec des fragments analogues de la Déclaration Universelle des Droits de l'Homme et d’autres déclarations. A l'issue de cet examen d’ensemble, l'auteur formule quelques généralisations essentielles. Il affirme notamment que l'action de l'ONU en faveur des droits de l'enfant témoigne d’une humanitarisation progressive du droit et des relations internationales. Un droit international est en train de naître, basé sur le principe de la dignité humaine, affirmant les droits subjectifs de l'homme, y réservant explicitement une place pour les droits de l'enfant. De l'ancien droit international, conçu traditionnellement comme un droit inter-étatique, surgit un nouveau système de normes, un droit international inter-humain, à orientation universaliste. L’action théorique et pratique des Nations Unies dans le domaine des droits de l'enfant intensifie ce processus, lui donne des formes historiquement définies. Cette action, pour porter un jugement sur son cours et ses résultats, n’est qu’un commencement. Malgré les dimensions limitées de l'aide effectivement portée aux enfants, force est de constater l'existence d’une action coordonnée dans ce domaine. La protection des droits de l'enfant a été inclue par ies Nations Unies dans leur programme d’édification d’une paix mondiale reposant sur des fonde- ments stables. Une telle paix exige la suppression de toute discrimination des fai- bles par les forts; c’est pourquoi la création, dans l'ONU, d’un embryon de système d’une protection internationale des droits de l'enfant annonce une réalité nouvelle, plus proche de l’idée de l’universalisme.

In the controversy on the character of common good the author takes side with the adherents of the immanent notion. The definition of common good as natural fulfillment of the personal values of a plura’ity of human individuals, fulfillment achieved through living together and mutual interdependence, implies the affirmation that bonum commune is a social principle. Such a view is consonant with the neo-thomistic theory of natural law in which social principle is understood as an injunction of practical reason, establishing the value which can be achieved in social intercourse only. Such a collective value is represented by common good conceived as immanent.The author has analysed elsewhere the concepts of social principle and common good, and makes use here of the conclusions reached then. He shows in what way common good is read by natural reason from the essence of man’s nature. In the argument that it is a principle of being and action, the author has recourse to synderesis known as habitus primorum principiorum. The fact that practical reason ascertains the duty to fulfiU good qua transcendental property of human beings is the beginning of the definition of the natural content of common good. Bonum in communi, however, covers a larger area than common good. Bonum commune considered here is the realisation of those innate predispositions to human perfection which men as associates achieve in common. It is this potential substratum of man’s social nature that characterizes the normative contents of common good qua principle of being, consequently as norm of behaviour in society.The realisation of the general contents of the principle of common good requires its previous embodiment in a concrete form through a so-called executive norm. It derives from the actual conditions of a given collectivity and members there of, and constitutes, on the basis of the absolute elements of the principle of common good, elements both necessary and unchanging, a concrete norm containing the picture of the state of society as desired hie et nunc.To find out the executive norm of common good requires a special subject, a social authority. The necessity of a governing body results not only from the natural limitation and contingency of those sharing in collective life, but is a consequence of their dependency on the author of natural common good, the Creator of nature. Owing to conscience, hence through the activity of practical reason, the immanent content of common good keeps a transcendental reference to the Lawgiver of human nature, which definitely confers it a normative, obligatory character. Social authority specifies the general content of common good bringing in elements particularized through the established legal order to the followed by society.The structure of the social principle of common good contains, in addition to natural general contents, the indispensable exigency of its embodiment in a right executive norm as well as the necessity of government, the subject that determines what common good is in actual circumstances, and enjoins to fulfill it. How the government is chosen and the methods used to carry out its task lie beyond the range of problems directly connected with the content of the social principle of common good.

L’auteur, s’appuyant sur les travaux d’une suite d’éminents theologiens tels que Y. Congar, L. Suenens, F. Klostermann, H. Heimerl et d’autres, analyse le texte de la Constitution dogmatique sur l'Eglise, adoptee par le IIe Concile du Vatican, concernant les droits et les devoirs des laïcs dans l’Eglise.La corrélation entre droits et devoirs moraux qui découle du droit naturel fait que les premiers indiquent les seconds, tandis que ceux-ci, inversement, manifestent les droits de la personne humaine. II n’en est pas moins caractéristique que la constitution conciliaire consacre sept articles aux devoirs des catholiques laïques et ne parle de leurs droits dans l’Eglise que dans un seul.L’auteur tire la conclusion que tous les états du peuple de Dieu participent à l’ensemble de la mission et de la vie de l’Eglise. Les laïcs ont done leur part assurée dans le triple ministère du Christ: sacerdotal, prophétique et royal, bien que ce soit dans ce dernier qu’ils exercent une mission particulière. Dans les deux autres fonctions pourtant, sacerdotale et prophétique, c’est-à-dire enseignante, les laïcs ont à remplir des tâches ecclesiales définies et propres à eux.L’accent spécial mis sur la fonction royale des laïcs résulte du fait qu’ils vivent dans le monde et que leur apostolat consiste au premier chef en l'action sur le monde dans les conditions de l’existence quotidienne. Leur méthode d’apostolat dans le monde est: l’exemple de leur propre vie, le témoignage de la parole (participation au magistère de l’Eglise) et la transformation des conditions économiques et sociales de telle sorte qu’elles favorisent au mieux le développement personnel de l'homme.

The evolutionary mechanisms sought in the relation of organism to environment can be solved by reducing both sides to a common nature. The author conceives the organism and environment in terms of electromagnetic field. At every level of complexity the organism emits electromagnetic radiations. This applies to individual cells (mitogenetic radiation) as well as to organs and to the whole complex organism. Human brain radiations have been best studied so far. The „metabolism” of electromagnetic energy is a manifestation of life as much as the transformation of matter. The biological field with its electromagnetic qualities is a universal manifestation of life. The organism may be considered as an oscillator emitting biological field with large band spectrum.The nature of the biological oscillator is implied by the physics of dielectrics, crystal semiconductors modified as to the specificity of biological systems. The characteristics of the dielectric are: polarization, existence of electric field, surface- and volume concentration of charges, and anisotropy. Moreover semiconductor properties decide of the drift of charges, ions, radicals, and crystalochemical groups, and of the acceptor or donor character. The semiconductor manifests its properties in the presence of external electromagnetic field or temperature. The surface where the electromagnetic wave causes a concentration of electrons is a privileged one. It makes the semiconductor able to receive electromagnetic information.Biological systems may be considered as semiconductors, ferroelectrics and ferromagnetics. Many ferroelectrics are piezoelectrics as well. A considerable number of organic compounds apart from glucose and cellulose have proved piezoelectrics. Such are RNA and DNA, proteins particularly the muscular ones, also whole animal and plant (wood) tissues. In a biological system one may distinguish a) the mobility of electric elements (charges, ions, radicals, crystalochemical groups). Under the same heading come, too, biological microorganisms endowed with surface potential (erythrocytes, lymphocytes, bacteria, migrating cancerous cells); b) the anisotropy of the mobility of these elements as result of biomolecule or tissue geometry; c) the rhytmical changes of potential following metabolical processes and oscillations of the biological field. The biological oscillator belongs to self-regulating systems. The biological system possesses an autonomous source of electrons in consequence of catabolical processes. Another source of electrons lies in the piezoelectric effect following active movement in animals, passive movement in superior plants.Electrostasis is a surface concentration of electrons, so called on the analogy of homeostasis. The electrostasis (ECS) results from dielectric properties and surface phenomena in the electromagnetic field. Surface potentials exist not only in microorganisms but also in individual cells of tissue systems. In neoplastic states the cell potential increases by 30%. On the example of the galvanic reaction of human skin the author shows the evolutionary conditionings of surface potentials. This character is common to animals and plants. At every level of structural complexity the organism reacts by a change of potential to both external and internal stimuli. The organism sends out ECS electrons to meet environment. The organic oscillator is a semiconductor with surface concentrations of electrons (ECS) emitting a biological field of electromagnetic character. The self-regulation of this oscillator is conditioned by the coupling of electrostasis, biological mass and the field emitted. Biological systems at various stages of organization have their own electrostasis probably. The ECS plays the role of a spherical waveguide reflecting the biological field back into the living system. The losses of the organism through radiation are thus made minimal. Simultaneously the ECS is set into rhytmical vibrations by the biological field emitted.Biological magnetohydrodynamic. The semiconductor together with the drift of charges, ions, and radicals may be approximately considered as physical plasma. The laws of water solutions apply to semiconductors, while plasma is governed by the laws of hydrodynamic. The biological semiconducting oscillator may be considered as physical plasma. The biological system prevents the entropy of plasma by metabolical processes. It is a characteristic of life, though biological plasma (to be distinguished from cytologically understood protoplasma) undergoes disintegration in the course of ontogenesis with death as final effect. Bioplasma possesses its own information through longitudinal and transverse magnetohydrodynamic waves. The biological field transfers itself inside the living organism by means of magnetohydrodynamic impulses. Morphogenesis and regeneration processes, internal coordination and exchange of structural elements take place according to magnetohydrodynamic principles.Evolutionary conditioning of ECS. Electrostasis is the border between organism and environment, hence it is the receiver of electromagnetic information from the environment. Simultaneously, it transmits its own electromagnetic information in the form of biological field. The ECS screens the biological system from the noxious influence of environmental radiation. It is then a filter and shock absorber of radiations. When all the screening mechanisms fail, the electromagnetic wave invades the biological system and begins destructive action in it. The ECS is the integrator of the different electronic processes in the biological system, the detector of electromagnetic information from outside, and the emitter of its own information. It is the ECS that ensures the minimization of the entropy of the biological system. Rubner’s law on the relation between surface and volume takes a new form with the existence of electrostasis.As prospects for further research the author suggests a possible solution of the etiology and pathogenesis of cancer. The cancer becomes an autonomous biological oscillator, changes its semiconductor properties and biological field, and apparently creates its own electrostasis. In consequence, the cancer develops a different mode of reception of magnetohydrodynamic impulses from the organism, and breaks off the general coordination of the biological system. The author mentions, too, an electromagnetic theory of life which he is working out.

Le propos de l’article est de tenter un regard peut-être neuf sur l’objet et les tâches de la philosophie de la nature et d’apporter une réponse à la question concernant le domaine propre de celle-ci; l’auteur s’efforce aussi de trouver une position telle qu’elle puisse permettre de fonder en droit le statut de la philosophie de la nature en tant que discipline distincte et d’élaborer un système cosmologique consistant et logiquement cohérent.Les réflexions sur le fond sont précédées d’une courte présentation de diverses conceptions de la philosophie de la nature, chez les auteurs non-thomistes en particulier, afin de mettre en relief l’objet propre de cette science. On en a distingué essentiellement quatre: philosophie de la nature en tant que ce qu’on appelle la „science au commencement”, philosophie de la nature en tant que synthèse des sciences naturelles, en tant qu’analyse des méthodes utilisées par celles-ci, enfin, en tant que réflexion sur les faits des sciences naturelles.L’objet de la philosophie de la nature au sens général c’est la réalité matérielle que composent les êtres matériels avec leurs propriétés générales et leurs changements. La cosmologie s’occupe aussi de la collectivité des corps pris dans leur ensemble et de la structure de l’univers en tant que groupant les êtres matériels considérés dans le temps et dans l’espace. Les idées anciennes et; médiévales sur la structure géocentrique de l’univers ont été rejetées par les sciences naturelles, la cosmologie d’Aristote, revue par Thomas d’Aquin, n’en a pas moins gardé sa valeur comme théorie philosophique des êtres matériels et de leurs transformations. La philosophie de la nature pose également la question des dimensions spatiales de l’univers, se bornant toutefois sur ce point à étudier la possibilité même de l’existence d’un monde illimité en son étendue.Pour préciser plus exactement l’objet propre de la cosmologie l’auteur part du texte d’ In librum Boethii de Trinitate, qu. V, a. 1, dans lequel St. Thomas distingue trois espèces d’objets de connaissance. L’un est constitué par les objets de la philosophie de la nature qui dépendent de la matière secundum esse et secundum intellectum. Les sciences se distinguent les unes des autres par le mode de définition des concepts et des choses. Il est caractéristique de la philosophie de la nature que ses définitions font appel à l’idée de matière connaissable par les sens.L’objet de la cosmologie c’est l’essence des propriétés générales et de leurs changements. Selon la philosophie traditionnelle il est possible d’étudier non seulement la nature de l’être substantiel mais encore celle de l’être accidentel et partant celle de la propriété. Sont propriétés essentielles celles qui appartiennent à tous les êtres sans exception constituant une espèce déterminée. Négativement, on peut les définir comme propriétés sans lesquelles il ne peut y exister de base pour classer un être dans une espèce. Les propriétés de cette sorte s’appellent spécifiques.Outre les propriétés spécifiques il en existe d’autres plus générales, débordant l’espèce et appartenant à tous les êtres matériels. Ces dernières sont l’extension, la spatialité, la temporalité et la changeabilité; tout être matériel est étendu, occupe une place dans l’espace, existe dans le temps et est sujet à changements. Les sciences naturelles elles aussi étudient les propriétés spécifiques et les propriétés interspécifiques mais elles le font sous un autre aspect et avec des méthodes comportant en général des mensurations, et leurs résultats sont exprimés en une langue mathématique. La philosophie de la nature, elle, s’intéresse au mode d’existence des propriétés et à leur essence. Elle parvient à la connaissance des propriétés essentielles par voie d’abstraction physique. Cette méthode lui permet d’abstraire non seulement les propriétés concrètes des corps mais encore les caractéristiques propres aux différentes espèces. On peut faire abstraction des propriétés spécifiques en un double sens. Dans le premier nous faisons abstraction des propriétés sans cependant aller au delà de la matière perceptible aux sens. Ainsi entendue, l’abstraction physique est conforme au principe fondamental de la méthodologie de l’Aquinate: In Physicis omnia terminantur ad sensum. Il y a abstraction des propriétés spécifiques dans le second sens quand nous isolons la matière des formes substantielles les plus diverses avec lesquelles ces propriétés sont substantiellement unies et par cette voie créons le concept de matière première comme pure potentialité (puissance). La matière ainsi conçue est l’objet de la connaissance par l’intellect.À l’encontre des sciences naturelles dont la fin est essentiellement de décrire, prévoir et découvrir de nouveaux phénomènes à l’aide des méthodes expérimentales et de la langue mathématique, la cosmologie vise à décrire les propriétés et les changements dans une langue philosophique. Ainsi p. ex., le physicien pose le problème si le temps et l’espace sont mesurables. Dans l’affirmative il les inclut dans le champ des études physiques. Pour le philosophe de la nature la question se pose autrement: si le temps et l’espace sont des êtres réels, en quel mode existent-ils et dans quelles conditions des changements sont-ils possibles dans leur nature. La langue de la philosophie naturelle contient des éléments propres à la cosmologie, ce qu’indique sa manière particulière de définir les concepts, mais elle fait de plus appel à l’appareil métaphysique des idées, l’appliquant aux êtres matériels, en particulier à l’explication des changements. C’est pourquoi convient-il de voir dans la philosophie naturelle thomiste une métaphysique appliquée.Au terme de ces considérations l’auteur propose de définir la cosmologie d’inspiration aristotélicienne et thomiste comme suit: la philosophie de la nature est une discipline philosophique du premier degré d’abstraction dont l’objet est le monde matériel en sa totalité ainsi que l’essence des propriétés et des changements les plus généraux des corps tombant sous les sens. Cette définition a le mérite de délimiter le champ de la recherche cosmologique. L’extension, la spatialité, la temporalité et la changeabilité sont des propriétés essentielles des êtres matériels, c.à.d. telles que les corps ne peuvent exister et sont impensables sans elles. Dès lors que les êtres matériels occupent une place dans l’espace et existent dans le temps, l’espace et le temps sont également objet de la philosophie de la nature. Les corps sont sujets à changements, ceux-ci intéressent donc la cosmologie qui en étudie les diverses sortes, les causes et les effets, la direction (d’où les questions de causalité, de déterminisme et de finalité en philosophie naturelle); les lois de la nature sont également étudiées en tant que successions régulières d’événements. Affirmant que le domaine de la philosophie de la nature est constitué par l’essence des propriétés et des changements tombant sous les sens nous suivons conséquemment le principe méthodologique de la cosmologie thomiste, déjà cité: In Physicis...L’auteur distingue l’objet propre de la philosophie de la nature des tâches de celle-ci, distinction justifiée par le fait qu’un groupe de problèmes philosophiques n’est pas embrassé par la définition ni n’en résulte directement. Les tâches dont il est question sont diverses. On peut y compter la conception, mentionnée au début, qui voit dans la philosophie de la nature une „science au commencement”, la réflexion philosophique sur les faits des sciences naturelles, l’analyse de la langue et des notions et méthodes fondamentales dans les sciences naturelles, bref l’épistémologie et la méthodologie des sciences naturelles, ou encore la philosophie ou la critique de ces dernières.L’auteur estime que l’une des tâches principales de la cosmologie est d’identifier les réalités et les processus fournis par l’expérience courante et l’expérience scientifique. Cette tâche consiste en une mise à part analytique dans les objets de notre connaissance de ce qui est réel, matériel, objectif, d’avec l’hypothétique, le subjectif, l’d priori. Une tâche particulièrement ardue c’est celle d’analyser le tableau du monde tel que le présente la physique, ce „monde physique” étant schématique, approximatif et „stylisé”; l’expérience et l’d priori s’y mêlent jusqu’à effacer complètement la ligne de démarcation entre la langue de la physique et l’empéirza.

Dialectic materialism holds that material beings are the only independent reality actually existing. They are the subject of ontological study, as understood by marxist philosophy. As Thomist natural philosophy has an identical object we can consider the terms „ontology” and „natural philosophy” thus defined as equivalent, at least as far as their respective ranges are concerned.The first part of the paper describes the present marxist idea of natural philosophy, the value of which is submitted to critical analysis in part two. To obtain a more precise insight into their views the marxist writers have been divided into three groups according to the degree of elaboration of the „ontological” metasystem. The analysis yields the conclusion that natural philosophy, as understood by the marxists, is a generalization of ontologically approached results of natural sciences; its object is nature which it cognizes and explains in terms of dialectical method, making use of the results supplied by natural sciences; it is also a philosophy of natural science, and, primarily, a methodology of the sciences of nature.Part two shows that such a conception of natural philosophy derives from the marxist philosophical system, particularly from the concepts of matter and theory of knowledge. Seen in the light of immanent criticism, this sort of natural philosophy is a philosophical discipline, while from the position of Thomist system it is rather a natural science than a philosophical one. Being then a kind of natural phenomenology it can be used as material base for the study of modern Thomist philosophy of nature.

1. Relativistic cosmology is based on the assumption that gravitation alone shapes the structure of the universe as a whole. The paper presents a new cosmological idea the starting point of which is the rejection of the above assumption. Gravitation is hold to be a predominant, but not the exclusive, factor of the world structure. Nuclear processes, especially in periods not too distant from the „minimum R” period, must be ascribed great significance, too.2. Definition 1. We call model Q of the universe, or briefly Q universe the differentiable manifold of events upon which is set the metric Q being the solution of the gravitational field equations in the general theory of relativity with determined values of the constants x, λ, R0.Definition 2. We call space of the universe Q at time tlf or equivalently state Q1 of the universe, the cross-section of time-space with metric Q by the plane t1 = const.The model Q of the universe is equivalent to a sequence of states of Q universe in the successive moments of cosmic time:... Q (t_n), ... Q (t_1), Q (t0), Q(t1), ... Q (tn), ...3. The field equations of general relativity are deterministic, i.e. knowing the state of Q universe at a time t0, they allow the calculation of the state of Q universe at any time tk. Field equations, though, express the law of gravitation only. The possibility of extragravitational factors once admitted, there exists a definite probability that a state of the universe, say Qn, will be followed, due to these factors, not by the state Qn+1 but a state Xn+1, defined by a model X. In such a case we shall speak of passage from model Q to model X at time tn, which will be formulated: [Qn→Xn]. In this new situation it is not possible to deduce, by means of field equations, the state of universe Q(t1) at an arbitrary moment t1 of cosmic time, from the knowledge of the state of universe Q(t0). We have, therefore, a kind of cosmological indetermination. World models set in such a sequence that the passage from one to another is highly probable will be called henceforth serial model of the world (SMW).4. It can be proved that even the present assumptions of relativistic cosmology imply some passages from model to model. It is known for instance that any model M, monotonically expanding as t →∞ passes into de Sitter’s empty world (model S: k = O, R = R0 e ct/a, λ 3/a2). Moreover, the models of the type Mwith k = +1 pass into model S through the so-called Lanczos model (model L: R = a cos h [c(t—t/a]). Hence the following series of cosmological models: M, L, S, a particular case of which is the series: E, A, L, S, where E is the known Einstein’s static model characterized by the magnitudes: k = +1, Re = 3C/2k = const., X = 1/R2, while A is the so-called asymptotic model with k = +1, Ro>Re, X = 4k3/9C2. The processes causing the passage [En → An] have been described by A. Eddington, G. Lemaître and others.5. All k= +1 relativistic models may be arranged according to increasing X. It may be shown that passages between models little different as to the value of X, are more probable than those between models widely different. If we have two models P and Q with respective cosmological constants λp and Xq, we may say that the probability of the passage [Pn Qnl is inversely proportional to the value Δλ = XQ — λP.6. In point origin models of the type M and in oscillatory models O a moment t0 is distinguished. When t → t0, then R → O, Q → ∞ and P → ∞. The application of field equations to periods „proximate” to time t0 is meaningless. From the viewpoint of SMW the world may be said to have been then in a state of continuous passages. These „properties” of the states of the universe proximate to time t0 make it little probable, in the case of O type models, that the world might remain in a state of perpetual oscillation. There is in fact an equal likelihood that after a period of oscillation the passage through the state of „minimum R” will be followed not necessarily by a model O but some other model, while it is very little probable for the model O always to follow the passage through the „minimum R” state.7. If empirically ascertainable statements result from the relativistic models known so far, in principle they follow from the SMW, too. When we observe astronomical objects more distant from us we reach earlier stages of the evolution of the universe. Now if in the process of its evolution the world „experienced” passages from model to model, then the observation of nearer objects should reveal a different model from those of more distant objects.8. It seems, that SMW may be deduced from relativistic cosmology completed by Mach’s principle: the magnitude of the inertia of any body is determined by all the masses of the universe and by their distribution. If at any time the universe was in a state very different from the present one, then Mach’s principle implies that the „constant” of gravitation x had a different value at that time. The constant X plays a role analogous to that of x in field equations, we should therefore admit the variability of the cosmological constant. According to definition 1 this is equivalent to passage from one model to another. It should be emphasized that in this argumentation it is not essential whether the changes in the distribution of the masses are caused by gravitation or by other factors.

The paper discusses the problem that Euclidean geometry is only one of a number of possible geometries. Generally speaking three types of these can be distinguished: elliptic, parabolic and hyperbolic. The Euclidean axiom: through a point not in a straight line one and only one straight line may be drawn parallel to the given line, is denied by Lobatchevsky’s system in which an infinite number of straight lines may be drawn through that point. Although different geometries are contradictory, each of them is logically consistent in the same sense as Euclidean geometry is. The case being such, the question arises which geometry describes our physical world, which one applies to our physical space. Experience alone can answer the question but we lack as yet adequate data to solve the problem. It is worth remarking that we should not expect Euclid to, be confirmed by experience. In fact his geometry is, as it were, a limitary case of non-Euclidean geometries, between elliptic geometry and the hyperbolic one. Now experience, which makes use of approximate estimations, cannot distinguish the limit case from its sufficiently close approximation. That is why experience may decide only as far as non-Euclidean systems are concerned. The acceptance of the general theory of relativity logically implies a non-Euclidean space. This is, however, a theoretical approach to the problem, not an experimental one. Every experimental proof of the general theory of relativity may be regarded as confirming the assumption that physical space is non-Euclidean.

The paper tries to work out a wave function determining the wave connected with a corpuscle having a defined momentum and position. That these are defined is a logical consequence of the principle of indétermination itself, accepted in quantum mechanics.Deterministic interpretation of de Broglie’s equation p = h/λ. The wave disturbance connected with the progressive movement of the particle is defined by wave function (11) or (14). If the momentum p = 0, then the particle is connected with a ball-shaped standing wave (fig. 3). This „elementary standing wave” of the particle is defined by function (15), its length is Δ=h/mc , and its frequency v=mc2/h De Broglie’s wave is a phase disturbance of the „elementary wave” brought about by the movement of the particle. The evaluation of Heisenberg’s relation in the case of a harmonic oscillator is a calculation of both quantum and classical mechanics; it must, therefore, have a different meaning from that accepted in quantum theory. The wave function (21) of the harmonic oscillator describes the wave associated with the oscillatory movement of a particle with defined momentum and position. The results obtained, particularly the corpuscle-wave picture of the particle can be considered as the beginning of a new, deterministic theory of micro-phenomena. The partial pictures: corpuscle and wave, condition one another and integrate in one total picture.

Modern physics has recently inspired more and more repeated attempts at introducing the idea of field into theoretical biology. The hypothesis was first used in biology on the basis of embryological investigations, and was next extended to other domains of the science of life. According to some biologists the field is the factor that coordinates developmental processes and influences the formation of the structural integrity of the organism.The paper makes a chronological review of various ideas of biological field, together with their empirical foundations. The conceptions discussed are those elaborated by A. G. Gurvitch (supercellular field theory and his later cellular fields theory) J. Winter, H. S. Burr, E. J. Lund, A. S. Presman and, the largest of all, H. Prat’s biotic field theory.The author discusses the relationship between the biological field and the field as understood in physics. At the present stage of biological science it is not possible to answer the question whether biological field can be identified with physical field. One can only say that there is some analogy between their respective descriptions given in physics and in biology.The idea of biological field, as first expressed in Gurvitch’s theory of super- cellular field, was associated with vitalistic theory which, however, was to be eliminated later. It diverges, too, from the mechanicistic view. The biological field is an integral system which must be considered only as a whole, not as a sum of constituents. The hypothesis of biological field seems useful especially for describing the organism in its integral aspect.

If the task of social psychiatry is to discover the correlation between social factors and mental disorders, this connection cannot be found without the light of history. The psyche, like the various phases of social life correlating with it, is the product of a long process lasting thousands of years. Thus, we should follow up, in this aspect, a series of prehistoric and historic cultures, from the times when stone tools were used, up to the whole complex of modern dependencies of the individual human.Investigations on the culture of the early Slavonic tribes indicate that the language of our forefathers contained many expressions reffering to normal and pathological mental experience, which proves that they were interested in the evidence of the activity of the psyche and attempted to interpret it. The early Slavs had the beginnings of knowledge of heredity and constitutionalism, as can be shown by an analysis of beliefs concerning fate. Belief in południca contains a knowledge of the symptomatology of mental and neurological disorders caused by physical exhaustion and exposure to strong sunlight, and simultaneously gives hygienic instruction which enable these disorders to be effectively prevented. Magic, which the early Slavs also knew, we shall here consider chiefly as an important factor of solidarity within the tribe, forming an effective defence of the weaker from physical violence. Intoxication was almost entirely a collective cult phenomenon.The attitude of the early Slavs to the handicapped, including the mentally sick was generally kindly, sometimes even one of religious awe. Mentally handicapped persons were in some regions particularly venerated as the performers of cult ceremonies, magic and healing arts. Sometimes, however, they were treated inimically.Together with Christianity (the baptism of Mieszko I — 966 A. D.) there appears a cultural element which is qualitatively different and new — the idea of care for the weak and the sick, without the expectation of material reward. Christian mercy — Caritas seen in the evolutionary aspect, we consider as a particular expression of interhuman solidarity and thus as a sign of progress.The Christian culture of the West also brought with it the school and book form of education. Thanks to this, the prelogical and magical altitude to diseases was gradually overcome by the rational and scientific attitude. Polish physicians of the XVIth 'century universally regard madness as an illness, which proves that they had left behind them prelogical prejudices toward the mentally sick.The end of the Middle Ages and the beginnings of modern times were full of internal, warf are that desolated Europe. At this time contacts with the East were increasing and later also with the newly-discovered America. Western scholars became more widely familiar with the scientific achievements of antiquity. All this made for the decline of authorities, and travel and migrations helped to spread epidemics. „Bad government, exactions, the cupidity and violence of the great, wars and brigandage, scarcity, misery and pestilence — to this is contemporary history nearly reduced in the eyes of the people” (Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages, English translation by F. Hopman). Everything inclined the man of these times to violent acts, to extremes such as explosions of hatred or generous consecration of himself for the sake of the suffering. However, for Poland these were times of relative peace.The appearance on Jan Ciudad, called John of God, at the end of the XVI and beginning of the XVII century was a turning-point in the attitude towards the mentally sick. The congregation of Bonifraters founded by him initiated most of hospitals for the mentally sick in Europe, including Poland. Nursing the mentally sick is a particular phenomenon in the evolution of the human society, a phenomenon which slowly but surely prevails over former tendencies, regressive in relation to it, which were inclined to use repression towards these unfortunates. Eloquent evidence of this victory is the remarkable development of psychiatric hospitalization, which has, today, spread over almost the whole world.The XVIIth century, in which european science and culture flourished, is a time of decline in Poland. This country was overwhelmed by wars which were accompanied by epidemics. The dynasty of kings from Saxony brought us reprieve. The serf barely vegetated, the gentry gave themselves over to drunkenness, the towns fell into economic decay. Then and only then, religious intolerance reared its head in Poland and trials for witchcraft revived.Already half-way through the XVIIIth century there is an obvious national revival. Polish youth went abroad to study, journalism appeared, many foreigners settled in Poland, among whom were not a few physicians. The founding of the Educational Commission (1773) was a particularly important event. The end of the XVIIIth century brought the reform of some Polish universities, above all of the Cracow and the Vilno Academy, with their faculties of medicine.Voices begin to be raised against alcoholism. Attention was paid to neuro- -psychic disorders, of which it was thought that they were the result of leading an unnatural life. The questions of the hereditary nature of mental disorders, and of mental hygiene, were investigated.Society of the age of enlightenment by no means exhibited sobriety and common sense. The upper classes believed in „sympathies'’ and „magnetism”, while simple folk were still tormented by witchcraft and ghosts. Perzyna pronounces for their guidance: „Possession (daemonomania) is the pretence of madness” and „only recently our gloriously reigning [...] Stanislaus Augustus [...] (1776) in abolishing torture, liberated the people from the persecution of foolish, and John Bo- homolec, tearing the veil from their eyes, uncovered the folly of believing appearances".For many centuries care of the sick, including the mentally sick, was the domain of Christian mercy and philanthropy, in which the local, or the State authorities did not betray much interest. The emphasis was on the isolation of the mentally sick from the „healthy” population. The conviction that hospitals were a State concern, was voiced in Poland about half-way through the XVIIIth century, and found expression in the so-called Hospital Commissions in 1775.As time went on, the tendency grew for the State to take over hospital administration. In the Russian zone of partitioned Poland there were a series of legislative acts which gradually limited the function of non-governmental officiąls in the hospitals. However, the governmental initiative did not solve even the most important problems in psychiatric treatment, which social action attempted to allay.During the period between the world wars there were still many psychiatric hospitals in Poland administrated by communal authorities; after the second world war they all became controlled by the State.Hospitalization and other forms of psychiatric treatment, although as yet unable to fulfil all needs, are developing rapidly in People’s Poland. In addition, Poland at present is carrying out large-scale investigations in the field of psychiatry and social psychopathology.