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Ed Mooney
Earth as Sacred Site—The Bearing of Defilement: A Case in Point
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Michael E. Zimmerman
Perception, Incarnation, and Transformation:
Sacred Images of Human Corporeality
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Gail Stenstad
Holy Earth, Whole Thinking
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Maxine Sheets-Johnstone
Origins of the Sacred in the Paleolithic
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Bruce V. Foltz
Nature's Other Side:
The Demise of Nature and the Phenomenology of Givenness
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Call to Earth:
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Editorial Guidance/IAEP Website url
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Call To Earth Mission Statement
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Ingrid Leman Stefanovic
From the Editors
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Report on Books
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Call to Earth:
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Ingrid Leman Stefanovic
What Is An Ethic Of Place?
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Ralph Acampora
Oikos And Domus:
On Constructive Co-Habitation with Other Creatures
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Dennis Skocz
Wilderness, the Wild, and Nature Made Homely
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Leslie Van Gelder
The Philosophy of Place:
The Power of Story
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David Seamon
Connections That Have A Quality Of Necessity:
Goethe's Way Of Science As A Phenomenology Of Nature
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Environmental Ethics:
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Susan L. Flader
Leopold’s Some Fundamentals of Conservation:
A Commentary
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Michael Ruse
Sociobiology and Behavior
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Paul F. Schmidt
Wilderness as Sacred Space
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Aldo Leopold
Some Fundamentals of Conservation in the Southwest
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rights & permissions
Leopold first discusses the conservation of natural resources in the southwestern United States in economic tenns, stressing, in particular, erosion and aridity. He then concludes his analysis with a discussion of the moral issues involved, developing his general position within the context of P. D. Ouspenky’s early philosophy of organism.
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Environmental Ethics:
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John B. Cobb,
Christian Existence in a World of Limits
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The new awareness of limits profoundly challenges dominant habits of mind and styles of life. Although Christians have largely adopted these now inappropriate habits and styles, the Christian tradition has resources for a more appropriate response. Among these resources are Christian realism, the eschatological attitude, the discernment of Christ, the way of the cross, and prophetie vision. Finally, faith offers freedom from the burden of guilt of failing to live in a way appropriate to our newly perceived reality.
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Environmental Ethics:
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Don Howard
Commoner on Reductionism
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Barry Commoner has argued that the environmental failure of modern technology is due in large part to the reductionistic character ofmodern science, especially its biological component where the reductionist approach has triumphed in molecular biology. I claim, first, that Commoner has confused reduction in the sense of the reduction of one theory to another with what is better called analysis, or the strategy of breaking a whoie into its parts in order to understand the properties of the whole, this latter being the actual target of his attack. I then argue that his criticisms of molecular biology fail since each of the properties of the cell which he claims cannot be understood in an analytic fashion, such as reproduction, development and inheritance, can be so understood, and that, in fact, each of his putatively nonanalytic accounts of these properties is the result of analysis. Similarly, Commoner’s claim that ecosystenls possess properties that cannot be understood analytically is refuted by comparing ecosystems with automobiles, which Commoner acknowledges are susceptible to analysis, and by showing that there are no essential differences between the two. FinaIly, l observe that while it is false that ecosystems canna! be understood in analytic terms, it is true that they are not usually thus understood, and that the explanation for this is not that scientists subscribe to amistaken philosophy, but that our social institutions for the teaching and application of science do not adequately stress the importance of exploring the connections between the parts of such complex wholes.
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