Phenomenology is a philosophical movement of contemporary western thought. Its founder was Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). Its main purpose was oriented towards a methodological research. In his phenomenological method Husserl tried to find an absolute scientific standpoint for philosophy without any presupposition.This study refers to my two previous articles, namely "The Concept Epoche by Edmund Husserl" (Bulletin of the College of Liberal Arts, National Taivvan University, No. 21,Taipei, June 1972, pp. 203-307) and "A Comparative Study of Laotzu and Husserl--A Methodological Approach" (Analecta Husserliana, Ed. by A-T. Tymieniecka, Vol. XVII, D.Reider Publ. Co. Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster, 1984, pp. 6573) to show the husserlian essential way of researching from the epistemological investigation to the ontological sphere.In the problem of on the methological repistemology, there would be raised the following questions. Namely: What is the thinking subject? What would be the object of thisthinking subject? Furthermore, in the phenomenological study, the instrument method, and process used by the subject become also centres of problems. The relation between subject and object is therefore to be discussed in this article.In the discussion the relation between subject and object Husserl then used his epoché (bracketing) to transcend all the sensible world in the first step, in the second step however he refers the cartesian meditations, in which the cogito seemed to be the genuine and absolute standpoint for the beginning of all sciences. The cartesian ego, cogito, is therefore the transcendental subjectivity for Husserl and his followers to guarantee his methodological beginning.But phenomenology would not satisfy with this subjectivity. Contrarily, it would like to extend its influence on the objective world. That is the method of the husserlianWesensschau through which all the external world would be constituted by the subjective intentional Bewuβtseinsstrom (consciousness-stream).The place in which Husserl overcomes Descartes lies on the refinding of the objective world. Descartes said "cogito, ergo sun", Husserl can even added "cogito, ergo die Welt ist".Phenomenology demonstrates indeed a way from epistemology to ontology.

The topic might indicate what kind of theme will be considered in this paper. I would like to do three things. First, to brief a historical development of the problem of definite descriptions, beginning from 1905, Russell's paper, through 1950, Strawson's rejection of Russell's theory, and 1966, Donnellan's theory of referential use and attributive use,to 1977, Kripke's criticism of Donnellan's theory. Secondly, to do some critical study of Donnellan's theory. And finally, taking the above account as an example to show that aphilosophical study of language is an important method of philosophy as well as one main philosophy in the modern time.

This paper is an attempt to expound and clarify the main points of Deweys naturalistic metaphysics. Section one deals with Dewey's definition of metaphysics as a study of the generic traits of existence and takes issue with Hook's and Rorty's negative view concerning Dewey's enterprise. Section two deals with Dewey's empirical method, in which such key concepts as "primary experience" and "selective emphasis" are examined. Section three deals with Deweys substantive metaphysical theories, using his treatment of the mind-body problem as a typical example. Section four deals with four generic traits of nature found or implied in Dewey's metaphysical works: change, quality, interaction and continuity. Section five defends Dewey's position against some criticisms raised by Santayana, Cohen and others, while at the same time points out that Deweys concept of "primary experience" is ambiguous and that his purely functional approach to natural existences is one-sided.

After a brief historical survey of the Is-Ought question, this paper takes issue with John Searle's important 1964 article 'How to Derive "Ought" from "Is".' Searle tries to derive"ought" from "is" through an analysis of speech act of making a promise. Searle claims that a promise is a fact (what he calls an institutional fact), but in making a promise, a person is committed to carrying out what is promised, that is to say, he is also making an evaluation. Searle's point is that through this speech act analysis, he is able to derive an "ought" conclusion from premises which are purely factual statements. The present paper argues that whether one has to carry out what one promises depends on the content of the promise. However, in order to decide whether one should keep the promise, one has to appeal to one's own moral principles. In other words, there are evaluative elements hidden in Searle's so-called factual premises. Searle's attempt to derive "ought" from "is" is thus shown to be unsuccessful.

Hempel's covering law theory of scientific explanation is discussed and criticized. According to Hempel, an adequate deductive-nomological explanation must satisfy the following three requirements: (i) the explanandum must be a logical consequence of the explanans; (ii) the explanans must contain general laws; and (iii) the sentences constituting the explanans must be true or well-confirmed. The present article argues that there could hardly be any explanation which satisfies all of the three requirements, and that either (i) or (iii) has to be abandoned.

The present paper first suggests that Quine's theory of river stage can be used in order to clarify Heraclitus' concept of the same river. However, in order for Quine's theory tobe useful, it is necessary to have a proper understanding of the principle of individuation. The author then attempts to offer an interpretation of the principle of individuation bymeans of the principle of abstraction. Finally, Leibniz's law is discussed through an analysis of the logical behavior of identity.

Religious language is what we use to express religious experience which can be found in various places and times. But, has religious language any meaning, or more properly, can it be understood by those who never have or never want to admit such experience? If the answer to this question is positive, then what kind of meaning is this? The present article aims to tackling this problem. It begins with defining "religious language" , then ponders the discussion of some analytic philosophers like A. J. Ayer, A. Flew, I. Ramsey and others. Following this is an exposition of four ways in using religious language; they are: the negative way, the dubious way, the analogical way, and the qualification way. The conclusion shows that the meaning of religious language is based on a more comprehensive understanding of reality and an adequate definition of existence.

A method of philosophy is not independent from a conception of philosophy. The way of understanding Wittgenstein's method of philosophy is in his Philosophical Investigations. He says, "The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness" (Sec.255). And, "The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always know. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language." (Sec. 109). That is to say, Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy is that philosophy is not a doctrine of reality, but a treatment of illness which is arised from human life. The, treatment is out of his theories of language. This paper deaIs with his two different prescriptions in two books, i. e., Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations. The author contends that it is one method, that is, "by means of language", and one aim, "die Loesung des Problems des Lebens."

The expression "three thousands" (三千) does not indicate a numerical or substantical immensity, but intends to show the inter-permeation of all dharmas and the ultimate unity of the whole universe.As the basis of "three thousands" the school sets forth a world system of ten realms. (十界) That is to say , the world of living beings is devided into ten realms, of which thehigher four are saintly (四聖) and the lower six are ordinary. (六凡)These ten realms are mutually immanent and mutually inclusive, (十界互具) each one having in it the remaining nine realms. This immanence of each of the ten worlds inall of them accounts for 100 worlds. (百界)Further, each of these realms has ten features of Thusness. (十如是) That is form, nature, substance, force, action, cause, circumstance, effect, remuneration, and the ultimate state. By discovering these ten features in the 100 worlds, this school arrives at the doctrine of 1000 realms. (千如)Moreover, each realm consists of three divisions (三世間) : the species of living beings (眾生世間), the species of space-region (國土世間)， and the spacies of five aggregates (五蘊 世間). Thus there are three thousand worlds (三千世間), constituting the whole of manifested reality. The universe of all beings are the whole world of dynamic becoming.In the end, all the dharmas of the universe are immanent In one rnoment of thought. Namely, that the one moment of thought is itself 3000 worlds (一念三千).

According to the tradition of the Zen Buddhistic school, the sudden method of Hui Neng follows the orthodox teachings of Hung Jen and Tao Hsin, while the gradual method of Shen Hsiu is a heresy. The present paper, based on a comparative study of Shen Hsiu's and Tao Hsin's way of Zen, shows that the method of "looking at mind, looking atpurity" critized by Hui Neng, is espoused not only by Shen Hsiu but also by Tao Hsin.Both Tao Hsin and Shen Hsiu adhere to the Zen of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra advocated by the earlier Zen masters from Bodhidharma on, but in Hui Neng and the later masters, we find that many ideas derived from the Diamond Sūtra are introduced into the way of Zen. This is the reason why Hui Neng takes exception to Tao Hsin's and Shen Hsiu's "Laṅkāvatāra Zen". Therefore, the distinction between "orthodoxy" and "heresy" in Zen school is not merely a matter of who holds fast to the original teachings of Bodhidharma, there are other factors to be considered.

韓非 has been regarded as the greatest thinker of the Legalist School. The main reason of such recoginization is always to be supposed that he first equally estimate each ofthese three elements 一勢、術、法- in the process of dealing with political affairs. For giving a more profounder research, in this paper I try to discuss his extraordinary view concerning the well-governed country and the relationship between king and subjects. And then I also try to point out the reason why he would insist that 勢、術、法 should have the main roles in a well operation government.

真常系思想為大乘佛教三大思想之一，影響中國佛教至鉅。此系統主要是建立在如來藏(或佛性)的教義上，高揚人心中蘊含的清淨本性。然而，帶有神我色彩的如來藏卸自古引起不少靜議。例如，如來藏是否代表某種有「我」論?清淨的如來藏如果是本然的存在，則染污的「無明」又因何而起?本文根據「寶性論」、「大般涅槃經」、「佛性論」等真常 系統經論，探討如來藏的空性義，以駁斥現代某些學者主張如來 藏思想為實體一元論的論調

This article is divided into three main parts. The first part deals with the historical development of the problems on the theories of human nature by Han-Confucianists fromChia-yi (200-168 B. C.), through Liu An (179-122 B. C.), Tung Chung-shu (179-104 B.C.), Liu Shang (77-6 B.C.), Yang Hsiung (53 B. C.-18 A. D.), Wang Chung (27-100 A. D.) to Hsün Yüeh (148-209 A. D.). In this part I try to shovv that the discussions on the theories of human nature by these philosophers had not sucedeed beyond the limitationof Pre-chin period. Their discussions are only the reflections on the good or bad nature proposed by Mencius or Hsün-tzu.In the second part I group the theories of Han-Confucianists on the human nature as the essential contents of this article. In my opinion there are four groups which can besummarized all the theories on the human nature in Han-dynasties, namely: theory of feeling , essentialism, liberalism and determinism. In all these theories there is however a metaphysical foundation: T'ien (Heaven). Human nature is participated the nature of T'ien. T'ien is the ultimate being of human existence. T'ien-ming (mandate of heaven) is therefore the orientation of human nature. The relation between T'ien and man is the very characteristics of Han-Confucianists.Finally, in the third part, the contemporary significance is discussed in the light of western philosophical and religious wisdom. The soul-body dualism both from Plato and Hebrew or Christianity should be complimented to the Chinese philosophical discussion on the human nature. The soul as the participation of prototype from ideal world by Plato, or as the Image of God by the Hebrew and Christianity seems to be equivalent to the good nature of Mencius, and the body however as a part of the material world or the cause of the original sin to be unanimous with bad nature of Hsüntzu. The salvific way of union of soul with body both philosophical and religious from western cultural point of view should illustrate the solution of this problem on human nature for Chinese philosophy.

This paper will first trace the historical sources and analyze the philosophical categories as found in Chu Hsi's metaphysics in order to find some connection and logicalstructure between his cosmology and his theory on human nature. It will be made clear that Chu Hsi's cosmology is based on the logic of the "unity of substance and function"(i'i yung i ju) , and his ontology on that while "principle is one, its manifestations are many" (Ii i fen shu). However, the main interrest of Chu Hsi's philosophical thought lies inmoral self-cultivation which is centered on "seriousness and extension of principle" (chu-ching ch'iung-li). So it will be able to deal with the practical problem inherent in human nature-a problem or a kind of paradox that while human mind and universal mind stand in opposite, universal mind must be realized in human mind. From this point of view, Chu Hsi's theory on substance and function has great advantage in that it does neither avoid nor distort the contradictory opposite. It has also resolved many difficulties， proved the perfectibility of human nature, and provided a new way to sagehood. This is the main point this paper tries to explicate so as to demonstrate the profundity of Chu Hsi's philosophical thought.

There are several major items in the Book of Chuang Tse. These items become members of the Tao-te clan. Among them, Tao (道), te (德), tien (天), ti (地), wu ( 物),jen (人), are the five prominent ones. They constitute a group of items for the plan strategy of the tao-te clan. Tao (道), te (德), hsing (nature) (性), hsing (bodily form) (形),constitute another group of items for the accomplishment of a being in the tao-te clan. And ch'i (氣), ming (命), ts'ai (才), ch'ing (情), hsin (心), chih (知) make up a group ofitems concerning man in the tao-te clan. This is the first point of Chuang Tse's view as I expound in my paper.The second point is that by observing the tao-te clan we can understand what the world is, so the view of tao-te is just Chuang Tse's Weltanschaung. Parallel to this point isthe point that he takes 'to be' as the aim of 'ought to be'. Since the tao-te clan is just what is 'to be', the tao-te clan, i. e., his Weltanschauung, is also his view of 'ought to be'.The third point is that three is a distinction between 'what is from heaven' and 'what is from man'. From 'what is from man' come things that are not in the tao-te clan.They are 'ought-not-to-bes', because they are not 'to bes'.The 'ought not to be' must be ruled out. Just as when we winnow the chaff, and the dust will get into our eyes, so when we winnow benevolence and righteousness we will cause the greatest confusion in the world. Therefore Chuang Tse maintains that kings or politicians must not winnow benevolence and righteousness. This is the fourth point as expounded in my paper.Since the 'ought to be' is simply 'to be' one needs no virtues to cultivate oneself. Chuang Tse's view of Tao-te as morality is a view of morality vvithout virtues. However, hedoes not go so far as to deny good, for the tao-te clan is good by itself. To abandon benevolence and righteousness does not, therefore, mean to abandon morality, it means only to abandon virtues. And his teaching of human nature is that human nature must be kept as what it is. While one needs no cultivation through virtues, still human nature isgood, because it is originally in the originally in the tao-te clan. This is the fifth paint.How can we keep our nature (性) vvithin the tao-te clan and not let it go beyond the latter? The answer is that we must maintain intactly what comes from heaven (全天) andkeep our original selves (守人). This is the sixth point expounded in my paper.

This paper is a study of the theory of human nature of the Pre-Chin legalist school with "Kuan Tzu" , the "Book of Lord Shang" and "Han Fei Tzu" main reference. It is divided into the following sections: (1) prologue, (2) understanding of human nature as the necessary condition for governing the world, (3) analysis of human nature in "Kuan Tzu" , (4) analysis of human nature in the "Book of Lord Shang", (5) analysis of human nature in "Han Fei Tzu", and (6) exanlination and appraisal of the theory of human nature of the Pre-Chin legalist school.The present author's analysis shows that the Pre-Chin legalist philosophers refrained from commenting on the question whether human nature is essentially good or evil.Their main concern is how a ruler could adequately govern the nation. In order to govern the nation, it is necessary to carry out empirical studies of human nature withoutmaking value judgments. The three main texts mentioned above all agree that emotions and desires are the basic elements of human nature, but they differ in details. Thetheories of human nature in "Kuan Tzu" and in "Han Fei Tzu" are, because of their Taoist intent and insight, especially profound and complicated.

It is well-known fact that Kuei-chi (A. D. 632-682) and his Great Teacher, Hsüan-tsan (A. D. 600-664) are the founder of the Chinese Vijñānavāda's school, Fa-hsing-tzung (法相宗), Kuei-chi has not only the Indian and Chinese Vijñānavāda's theories, but also his outstanding theories, because he , borrowed the important technical name "citta-uttāpana" (鍊磨，心) from the Mahāyānasaṁgraha-śastra, explains the "Deep course of the Prajñāpāramitā" of PPHS (Prajñāpāramitā-hṛdaya-sūtra) with the theories of Vijñānavāda's Practices.Before explaining this Vijñānavāda's theories, I, in this paper, attempt to explain the meanings of Mind (citta) connected with the Three "citta-uttāpana" from the viewpointof PPHV, the Commentary of PPHS by Kuei-chi. In the First Section , Kuei-chi's works, the name of 26 books are introduced, and then his special Chinese explanations of"vijñāptimātra" (唯識) and "vijñāptimātratā" (唯識性) are dealt. In order to research the theories of "citta", "manas" and "vijñāna" in the PPHV, the Second Section is dividedinto three subsections as follows: (1) the "vijñāna" (識) of the Five-skandhas means "citta" , "manas" and "vijñāna". (2) The "manas" (意) of the Twelve-āyatanas means theeight vijñāna. (3) The "mano-vijñāna-dhātu" (意識界) of the Eighten-dhātus has above both meanings: the citta (Eighth Vijñāna)， the "manas" (Seventh Vijñāna) and "vijñāna" (six vijñāna). Of them the first two, especially have three states' vijñāna. As regards these theories, a diagram of the comparative saṁskrit with Chinese theories, and some theories of the Āgama, Yogācāra-bhūmi and Mahāyānasaṁgraha-bhāṣya etc. are discussed.In conclusion, the outstanding theories of Kuei-chi are considered as follows : (1) The "citta" , "manas" and "vijñāna" have the characteristics of both negative and positive. (2)The natures of both the Eighth Vijñāna (citta) and the Seventh Vijñāna (manas) are good, which are different not only from the Vijñaptimātra-siddhi-śāstra， but also fromFui-ching (慧淨)'s Tathāgatagarbha.