The aim of this essay is to focus the function of women in Aristophanes’ theatre (Lysistrata and Ecclesiazusae) and in Plato’s book V of the Republic, in an attempt to compare the different strategies adopted by these two authors in staging the female subject on the scene of their respective writings. This enquiry involves raising some fundamental questions such as : is the world of women, evoked by Aristophanes in his dramas and by Plato in his dialogues, a simple metaphor and a mere instrument, if not an utopian mirage, of political theorizing ? If this is not the case, what is the real and practical importance of women within the models of society and collective life outlined by Aristophanes and Plato ? Do Aristophanes and Plato share a same perspective about the role of women in their hypothetical ideal cities ? If not, what are the differences between Aristophanes’ and Plato’s views on this matter?

Le premier commentaire à l’Isagoge de Porphyre, réalisé à partir de la version de Marius Victorinus, semble avoir été pour Boèce l’occasion de faire converger deux analyses, mises au service d’un même idéalisme culturel, l’une propre à une certaine philologie, en un sens qu’il conviendra de définir, l’autre propre à la philosophie, dans son acception classique. Par bien des aspects, ce double cheminement nous paraît présenter des analogies avec ce que l’on observera à la Renaissance, lorsque les approches linguistiques et gnoséologiques se verront associées dans le déchiffrement de textes dont la teneur se révèle à même de susciter l’élévation et l’accomplissement de l’homme.

The paper reconsiders Aristotle’s criticism of Platonic forms as causes together with its wider implications for the differences but also similiarities between the two philosophers. Analyzing the relevant texts of Metaphysics A 9 and Generation and Corruption II, 9, where Aristotle addresses the hypothesis of forms as put forward in the Phaedo, it discusses two interpretative options : that Aristotle takes these forms for an imperfect anticipation of formal causes, and that he sees them as an aborted attempt at grasping the efficient causation whose proper discovery Aristotle claims to be uniquely his own. Although both readings have their virtues and can be defended from the Aristotelian perspective, their check against the text of the Phaedo reveals that, in this context, efficient causation distinct from material causation is quite plausibly the issue Aristotle has in mind first and foremost. This, however, is only one side of Aristotle’s broader critical stance towards forms as causes : while he seems to detect a split in Plato’s own understanding of the relation between the forms and causation (a split between the direct yet unclear influence of universals such as the forms of the large or the beautiful on the one hand and the clear causal scheme of the craft-like model of producing things on the other hand), he is equally critical (if not scornful) of the craft-like model as personified by the demiurge of the Timaeus. However, other passages from the Metaphysics (and also from the Generation of animals) suggest that some features of precisely this model, once it is carefully stripped of its personal aspect, may ultimately bear on Aristotle’s own conception of efficient cause.

Questo articolo discute un aspetto specifico della teoria causale di Plotino, ossia la critica che egli rivolge alla funzione della causa finale nella sua spiegazione della struttura e della generazione della realtà a partire dal principio primo situato al suo culmine. A tale fine, sono esaminati i capitoli 1-3 e 25 del trattato VI 7 (38) delle Enneadi, in cui la questione della causa finale è posta con chiarezza, innanzitutto nel quadro di una lettura e di un’interpretazione del racconto cosmologico del Timeo di Platone e del ruolo che assume il demiurgo in questo racconto, quindi nel quadro di una critica della concezione aristotelica del primo motore immobile come fine ultimo di tutte le cose.

The first part of this article focuses on Plotinus’ account of demiurgic causation in treatise VI, 7 [38]. Plotinus’ position is based on two assumptions : 1) the sensible cosmos is rationally ordered and its order depends on an intelligible prior cause ; 2) this order does not reflect any rational design on the part of the cause, since the cause has no reasoning or calculation in it. This view is spelled out against the background of Plotinus’ gradualist metaphysics (theory of the “double activity”) and with respect to Plotinus’ philosophical sources (Plato’s Timaeus and Aristotle’s Metaphysics). The second part of the article focuses on Porphyry, on the anonymous commentary on Plato’s Parmenides and on Iamblichus. Unlike Plotinus, Porphyry has no hesitation in employing concepts drawn from Aristotle’s logic as a resource for expressing his metaphysical theories. This approach can interestingly be set in parallel with that of the anonymous commentary to Plato’s Parmenides assigned to Porphyry by Pierre Hadot (see In Parm., XI, 5-19). A hitherto unnoticed parallel between these lines and Porphyry’s view on the divine hierarchy criticised in Iamblichus’ Response to Porphyry (I, 4, p. 7, 21-11, 4, Saffrey – Segonds) provides a new argument in support of Porphyry’s authorship of the Parmenides commentary.

The stoic fragments about the notion of cause describe general determinations of what a cause is, without distinguishing kinds of causes. This, for instance, is the case with Zeno’s and Chrysippus’ definitions conveyed by Stobaeus. On the other hand, many testimonies mention causal distinctions, but only related to the Stoics in general, or even without indicating any school. The interest of Cicero’s De fato is that this treatise refers precisely to some causal distinctions presented by Chrysippus and points out the context in which they are developed, i.e the defence of human responsibility. The present study first analyses these causal distinctions linked to Chrysippus at the end of the preserved part of Cicero’s treatise. Secondly, it studies the academic reactions to these distinctions, which are carefully described by Cicero. Finally, these debates between Stoics and Academics are considered from the standpoint of the contrasting positions found in Plato’s dialogues, about the proper or improper usage of the word a‡tion. There are good reasons to think that Plato’s positions underlie the discussions presented by Cicero.

Œnomaus of Gadara, in his work Detection of Deceivers (γoήτων ϕώρα), of which long fragments are preserved by Eusebius of Caesarea, contests Apollo’s oracles in name of the human action contingency. His targets are not only the Democritean and Stoic determinism, but also the Middle Platonic view of conditional fate. In a fictional address to Apollo, he demonstrates the contingency of the action, in an original way (the „dialectical cogito”), which he extends to the field of the animal action. The examination of his argument shows that the Stoic conceptions of what depends on us (ἐφ᾽ἡμῖν) and of consciousness (συναίσθησις) are cannibalized against determinism.

Cet article s’attache à l’émergence de l’idée d’une cause agente, en lieu et place de la cause motrice aristotélicienne. Si Avicenne a dédoublé la cause agente en reconnaissant un principe du mouvement et un principe de l’être, la tradition exégétique grecque puis la falsafa d’expression arabe s’étaient d’abord attachées à reconnaître une cause rendant compte de l’advenue à l’être.

Cet article entend déterminer l’apport original du concept de cause essentielle chez Dietrich de Freiberg à la théorie de la causalité. La première partie est consacrée à la définition de cette cause qui précontient l’essence de son effet sur un mode plus noble. Elle montre que cette idée se situe au croisement d’influences néoplatoniciennes (Proclus, Pseudo-Denys l’Aréopagite, le Liber de causis), arabes (Avicenne et Averroès), et qu’elle provient d’une discussion serrée de la thèse de la «cause par essence» d’Albert le Grand. La deuxième partie se focalise sur la fonction cardinale de la cause essentielle dans l’oeuvre de Dietrich. En effet, ce concept permet d’expliquer, sur le plan cosmologique, l’unité de l’univers, le mouvement des cieux et des astres, et sur le plan noétique, de démontrer les propriétés de l’intellect agent, sa relation à l’intellect possible et aux intelligibles, et pour finir son rapport à l’âme. Il ressort de cette étude que la causalité essentielle sert à construire l’ordre des étants «conceptionnels» dans un ensemble cohérent et articulé.

This article proposes an analysis of the use of emotions, in particular the shame, characterizing the elenctic method performed by Socrates in the dialogue with Callicles in the third part of Plato’s Gorgias. The elenchus aims at improving the interlocutor through a process of purification that is capable of changing his whole existence. However, Plato’s dialogues only rarely give testimony of a successful transformation occurring in the interlocutor. This is due to the interlocutor’s attitude towards shame : the feeling of shame can be accepted as a mean for self-transformation or hidden to protect a social status. The article will explore the way in which this fundamental difference is delineated within the dialogue by providing appropriate textual examples. Arguably, by outlining the distinction between the types of shame, it is possible to notice how the purification of the interlocutor implies a turning point for the public. This is what I call „outreach elenchus”, a specific hermeneutic figure that allows to understand a form of purification of the audience and the spectators witnessing the debate. This type of elenchus steps in at the very moment in which the Socratic interlocutor attempts to protect his social image, concealing his shame. The audience, thanks to Plato’s literary strategy, realizes the failures of the interlocutor even as he refuses to accept them. As a result, his social image becomes tarnished.

Epicurus claimed that „all sensations are true”, and that the false is only in the opinions. This paradoxical theory, very much criticized both by ancient and modern commentators, for it seems counterfactual, draws on Aristotle’s theory of sensations. Aristotle (as shown especially in the De anima) holds that sensations and opinions must be distinguished. As long as sensations stick to their „proper domain”, they remain trustworthy and cannot refute each other, regardless of whether they are similar or different in kind. Yet they can fail to perceive the truth, when they pass beyond their proper domain into what one can call their „improper domain” (sizes and things). At this moment sensations resemble opinions and become fallible. So, to a certain extent, the divide between sensations and opinions becomes blurred. Epicurus seems to have taken up much of this theory. Yet he submitted it to a radical simplification: now, there is no room for the „improper domain”, so that all one sensation seizes always belongs to its „proper domain”. Thus it can never be refuted neither by a similar, nor by a dissimilar sensation in kind; therefore it is always and in every circumstance trustworthy. One can add that, in reshaping Aristotle’s theory of senses by removing the „improper domain”, Epicurus purged the theory of senses of all elements that could involve uncertainty and imprecision – which is typical for his strenuous attempt to achieve calm and serenity.

Questo articolo in un primo tempo avrà il fine di indagare le carat­teristiche che costituiscono la teologia stoica, così come esse sono presenti nell’Inno a Zeus di Cleante. Per perseguire questo obiettivo, in un secondo tempo bisognerà tracciare la nozione della divinità secondo gli Stoici, insistendo sull’aggettivo πολυώνυμος attribuito a Zeus e rivedere certi punti dell’Inno secondo un’interpretazione personale. Infine, in un terzo e ultimo tempo si tenterà di proporre una esegesi del termine πάνδωρος, anch’esso attribuito a Zeus, e di individuare nella sua etimologia quale sia il rapporto tra la divinità e la vita dell’uomo.

Apuleius’ generation was caught in the passage from philosophic monotheism to that form of imperial henotheism whose aim was to counteract the tension between philosophy and popular religiosity. It can be affirmed that terminology, vocabulary and especially the motive of discreetness and the prudence in the use of defining syntagmatic expressions are a common fact of Medioplatonism. Author’s attitude is that of a philosopher resorting to the mystic cults, plainly aware of their value and, not the last of the things, of the worship responsibilities devolving on a deliberate attachment. The prudence characterizing the discourse on the ineffable nature of the divinity dwells rather on the meaning and requirement of Platonic mysteries, as they were translated and interpreted by Medioplatonism, in its semi-literal manner, current that Apuleius joined on a base of a certain familiarity from a stylistic and thematic point of view.

The Alba Iulia Battyaneum Library, subsidiary of the National Library of Romania, was visited in the summer of 2014 by the authors with the intent to explore the commentaries on Peter Lombard’s Sentences which are preserved in the renowned collection of this library. With the help of research tools currently available, the authors verified 21 manuscripts and identified 20 commentaries, and also 4 copies of the Sentences’ text. Overall, the authors discovered five yet unmentioned copies of commentaries. The article presents the newly ascertained details on 17 manuscripts, in relation with previously known data.

In this paper, a pluralistic explanation of the sources of evil according to Plato is offered, which takes into account not only ethics, but also cosmology. In Plato, one must distinguish between negative evils, which result from the inherent distortion of images, that is, of bodies, as compared to their model, that is, of intelligible reality; and positive evils, whose ultimate cause is the soul. In the case of the soul of the world, one must speak of relative positive evils that are the consequence of its degraded power, and in the case of man, of absolute positive evils, which are the consequence of error.

Alexander’s Treatises on Fate (in Greek) and on Providence (conserved in Arabic) have many features in common, so that Jaap Mansfeld referred to them as «twins treatises». One reason of this kinship is the method used by Alexander, who takes the doxographical presentation as a skeptical dissensus in order to establish the superiority of Aristotelian thesis. But another reason, perhaps more important, is their conceptual closeness : the peripatetic definitions of providence and fate, in these two treatises, are very similar and obviously seek to address similar concerns. This proximity is so high that one could ask in which way the two concepts differ one from another. In this paper I will offer an overview of common features between the two treatises, especially Alexander’s attempts to find some textual grounds in Aristotle’s treatises for building a peripatetic theory of fate and providence consistent and strong enough to be held against the thesis developed on these topics since the Hellenistic period. Then I will propose a hypothesis on the relation between these two treatises and consequently between these two concepts.

One of the main philosophical works by Alexander of Aphrodisias, De principiis, is lost in its original Greek text, but it is preserved in three extant Medieval Semitic versions, one in Syriac and two in Arabic, which were written in the Near East between 500 and 950 AD. These versions are not totally identical and, as we have shown in 2012, they are in a rather complex textual relationship. As we will show in this article, a tentative reconstruction of the lost text should be based upon an attentive and point‑to‑point comparative analysis of some aspect of all three versions. We have tentatively called the abore way “critical translation”.

In this paper, we argue that Plotinus denies deliberative forethought about the physical cosmos to the demiurge (or to any other divine principle) on the basis of certain basic and widely shared Platonic and Aristotelian assumptions about the character of divine thought. We then discuss how Plotinus can nonetheless maintain (as he does) that the cosmos is «providentially» ordered.