21.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1996 >
Issue: 19
Van-Doan Tran
陳文團
Difference De-Difference Identity:
Reflection on Ideological Dialogue
差異-去異-合一:對
view |
rights & permissions
近來兩岸雙邊文化對話或相互交流,不僅是量的增加,在質 方面也有進展。本文探討的重點並非是對這種工作做評估,而是 討論其中被隱藏或刻意迴避的課題:意識型態的衝突。我們將採 取以下的方式討論之:首先,文化對話或文化交流基本上是有益於邁向兩岸相互了 解的第一步O但是,這並不能解決實際的問題,因為,如果沒有 小心處理雙方對話的動機,則所獲得的所謂成果就是不充份的或 是偏見的O因此,我們必須討論動機的問題。其次,文化衝突永遠都可以反映出人類利益衝突的事實。意 識型態,如同文化一般,表達出一個人民、種族、類型的共通 性,但不同於文化的是,意識型態密切關係著人類上層建築( supra 叫ructure )的一致性;文化則有助於轉化能力與權力表 白,它可以維護利益,獲取或整合權力,而且與塑造社會中的 上、下層建築都有牽連。第三,意識型態的對話只有在全面性的觀念上討論人的生 活,以及試圖處理人類與生俱來的利益街突的導引下,才有可能 成功。為了證明這些論點,我們採取批判的與理性的進路,以及部 分黑格爾式的辯證O首先,我們要批判立基於差異( difference ) 和二元論( dualism) 的意識型態, 以顯示這些意識型態最多只 能產生一些單一的、局部的、非歷史的綜合O在陳述這樣一個為 差異或為錯誤的合一性差異性辯證後,我們接著討論真實的綜合 辯證'這種辯證可以去除局部的、非歷史的以及單一的綜合(錯 誤意識型態) ,以達致人類生命的真實性揚棄( authentical Aufhebung) 。 這篇論文包含三個部分: 第一部份處理非真實性 的差異辯証,第二部份分析去差異(de-differentiation) 的辯證 歷程,以及,最後提出一個解決意識型態衝突的途徑。
|
|
|
22.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1996 >
Issue: 19
Chin-mu Yang
楊金穆
Rules for Negation in Natural Deduction Systems
自然沒繹象統中否定之推衍規則
view |
rights & permissions
自然演繹系統( ntural deduction systems) ,依其創始者G . Gentzen 之立意, 係指僅只由一組設定之推衍規則 (rules of inference) 所構成的邏輯系統。 而在此類系統中, 一個推衍之建構 (the construction of a derivation) 係由某些特定的假設出發, 利 用適當的規衍規則逐步推論出所要的結論。由於此類系統不預設 任何設基(axims) ,因而得以避免有關設基是否為真的哲學爭 論。復次,系統中每一規則的訂定,概皆依循相對應之邏輯連詞 (connectives) 之真值表, 如此一來, 推衍的運作可以「自然 地」按照吾人對於相對應之連詞之(真值表)理解而進行。例 如,若由假設P成立,可推知Q亦成立,吾人可斷盲P→ Q成 立。 此一推衍顯示結論中的「→」並沒有出現在前提人指P與 Q) 中, 因此, 欲由前提得知P →Q' 吾人需建立一規則可資 引進 (introduce) I → J 記號。職是吾人可設一「引進」→ 規則 (introduction rule for →) 來進行上述推衍O相對地,假設 (P → Q) 成立而且P成立,吾人可推衍出Q成立,此一推衍顯示 在提出現的→記號已不復出現在結論中。因此,吾人可設定一 「消去J→規則(Elimination rule for →)來進行上述推衍。 整 個自然演繹法的建立即在於將此一基本方法應用至所有之連詞。 若然對應於每一連詞都有一組「消去規則J與「引進規則 ˩ '吾 人可得以「自然地」進行任何語旬的推衍。由於上述優點,自然 演繹系統已成為一般認為最優雅的表現方式。然則,本文將指出,在一個滿足的自然演繹系統中,對於每 一個連詞而言,都應有一組自然的「消去規則」與「引進規 則˩ 。 而且, 更重要的, 此一組規則必需是局部完備的( Local complete) 。所謂一組規則是局部完備的系指所有的中效的句式 (Valid Sequents) ,若其只合此一組規則所關連之連詞。則此一句式可只藉由此一組規則推衍而得。很明顯地,在一般常見的自 然演繹系統中,對應對「 ˅ ˩ 與「 ˄ ˩ 的一組規則, 如Van Dalen d { ( ˄ I) , ( ˄ E) } 與 { ( ˅ I),( ˅ E) }, 即各其備此- 條 件。 更且, 所有中效的句式若其連詞只包含 ˄ 與˅ , 則此的句式 可利用此兩組規則推衍而得O因此,若針對每一連詞,都有一組 完備的規則,則整個系統自然是完備的。就命題邏輯而育,吾人已知{ ¬, ˅ } 或 { ¬ ,˄ }是一組完 整的連詞,意謂任一命題皆可利用一只包括¬ 與˅的語式( formula) 來表現。 因此, 若對於¬而盲, 吾人亦可建立一組完備且自然的規則,則此一組規則加上對於「而育,另一組對於{¬ ˅ v} 或者{¬ ˅} 的規則都可組合成一個完備且自然的演繹系 統。然而,本文將討論並指出,目前所常見的否定記號之推衍規 則,有些雖是完備的但不夠自然,有此雖是自然的,但本身並非 完備,此一觀察顯示出自然演繹系統並非如一般所認為的優雅。就其「自然性」而吉似乎比樹枝法( tableau system) 要略遜一 籌。 就規則組之局部完備性而吉顯然又不如Sequent Calculi 。
|
|
|
23.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1996 >
Issue: 19
Louis G. Aldrich
艾立勤
A Methodology of Moral Judgment according to Jacques Maritain: Some Initial Insights
馬里旦的迫使、判斷方法論 一些初步的洞識
view |
rights & permissions
本篇文章題目為『馬里旦道德判斷方法論』。許多人認為馬里 旦 (Jacques Maritain) 是本世紀多瑪斯學派的權威。他治學過 人之處,是能以創新的方法,將現代哲學及科學的精華曳融合於 多瑪斯偉大的哲學和神學理論中。馬里旦的思想廣博,涵蓋的範 圍包括形上學、認識論、自然哲學、政治與社會哲學及人學與倫 理學。他的政治思想和社會倫理觀念,對歐洲及拉丁美洲影響深 遠。馬里旦希望教導現代人概念及判斷的正確觀念。他撰寫過多 篇文章概述「判斷」的問題,而其中著墨最多的部份便是「道德 判斷」。任何道德判斷方法論都必須面對一個基本問題:如何將 普遍的道德概念,融合於道德主體特定的其體判斷中?換吉之, 基於個人獨特的倫理主體性 (moral subjectivity) ,在一特定情 況下, 「 人類主體」 (human subject) 是如何決定要運用哪些 普通準則?要如何將這些準則付諸實現呢?為了解馬里且如何將客體的普遍道德觀與倫理主體性相結 合,我們將探討下列主題:其一,馬里且對其體道德判斷之架構 及其動態過程 (dynamism) 的看法。 其二, 實際運用普遍道德 原則時的困難。馬里且認為康德和齊克果 (Kierkegaard) 皆未 能解釋道德判斷;我們將利用他在這方面的研究做為例子。其三,馬里且如何運用其對自然道德律的認識,來嘗試解決普遍規 範和個人主體性間的衝突。根據他的說法,如果對自然道德律有 正確的認識,便不會做出被個人主體性視為「武斷J (arbitrary) 的道德判斷, 也可避免過於主觀, 使普遍規範無法引導道 德選擇。最後,基於對馬里且學說的分析,我們將提出幾項道德 判斷方法論須考量的因素。雖然上述各點並不構成完整的道德方 法論,但我希望本篇初探的內容,能遵循馬里且學說的精神,使 讀者認識一位本世紀偉大哲學家的基本思想。
|
|
|
24.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1972 >
Issue: 2
Robert L. Martin
Some Thoughts on the Formal Approach to the Philosophy of Language
|
|
|
25.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1972 >
Issue: 2
Hsiu-hwang Ho
Syntactical Descriptions of "Possible World" and Consequences
|
|
|
26.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1972 >
Issue: 2
Perry Smith
Well-founded Relation and a Generalization of König's Lemma
|
|
|
27.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1972 >
Issue: 2
Sung-Peng Hsu
Belief, Knowledge, and the Personal
|
|
|
28.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1972 >
Issue: 2
Ellen-Marie Chen
Individual and Society in Rousseau's Idea of Freedom
|
|
|
29.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1972 >
Issue: 2
Chung-ying Cheng
On Questions Relating to Philosophy of Mathematics
|
|
|
30.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1972 >
Issue: 2
Robert E. A. Shanab
A Defense of Tolman's Position Concerning Intervening Variables
|
|
|
31.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1998 >
Issue: 21
Tran Van Doan
陳艾團
Asian Marxism or The Dialectic of Violence
亞洲馬克思主義一一暴力辯證法
view |
rights & permissions
在本篇論文中,我們將論述那些所謂的亞洲馬克思主義者,言之鑿鑿奉行的「主義J '在事實上,只不過是一個口號。這些 亞洲共產主義的領導者並不是真正採取馬克思的觀點,而是向列 寧或史達林那邊靠攏。對他們來說,辯證法不意謂著無產階級的 發展邏輯,而是用來摧毀反對力量(包括保守主義、反對主義、或修正主義等等)的有效工其。因此, 「揚棄」 (Aufhebung) (不論以普遍階級或無產階級作為形式)只存在烏托邦論者的空 想中。這樣的一種「揚棄」是不能被實現的。因為,在亞洲所企 盼的任何實現,不論其外在或內在條件都是不充足和不成熟的。
|
|
|
32.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1998 >
Issue: 21
Wing-wah Chan
陳榮華
Is the Mind in Mencius' Philosophy Self-sufficient for Moral Cultivation?
孟子哲學的心概念在這德實踐中是否自足?
view |
rights & permissions
本文要指出, <孟子〉在討論道德實踐時,心不是最後的存有 學基礎,它尚需莫基於天,因此本文認為,心在道德實踐時不是 自足的。但是,當代的孟子哲學詮釋者大都認為心是自足的。對 於這種主張,我稱為心靈自足論。本文首先介紹這種理論的源 起,再提出三個論証來指,出它在理論上的困難。跟著,我提出以 天為道德實踐的存有學基礎,並嘗試以這個主張來詮釋孟子的道 德實踐理論。對於這種詮釋,我稱之為「以天為基礎的詮釋」 。 最後,我發現這種詮釋能避免心靈自足論所導致的困難,且又一 致於〈孟子〉的語吉。所以,我認為這種詮釋是更妥當的。
|
|
|
33.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1998 >
Issue: 21
Tim Lane
藍亭
Quiet Qualia, Unsensed Sensa
無感覺的感知
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
In C. I. Lewis's epistemology, qualia are taken to be directly intuited and inherently recognizable. He distinguishes sharply between qualia and that which C. D. Broad and Bertrand Russell refer to as “sensa" or “sense-data." Where Broad and Russell appear to allow for the possibility of unsensed, incompletely sensed, or inaccurately sensed sensa, Lewis regards qualia as given--to be is to be sensed and certain. Lewis finds the Broad-Russell view to be incredible and says of sensa so construed that they are “neither fish, flesh, nor good red herring."I argue that the Broad-Russell view is at least as plausible as Lewis's and, indeed, that to adequately describe and explain mental phenomena, it may be necessary to distinguish the phenomenal aspect of consciousness (sensa or qualia) from the accessing function of consciousness. In arguing the pIausibilityof this distinction, I draw upon work from both cognitive science and phenomenology. I also argue that, in principIe, experimental evidence could be adduced to decide the issue between the Broad-Russell and the Lewis views. In a concluding section I suggest implications of the view developed here for Lewis's epistemology.
在路易斯 (C.I. Lewis) 的知識論中,感知 (qualia) 被視 為直接的直覺及與生俱來的察覺O他非常明確的區分感知及布洛 得 (C.D. Broad) 和羅素 (Bertrand Russell) 所認為的感覺材料 (Sensa-data) 對於布洛得和羅素顯然容許的「未 感覺到」、「未完全感覺到J '或「不正確感覺到」之感覺材料 (Sense-data) 的可能性, 路易斯卻視感知 (qualia) 為必定會被感覺到、且不可能感覺錯的。他認為布洛得一羅素的觀點不可 思議,並說如此解說感覺材料是荒謬的。我論證布洛得一羅素的觀點至少是與路易斯的同樣合理。事 實上,要適切的描繪及解說心理現象,去區分意識的現象層面 (phenomenal aspect of consciousness) 和意識的進入使用功 能 (accessing function of consciousness) 或許是需要的。在論 證此區分的合理性中,我援用了認知科學及現象學的研究。我還 論證原則上,由實驗而得的證據可以決定布洛得一羅素和路易斯 的觀點何者正確。在結論部分,我提出了這一觀點對路易斯的知 識論發展之影響的看法。
|
|
|
34.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2001 >
Issue: 24
Gerald Cipriani
Reflections on the Nature of the Figural in Art
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
In this essay I develop evelop a critique of different modes understanding what is a moment of meaningful form in art (the figural). I attempt to show that approaches which maintain a separation between form and content, or the subjective and the objective cannot truly do justice to the presentational nature of meaning in art. In particular, I refer to Mikel Dufrenne's conception of expression in his Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience as being paradoxically misleading when it comes to understand the figural in its phenomentality. I ultimately argue for the need to bear in mind that the relationship between presentation and representation, or experience and objectivity ought to be approached in terms of complementary difference.
|
|
|
35.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2002 >
Issue: 25
Jih-Ching Ho
何志青
Inferentialism, Conceptualism, and Social Pragmatism
推演論,概念論,及社會實踐論
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
How do our minds grasp the world? The nlajor task in explaining the relation between mind and the world is to indicate how facts, experiences, and judgments stand in justificatory relation. This paper examines three ways of explaining the cognitive relation between mind and world: inferentialism, conceptualism, and social pragmatism. These three theories differ from the traditional foundationalism, coherentism, and reliabilism in that they no longer attempt any analysis of the epistemic notions such as knowledge and evidence abstractly; rather, they explore, in a Wittgensteinean way, these notions in relation to linguistic practices. In this paper, I will first examine the debate between inferentialism and conceptualism, a debate involving Sellars, Davidson, McDowell, and Brandom. I will show that both inferentialism and conceptualism have difficulties in giving a complete account of empirical justification and that their difficulties can be remedied only by resorting to some social pragmatisnl notions such as the social development of conceptual capacities and the social recognition of cognitive performance.
我們的心智如何掌握世界?最近之相關哲學論述的主要關 懷是要指出事實、經驗和判斷之間具有某種證成之關係。本論文 檢視三個經驗證成之理論:推演論、概念論及社會踐行論。此三 理論不同於傳統之基礎論、融貫論及可靠論,在於它們不企圖對 知識論概念(如「知識」和「理據J )提供抽象之分析;這些新 興理論深受維根斯坦之影響,強調知識概念與「語言踐行」之密 切關連。本文首先說明推演論與概念論之間的論爭,釐清其主要 論證和反駁,最後展述社會踐行論,並指出其對推演論與概念論 之修正及補強。
|
|
|
36.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2002 >
Issue: 25
Francisco Calvo Garzon
The connectionist sceptic versus the “full-blooded" semanticist
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
Gareth Evans produced a powerfulline of argument against Quine's well-known Thesis of the Inscrutability of Reference. In one part of his attack, Evans argued that, under certain conditions, structural simplicity may become truth-conducive for semantic theories. Being structurally more complex than the standard semantic theory, perverse semantic theories a la Quine are an easy prey for Evans' considerations. The bulk of the paper will be devoted to addressing Evans' criticism. By reviewing the classical/connectionist debate in cognitive science between a hypothetical sympathizer of “cognitive orthodoxy" and the friend ofconnectionism, I shall contend that the Quinean has nothing to fear from a classical reading of Evans' considerations.
|
|
|
37.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2002 >
Issue: 25
Chung-Chi Yu
游涼祺
Schutz on Pure We-Relationship
舒茲論純粹我們關條
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
An inquiry into the “pure we-relationship" in Schutz is attempted. In his early major work The Phenomenology of the Social World Schutz regards the “pure we-relationship" as the ultimate foundation of the social world. Because of the confusion with “concrete we-relationship," its meaning remains misunderstood among many interpreters. While this concept is rooted in “Thou-orientation" and is regarded as formal concept without any content, Schutz is criticized for having taken up an idealistic and egocentric position in his social theory. I find it is deficient to defend Schutz by reference to the lifeworld theory that he develops in late thought. Instead , I suggest that we might save him from such criticism by introducing the “mutual tuning-in relationship."
本文旨在探討舒茲的「純粹我們關係」概念,本文的出發點 在於認識到此概念往往被當作「具體我們關係」而導致其涵義未 能被適切的理解。本文指出,舒茲將「純粹我們關係」奠定在「對 你態度」之上,並視之為「極限概念J '亦即將它當作無任何具 體內容的抽象概念,而且主張它是任何社會關係的最終基礎。此 一論述導致理念化與自我中心化的批評。本文指出,舒茲此一觀 點在晚期的生活世界論述中依然保留,並試著指出此一概念所導 致的批評或許可以藉由「相互準備投入關係」來加以化解。
|
|
|
38.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2003 >
Issue: 26
Francisco Calvo Garzón
Francisco Calvo Garzón
Is Simplicity Alethic for Semantic Theories?
「簡單性」是否為語義理論所不可忘 者?
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
Crispin Wright (1992) has reshaped debates about Realism by offering a new landscape of what's at stake in the discussions between realists and their opponents. Instead of arguing whether a given discourse can be truth apt, discussion should focus, Wright contends, on what kind of truth predicate a discourse can enjoy. Namely, whether truth for a discourse can be 'robust' or merely ‘minimal' Wright's approach has important implications for Quine's well-known Thesis of the Inscrutability of Reference. The bulk of this paper will be devoted to showing that an argument involving minimalism about truth which Wright (1997) offersagainst the Inscrutability Thesis fails by reductio. By the end of the paper, we'll see how Wright's proposed frame of' discussion for Realism bears on themetaphysical status of Semantic Theories.
賴特 (Crispin Wright) 於其1992 年之文章中, 為實在論與 反實在論之爭提出了一個新的看法,也因此,吾人實可對實 在論者與其對手間之爭論焦點有一番新的認識。賴特認為: 實在論者與其對手間之爭論,實非針對「語句是否能具真理 傾向(truth apt) J 此一問題而發, 而係針對「語句究竟能有何 種真理述詞」此一問題而發一亦即:吾人可謂實在論者與其 對手之爭,實為對於「語句之真」究竟是「直率 ('robust') 之 真」抑或僅是「最小之真」之爭O對翩因 (Quine) 著名之「指 稱之不可測」 (the Inscrutability of Reference) 主張, 賴特之探 究進路實有重要之哲學理趣。對此,本文擬指出:賴特於其 1997 年之文章中提出「真理之最小論」 (minimalism about truth) 論證' 並藉以反對捌因之「指稱之不可測」主張, 整體 而言並未成功,此為本文之主要重點所在。儘管如此,賴特 之探究進路與「語意理論之形上地位」間究竟有何關係,亦 為一重要問題。此為本文最後所將著墨之重點。
|
|
|
39.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2003 >
Issue: 26
Szu-Ting Chen (陳思、廷)
The Distinction between Causation and Invariance and Its Implications for the Philosophical Discussion of Economic Theorizing
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
Recently, certain philosophers have argued that an explanatory relation is a causal relation that is fundamentally about the invariance of a relation betweenvariables of interest under intervention-i.e., about a manipulable invariant relation. This manipulative theory tends to reduce a causal relation to a manipulable invariant relation. By explicating a case from contemporary econometrics, this paper argues that a manipulable invariant relation can be obtained only when the causal chain or causal structure of the targeted relation is free from disturbing influences. In other words, a manipulable invariant relation can be regarded only as a special kind of causal relation, and so the notion of invariance can never replace the idea of causation. This paper also shows that the distinction between causation and invariance has methodological import concerning the philosophical discussion of economic theorizing and of economic theory development.1. Introduction2. Manipulation, Invariance, Superexogeneity, and Causal Structure2.1 The Manipulability Theory of Causation2.2 The Idea ofWeak Exogeneity2.3 The Idea of Invariance and Its Relation to the Idea of Superexogeneity2.4 Can We Equate a Causal Relation with an Invariant Relation?3. The Methodological Import of the Distinction between Causation and Invariance4. A Causal Structuralist Account of Economic Theorizing and Economic Theory Development5. Conclusion
|
|
|
40.
|
NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2004 >
Issue: 27
Hans Lenk
Hans Lenk
Towards a Technologistic Methodology and Philosophy of Science
邁向技術取向的方法論和科學哲學
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
For the past several decades, philosophers of science such as Hacking and Giere, instead of focusing attention on scientific theories and seeing them as just linguistic entities, have been thinking about philosophy of science from the standpoint of experimental manipulation and model-construction. Both Hacking’sexperimentalism and Giere’s modelism have played a great part in giving birth to an action-oriented and technology-shaped philosophy of science. In this paper, it is argued that philosophy of science can benefit from the technological approach and correlatively, the methodology of general technology might profit from taking into consideration the refinements and novel developments of philosophy of science. It is argued, besides, not only that different methodological approaches have to be integrated into a rather general theory of scheme-interpretation, but also that action-“grasping”-knowledge is shaped by interpretations and by perspectives.
過去數十年來,諸如Hacking 和Giere 等哲學家在討論科學 哲學時,已不再專注於科學理論本身,而是從實驗操控和建造模 型等方面來進行論述。就催生實作和技術取向的科學哲學而言,不管是Hacking 的實驗主義或是Giere 的模型論都貢獻良多。本 文要論證的是,科學哲學和工程技術學科的方法論兩者之間其實 可以彼此借鏡而相互受益。此外,不同的方法論進路也有必要整 合成一個更普遍的詮釋架構理論,而實作-理解-認知乃是被詮釋 和觀點所形塑而成的。
|
|
|