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Anthony Brueckner
The Shifting Content of Knowledge Attributions
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Clive Stroud-Drinkwater
The Naive Theory of Colour
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Sydney Shoemaker
Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense" Lecture II: The Broad Perceptual Model
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Sydney Shoemaker
Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense" Lecture I: The Object Perception Model
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Nicholas Rescher
Replies to Commentators
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Douglas C. Long
One More Foiled Defense of Skepticism
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In my essay I contend that the three main avenues by which one might plausibly account for one's self-awareness are unavailable to an individual who is restricted to the skeptic's epistemic ground rules. First, all-encompassing doubt about the world cancels our "external" epistemic access via perception to ourselves as material individuals in the world. Second, one does not have direct cpistemic access to one's substantial self through introspection, since the self as such is not a proper object of inner awareness. Third, we cannot claim, as Descartes did, that we have indirect epistemic access to the substantial self by inference from the occurrence of experiences.The summary conclusion for which I argue is that, if we are to account for our self-knowledge, we cannot adopt the purely subjective epistemological stance that is at the heart of global skepticism.
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Sydney Shoemaker
Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense" Lecture III: The Phenomenal Character of Experience
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Terrance McConnell
On the Nature and Scope of Morality
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John Kekes
The Pragmatic Idealism of Nicholas Rescher
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T. L. S. Sprigge
Idealism contra Idealism
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Jack Meiland
Cognitive Schemes and Truth as an Ideal
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Derk Pereboom
Bats, Brain Scientists, and the Limitations of Introspection
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John Kekes
Rescher on Rationality and Morality
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Nicholas Rescher
Précis of A System of Pragmatic Idealism
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Joseph Margolis
Nicholas Rescher's Metaphilosophical Inquiries
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Johanna Seibt
A Janus View on Rescher's Perspectival Pluralism
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Harold Langsam
Kant, Hume, and Our Ordinary Concept of Causation
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Michael Slote
Précis of From Morality to Virtue
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Stephen Darwall
From Morality to Virtue and Back?
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Michael Stocker
Self-Other Asymmetries and Virtue Theory
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