Presently, we are living in international and inter-cultural society or what is called global society. The question of global peace and prosperity has emerged as the foremost challenge of our times. The need for global peace can be authenticated from various ideological, theological, religious and spiritual perspectives. A purely intellectual and subsequently scientific and technological approach to social, political and economic problems can again culminate into great wars across the globe. We, the philosophers, have to strive to make room for faith, love, tolerance and devotion in inter-personal as well as inter-national affairs, if we earnestly want global peace and progress. In this paper, I shall try to shed some light on the abovementioned issue with reference to the basic sources of Islamic cultural and spiritual tradition. The entire focus of the Islamic teachings, including the Prophetic behavior and the practices of his faithful companions, Imams, Sufi-poets and philosophers, powerfully oriented Muslims to adopt Islamic ethical teachings for peace, universal goodwill and service to mankind with love and care. They transcended all kinds of prejudices or even considerations of caste, color, gender, race, culture and geographical divisions. They fostered horizontal and liberal values of love and tolerance. Their universal and perennial spiritual vision was anchored on One Supreme God —the Creator and Sustainer of them all; the Supreme personification of Truth, Beauty and Goodness. Unfortunately, however, the modern puritans are displaying great misunderstanding of the spirit of the Qur’an and are shutting off the doors for a universal, tolerant and judicious interpretation of the Islamic Weltanschauung. Therefore, during current tumultuous and terror-shaken scenario, there is a great need to initiate, appropriate and appreciate the real Islamic spirit, its ethnico-cultural legacy and value-system on positive lines along with other great religions of the world. A truly global dialogue from Islamic perspective can help bringing about peace and prosperity for the entire human race. No doubt, Islam has such great ideals and moral standards to offer with a view to solving of the moral crises of the global human society.

After the publication of William Lane Craig, ‘The Kalam Cosmological Argument’ in 2000, the discussion of classical Muslims scholars’ arguments on the existence of God has attracted many contemporary students. In his book Craig discusses Al-Kindi’s cosmological argument on the existence of God. He suggests that Kalam cosmological argument also survives the objections of Hume and Kant. In this paper, however, I would like to introduce another type of cosmological argument based on the concept of analogy (qiyas) by another Muslim rationalist scholar, Al-Qadi ‘Abd Al-Jabbar. In his arguments ‘Abd Al-Jabbar rejects the philosophers’ view that God is the cause of the universe, since that will imply the eternity of the world, one of the justifications used by al-Ghazali to discredit Muslim philosophers in his Tahafut Al-Falasifah (‘The Incoherence of Philosophers’). Hence, ‘Abd Al-Jabbar in his arguments mainly depends on the concept of action.

This paper aims at presenting a comparative study of a summary of Proclus’ first argument on the eternity of the world in two of al-Shahrastānī’s works. Proclus’ first argument does not survive in Greek, but we have two surviving Arabic versions, one in the translation of Isḥāq b. Hunayn (d. AD 910) and an earlier one by an anonymous translator. In this paper, I shall comment on some philological and philosophical points of al-Shahrastānī’s summary of Proclus’ first argument on the eternity of the world. Also, I shall briefly look into al-Shahrastānī’s sources and his argumentation against Proclus in the context of Muslim dialectical (kalām) discussions for the doctrine of the creation of the world.

The paper discusses Ibn Tufayl’s Hay ibn Yaqzan, a philosophical novel written in Andalusia in the 12th century. The novel’s eponymous character is a solitary individual growing up in a deserted island, who only meets another human being and gets initiated into language at an advanced age. As Ibn Tufayl presents it, in solitude Hay has developed elaborate ways of thinking, discovered God as the ultimate cause of the world and worships him in a direct, personal way. Given the context of Ibn Tufay’s story, the paper focuses on the relation between language and thinking. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations it criticizes the idea that language and community are inessential to human identity and ways of thinking. It argues that Ibn Tufayl should not be interpreted as putting forward a dualist picture of the self like Descartes’, but rather, as influenced by the Sufi ideals of genuine faith and personal experience of God.

In this proposal I would like to present figures and works such as Leon Hebreo´s Dialoghi d´Amore and Abraham Cohen de Herrera´s Porta Coelorum as examples of the interrelation between Jewish and Christian scholars. This is a story that begins in 1492, when the Expulsion of the Jews from the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon took place. Alongside with the spread of Jewish people around the Maghreb, the Balkans, Palestine, the Netherlands, England and Italy this community started to have intellectual exchanges with the Christian population around them and this situation of course modified the cultural universe of both, Jewish and Christians. The fashion of Hebraism among Christian scholars during the sixteen and seventeen centuries had been place in part thanks to this kind of syncretism that could teach them the keystones of the Jewish intellectual framework but in an understandable way for their sensibility. The Jewish writings were because of that, one of the keystones in the foundation of modern science and philosophy, a source of inspiration for the systems and theories of space and matter of figures such as Conway, More or Newton.

There is no notion of postmortem Heaven and Hell in both ancient Israeli and Confucian traditions, and the two traditions also share quite a number of similarities about the idea of immortal life after death. Therefore, a comparison of the commonness in this field, e.g. the Jewish Levirate Marriage custom and the Confucian custom of adopting one’s son as heir; the idea of name surviving death in Biblical Judaism and that of glorifying one’s parents by making one’s name famous in future ages in Confucianism, can help us reveal the common pursuit in the two traditions: the postmortem fulfillment of an individual is realized in the form of the continuation of one’s family/ tribe/ nation of which they were, and forever remain, a generational link. In addition, this can help clarify a long faulted Confucian dogma of “Having no male heir being the gravest of the three cardinal offences against filial piety”.

We think that the formation and development of the logic of language in China can be divided into three periods: (1) Initial Period (the fifties - the eighties of the 20th century). Zhou Liquan is the initiator and founder of the logic of language research in China; under his advocation and influence, some scholars begin to introduce the logical thought of foreign languages systematically, discussing the objects of research and contents of the logic of language. The representative work of this period is Wang Weixian, Li Xiankun and Chen Zongming’s “The Introduction to the Logic of Language”. (2) Formative Period (1990s - the end of the 20th century). The representative achievements in this period are as follows, Zhou Liquan’s “Logic-A Theory of Accurate Thought and Effective Communication”, Zou Chongli’s “A Part of Lexical System that Utilizes Montague Grammar and General Quantifiers Theory to Analyse the Quantified Phrases of Chinese”, Cai Shushan’s “Speech Acts and the Logic of Language”. These three achievements indicate The Logic of Language has already formed in China. (3) Developing Period (the beginning of 21st century). It starts with Zou Chongli’s “Logic, Language and Communication” that was published in 2002. From the view of research approach, the studies of logic of language by Zhou Liquan, Li Xiankun and Chen Zongming belong to the Descriptive Logic of Language, and those by Cai Shushan and Zou Chongli belong to the Formal Logic of Language.

Quasi-set theory by S. French and D. Krause (2006) has been so far the most promising attempt of a formal theory of non-individuals. However, due to its sharp bivalent truth valuations, maximally fine-grained binary relations are readily found, in which members of equivalence classes are substitutable for each other in formulas salva veritate. Hence its mentioning and non-mentioning of individuals differs from existing set theory with defined identity merely by the range of nominal definitions. On a semantic level, quasi-set theory does not provide an interpretation with explanatory power of its language terms as non-individuals, and it is not easy to see how such an interpretation can be set up.

Routley-Meyer ternary relational semantics (RM-semantics, for short) was introduced in the early seventies of the past century. RM-semantics was intended to model classical relevant logics such as the logic of the relevant conditional R and the logic of Entailment E. But, ever since Routley and Meyer’s first papers on the topic, this essentially malleable semantics has been used for characterizing more general relevant logics or even non-relevant logics. The aim of this paper is to provide an RM-semantics with respect to which Łukasiewicz 3-valued logic Ł3 is sound and complete. Ł3 is understood as (any axiomatization of) the set of all valid formulas in Łukasiewicz 3-valued matrices MŁ3. In this sense, leaning on previous work by us, Ł3 is axiomatized as an extension of Routley and Meyer’s basic positive logic B+, labelled Ł3(B+). And the RM-semantics for Ł3 is actually defined for this particular axiomatization of Ł3(B+). The result presented in the paper is interesting from the Universal Logic perspective, in the sense that it connects Łukasiewicz many-valued logics and similar systems to relevant logics from the point of view of the latter, the 3-termed relational point of view, in particular.

The paper develops an axiomatic theory of truth and falsehood operators, including the non-classical case. Their domain is a set of sentences, which then is extended to the set of symbol expressions of the language. In general, sentences do not necessarily have to be two-valued. In case of statements about the truth or falsity of sentences, classical logic is applied. We restrict ourselves to the set of sentences for which the truth and falsehood operators are well-defined. This proposed theory differs from Kripke’s theory of truth. Iterations of truth and falsehood operators are allowed. Thus, the pro-posed theory differs from Tarski’s semantic theory of truth. Note that the use of truth and falsehood operators instead of the corresponding predicates allows avoiding the liar paradox. Non-truthfulness in general does not necessarily mean falsehood. Therefore, truth and falsehood operators will be regarded as logically independent. On the basis of the above considerations, the truth and falsehood operator theory is constructed and formulated and it is further ex-tended to the universe of symbolic expressions.

In 1934 Jaśkowski and Gentzen independently published their groundbreaking works on Natural Deduction. The aim of this paper is to provide some criteria for division of the diversity of existing systems on some natural subcategories and to show that despite the differences all these systems are descendants of original systems of Jaśkowski and Gentzen. Three criteria are discussed:The kind of items which are building-blocks of the proof.The format of proof.The kind of rules.The first leads to the division of ND into two main classes: F-systems working on (occurences of) formulas and S-systems working on sequents (but not to be confused with sequent calculi). The second distinguishes between T-systems with tree-proofs and L-systems with linear proofs. Finally, the third leads to several minor divisions in the main categories.

As it is well known, in the forties of the past century, Curry proved that in any logic S closed under Modus Ponens, uniform substitution of propositional variables and the Contraction Law (W), the naïve Comprehension axiom (CA) trivializes S in the sense that all propositions are derivable in S plus CA. Not less known is the fact that, ever since Curry published his proof, theses and rules weaker than W have been shown to cause the same effect as W causes. Among these, the Contraction rule (RW) or the Modus Ponens axiom (MPa), for example, are to be noted. But, moreover, as Brady has proved, even the Generalized Modus Ponens axiom (gMPa) or the Generalized Contraction rule (gRW) give rise to “Curry’s Paradox” under the same circumstances as W does. In some previous work by us, “weak relevant model structures” (wr-ms, for short) are defined on “weak relevant matrices” by generalizing Brady’s model structure MCL built upon Meyer’s Crystal matrix CL. We have proved that wr-ms only verify logics with the “depth relevance condition” (drc). The aim of this paper is to show how to falsify gMPa and gRW (and so, W, RW and MPa) in certain wr-ms. In particular, it will be shown that gMPa is falisfied in any wr-ms and gRW in any wr-ms verifying Routley and Meyer’s basic positive logic B+.

This paper intends to lead with one of the most famous sentences of the Parmenides’ poem Peri physeos: “[...] are the same thinking and being”. The proposal is to bring some considerations of Jacques Lacan and of Martin Heidegger that concern also this sentence, and then to achieve one interpretation that includes both considerations. Those considerations seem to be in contraction in the beginning, but, when we look forward, we see that they both criticize the modern way of thinking to talk about one distinguished experience that fundamentally the Greek poem introduces: the thinking – noein – as existing in the mood of the being; that is einai. We develop the notion that this experience can show the destiny to who seeks it.

The author wishes to show that in Parmenides’ approach, the Aristotelian division of being and the truth still do not exist: being as presence or an object in general, individual or universal, material or mental, and the truth as the value of the judgment, because for the Eleatic word ‘to eon’ only means the truth. This word is the name of the truth as a transcendent nature (resp. essence) in general. In his poem Parmenides, for whom the truth is the only Being, praises and describes the existence of the truth (identified with what truly is or with pure being par excellence) in opposition to the multitude of opinions (appearances of the truth and being). Parmenides’ poem is the testimony and account of experience (of existence) of the truth as Being itself, and the experience of its normative force as transcendent nature. This Parmenidean ‘aletheism’ allows us to understand how Plato’s theory of eternal truths ever appeared (ideas, or forms as norms and paradigms of nature, cognition and action), as well as the importance of Parmenides himself for Neo-platonism.

1. There is a commonly held endoxon that idealism did not exist and could not exist before Plato, since the «Presocratics» did not yet distinguish between the material and the ideal etc. This preconception is based on the misleading conception of «Presocratics» as physicalists and the simplistic evolutionist scheme of Aristotle’s Metaph. A. In fact, religious and idealist metaphysics are attested in different archaic traditions before Plato, whereas «simple» physical theories of elements of the Milesian type did not exist before the 6th century B.C. scientific revolution. 2. Those who deny the existence of idealism in Greek philosophy commonly refer to Myles F. Burnyeat (see, “Idealism and Greek philosophy: What Descartes saw and Berkeley missed” in: The Philosophical Review, Vol.91, No1, 1982, 3-40). We will argue against this article on the following grounds: a) it is based on a selective and incomplete data from early Greek philosophy, b) Burnyeat understands by «idealism» subjective idealism and anti-realism. But Greek idealism as a rule is a form of objective idealism and has nothing to do with anti-realism. The two basic forms are: dualstic idealism (Pythagoreans, Plato) and monistic idealism (Parmenides, Neoplatonists). 3. We will argue against modern naturalist interpretations of the Pythagorean first principles by Huffmann and others. Both in the table of opposites (58 Α5 DK) and in Philolaus (44 B1) πέρας καὶ ἄπειρον (ἄπειρα καὶ περαίνοντα) denote self-subsistent mathematical essences, ‘out of which’ (cf. ἐξ ἀπείρων etc.) physical bodies (cf. φύσις – ibid.) are composed. It is impossible to interpret “the limit and the unlimited” (or “limiters and unlimiteds”) as physical bodies themselves or as properties of physical bodies. 4. We will argue for the Pythagorean (not «Orphic») origin of the 5th centu-ry graffiti on bones’ plates from Olbia. According to this early table of oppo-site, the body is ψεῦδος, i.e., an illusion. 5. The Zeller-Burnet interpretation of Parmenides B3 (taking τὸ αὐτό as subject) is grammatically impossible. The fragment states the identity of νοεῖν καὶ εἶναι, i.e., affirms mental nature of Being.6.The basic opposition of Parmenides’ Aletheia (being vs. non-being) exactly corresponds to the basic opposition of doxa (light vs. darkness). Light is the active and thinking element, night is the «heavy», dense, corporeal substance. Sine light corresponds to Being, night (i.e., body) corresponds to non-Being. The philosophy of Parmenides is a radical form of immaterialism and idealistic monism.

Anaxagoras philosophy has been traditionally analyzed from the concept “homeomeries”. This concept is only a part of a bigger topic which can be found in his doctrine almost in a tacit way. That is infinity. But, why did Anaxagoras include this concept in his doctrine? The explanation given in this paper is that Anaxagoras propounded infinity as a way to preserve the Eleatic legacy without denying reality. In fact, infinity helps to keep the most radical ideas of Parmenides (no generation, no destruction and no changes) and, at the same time, to explain reality from itself, it means, accepting that these events are in reality and are not an appearance. For this reason, Anaxagoras theory has infinity as an important concept and from this concept, his doctrine will be explained in this paper.

The matter of difference appears at the moment in human thought, inaugurates debate and philosophical discussion in Western tradition, and becomes a significant and culminant point in the history of philosophy. From its origin the philosophical discourse lives on this perplexity, although it searches from its very origin to think identity as identity in the sinuosity of real differences, and in the power of its linguistic game, it assumes a position, which is essentially based on a logocentric illusion. It is about a position which expresses itself for being, against nothing, for synchrony against diachrony, and for sameness against alterity. Concerning this, it is not possible here not to inquire about this position towards multiplicity, in which reason tries to unite it in a whole. Would this not mean in the origin of philosophy itself a limitation and insecurity of what is rational? Would this attitude not reveal a symptom of weakness and an incipient decline, whose destiny is fulfilled along the Western tradition? Historically, and in spite of the most varied solutions and vicissitudes presented to this problem, it is possible to observe that the attempt to direct philosophical thought to totality continually prevails.

There is probably no doubt that Hesiod is one of the important ancient Greek personalities still known today. From my point of view, Hesiod is not only the first European philosopher who reflected on the beginning of the world in the Theogony or about a few ethical questions in the Works and days, but also the first who thought about the human being and his unique features from a political standpoint. For this purpose I will consider six different politico-anthropological identities of human beings: eris (good and bad strife), dikê (justice and injustice), ergon (work), oikos (home), philia (friendship) and godliness. As far as I can see, no one has argued until today that a political anthropology exists in Hesiod’s Works and days. We can´t find a classical philosophical construction in the text, but what we can find is the consideration of some basic categories, words and themes of a political anthropology that are – as it seems – firstly discussed by Hesiod.

When contemporary scholars study the first Greek (and European) thinkers, their most current attitude is to concentrate on their ontological and epistemological theories, paying little or no attention at all to their ethical or political positions. It is true that ethical and political ideas cover a minor part of the fragments we possess. Moreover, they often take up a peculiar form, which has been characterized as “non-philosophical”, because it isn’t deductive, empirical or clearly founded on rational arguments: they resemble rather some common sense advice offered by the elderly members of a community. But are these precepts indeed to be taken so lightly? In my paper, I intend to make an analysis that hasn’t been undertaken up to now, to my knowledge, of this particular form of ethical and political ideas destined to help people to achieve concretely a life as good as possible, in order to prove that: a) these concepts are founded on a philosophical method equivalent to the one result-ing in the cosmological theories of the archaic period; b) their form, inspired by the oracles, is chosen deliberately in order to astound, to help memorization in a largely oral cultural environment, and to encourage the personal activity of rational interpretation, which may lead to multiple results, underlining the liberty of thought. I shall finally cite some representative examples of the eth-ical and political maxims attributed to the “Seven sages” (of which Thales), to Pythagoras and to Democritus, to illustrate this particular link between theory, and practice at the origins of the European philosophy.

The essay examines the Stoic notion of appropriate actions (καθήκοντα), focusing on the relationship between the perfectly appropriate actions of the virtuous person (the Stoic κατορθώματα) and “intermediate appropriate actions” (καθήκοντα μέσα). I present some of the philosophical motivations behind the general Stoic theory of καθήκοντα, and argue against the common interpretation of μέσα καθήκοντα as action types that make no reference to the manner of their performance, and of κατορθώματα as μέσα καθήκοντα that are rightly performed by an agent with a virtuous disposition. Instead, I claim that the different types of καθήκοντα should be distinguished with reference to the kinds of things they aim at, rather than the manner in which they are performed. So, μέσα καθήκοντα should be understood as actions aiming at natural advantages that are indifferent, and κατορθώματα as actions aiming at the only true good, i.e., virtue. I discuss some of the advantages of the alternative view and outline the account of virtuous motivation that arises from it.