Time presents a difficult problem, both to the philosopher and the psychologist. All conscious human experiences take place in time, which developes in three dimensions: the present, the past, and the future, and none of these appears to have real existence.The author discusses two problems: the experience of time and the human attitude to time, namely man’s link with time and his struggle with time.The experience of time in the present turns about the moment, which most closely links man with life, although itself is short. The future is an attempt to project the moment into possible happenings and is, in principle, a work of the imagination.The past has no reality, but factually occurs in man as a series of remembered pictures which, however, act upon the present.Time is properly a moment, which lasts briefly, passes and is renewed, but as another moment.The basic attitude of man towards time is linking with time and living within time, taking part in the processes which form time, perceiving moments in the world, comparing his own processes with them, transforming himself on that basis, accepting environmental, physical and mental stimuli, joining in the life of the environment and shaping his own forms for living on this pattern.Simultaneously, man fights with time, the expression of which is his control of time by technical means, measurements of size and difference. In addition, every act of reflective thought is opposition to time, for it is exclusion of certain experiences from the wave of perceptions streaming through consciousness. Similarly, the act of remembering and analysing certain perceptions. A typical form of struggle with time is speech and material speed. The latter gives a feeling of superiority over time and brings confusion and forgetting of time. An interesting form of „ethic struggle” with time is the fidelity of man to other men and himself.Similarly, exterior culture (works of art, buildings etc.) can be assessed as opposition to time.

The purpose of the article is a measurement of the reliability and validity of the Polish translation of R. B. Porter and R. B. Cattell’s C. P. Q., and a critical appraisal of this method.The coefficients of reliability are based on the testing of 100 children aged 9 years (50 boys and 50 girls). The dependability coefficients (test-retest coefficient without an interval) of our translation vary from 0.41 (factor E) to 0.76 (factor B), while the stability coefficients (called test-retest coefficient after an interval of 14 days) vary from 0.28 (factor A) to 0.J67 (factor N). These were too low to use as a basis in the analysis of individual cases. This inclined the translator to revise his translation; a new version appeared in 1965 in an experimental edition.In the light of the investigations with the Polish translation of the C. P. Q. neurotic boys (28 children) differed from their healthy coevals (50 children, in 10 factors: A-, C-, DH-, E+, G-, H-, I-, J+, 0+ and Q4 -j-, while neurotic girls (26 children) differed from their healthy coevals (50 children) in 8 factors. These are: A-, C-, D+, E+, G-, 0+, Q3- and Q4+. 28 boys with behavioural disorders (in this group were cases of characteropathy, psychopathy, and anomalies in the formation of character) differed from their coevals without behavioural disorders in the factors: A-, C-, D+, G-, H-, N+, and Q4+. The 28 boys with behavioural disorders differed from the neurotic boys in C-f-, F+, G-, H+ and Q4+. Girls successful in school differed from coevals without school success in 7 factors: B+, C+, D-, H+, O-, Q3-f- and Q4-, while boys successful in school differed in 6 factors from boys without school success: B+, C+, H+, J+, Q3-f- and Q4-. The author observed that certain questions were too obvious, containing socially accepted values, and these should be omitted. The method discussed (ed. 1959) is a good diagnostic tool in relation to neurotic children, children with behavioural disorders, and children successful in school or without school success. However, its dependability and stability should be increased. Possibly a new translation will fulfil these requirements. Further investigation is indicated.

The article presents the results of investigations on the personality of individuals with scruples. The investigations were carried out by means of the Personality Questionnaire of R. B. Cattell, edited by M. Choynowski and standardized on a Polish population. This is the Polish version of the Sixteen Personality Factors Questionnaire of R. B. Cattell (4). A supplementary method of investigation was a specially constructed biographical questionnaire. The group examined consisted of 30 scrupulous individuals with secondary or university education aged 21—60 years, of whom the majority had suffered from scruples for from 6 to 20 years. The criterion for inclusion in this group was the appraisal of a priest- confessor.The author first presents views on the essence of scruples, with emphasis on the psychasthenic theory of P. Janet (13) and the theory of emotional immaturity with consideration of the psychological views of R. Gleason and G. Hagmaier (10), H. Gratton (13) and N. Mailloux (18) on the role of the super-ego in the process of the formation of scruples. He then analyses the material gathered.The results obtained allow the observation to be made that scrupulous individuals very significantly differ from persons in the comparative group in the following factors: emotional immaturity (C-), submission (E-), desurgency and feeling of inadequacy (F-), dominant structure of the super-ego (G+), inhibition and deep state of depression (H-), great sensitivity and need to be understood (I+), naïveté and simplicity (N-), a tendency to blame themselves, especially group Si with higher results in the scale of anxiety (0+), conventionalism in their social attitude (Qi), increased general psychic tension (Q4). The scrupulous are also characterized by flight from responsibility, anxiety, doubts, importunacy and general maladjustment. Among the principal features which condition the arisal of scruples can be counted emotional immaturity and dominant super-ego, and among the chief mental symptoms are feelings of guilt and anxiety. In the statistical analysis of the results, in the factors of anxiety there appeared two groups of scrupulous individuals, with high and low scores on the anxiety, rating. The first group consisted of scrupulous individuals with anxieties, the second of scrupulous perfectionists.The dominating and unintegrated super-ego, in the scrupulous, is transformed into the neurotic conscience, called the emotional conscience.On the basis of these investigations, the author defined scruples as fear of transgressing the pseudomoral norms of an emotional conscience.

The purpose of the communication is to inform Polish readers of an original classification of types of scale, kinds of testing, and scaling methods presented by W. S. Torgerson. The bases of his classification render prominent the various formal and real properties of different types of scaling. The classification emphasizes the specific nature of each method. The importance of the question of scaling in psychology is also indicated in this communication.

The article is a brief presentation of contemporary views on the etiology of Down’s disease, including the results of the author’s own investigations.In the introduction the author gives the results of his own investigations on 200 cases of Down’s disease and a group of 200 non-mongoloid mental retardates, which indicated a connection between Down’s disease and the age of the mothers in older age-groups. He informs, after L. S. Penrose, that at present two groups of mongoloids are distinguished. In 75% of the mongoloids, the greater age of the mother is a significant factor in the etiology of Down’s disease. In 25% of the mongoloids, the mother’s age is not significant; other factors, which he discusses are decisive. He gives the frequency of occurrence of chromosome anomalies of the type: trisomia, translocation, mozaicism and others in Down’s disease, basing his information on the results of investigations in the world literature and the Lublin investigations of Mrs. Dobrzańska M. D. He submits the results of the introductory investigations of J. Strojnowski M. D. and his own on the periodicity of births of mongoloids in the Lublin province. These results are similar to those of R. Collman and A. Stoll er in 1962. Finally, he reports that chromosome anomalies are the direct cause of L. Down’s disease. Greater age of the parents appears not to be a cause, but a factor facilitating the arisal of such chromosome anomalies. Other causes of the chromosome anomalies are numerous, inter alia, infections, viruses, chemical substances, x-rays and all other mutagennie factors.

La présente communication signale que les textes philosophiques contenus dans les sermons de St. Bernard sur le Cantique des Cantiques n’ont pas encore reçu, dans les études médiévistiques, l’attention qu’ils méritent. Ces textes apportent la preuve que les contacts de St. Bernard avec les problèmes philosophiques ne se bornent pas à la théorie de la connaissance mystique. L’intéresse aussi, p. ex. la typologie des êtres considerée au plan purement naturel. Le saint consacre une attention particulière aux êtres incorporels qu’il groupe en une hiérarchie à quatre degrés. A l'échelon le plus bas de celle-ci, les âmes animales dépendent de la sphère corporelle quant à leur existence et leur activité de principes vitaux et remplissent, en même temps, une fonction auxiliaire par rapport aux êtres doués de raison. Les âmes humaines, eiles, en tant que spirituelles et raisonnables existent indépendamment des corps mais en dépendent dans leur activité, en particulier s’il s’agit de la connaissance, et ce non seulement des êtres matériels mais encore des spirituels. Ce climat d’ à posteriori transparait jusque dans les considérations sur les purs esprits qui, en tant que restreints en leur activité à un lieu déterminé, deviennent ainsi indirectement dépendants du rnonde corporel. Seul l’être du type le plus élevé, qu’est l’Esprit Incréé, est absolument iliimité, possédant sa raison d’être en lui-même; cause créatrice des autres êtres, II en conditionne Pexistence (U est Vesse causale) sans se confondre pourtant avec leur nature et conservant sa transcendance propre (II n’est pas esse materiale). II semble done qu’il y aurait lieu de completer, voire de modifier sur certains points, ce qu’enseignent les manuels sur les idées philosophiques de I’Abbé de Clairvaux.

Aristotelis philosophi cum Alexandro M. consuetudo inde ab antiquis temporibus eruditorum hominum curiositatem movit, fontium tarnen penuria pauca admodum ea de re certo sciri potuerunt. Quae cum ita sint, animadversione minime indigna esse videntur Aristotelis epistularum fragmenta, quorum perpauca Graece, paulo plura Arabice tradita sunt. Haec praesertim cum nuper innotuissent, a re certe non alienum duximus ea, quae e Plutarchi vita Alexandri iam dudum cognita essent, cum novis illis testimoniis comparare indeque pleniorem quandam imaginem necessitudinis, quae inter utrumque summum virum intercessisset, elicere, quamvis minime ignoraremus, quam parum fidei eiusmodi documentis, ut sunt epistulae, a doctis hominibus vulgo tribueretur. De fide tarnen auctoritateque Arabicorum fragmentorum alibi disputaturi hoc loco ea tantum, quae ad historiam Aristotelis atque Alexandri plenius cognoscendam ex eis lucramur, breviter exponimus.

The aim of the paper is to show the part played by Ockham, as a philosopher of knowledge mainly, in the evolution of the idea of natural science. With that view, and on the philosophical background of the early fourteenth century, such elements of Ockham’s doctrine are presented as favoured the rise of the new science and theories thereof. Ockham’s doctrine concerning natural knowledge is expounded next, together with the most important instances of the Philosopher’s influence on the formation of Physics in the years 1325—1389.

Les problèmes examinés dans cet essai sont formulés et discutés par Abélard dans le premier traité de sa Dialectique int. Liber partium. La troisième partie de ce traite contient trois chapitres: de signification, de dictionibus indefinitis et de dictionibus definitis. Par le terme „dictiones indefinitae” qui correspond au terme „syncategorematica”, employé plus tard dans la logique médiévale, Abélard désign e cette classe de symbols qui ne peuvent pas — dans leur supposition formelle — assumer le rôle de sujet ni de prédicat dans une proposition catégorique. A cette classe appartiennent les conjonctions et les prépositions — „dictiones habentes incertam significationem”. Contrairement à Boèce et à ses propres idées développées dans la Logica „ingredientibus” refusant à ces locutions toute signification „per se”, de même que le caractère de partie de l’énoncé, Abélard leurs confère dans la Dialectique non seulement le rôle de „consignificare” mais aussi une signification propre malgré qu’incomplète; et il démontre par une analyse de leurs fonctions syntaxiques et sémantiques qu’ils dénotent certaines relations et certaines propriétés relatives.Ces remarques sémiotiques d’Abélard, surtout celles qui concernent les conjonctions, „et”, „si”, „vel” etc., présentent une intéressante contribution aux origines d’une théorie des Operateurs dans la logique du Moyen Age.

A distinction should be made between:1. Fundamental philosophy, covering epistemological, logical, and methodological questions as well as basic ontological ones; and 2. metaphysics bent on solving, in the light of fundamental philosophy, the problem of the metaphysical structure of substantive being.The history of philosophy shows that metaphysics has failed so far to present a unique (universally and definitely accepted) solution of its problem; it is subject to internal struggle among contending systems: Plato’s, Aristotle’s, Rusticus the Deacon’s, John of Damascus’, Thomas Aquinas’ (early years), Duns Scotus’, Cajetano’s and Suarez’s. The metaphysics presented here considers itself as a synthesis, or rather as the final stage of the development of metaphysics from Aristotle to Thomas Aquinaś’ mature age, through Rusticus the Deacon.Such substantive beings as man, animal or plant are „enlarged” substantive beings, consisting of a soul, substantive being stricto sensu, complemented into an „enlarged” substantive being by a body, collection of material, substantive beings, formed by the soul into an organism appropriate to it, and united by virtue of the soul’s substantiveness into the sphere of that same substantiveness. The souls are „entia alteri incommunicabilia”, they cannot be incorporated into the frame of any alien substantiveness. The material substantive beings are „entia alteri communicabilia”; as such they can be incorporated into the frame of the substantiveness of non-material substantive beings.The metaphysical structure of substantive beings stricto sensu and that of both material substantive beings and uncorporeal substantive beings, parallel to the former, is as follows:The substantive being stricto sensu, qua being limited in perfection, compound, n,on-unique, contingent, subject to change — in the light of the theory of act and potency consists of:1. act — esse, forma, suprastantia, natura;2. potency — suppositum, first stuff, substantia, subsistentia. Both esse and actual insubstantive being, but „in alio”, i. e. „supra alium”. Suppositum is an. insubstantive potential being, but „in se” and „sub alio”. The esse of a substantive being sensu stricto consists of a fundamental, permanent esse, and of a superficial, functional esse. In the souls, the fundamental esse is an assembly composed of active and passive faculties; from the potentialities of the passive faculties arises the functional esse, the assembly of the acts of the faculties. In material substantive beings the fundamental esse is extension, magnitude, quality, etc; the functional esse is the „forces” of the material being. The suppositum (first stuff, substantia, subsistentia) is the ontological keystone of substantive being, uniting diversely composed esse (forma, suprastantia, natura) in one substantive individuum (unum et aliquid substantivum); it is, at the same time, the element individuating the substantive being in the given one substantive individuum.In the light of the theory of act and potency (potentia cognoscitur per actum sibi correspondentem) should be distinguished, parallel to multiform esse’s (forma, suprastantia, natura), multiform suppositum (first stuff, substantia, subsistentia) — namely spiritual, sensitive, vegetative, material ones. Material suppositum (material first stuff, material substantia, material subsistentia) is prime matter.The system of substantive beings is a scale with analogous rungs: „ens alteri communicabile materiale”, „ens alteri incommunicabile vegetativum” — vegetable individual, „ens alteri incommunicabile sensitivum” — animal individual, and „ens alteri incommunicabile, sui compos et sui iuris”, rational, free, immortal rational individuum — person. Rational suppositum (first stuff, substantia, subsistentia) is the element constituting a person.

Les mss IV F 8 et IV Q 26 de la Bibliothèque de L’Univ. de Wrocław contiennent des commentaires identiques sur les oeuvres d’Aristote, que le ms IV F 8 attribue au maître parisien Jean le Damoisiau (Auctarium Chart., t. III, année 1482, coli. 491—492). Le texte des commentaires contenus dans le ms IV F 8 fut écrit par une seule main, à savoir celle de Nicolas de Cumeres. Une analyse plus détaillée des colophons nous fait voir que les noms de Jean le Damoisiau et Louis Mares furent inscrits par une main différente de celle de Nicolas de Cumeres (probablem ent la main de Louis Mares) à la place des mots grattes (cf. ff. 138, 263, 302). Le grattage a été malheureusement si bien fait qu’on n’a pu déchiffrer sur le f. 302, à l’aide de la lampe de Wood, sous le nom de Louis Mares, que le nom gratté de Nicolas de Cumeres. II est possible que Jean le Damoisiau ait professé ces cours sur Aristote, mais il nous semble que le maître dont le nom fut gratté a ete l’auteur des commentaires en question. Nous esperons qu’ il sera possible, peut-être, de trouver d’autres copies de ces commentaires, ce qui permettrait de résoudre la difficulté. Ajoutons que deux influences sollicitent surtout l’enseignement présenté par nos commentaires, celle de Duns Scot et celle de Buridan.

Almost all the commentaries of Porphyrius’ Isagoge, written in the University of Cracow during the first three quarters of the fifteenth c. to serve as a basis for lectures and disputes on the universals, argue with and reject Wycliffe’s theory. His ideas could hardly find any supporters there so long as Buridanian terminism prevailed. In the last quarter of the century, when the influence of Buridan lessened, the Wycliffite theory of the universals still remained scarcely mentioned by the Polish commentators of the Isagoge.

It is generally known that Buddhist philosophy does not admit the substantiality of empirical things: both the physical and psychical things are ultimately composed of fleeting elements (dharma). This doctrine is already contained in the earlier Buddhist canon, the pdli canon, and is put in the mouth of the Buddha himself.In this article we are concerned with the nonsubstantiality of the soul. Is the nonsubstantiality of the soul really the teaching of the Buddha himself, or is it perhaps a later evolution of his doctrine?The orthodox Buddhist standpoint is that the nonsubstantiality of the soul is the teaching of the Buddha himself. The Western scholars generally maintain the same traditional standpoint.Between the two World Wars a different opinion was put forward, the representative of which in Poland was the well known scholar, Stanisław Schayer: the Buddha himself taught the substantiality of the soul; nonsubstantiality of the latter is a later evolution of his doctrine, accomplished (for „soteriological” reasons) by Ceylonese monks, and imputed to the Buddha in the pali canon. This opinion is somewhat boldly expressed by St. Schayer in the collective work Religie Wschodu. However, this critical theory and its arguments are not generally accepted.Author’s conclusion is as follows: Although this critical theory is not generally accepted, its representative, St. Schayer, est benigne interpretandus; from this theory we should learn not to be too naive in respect to the päli canon or to the mahäyänasütra: we should keep reserve as to the question what the teaching of the Buddha himself is,., and rather talk of the teaching of hinaydna and mahdydna buddhism on the basis of their respective sources.

The paper discusses the notions of Matter and Form in their relation to the idea of science. Particular regard is given to the conceptions of Aristotle, Descartes Kant and Husserl which appear as cruxes in the evolution of the above notions.

Qu’entend Henri de Gand par infinité de Dieu? L’analyse des textes y relatifs dans sa Summa permet d’affirmer que, selon le Philosophe, l’esprit de l’homme parvient, à l’aide d’actes par lesquels il nie et écarte de Dieu toute imperfection et limitation, à une conception négative de l’infinité pour désigner l’absolue aséité de Dieu. Pour cette raison l'on peut dire que le concept négatif d’infinité, comme du reste tout concepte négatif, possède un sens positif puisqu’il remplit la fonction de signe désignant l’absolue aséité de Dieu. Cette aseite absolue n’est pas infinie en soi; eile a été seulement conçue par l’esprit humain et désignée à l’aide du concepte négatif d’infinité.

Bosseli voulait renouveler la philosophie chrétienne en s’appuyant sur l'autorité et la doctrine d’Hermès Trismégistes; à cet effet il écrivit le plus vaste des commentaires connus des écrits hermétiques. Partant de l'analyse des idées sur le monde matériel contenues dans le Commentaire, l'articie s’efforce de présenter la manière dont le philosophe entendait réaliser son programme.Rosseli s’appuie surtout sur les passages de tendance optimiste dans les écrits hermétiques. Son Commentaire accepte la thèse fon dam ent ale de cette tendance au sujet du monde: le monde est un, bon, beau; il y règne une entière harmonie. Cependant les fondements métaphysiques étayant la thèse ci-dessus apparaissent radicalement changés: le monde n’est pas tel parce au’il est Dieu lui-même ou parce qu’il fait partie de Dieu mais parce que chaque être a été directement crée et est sans cesse maintenu dans l’existence par le Bien, le Beau, l’Unité et la Sagesse mêmes. Ce changement a été rendu possible par l’utilisation de diverses doctrines chrétiennes dans l'interprétation des écrits hermétiques. Rosseli, comme St. Bonaventure, conçoit le monde comme une voie menant vers Dieu. II subordonne cependant cette conception du monde à celle de la pia philosophia, forme revêtue par la gnose durant la Renaissance. C’est de Marsilio Ficino que Rosseli a emprunté l’idée de prisca theologia (tenant Hermès pour le premier d’entre les prisci theologi) avec celle, complémentaire, de pia philosophia sans pourtant confondre celle-ci avec la doctrine de Platon et des néo-platoniciens. Les leitmotive de sa doctrine sont la communis opinio et la connaissance intellectuelle de la Sagesse par la connaissance de l’harmonie dans le monde.