RESUMEN: Este artículo argumenta a favor de la necesidad de mantener una distinción nítida entre ciencia y técnica en contra de ciertas tendencias interpretativas y socio-institucionales dominantes en algunos círculos de filósofos y sociólogos. Se presentan dos argumentos: el primero insiste en la conveniencia analitíca de describir direrencìadamente las actividades científicas y tecnológicas a partir de las nociones de "acto epistémico" y "acto material"; el segundo descubre en las reglas constitutivas de la aceptabilidad de resultados científicos y técnicos respectivamente un modo de distinguir socio-institucionalmente ambas esferas de producción de conocimiento.ABSTRACT: This paper argues for the need to maintain a clear distinction between science and technology against some well-known interpretative tendencies within some dominant circles of philosophers and sociologists. Two arguments are presented: the first one insists on the analytical convenience to describe differently the scientific and the technological activities by introducing the notions of "epistemic act" and "material act"; the second one discovers in the constitutiverules for the acceptability of scientific and technological results a way to distinguish socioinstitutionally both spheres of knowledge production.

Se presenta un esquema ontológico en el que el par relacional/atómico desempeña un papel central. La noción basica, la que se define en terminos positivos, es la de “relacionalidad”. La atomicidad es definida negativamente, como no-relacionalidad. En realidad, se distinguen diversas nociones positivas, emparentadas entre sí, que pueden verse como diferentes formas de relacionalidad a las que corresponden diferentes formas de atomicidad (o no-relacionalidad). A continuación, ese instrumental ontológico se aplica al planteamiento de dos cuestiones semánticas: se trata brevemente la cuestión deI individualismo y, más en detalle, la cuestión deI holismo semántico.An ontological framework is presented in which the relational/atomic pair plays a central role. The basic notion, which is defined in positive terms, is that of “relationality”. “Atomicity” is negatively defined as non-relationality. More exactly, we distinguish between several related positive notions that can be seen as different kinds of relationality. Correspondingly, we distinguish between several kinds of atomicity (or nonrelationality). Then, the ontological tools are applied to two semantic issues: we briefly deal with the individualism issue and in more detail with the issue of semantic holism.

Brahe creía que su teoría sobre los cometas refutaba el copernicanismo. Analizamos el argumento y mostramos que ningún sistema existente podía acomodarlos. Tras el decreto anticopernicano de 1616, muchos jesuitas que rechazaban a Ptolomeo e incluso coqueteaban con Copérnico se vieron obligados a abrazar el sistema de Brahe. La discusión de los cometas de 1618 permitía a los jesuitas reforzar a Brahe en un momento en que Galileo no podía defender el copernicanismo. La disputa de los cometas se examina bajo esta luz y se conjetura la orientación pro-Brahe de las censuras del Diálogo de Galileo.It was Brahe’s belief that the motion of comets refuted Copernicus’ system and complied with his own. His argument is analyzed to show that neither could explain their motion. After the anti-copernican decree of1616 quite a few Jesuits that rejected Ptolemy and even courted Copernicus were bound to accept Brahe’s system. The appearance of comets in 1618 allowed the Jesuits to describe them and support Brahe, while Galileo could not treat them in copernican terms. So he crossed them off. The comets war is seen under this light and the pro-Brahe bias in the censorship of the Dialogo is strongly conjectured.

EI análisis de algunos programas lógicos y de algunos problemas ya tradicionales de la teoría de la computabilidad -como el problema de la correspondencia de Post-, permiten mostrar algunas claves para argumentar acerca de la posibilidad o imposibilidad de un ordenador omnisciente. Los programas logicos inductivos y alguno de sus resultados más prometedores, como Golem, sirven para valorar la posibilidad de un ordenador corno ayudante cualificado en la tarea de hacer ciencia. Ambas discusiones dan paso a una reflexión final sobre el mecanicismo.The analysis ofsome logical programs and some traditional topics from the computability theory -as the Post Correspondence Problem-, enables us to illustrate some key points for discussing the possibility ofa computer as an omniscient entity. Inductive logical programs and some oftheir most promising representatives, such as Golem, are showed useful for evaluating the possibility ofa computer as a qualified support ofscientific activity. Both topics give rise to a concluding discussion around mechanism.

Este trabajo tiene por objetivo examinar la idea de deducción metamatemática en el programa de Hilbert, mostrando su dependencia de conceptos gnoseológicos, tales como el de conocimiento intuitivo. También se comparará esta concepcion de la deducción con la fundamentación intuicionista de la logica. Sostendré que esta deducción metamatemática lleva a una caracterización de la logica como una teoría de las deducciones formales en un sentido particular.This paper aims to examine the idea of metamathematical deduction in Hilbert’s program showing its dependence of epistemological notions, such as intuitive knowledge. This conception of deduction will be also compared with the intuitionistic foundation of logic. I will argue that this metamathematical deduction leads to a characterization of logic as a theory of formal deductions in a particular sense.

Este trabajo se encuadra dentro de una nueva visión de la lógica de Leibniz, la cual pretende mostrar que sus escritos fueron ricos no solamente en proyectos ambiciosos (Característica Universal, Combinatoria, Mathesis) sino también en desarrollos lógico-matematicos concretos. Se demuestra que su “Caracteristica Numerica” que asigna pares de números a las proposiciones categóricas es una semántiea para la cual la silogística aristotélica es correcta y completa, y que el sistema algebraico presentado en Fundamentos de un Cálculo Lógico es una lógica algebraica similar a la de Boole.This work is a contribution to a new view of Leibniz’s logic, pretending to show that his writings were not only rich in projects (Characteristica, Combinatoria, Mathesis), but also in concrete logico-mathematical developments. We prove that his “Numerical Characteristic” assigning pairs of numbers to terms of categorical propositions, is a complete and correct semantics for aristotelian syllogistic, and the algebraic system presented in Fundamentals of Logical Calculus is essentially a complete version of boolean algebraic logic.

EI desarrollo de su teoría de las leyes como relaciones entre universales condujo a Armstrong a establecer un marco metafísico general mas complejo que el que sus anteriores trabajos presentaban. En este artículo se exponen los aspectos principales de la metafísica de particulares y universales exigida por la identificación original de Armstrong de las leyes con estados de cosas universales. Además, se presentan diversas dificultades que pueden hallarse en su propuesta, y algunas soluciones para las mismas. Los temas principales que se discuten son las leyes con excepciones, las leyes con restriccionesespacio-temporales, las leyes probabilísticas y las leyes no ejemplificadas.The development of his theory of laws as relations between universals led Armstrong to set up a more complex general metaphysical framework than that advanced in his previous works. In this paper I present the main traits of the metaphysics of properties and particulars required by Armstrongsoriginal identification of laws with universal states of affairs. Besides, I advance some serious drawbacks that can be found in his proposal and I also offer some solutions to them. The main subjects to be discussed here will be laws with exceptions, laws with spatio-temporal limitations, probabilistic laws and uninstantiated laws.

The starting point of this work is the existence of historical paradoxes in the set theory. These are: Russell's paradox, applied to the set W, Cantor's, for the set U, and Burali-Forti's, of the set Omega. A systematic analysis aimed at the simplification and the refining of such paradoxes showed that: (i) there exist at least eight contradictory expressions instead of three; (ii) another contradictory set is suggested by an extension of Burali-Forti's paradox; (iii) almost all of the contradictions apply to more than one paradoxical set.

Belnap and Gupta have recently maintained that truth is a circular concept: its extension cannot be established without being previously hypothesized. This has led Yaqub to claim that the circular character in question cannot be made compatible with the thesis that semantic properties tlre supervenient ones. Belnap and Gupta have explicitly denied sitch a claim any plausibility. In this paper, I offir some new arguments in support of Yaqub 's position. Such arguments are based on an analysis of some aspects of Belnap and Gupta's theory that, as for as I know, had not been considered before.

This paper contains two sections. In the first one, some ideas on human mind Dennett presents in his book Consciousness Explained are sketched. In the second section, a critical review is made on Dennett's Multiple Drafts Theory. It is concluded that some of its proposals do not find enough experimental support from research on Cognitive Neuroscience. Even though there is no cardinal point in the brain, both functional and anatomical criteria can be found to distinguish conscious and unconscious information processing in the human brain

This paper presents a critical evaluation of different opinions about determinism in Classical Mechanics. The goal of this analysis is to show that, even in the supposedly non controversial field of Classical Mechanics, the answer about determinism is not univocally fixed by scientific arguments, but inescapably depends on the epistemological perspective fom which the problem is formulated.

The notion of stimulus meaning, a key notion for Quine's Indeterminacy of Translation thesis, has undergone an essentiaJ change fi'om the beginning of the nineties. Then, this essay offers an expository work oj this change (its origin and motivations) and its final result. Th~ main aim of this essay is to show the validity of the reasons that forced Quine to modify his stimulus meaning notion and the failure of its substitutes (global stimulus, stimulus range, and perceptual similarity) to solue the problems they were thought to give an account of. Moreover, these new notions make the Indeterminacy Thesis, mainly the Inscrutability of Reference Thesis, face new problems and, if I'm right, unsolvable ones.

A prevailing assumption in contemporary epistemology is that there exists a conceptual connection between the notions of belief and rationality. In this paper I examine a weak notion of rationality, according to which it is not necessary to assume the existence of a uniquc set of norms of rationality in order to be able to assign beliefi to a subject. From this point of view, belief attribution only requires that we understand a subject's utterances and, to do this, we only need assume that she is similar to us in some epistemic relevant issues.

Peacocke's explanation of the first-person concept provides non-circu/ar possession conditions for such a concept, accommodating two different constraints: the noncircularity requirement and Evans's Thesis. In this paper, it is argued that Peacocke's explanation faces some difficulties: on the one hand, it appears unable to meet a serious objection facing the non-circularity requirement; on the other hand, it misunderstands the constitutive constraints imposed by Evans's Thesis on a correct account of the first person.

Debate among scientists is frequently hampered by intense difficulties in communicating and translating their viewpoints. This well-known fact illustrates the role of unarticulated core knowledge in the activities of sientific communities. But it has been little noticed that the issue afficts not just written science, but especially traditions of experimental activity and their products, including instruments and techniques. The question is addressed on the basis of examples from the history of optics and electromagnetism - Fresnel and Brewster, Maxwell and Hertz - and texts from Kuhn's Structure. Particular attention is paid to interrelations between succeeding theories, and to the notorious problem of theory-choice.

We study twentieth-century biological sciences as experimental sciences by historically reconstructing the uses of experiments. Concepts like artificial, natural, and inventions, are handled so as to show how much current biological thought has been constructed on the basis of the invention of different kinds of experiments, instruments, and technical devices, experimental systems, and ideas concerning the fonctioning of nature. It is suggested that the frontier that may separate the natural from the artificial has already been crossed. Human intervention in the natural phenomena through reproducible experiments hints to a view of current biological knowledge as a permanent invention of nature.